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Časopis CIVITAS je od 2021. godine kategorizovan od strane Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja kao vrhunski nacionalni časopis kategorije **M51**. U proteklom periodu časopis je indeksiran u Evropskom referentnom indeksu za društvene i humanističke nauke ERIH PLUS a uključen je i u Kinesku naučnu infrastrukturu – CNKI, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, Indijsku mrežu razmene časopisa – J-Gate i *online* biblioteku centralne i istočne Evrope – CEEOL.

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Do sledećeg broja,

Prof. dr Vladimir Njegomir

U Novom Sadu, 28. decembar 2021. godine

Editor's Foreword

Dear Readers, Colleagues, and Authors,

Welcome to the second issue of the CIVITAS Journal for 2021.

Since 2011, the journal has published articles focusing on various current trends and topics related to law, security, psychology, philology, and economics, as well as interdisciplinary research involving the above fields.

In 2021, the journal was awarded the M51 ranking by the Serbian Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, and classified as a leading national journal.

The journal has been indexed in the ERIH PLUS academic journal index for the HSS (Humanities and Social Sciences) society in Europe, in CNKI (China National Knowledge Infrastructure), Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, J-Gate (Indian database for e-journal literature), and CEEOL (Central and Eastern Europe Online Library).

The articles accepted for publication deal with a variety of issues related to social sciences and humanities.

The current issue focuses on a wide range of interesting topics such as the proclivity towards infidelity, effects of perceived social support on loneliness, impact of the pandemic on economy, Business English competence among the staff in foreign-owned businesses, ecocriticism and eco-dystopia, correlation between social motivation and emotional competence, traditional and modern models of police work, Russian foreign policies, and the statute of limitations for damages claims in Serbian law.

The information about the journal, instructions for authors and reviewers, editorial board members, and reviewers' names and affiliations are available at the journal website in Serbian and English.

The articles may be submitted via the journal website <http://civitas.rs/index.php/prijava-rada> or via email to redakcija@civitas.rs

Our sincere gratitude goes to all the authors for the high standard of the articles that follow.

We hope the current issue will stimulate further research and invite all interested researchers to submit their articles for publication in CIVITAS.

Until the next issue,

Prof. dr Vladimir Njegomir

Novi Sad, 28 December 2021

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ZAŠTO LJUDI ČINE PRELJUBU – ‘NIŠTA LIČNO’ ILI ‘VRLO LIČNO’: MAKIJAVELIZAM I SUPKLINIČKI SADIZAM KAO PREDIKTORI PRELJUBE

APSTRAKT: Nezavisno od neposrednog motiva, preljuba podrazumeva ponašanje kojim se nanose patnja i bol bliskim osobama radi postizanja sopstvenog zadovoljstva. Naš cilj je bio utvrditi da li su makijavelizam (preljuba kao konativni stil ili ‘ništa lično’) i supklinički sadizam (preljuba upravo s namerom da se povredi ili ‘vrlo lično’) značajni prediktori preljube. Podaci prikupljeni testiranjem 111 žena i 48 muškaraca pokazuju da je osnovni prediktor preljube antagonistička struktura ličnosti makijavelista i instrumentalnost. Regresionim modelom, supklinički sadizam gubi inkrementalnu prediktivnu validnost, što implicira zaključak da je preljuba u sklopu ponašanja ‘ništa lično’, pre nego ‘vrlo lično’. Nisu utvrđene statistički značajne polne razlike u sklonosti ka preljubi.

KLJUČNE REČI: preljuba, makijavelizam, supklinički sadizam

Uvod

U većini ljudskih zajednica romantične veze podrazumevaju emocionalnu, kognitivnu i seksualnu privrženost između dve osobe. Ovaj dijadni odnos zasnovan je na načelu ‘ekskluzivnosti’, čime se obez-

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beđuje stabilnost same veze, kao i lični razvoj svakog partnera i njihovog potomstva (Brewer & Abell, 2015). Samim tim, uključivanje 'treće osobe' znači gubitak ekskluzivnosti i određuje se kao sklonost ka prevari, preljuba, ili neverstvo u romantičnim vezama (Fincham & May, 2017). Preljubu čini seksualni i/ili emocionalni odnos s trećom osobom, ostvaren direktnim kontaktom ili indirektno putem elektronskih medija (SMS, četovanje i slično; Zare, 2011). Iako ne mora nužno dovesti do formalnog prekida odnosa, ili prekida veze, svakako uzrokuje trajne afektivne posledice kod partnera koji je prevaren, kao i kod potomstva (Gordon, Baucum, & Snyder, 2004). Prevara kao doživljaj lične izdaje, izaziva snažna osećanja negativnog afekta, nepoverenja, razočaranja, ali i ljutnje, besa, ljubomore, koje mogu ishodovati strukturiranjem mentalnog poremećaja (Shackelford, LeBlanc, & Drass, 2000; 2005), ubistvom ili samoubistvom.

Paradoks fenomena prevare ogleda se u tome što ljudi istovremeno teže ka monogamnim zajednicama, ali i vezama izvan te zajednice, i to uprkos tome što znaju da na taj način povređuju svog partnera. Očigledna društvena hipokrizija, izražena kao nepodudarnost između stava ljudi prema prevari i stvarnog ponašanja u vezama, potvrđena je u mnogim istraživanjima. Na primer, 90% američkih građana smatra da je prevara nedopustiva, 95% očekuje vernost od partnera, 65% neverstvo definiše kao amoralno, a istovremeno se 20–25% brakova svake godine završi razvodom zbog neverstva (Fincham & May, 2017). Takođe, utvrđeno je da oni koji su skloni prevari, to ponašanje ponavljaju (Brewer & Abell, 2015). Studije (Thompson & O'Sullivan, 2016) pokazuju da su različiti motivi prevare, a zavise i od polne pripadnosti: žene (15,5% prevarilo je bar jednom) navode nezadovoljstvo u vezi, obezbeđivanje socijalnog statusa, a muškarci traženje senzacija i redukciju stresa (23,4% prevarilo je bar jednom). Nezavisno od motiva, zajedničke odlike prevare jesu egocentričnost, odsustvo poštovanja i empatije prema drugoj osobi – bezobzirnost, često i nezavisnost od osećanja krivice (Smith, 2006). Ako imamo u vidu da antagonistički sklop ličnosti (narcizam, makijavelizam i psihopatija, ili mračna trijada; Paulhus & Williams, 2002) podrazumeva socijalno averzivno, bezdušno, egocentrično, manipulativno i koristoljubivo ponašanje, razumljivo je što su individualne razlike u sklonosti ka prevari dovođene u vezu s osobinama ove strukture ličnosti.

Istraživanja su pokazala da je visok skor na mračnoj trijadi pozitivan prediktor sklonosti ka prevari – obmani i zloupotrebi poverenja partnera (Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Jones & Paulhus, 2017). Supklinička psihopatija, kao jezgro bezdušnosti, obezbeđuje motiv prevare koji podrazumeva stav ‘ništa lično’ i promiskuitet u sastavu impulsivnosti kao konativni stil (Faktor 2 psihopatije; Hare, 1991; Jonason, Li, & Buss, 2010). Visok narcizam podrazumeva promenu partnera u cilju održanja visoke slike o sebi, traženje rizičnih senzacija i obezbeđuje motiv prevare kroz ‘privilegovano pravo’ (Paulhus, 2010).

Međutim, posebnu pažnju istraživača u domenu istraživanja nomološke mreže prevare, privlači makijavelizam. Naime, za razliku od ostale dve osobine mračne trijade, makijavelizam nikada nije bio klinička kategorija, i neretko se doživljava kao socijalno prihvatljivo ili čak poželjno ponašanje. Christie i Geis (1970; 2013) određuju makijavelizam kao heterogenu crtu ličnosti koja podrazumeva hostilno viđenje ljudske prirode, čime se opravdava korišćenje negativnih interpersonalnih taktika. Za razliku od psihopata, makijavelisti ne čine prevaru impulsivno, a za razliku od narcisa, oni izbegavaju traženje senzacija, a time i rizik da budu ‘uhvaćeni’ (Jones & Paulhus, 2009). Odsustvo afekta ih čini dodatno zloćudnim – bezobzirnim. Gratifikacija koju dobijaju angažovanjem u prevari u skladu je s njihovom eksploatatorskom prirodom, koja smatra da su drugi ljudi samo sredstvo za postizanje cilja (Brewer & Abell, 2015), ili da ‘cilj opravdava sredstvo’. Meston & Buss (2007) ukazuju na to da je manipulativnost značajna prediktorska crta nevernog ponašanja. Žene s povišenim makijavelizmom ostaju u romantičnoj vezi uprkos prevari, ali su, isto tako, one sklonije da se upuste u neverstvo nego muškarci s jednako izraženim makijavelizmom (Jones & Paulhus, 2010). Dakle, motivi makijavelista za prevaru očekivano se vezuju za proračunatost i manipulaciju, što donosi bar dva nivoa gratifikacije: neposredni je telesno (emocionalno) zadovoljstvo, a posredni, ali suštinski, jeste potvrda sopstvene umešnosti i nadmoći (kognitivno-emocionalno).

‘Prevara iz računice’, uz nalaz da je neverstvo kontinuirano ponašanje (Brewer & Abell, 2015), govori o bezobzirnosti preljube. Bezobzirnost je delom makijavelistička osobina jer se vezuje za odsustvo afekta prema drugima – afekat je okrenut isključivo ka sebi. Međutim, ona

je istovremeno i spremnost da se nanosi patnja drugim ljudima radi postizanja ličnog zadovoljstva, što se definiše kao sadizam (Buckels, Jones, & Paulhus, 2013). Kao što istraživanja nedvosmisleno pokazuju, ljudi varaju uprkos tome što time povređuju svog partnera, a ponekad baš zbog toga. Za razliku od kliničkog sadizma, supklinički (svakodnevni) sadizam (Buckels, 2018) jeste crta ličnosti koju ispoljavamo svakodnevno, kada nepoželjna ponašanja, stavove i emocije kamufliramo prigodnim racionalizacijama, poput 'činjenja zla u ime dobra'. Prepoznaje se kroz predominaciju kontradikornog ili paradoksalnog afektivnog odgovora, direktno ili indirektno. Direktno – kada se radujemo tuđoj nesreći, što je poznato kao disonantna empatija (na primer, drago nam je kada nekoga stigne 'zaslužena kazna'). Indirektno – kada uživamo u gledanju scena u kojima se nekom nanose bol ili poniženje (scene nasilja u filmovima i boks mečevima, ili ljudskog poniženja u rijaliti programima). Istraživanja su pokazala da je supklinički sadizam značajno povezan s makijavelizmom i psihopatijom (Dinić, Sadiković, & Wertag, 2020) i danas se smatra delom mračne konstelacije crta (mračna tetrađa).

Koliko je nama poznato, do sada nije istraživana povezanost između makijavelizma, supkliničkog sadizma i sklonosti ka prevari. Cilj našeg rada bio je da se utvrdi da li su makijavelizam i supklinički sadizam značajni prediktori preljube. Na taj način, ispitivali smo moguću dvostruku prirodu motivacije preljube. Prvo, da li je sklonost ka preljubi određena makijavelističkim, antagonističkim karakterom, pa se neverstvo čini planirano i iz koristoljublja. Ovaj vid neverstva je afektivno fokusiran isključivo na počinioca, jer je sopstveno zadovoljstvo nezavisno od toga kako se drugi oseća (uprkos tome što drugi pati). Time se ovaj vid neverstva definiše kao ponašanje 'ništa lično'. Drugo, da li je i koliko preljuba 'vrlo lično' (afektivno) motivisana, jer se čini primarno zbog toga da bi se uživalo u patnji druge osobe (ne uprkos, nego baš zbog toga). Takođe, istraživali smo i da li postoje statistički značajne polne razlike prema osobinama makijavelizma, supkliničkog sadizma i sklonosti ka preljubi. Našim istraživanjem proveravali smo da li:

H1) postoji statistički značajna povezanost između makijavelizma, supkliničkog sadizma i sklonosti ka prevari;

H2) postoje statistički značajne polne razlike prema svim merenim varijablama.

2. Metod

2.1. Uzorak ispitanika

Testirano je 159 punoletnih osoba iz Novog Sada i Apatina, starosti od 18 do 53 godine ($M = 24,99$, $SD = 7,94$) od čega je 111 žena i 48 muškaraca. Podaci su prikupljeni delimično onlajn (engl. *on-line*) – 72 ispitanika, korišćenjem društvenih mreža, a delom metodom papir i olovka (87 studenata Fakulteta za pravne i poslovne studije dr Lazar Vrkatić iz Novog Sada). Istraživanje je obavljeno u periodu od maja do jula 2020. godine, uz poštovanje standardne testovne procedure.

2.2. Instrumenti

Za merenje sklonosti ka preljubi korišćena je Skala sklonosti ka preljubi ITIS (Intentions Towards Infidelity Scale; Jones, Olderbak, & Figueredo, 2011), koja je za potrebe istraživanja prevedena s engleskog na srpski jezik. Skala se sastoji se od sedam stavki, u Likert formi petostepenog izbora odgovora. Pitanja obuhvataju procenu neverstva u ranijim, sadašnjim i budućim romantičnim vezama.

Za merenje crte makijavelizma, primenjena je skraćena forma Petofaktorskog inventara makijavelizma FFMI 52 (Five Factor Machiavellianism Inventory; Collison, Vize, Miller, & Lynam, 2018), koji je za potrebe istraživanja preveden s engleskog na srpski jezik. Sastoji se od 52 stavke u Likert formi petostepenog izbora odgovora. Ukupnim skorom upitnik meri izraženost makijavelizma i kroz tri dimenzije meri osobine makijavelizma: antagonizam, planiranje i instrumentalnost.

Supklinički ili svakodnevni sadizam meren je Skalom sadizma SSIS (Short Sadistic Impulse Scale; O'Meara, Davies, & Hammond, 2011) koja je za potrebe istraživanja prevedena s engleskog na srpski jezik. Sastoji se od deset stavki u Likertovoj formi petostepenog izbora odgovora. Indirektni i direktni sadizam mereni su primenom Skale raznovrsnosti sadističkih tendencija VAST (Varieties of Sadistic Tendencies; Paulhus, & Jones, 2015), koja je za potrebe istraživanja takođe prevedena s engleskog jezika. Obuhvata šesnaest stavki od kojih osam meri direktni sadizam, a osam indirektni sadizam.

2.3. Statistička obrada

Za proces obrade podataka korišćen je statistički paket SPSS20.0. Metode korišćene za analizu podataka jesu deskriptivna statistička analiza, Pirsonov bivarijatni korelacioni metod, višestruka regresiona analiza i Studentov t-test za nezavisne uzorke. Pouzdanost primenjenih upitnika merena je Kronbahovim alfa koeficijentom.

3. Rezultati

3.1. Rezultati deskriptivne statistike, bivarijatnih korelacija i pouzdanosti upitnika

Svi primenjeni upitnici imaju zadovoljavajuću pouzdanost, osim skala Svakodnevni sadizam, Indirektni sadizam i supskale makijavelizma – Planiranje (koja ima najmanji broj stavki), čija je pouzdanost upitna.

Prema pokazateljima deskriptivne statistike, ispitanici su najmanje vrednovali direktni sadizam. S druge strane, sebe vide i prikazuju kao osobe koje su preduzimljive i sklone planiranju. Ispodprosečno su skloni prevari u romantičnim odnosima, i umereno su makijavelisti.

Korelaciona analiza pokazuje da su sve tri varijable, merene ukupnim skorom, statistički značajno pozitivno povezane, pri čemu makijavelizam ima jaču povezanost s preljubom od supkliničkog sadizma. Makijavelistička osobina antagonizam ima najveći stepen povezanosti s preljubom i svim tipovima supkliničkog sadizma. Indirektni sadizam nema značajne povezanosti s prevarom, dok je planiranje negativno povezano i s preljubom i sa supkliničkim sadizmom. Instrumentalnost makijavelizma je povezana samo s preljubom i indirektnim sadizmom (Tabela 1).

Tabela 1. Deskriptivna statistika, bivarijatne korelacije i pouzdanost upitnika

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	α	AS	SD
1.Prevara									.75	1,89	.76
2.Sadizam	.18*								.80	1,59	.44
3.Svako- dnevni	.18*	.28**							.61	1,53	.46
4.Direktni	.20*	.17*	.71**						.78	1,39	.52
5.Indi- rektni	.07	.28**	.52**	.40**					.63	1,98	.66
6.Makije- velizam	.28**	.29**	.28**	.17*	.28**				.84	3,12	.35
7.Antago- nizam	.33**	.51**	.54**	.44**	.30**	.64**			.79	2,64	.56
8.Instru- men- talnost	.19*	.08	.04	-.04	.22**	.83**	.18*		.82	4,23	.64
9.Planir- anje	-.17*	-.22**	-.22**	-.19*	-.14	.21**	-.24**	.13	.50	3,44	.59

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

3.2. Višestruka regresiona analiza

Regresionom analizom dobijen je statistički značajan model koji objašnjava oko 16% varijanse kriterijumske varijable ($R = 0,39$; $R^2 = 0,16$; $F = 4,646$; $p = .001$), pri čemu su značajni prediktori preljube samo osobine makijavelizma, antagonizam i, u nešto slabijoj meri, instrumentalnost. Kao što se može videti u Tabeli 2, nijedna osobina supkliničkog sadizma ne ostvaruje parcijalni uticaj na promene u kriterijumskoj varijabli.

Tabela 2. Pojedinačni doprinosi prediktora prevare

	β	t	p
Svakodnevni sadizam	-.039	-.322	.748
Direktni sadizam	.132	1,224	.223
Indirektni sadizam	-.096	-1,055	.293
Antagonizam	.255	2,746	.007
Instrumentalnost	.190	2,355	.020
Planiranje	-.130	-1,639	.103

3.3. Polne razlike

Muškarci su postigli više skorove na svim merenim osobinama, osim na planiranju, sklonosti prevari i direktnom sadizmu. Muškarci su u statistički značajno većoj meri makijavelisti koje odlikuje osobina instrumentalnost, imaju izražene osobine indirektnog i svakodnevnog sadizma. Žene u statistički značajno većoj meri odlikuje makijavelističko planiranje (Tabela 3).

Tabela 3. Deskriptivna statistika polnih razlika prema merenim varijablama i Studentov t-test

		AS	SD	t	df	p																																																																												
Prevara	muškarci	12,83	5,14	-.58	157	.560																																																																												
	žene	13,37	5,42				Sadizam	muškarci	47,15	10,23	4,24	157	.001	žene	39,13	11,26	Svakodnevni sadizam	muškarci	150,2	3,95	2,65	157	.009	žene	13,17	4,07	Direktni sadizam	muškarci	14,73	4,70	1,25	157	.212	žene	13,61	5,34	Indirektni sadizam	muškarci	17,40	3,87	7,38	157	.001	žene	12,34	4,01	Makijavelizam	muškarci	167,48	15,55	2,32	157	.022	žene	160,23	19,13	Antagonizam	muškarci	52,65	8,49	1,94	157	.054	žene	49,14	11,23	Instrumentalnost	muškarci	88,50	10,97	2,51	157	.013	žene	83,05	13,16	Planiranje	muškarci	26,30	4,44	-2,15	157
Sadizam	muškarci	47,15	10,23	4,24	157	.001																																																																												
	žene	39,13	11,26				Svakodnevni sadizam	muškarci	150,2	3,95	2,65	157	.009	žene	13,17	4,07	Direktni sadizam	muškarci	14,73	4,70	1,25	157	.212	žene	13,61	5,34	Indirektni sadizam	muškarci	17,40	3,87	7,38	157	.001	žene	12,34	4,01	Makijavelizam	muškarci	167,48	15,55	2,32	157	.022	žene	160,23	19,13	Antagonizam	muškarci	52,65	8,49	1,94	157	.054	žene	49,14	11,23	Instrumentalnost	muškarci	88,50	10,97	2,51	157	.013	žene	83,05	13,16	Planiranje	muškarci	26,30	4,44	-2,15	157	.033	žene	28,04	4,74						
Svakodnevni sadizam	muškarci	150,2	3,95	2,65	157	.009																																																																												
	žene	13,17	4,07				Direktni sadizam	muškarci	14,73	4,70	1,25	157	.212	žene	13,61	5,34	Indirektni sadizam	muškarci	17,40	3,87	7,38	157	.001	žene	12,34	4,01	Makijavelizam	muškarci	167,48	15,55	2,32	157	.022	žene	160,23	19,13	Antagonizam	muškarci	52,65	8,49	1,94	157	.054	žene	49,14	11,23	Instrumentalnost	muškarci	88,50	10,97	2,51	157	.013	žene	83,05	13,16	Planiranje	muškarci	26,30	4,44	-2,15	157	.033	žene	28,04	4,74																
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	žene	13,61	5,34				Indirektni sadizam	muškarci	17,40	3,87	7,38	157	.001	žene	12,34	4,01	Makijavelizam	muškarci	167,48	15,55	2,32	157	.022	žene	160,23	19,13	Antagonizam	muškarci	52,65	8,49	1,94	157	.054	žene	49,14	11,23	Instrumentalnost	muškarci	88,50	10,97	2,51	157	.013	žene	83,05	13,16	Planiranje	muškarci	26,30	4,44	-2,15	157	.033	žene	28,04	4,74																										
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Planiranje	muškarci	26,30	4,44	-2,15	157	.033																																																																												
	žene	28,04	4,74																																																																															

4. Diskusija

Uprkos tome što prevara u romantičnim vezama može imati dugoročne lične i porodične negativne posledice, i podrazumeva deklarativno reakciju društvenog neodobravanja, istraživanja pokazuju da

postoji doslednost u tom ponašanju, kao i porast učestalosti (Brewer & Abell, 2015). Prema dostupnim podacima, prevaru podstiču razni socijalni okidači, koji se nadovezuju na specifične strukture ličnosti koje određuju: niska savesnost, niska prijatnost i visoka ekstraverzija (Schmitt, & Shackelford, 2008); kod žena i visok neuroticizam (Whisman, Gordon, & Chatav, 2007), kao i osobine socijalno averzivnog karaktera – narcizam, psihopatija i makijavelizam. Ipak, polje nomološke mreže prediktora prevare još uvek je nedovoljno ispitano. Cilj našeg rada bio je da utvrdimo da li se i u kojoj meri sklonost ka preljubi može pripisati delovanju makijavelističkih osobina ličnosti, odnosno disonantnom afektu koji je glavna odrednica supkliničkog sadizma. Osnovni nalaz istraživanja je da su, kod naših ispitanika koji su skloni preljubi, izražene obe merene osobine, ali da preljubu predviđa makijavelistički antagonizam, pre nego supklinički sadizam. Prema našim rezultatima, oba pola (ne) varaju partnere u istoj meri.

4.1. Makijavelizam i prevara

Makijavelizam pozitivno predviđa sklonost ka prevari, iako nemaju sve makijavelističke osobine jednak prediktivni značaj, niti smer predikcije. Posebno važnu ulogu ima osobina antagonizma, koja predviđa i sklonost ka prevari i supklinički sadizam u svim oblicima. Prema tome, u kontekstu prevare, naši ispitanici se ne rukovode nekim dugoročno postavljenim ciljem, niti korišću koju postižu neverstvom, nego generalnom spremnošću da druge ljude podrede sopstvenom zadovoljstvu. To je saglasno paradigmi da je sposobnost obmane, prevare, laganja i prikriivanja, deo opšteg manipulativnog interpersonalnog stila (Christie, & Geis, 1970; 2013), koji ima karakter ‘ništa lično’. Instrumentalnost dodatno stimuliše prevaru, jer se prevara koristi kao deo trgovine u potrazi za željenim ciljem. Lagodnost u takvom ponašanju omogućava konativni sklop (Jones, 2010). Nasuprot tome, makijavelističko planiranje (proračunatost) protektivni je faktor vernosti u romantičnim vezama. Međutim, ovaj nalaz treba oprezno razmatrati, jer je na našem uzorku utvrđena upitna pouzdanost supskale Planiranje. Moguće je da je jedan od razloga niske pouzdanosti relativno mali broj stavki u odnosu na ostale supskale FFMI. Ipak, imajući u vidu da FFMI ima u celini

visoku pouzdanost, možemo reći da je izraženo planiranje jedina osobina koja značajno razlikuje žene u odnosu na muškarce. U tom smislu, odsustvo dugoročnih kalkulacija predviđa prevaru, što ukazuje na to da je prevara u vezi sa situacionim kontekstom, pa se odvija impulsivno, bez mnogo razmišljanja. Dakle, ukoliko postoji izražena makijavelistička sklonost ka planiranju, onda račun govori u prilog tezi da bi se više izgubilo nego dobilo prevarom partnera ('prevara se ne isplati'). Ovaj nalaz nije u skladu sa ranijim koji pokazuju da su žene sklonije prevari u znatno većoj meri makijavelisti (Jones, & Paulhus, 2010). To je moguće objasniti primenom različitih instrumenata za merenje makijavelizma, polnom strukturom uzorka, nekim kulturološkim specifičnostima, ali i upitnom pouzdanošću ove supskale u našem radu.

4.2. Supklinički sadizam i prevara

Supklinički sadizam, kao i sve njegove osobine izuzev indirektnog sadizma, pozitivno je povezan s preljubom. Međutim, i ovaj nalaz treba razmatrati oprezno, iz tri razloga. Prvo, dobijene korelacije objašnjavaju relativno niske procenete zajedničke varijanse. Drugo, nakon parcijalizacije, gubi se prediktorski efekat osobina sadizma, što ukazuje da je povezanost s preljubom bila posredovana zajedničkom varijansom s osobinama makijavelizma. To znači da je prediktivna moć supkliničkog sadizma zapravo definisana antagonističkom prirodom makijavelizma. Treće, skale indirektnog i svakodnevnog supkliničkog sadizma takođe imaju upitnu pouzdanost. U odnosu na početku postavljeno pitanje – zašto ljudi varaju partnere uprkos tome što znaju da će ih to povrediti? – odgovor bi bio relativno optimističan: izgleda ipak ne zato što uživaju u bolu koji nanose, nego zato što je to deo njihovog konativnog, makijavelističkog sklopa. Bezobzirnost neverstva je ipak neupitna, i podrazumeva ne samo angažovane afektivne resurse (odsustvo adekvatnog i prisustvo kontradiktornog afektiviteta) nego i aktivitet, jer jedino indirektni (vikarijski) sadizam, koji ne podrazumeva direktno učešće osobe, nema značajnu povezanost s prevarom. Odsustvo povezanosti vikarijskog sadizma s planiranjem uz značajnu povezanost s ostalim makijavelističkim osobinama, potvrđuje nalaz da je priroda tog aktiviteta deo opšteg makijavelističkog stila i da može imati instrumentalni karakter.

Kao što je rečeno, supklinički sadizam je zajedno s makijavelizmom, narcizmom i psihopatijom, deo mračne tetrade, što objašnjava povezanost između makijavelizma (posebno antagonizma) i osobina sadizma u ovom radu. Dakle, sklonost ka preljubi je deo konativnog stila antagonističkog karaktera, pa je čin preljube ‘ništa lično’. To je u skladu s ranijim nalazima da je sklonost ka preljubi dosledno ponašanje, ili kolkvijalnom sintagmom da je ‘jednom preljubnik – uvek preljubnik’.

U dostupnoj literaturi nema nalaza o povezanosti supkliničkog sadizma i prevare, ali su rezultati tih studija pokazali da je supklinički sadizam značajno povezan sa seksualnom dominacijom, porodičnim nasiljem, uživanjem u povređivanju partnera tokom seksa, kao i internet ‘trolovanjem’ (engl. *trolling* – pisanje uznemirujućih poruka; Buckels, Trapnell, Andjelovic, & Paulhus, 2019). Stoga je sasvim moguće da ovaj činilac prevare može imati i najteže ishode.

4.3. Polne razlike

Utvrđene su značajne polne razlike prema skoro svim merenim osobinama, osim u odnosu na preljubu i direktni sadizam. Ranija istraživanja polnih razlika u prevari nisu dala dosledne nalaze. Dok neki autori govore o tome da su muškarci i žene jednako skloni prevari (Kellum, 2018), drugi navode da je neverstvo odlika muškaraca (Allen, & Baucom, 2004). Studija koja se bavila pregledom istraživanja o neverstvu (Zare, 2011) saopštava da je na uzrastu od 40 godina, sredinom prošlog veka, 50% oženjenih muškaraca počinilo preljubu i 25% udatih žena, dok je 30 godina kasnije – 60% oženjenih muškaraca počinilo preljubu i 50% udatih žena. Međutim, jedan od problema na koji ukazuju istraživanja varijabli iz domena seksualnosti jeste sklonost ka davanju socijalno poželjnih odgovora. Ukoliko imamo u vidu ranije opisanu hipokriziju stava o neverstvu u romantičnim vezama, onda bi i ovaj naš podatak o jednakim sklonostima možda trebalo uzeti s rezervom. Argument u prilog tome jeste da su polne razlike utvrđene kod skoro svih ostalih varijabli, osim kod direktnog sadizma, koji takođe podrazumeva samoiskaz o eksplicitnoj sadističkoj prirodi.

Gledajući tako, rekli bismo da muškarci svoj ugao gledanja na prevaru definišu kroz makijavelizam koji je u sklopu averzivnog karaktera, ili kroz disonantan afekat (supklinički sadizam) koji može biti i vikarijskog tipa. Izraženiji sadizam nego kod žena ukazuje na veći stepen bezobzirnosti i manje izraženu mogućnost osećanja krivice, ali i veću verovatnoću motiva preljube 'vrlo lično'. Žene, kao što smo ranije rekli, pre su sklone kalkulaciji koja ih čini odanim partneru: one, izgleda, pre varaju situaciono. Značajno niži kapacitet za supklinički sadizam u odnosu na muškarce ukazivao bi na mogućnost naknadnog osećanja krivice. Raniji istraživači su supklinički sadizam, kao primarno odliku muškog pola, objašnjavali karakterističnim reproduktivnim strategijama (Buss, & Shackelford, 1997), ali bi se možda pre moglo govoriti o značajnim polnim razlikama (u korist žena) utvrđenim na osobini emocionalnost, koja konotira osobine rođakog altruizma i neuroticizma (Whisman et al., 2007).

Generalno, izgleda da je preljuba u romantičnim odnosima u sastavu opšteg sklopa antagonističkog karaktera preljubnika. Kao takva, ona je kontinuirana, nije lično usmerena ('ništa lično'), a kombinacija makijavelizma i supkliničkog sadizma objašnjava bezobzirnost prevare. Rezultati ukazuju na vrlo složenu prirodu ovog problema, koji bi trebalo dalje istražiti, posebno zato što može imati visoko rizično dejstvo u oblasti antisocijalnog ponašanja (sklonost ka nasilju u porodici, homi- cid) i mentalnog zdravlja ljudi.

4.4. Ograničenja rada

Prvi tip ograničenja odnosi se na strukturu uzorka, kroz polnu neujednačenost i primenu metoda samoiskaza. Drugi tip ograničenja u vezi je s neujednačenošću uslova ispitivanja: s obzirom na pandemijsku situaciju, deo ispitanika je popunjavao upitnike onlajn, a deo primenom standardnog papir-olovka metoda. Treći tip ograničenja odnosi se na generalnu slabost istraživanja fenomena preljube, a to je visoka verovatnoća davanja socijalno poželjnih odgovora. Konačno, niska pouzdanost supskala sadizma – Indirektni i Svakodnevn i posebno supskale makijavelizma – Planiranje, značajno ograničavaju mogućnost generalizacije podataka. Međutim, smatramo da je uprkos ovim ograničenjima,

istraživanje ukazalo na neke vrlo značajne aspekte složenog fenomena neverstva u romantičnim vezama, koje bi dalje trebalo istražiti, posebno imajući u vidu uticaj preljube na različite forme aberantnog ponašanja ljudi: kako u domenu nasilničkog ponašanja, tako i u domenu opšteg mentalnog zdravlja ljudi.

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WHY PEOPLE COMMIT INFIDELITY? 'NOTHING PERSONAL' OR 'VERY PERSONAL': MACHIAVELLIANISM AND SUBCLINICAL SADISM AS PREDICTORS OF INFIDELITY

ABSTRACT: Apart from the proximate incitement, infidelity implies an intention to inflict harm and suffering to a perpetrator's regular intimate partner for the sake of the perpetrator's own pleasure. The aim of this study was to determine whether Machiavellian deceit (infidelity as a conative style, i.e., 'nothing personal') or subclinical sadism (infidelity with the overt intention to hurt, i.e., 'very personal') is the dominant impetus of infidelity. Our data collected on 111 female and 48 male respondents indicated that Machiavellian antagonism and agency were the best predictors of adulterous behaviour, thus highlighting its 'nothing personal' dimension. No indices of subclinical sadism proved their incremental predictive power in the regression model, thus challenging the 'very personal' approach to the underpinnings of infidelity. In addition, there was no evidence of sex-related differences in proclivity to infidelity.

KEY WORDS: infidelity, Machiavellianism, subclinical sadism

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Introduction

In most human communities, romantic relationships involve emotional, cognitive, and sexual attachment between two people. This dyad relationship is based on the principle of 'exclusivity,' which ensures the stability of the relationship itself and the personal development of each partner and their offspring (Brewer & Abell, 2015). Thus, including a 'third person' signifies a loss of exclusivity and is regarded as a propensity for cheating, adultery, or infidelity in romantic relationships (Fincham, & May, 2017). Adultery is a sexual and/or emotional relationship with such a third person, achieved through direct contact or indirectly through electronic media (SMS, chatting, etc.; Zare, 2011). Although it does not necessarily lead to an official separation or a break-up, it certainly causes lasting effective consequences on the deceived partner and the offspring (Gordon, Baucom, & Snyder, 2004). Cheating, as an experience of personal betrayal, can give rise to intense feelings of negative affect, mistrust, and disappointment, but also anger, rage, and jealousy, which can result in a mental disorder (Shackelford, Le Blanc, & Drass, 2000; 2005), murder, or suicide.

The paradox of the phenomenon of cheating is reflected in the tendency for people to strive for monogamous communities as well as outside connections, despite knowing that by doing so, they are hurting their partner. The apparent social hypocrisy, expressed as a mismatch between people's attitudes towards cheating and actual behaviour in relationships, has been confirmed by many studies. For example, 90% of citizens in America believe that cheating is unacceptable, 95% expect fidelity from their partner, and 65% define infidelity as immoral, while 20-25% of marriages end in divorce each year due to infidelity (Fincham & May, 2017). Also, it has been determined that those who are prone to cheating often repeat this behaviour (Brewer, & Abell, 2015). Studies (Thompson, & O'Sullivan, 2016) show that there are different motives for cheating, depending on gender: women (15.5% have cheated at least once) express, for example, dissatisfaction in their relationships and securing social status, while men indicate seeking sensation and stress reduction (23.4% have cheated at least once). Regardless of the motive, a common characteristic of cheating is egocentrism and a lack of respect

and empathy for the other person - ruthlessness, often an emotional detachment from guilt (Smith, 2006). If we keep in mind that the antagonistic structure of personality (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, or the dark triad; Paulhus, & Williams, 2002) implies socially aversive, heartless, egocentric, manipulative, and selfish behaviour, it is understandable that individual differences in propensity to cheat are in connection with the characteristics of this personality structure.

Research has shown that a high score on the dark triad is a positive predictor of a propensity to cheat – to commit deception and abuse of partner trust (Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Jones, & Paulhus, 2017). Subclinical psychopathy, as the core of heartlessness, provides a motive for cheating that implies a 'nothing personal' attitude and promiscuity in the composition of impulsivity as a conative style. (Factor 2 of psychopathy; Hare, 1991; Jonason, Lee, & Buss, 2010). High narcissism implies changing one's partner in order to maintain a high image of oneself, seeking risky sensations, and providing a motive for cheating through 'privileged law' (Paulhus, 2010).

However, Machiavellianism attracts the special attention of researchers in the field of research of the nomological network of cheating. Namely, unlike the other two features of the dark triad, Machiavellianism has never been a clinical category and is often perceived as socially acceptable or even desirable behaviour. Christie, & Geis (1970; 2013) define Machiavellianism as a heterogeneous personality trait that implies a negative view of human nature, which justifies the use of negative interpersonal tactics. Unlike psychopaths, Machiavellians do not commit cheating impulsively, and unlike narcissists, they avoid seeking sensation and thus the risk of being 'caught' (Jones, & Paulhus, 2009). The absence of effect makes them even more malicious-reckless. The gratification they gain by engaging in cheating is in line with their exploitative nature, which holds that other people are only a means to an end (Brewer, & Abell, 2015), or that 'the end justifies the means.' Meston, & Buss (2007) suggest that manipulateness is a significant predictor of unfaithful behaviour. Women with elevated Machiavellianism may remain in a romantic relationship despite the cheating, but they are also more likely to engage in infidelity than men with equally expressed Machiavellianism (Jones, & Paulhus, 2010). Thus, Machiavellian moti-

ves for cheating are expected to be related to calculation and manipulation, which brings at least two levels of gratification: the immediate level is physical (emotional) pleasure, while at the indirect level, yet also essential here, is the confirmation of one's skill and superiority (cognitive-emotional).

'Calculated fraud,' with the finding that infidelity is a continuous behaviour (Brewer, & Abell, 2015), speaks of the recklessness of adultery. Recklessness is partly a Machiavellian trait because it is associated with the absence of affect towards others; that is, the affect is turned exclusively towards oneself. However, it is also a willingness to inflict suffering on other people in order to achieve personal satisfaction, which is defined as sadism (Buckels, Jones, & Paulhus, 2013). Research unequivocally shows that people cheat despite hurting their partner, though this is sometimes their goal. Unlike clinical sadism, subclinical (every day) sadism (Buckels, 2018) is a personality trait that we express on a daily basis when we camouflage undesirable behaviors, attitudes, and emotions with appropriate rationalizations such as 'doing evil in the name of good.' It is directly or indirectly recognized through the predominance of a contradictory or paradoxical affective response: directly – when we rejoice in someone else's misfortune, which is known as dissonant empathy (for example, we are glad when someone receives a 'deserved punishment'); indirectly – when we enjoy watching scenes in which someone is hurt or humiliated (scenes of violence in movies and boxing matches, or human humiliation in reality shows). Research has shown that subclinical sadism is significantly associated with Machiavellianism and psychopathy (Dinić, Sadiković, & Wertag, 2020) and today is considered part of the dark constellation of traits (dark tetrad).

To the author's knowledge, the connection between Machiavellianism, subclinical sadism, and a tendency towards cheating has not been researched so far. The aim of our study was to determine whether Machiavellianism and subclinical sadism are significant predictors of adultery. In this way, we examined the possible twofold nature of the motivation for adultery. First, whether the tendency towards adultery is determined by the Machiavellian, antagonistic character, so that infidelity seems to be planned out from self-interest. This type of infidelity is affectively focused exclusively on the perpetrator, where his/her pleasure is independent of how others feel (despite others' suffering).

Thus, this type of infidelity is defined as a “nothing personal” behavior. Secondly, whether and how much adultery is ‘very personally’ (affectively) motivated because it seems primary to enjoy another person’s suffering (not in spite of, but precisely because of). We also investigated whether there are statistically significant gender differences according to the characteristics of Machiavellianism, subclinical sadism, and the propensity to commit adultery. Our research examined whether:

H1) There is a statistically significant association between Machiavellianism, subclinical sadism, and the propensity to cheat;

H2) There are statistically significant gender differences according to all measured variables.

2. Method

2.1. *Study of participants*

In Novi Sad and Apatin, a total of 159 participants, aged 18 to 53 ($M = 24.99$, $SD = 7.94$) were tested, of which 111 were women and 48 men. Data were collected partly online (72 participants), using social media, and partly employing paper and pencil surveys (87 students of the Faculty of Law and Business Studies Dr Lazar Vrkatić from Novi Sad). The research was conducted in the period from May to July 2020, in compliance with the standard test procedure.

2.2. *Instruments*

The ITIS or Intentions Towards Infidelity Scale (Jones, Olderbak, & Figueredo, 2011), which was translated from English into Serbian for research purposes, was used to measure the propensity to commit adultery. The scale consisted of 7 items, the answers to which were indicated by participants according to the 5-point Likert scale. The questions were aimed at assessed infidelity in past, present, and future romantic relationships.

To measure the trait of Machiavellianism, an abbreviated form of the Five-Factor Machiavellianism Inventory - FFMI 52 (Five-Factor

Machiavellianism Inventory; Collison, Visas, Miller, & Lynam, 2018) was used, and for research purposes, it was translated from English into Serbian. It consisted of 52 items, the answers to which were indicated by participants according to the 5-point Likert scale. The overall purpose of the questionnaire was to measure the expression of Machiavellianism and the characteristics of Machiavellianism in three dimensions: antagonism, planning, and instrumentality.

Subclinical or everyday sadism was measured by the SSIS or Short Sadistic Impulse Scale (O'Meara, Davies, & Hammond, 2011), which was translated from English into Serbian for research purposes. It consisted of 10 items, the answers to which were indicated by participants according to the 5-point Likert scale. Indirect and direct sadism were measured using the VAEST Variety of Sadistic Tendencies (Paulhus, & Jones, 2015), which was translated from English into Serbian for research purposes. It includes 16 items, of which 8 items measure direct sadism and 8 items indirect sadism.

2.3. Statistical processing

For the data processing process, the statistical package SPSS20.0 was used. The methods used for data analysis are descriptive statistical analysis, Pearson's bivariate correlation method, multiple regression analysis, and the student's t-test for independent samples. The reliability of the applied questionnaires was measured by the Cronbach's alpha coefficient.

3. Results

3.1. Results of the descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and reliability of the questionnaires

All the applied questionnaires exhibited satisfactory reliability, except for the Scale of Everyday Sadism, Indirect Sadism, and the subscale of Machiavellianism Planning (which has the smallest number of items), whose reliability was questionable.

According to the descriptive statistics, respondents rated direct sadism as the least indicated descriptor. On the other hand, they indicated seeing and presenting themselves as enterprising people and people prone to planning. In total, the respondents' results showed a below average tendency to cheating in romantic relationships and a moderate level of Machiavellianism.

Correlation analysis showed that all three variables, measured by the total score, were statistically significantly positively related, with Machiavellianism having a stronger association with adultery than subclinical sadism. The Machiavellian trait of antagonism had the most significant degree of association with adultery and all types of subclinical sadism. Indirect sadism demonstrated no significant association with cheating, while planning was negatively associated with both adultery and subclinical sadism. The instrumentality of Machiavellianism was associated only with adultery and indirect sadism (Table 1).

Table 1 Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and reliability of questionnaires

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	α	AS	SD
1. Cheating									.75	1.89	.76
2. Sadism	.18*								.80	1.59	.44
3. Everyday	.18*	.28**							.61	1.53	.46
4. Direct	.20*	.17*	.71**						.78	1.39	.52
5. Indirect	.07	.28**	.52**	.40**					.63	1.98	.66
6. Machiavellianism	.28**	.29**	.28**	.17*	.28**				.84	3.12	.35
7. Antagonism	.33**	.51**	.54**	.44**	.30**	.64**			.79	2.64	.56
8. Instrumentality	.19*	.08	.04	-.04	.22**	.83**	.18*		.82	4.23	.64
9. Planning	-.17*	-.22**	-.22**	-.19*	-.14	.21**	-.24**	.13	.50	3.44	.59

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

3.2. Multiple regression analysis

The regression analysis yielded a statistically significant model that explained about 16% of the variance of the criterion variable ($R=0.39$; $R^2=0.16$; $F=4.646$; $p=.001$), with significant predictors of adultery being only the features of Machiavellianism, antagonism, and, to a lesser extent, instrumentality. As seen in Table 2, no feature of sub-clinical sadism was found to exhibit a partial effect on changes in the criterion variable.

Table 2 Individual contributions of the cheating predictor

		T	P
Everyday sadism	-.039	-.322	.748
Direct sadism	.132	1.224	.223
Indirect sadism	-.096	-1.055	.293
Antagonism	.255	2.746	.007
Instrumentality	.190	2.355	.020
Planning	-.130	-1.639	.103

3.3. Gender differences

Men scored higher on all the measured traits except for planning, the propensity to cheat, and direct sadism. Men exhibited being statistically significantly more Machiavellian, characterized by the trait of instrumentality; they were also determined to have pronounced traits of indirect and everyday sadism. Women were statistically more characterized by Machiavellian planning (Table 3).

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of gender differences according to the measured variables and the student's t-test

		AS	SD	T	Df	P
Cheating	Men	12.83	5.14	-.58	157	.560
	Women	13.37	5.42			
Sadism	Men	47.15	10.23	4.24	157	.001
	Women	39.13	11.26			
Everyday S	Men	150.2	3.95	2.65	157	.009
	Women	13.17	4.07			
Direct S	Men	14,73	4.70	1.25	157	.212
	Women	13.61	5.34			
Indirect S	Men	17.40	3.87	7.38	157	.001
	Women	12.34	4.01			
Machiavellianism	Men	167.48	15.55	2.32	157	.022
	Women	160.23	19.13			
Antagonism	Men	52.65	8.49	1,94	157	.054
	Women	49.14	11.23			
Instrumentality	Men	88.50	10.97	2.51	157	.013
	Women	83.05	13.16			
Planning	Men	26.30	4.44	-2.15	157	.033
	Women	28.04	4.74			

4. Discussion

Despite the possibility for cheating in romantic relationships to have long-term personal and family negative consequences, and in spite of it implying a declarative reaction of social disapproval, research shows that this behaviour is consistently exhibited, as well as that it is increasing in frequency (Brewer, & Abell, 2015). According to available data, cheating is encouraged by various social triggers, which build on specific determined personality structures: low conscientiousness, low pleasure, and high extraversion (Schmitt, & Shackelford, 2008); for women also high neuroticism (Whisman, Gordon, & Chatav, 2007); as

well as traits of socially aversive character - narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism. However, the field of the nomological network of predictors of cheating is still insufficiently examined. The aim of our work was to determine whether and to what extent the tendency towards adultery could be attributed to the action of Machiavellian personality traits, i.e., dissonant affect, which is the main determinant of subclinical sadism. The main finding of this research is that in our respondents who indicated being prone to adultery, both of the measured characteristics were expressed, but that adultery was predicted by Machiavellian antagonism, rather than subclinical sadism. According to our results, both sexes were determined to cheat/not cheat on their partners to the same extent.

4.1. *Machiavellianism and cheating*

Machiavellianism positively predicted the tendency towards cheating, although not all Machiavellian features exhibited the same predictive significance, nor the direction of prediction. The feature of antagonism was seen to play a particularly important role, predicting the tendency to deception and subclinical sadism in all its forms. Therefore, in the context of deception, our respondents did not indicate being guided by some long-term goal or benefit they might achieve through infidelity, but by a general willingness to subordinate other people to their own pleasure. This is in line with the paradigm that the ability to deceive, deceive, lie, and conceal is part of a general manipulative interpersonal style (Christie, & Geis, 1970; 2013), which has the character of 'nothing personal.' Instrumentality was shown to further stimulate deception, likely because deception is used as part of a trade in search of a desired goal. Comfort in such behaviour is provided by the conative assembly (Jones, 2010). In contrast, Machiavellian planning (calculation) has been shown to be a protective factor of fidelity in romantic relationships. However, this finding should be considered with caution, as reliability of the Planning subscale was determined as questionable in our sample. It is possible that one of the reasons for the low reliability was the relatively small number of items compared to other FFMI subscales. However, having in mind that FFMI as a whole has high reliability,

we can say that pronounced planning was seen as the only feature that significantly distinguished women from men. In that sense, the absence of long-term calculations was found to be a predictor of cheating, indicating that the cheating is related to the situational context, so it takes place impulsively, without much thought. That is, if there is a pronounced Machiavellian tendency towards planning, then this account speaks in favor of the thesis that more would be lost than gained by cheating on a partner ('cheating is not worth it'). This finding is inconsistent with previous ones, which have shown that women are more prone to deception to a much greater extent as Machiavellians (Jones, & Paulhus, 2010). This could be explained by the application of the various instruments for measuring Machiavellianism, the gender structure of the sample, and some cultural specifics, but also the questionable reliability of this subscale in our study.

4.2. *Subclinical sadism and deception*

Subclinical sadism, like all its features, except indirect sadism, was seen to be positively associated with adultery. However, this finding should also be considered with caution, for three reasons. First, the obtained correlations explained the relatively low percentages of common variance. Secondly, after partialization, the predictor effect of the traits of sadism was lost, which indicates that the connection with adultery was mediated by a common variance with the traits of Machiavellianism. This means that the predictive power of subclinical sadism was actually defined by the antagonistic nature of Machiavellianism. Third, the scales of indirect and everyday subclinical sadism were also seen to have questionable reliability. In relation to the initial question (Why do people cheat on their partners despite knowing that it will hurt them?) the answer could be seen relatively optimistically: it seems that it is not because they enjoy the pain they inflict, but because it is part of their conative, Machiavellian structure. Still, the ruthlessness of infidelity is unquestionable, and it implies not only engaged affective resources (absence of adequate and contradictory affectivity), but also activity, because only indirect (vicarious) sadism, which does not imply direct

participation of a person, demonstrated a significant connection with cheating. The absence of the connection between vicarious sadism and planning, displaying a significant connection with other Machiavellian features, confirms the finding that the nature of this activity is part of the general Machiavellian style and can have an instrumental character.

As previously mentioned, subclinical sadism, together with Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy, is part of the dark tetrad, which explains the connection between Machiavellianism (especially antagonism) and the characteristics of sadism in this paper. Thus, the tendency towards adultery is part of the conative style of antagonistic character, so the act of adultery is 'nothing personal.' This is in line with earlier findings that the propensity to commit adultery is a consistent behaviour, or, as the colloquial phrase goes, "once an adulterer is always an adulterer."

In the available literature, there are no findings linking subclinical sadism and deception, but the results of these studies have shown that subclinical sadism is significantly associated with sexual dominance, domestic violence, and the enjoyment of injuring partners during sex, along with internet "trolling" ("trolling" - writing disturbing messages; Buckels, Trapnell, Andjelovic, & Paulhus, 2019). Therefore, it is quite possible that this factor of cheating can result in the most serious outcomes.

4.3. *Gender differences*

Significant gender differences were found according to almost all measured characteristics, except in relation to adultery and direct sadism. Previous research on gender differences in cheating has not yielded consistent findings. While some authors argue that men and women are equally prone to cheating (Kellum, 2018), others state that infidelity is a stronger trait in men (Allen, & Baucom, 2004). A study reviewing research on infidelity (Zare, 2011) reported that at the age of 40, in the middle of the last century, 50% of married men committed adultery and 25% of married women, while 30 years later 60% of married men committed adultery and 50% of married women. However, one of

the problems pointed out by research on variables in the field of sexuality is the tendency to give socially desirable answers. If we have in mind the previously described hypocrisy of attitudes about infidelity in romantic relationships, then this information about our equal inclinations should be taken with a grain of salt. In favor of this in this study is that gender differences were found in almost all other variables, except for direct sadism, which also implies self-expression regarding explicit sadistic nature.

Looking at it this way, we would say that men define their angle of view on cheating through Machiavellianism, which is part of an aversive character, or through dissonant affect (subclinical sadism), which can also be of the vicarious type. The more pronounced sadism indicated in men than in women indicates a greater degree of ruthlessness and a less pronounced possibility of feelings of guilt, but also a higher probability of adultery to be committed "very personally." Women, as we said earlier, were shown to be more prone to calculations that make them loyal to their partner: they seem to cheat situationally. The exhibited significantly lower capacity for subclinical sadism compared to men would indicate the possibility of subsequent feelings of guilt. Earlier researchers have explained subclinical sadism as a primary feature of the male gender in characteristic reproductive strategies (Buss, & Shackelford, 1997), but perhaps we could talk more about significant gender differences (in favor of women) identified for the trait Emotionality, which connotes traits of parental altruism, and Neuroticism (Whisman et al., 2007).

In general, adultery in romantic relationships seems to be part of the general set of antagonistic characters of adulterers. As such, it is continuous, not personally directed ('nothing personal'), and the combination of Machiavellianism and subclinical sadism explains the recklessness of the cheating. The results indicate the very complex nature of this problem, which should be further investigated, especially because it can have a high-risk effect in the field of antisocial behaviour (propensity to domestic violence, homicide) and mental health.

4.4. *Limitations of the study*

The first type of limitation is found in the structure of the sample, through its gender inequality and the application of self-expression methods. The second type of restriction is related to the inconsistency of the test conditions: given the pandemic situation, some respondents filled out questionnaires online, and some using the standard paper-pencil method. The third type of restriction refers to a fundamental weakness of research on the phenomenon of adultery; the high probability of respondents to give socially desirable answers. Finally, the low reliability of the subscales of sadism (Indirect and Everyday) and especially the subscales of Machiavellian Planning, significantly limit the possibility of generalizing data. However, we believe that despite these limitations, this study has highlighted some very important aspects of the complex phenomenon of infidelity in romantic relationships, which should be further explored, especially given the impact of adultery on various forms of aberrant behaviour: both in the domain of violent behaviour and in the domain of the general mental health of people.

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EFEKTI PERCIPIRANE SOCIJALNE PODRŠKE NA USAMLJENOST

REZIME: Cilj ovog istraživanja bio je da se ispituju efekti opažene socijalne podrške na usamljenost kod ispitanika različitog starosnog uzrasta za vreme pandemije koronavirusa. Uzorak je činilo 442 ispitanika (41% muškog pola), koji su svrstani u pet starosnih kategorija: do 25 godina, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, preko 55 godina. Na ovim poduzorcima primenjene su Skala usamljenosti UCLA (Russell et al., 1980) i Višedimenzionalna skala percipirane socijalne podrške (MSPSS; Zimet et al., 1988), koja meri opaženu socijalnu podršku iz tri izvora – porodice, prijatelja, posebne osobe. Rezultati regresione analize pokazuju da je u svih pet modela percipirana podrška prijatelja statistički značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti, dok je percipirana podrška porodice značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti kod ispitanika do 25 godina, od 36 do 45 godina i kod ispitanika starijih od 55 godina. Podrška posebne osobe je statistički značajan negativan prediktor samo na uzorku ispitanika od 46 do 55 godina. Rezultati ukazuju na to da se kao značajan prediktor usamljenosti izdvaja onaj doživljaj podrške koji je kod ispitanika određene starosne kategorije u najvećoj meri osujećen.

KLJUČNE REČI: *usamljenost, percipirana socijalna podrška, starost, pandemija COVID-19*

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1. Uvod

Usamljenost, kao univerzalno iskustvo svake osobe tokom života, predstavlja jedan od indikatora mentalnog zdravlja. Usled pandemije koronavirusa koja je trenutno aktuelna i koja je uzrokovala promene u sociopsihološkom funkcionisanju ljudi, pitanje ne samo fizičkog već i mentalnog zdravlja stavlja se u prvi plan. Značajnu ulogu u osećanju usamljenosti imaju socijalne interakcije koje ne mogu da zadovolje jednu od osnovnih ljudskih potreba – potrebu za bliskom vezom i ljubavlju (Weiss, 1974). Prema Maslovu (Maslow, 1954) osobe koji ne uspeju da zadovolje potrebe za pripadanjem i ljubavlju sklone su doživljaju napašćenosti, otuđenja i odbacivanja. Drugim rečima, osujećenje ove grupe potreba srž je neprilagođenosti.

1.1. Usamljenost

Iako ne postoji konsenzus autora pri definisanju usamljenosti, ona se može odrediti kao neprijatno emocionalno stanje, koje nastaje kada se osoba oseća odbačeno, otuđeno ili neshvaćeno od strane drugih i kada joj nedostaju društvo za socijalne aktivnosti i emocionalna intimnost (Rook, 1984). Ipak, usamljenost treba razlikovati od ostalih oblika odvojenosti od drugih, kao što su stanja fizičke osamljenosti, izolacije i samoće. Usamljenost se može definisati i kao percipirana osujećenost broja i kvaliteta interpersonalnih odnosa (Peplau, Russell, & Heim, 1979; Anderson, 1998). Ovakva osujećenja se javljaju kada je mreža podrške manje zadovoljavajuća nego što osoba priželjkuje. Slično ovim autorima, socijalno-kognitivni model (Sermat, 1978) posmatra usamljenost kao nepodudaranje interpersonalnih odnosa kakve osoba ima s onima kakve bi želela da ima. Ovaj model uzima u obzir mogućnost da se osoba ne oseća usamljeno uprkos objektivno niskoj frekvenciji socijalnih kontakata, i suprotno, da se neko oseća usamljeno uprkos visokom nivou socijalne uključenosti. S druge strane, interakcionistički pristup (Weiss, 1973, 1974) stavlja naglasak na interakcijsko delovanje ličnih i društvenih karakteristika na pojavu usamljenosti. Ovaj pristup razlikuje emocionalnu i socijalnu usamljenost. Emocionalna usamljenost nastaje

kao posledica nedostatka bliske, intimne, romantične veze i praćena je anksioznošću, nemirom, doživljajem praznine i napuštenosti. Socijalna usamljenost nastaje kao posledica neuključenosti u socijalnu mrežu, tj. nedostatka prijateljstva i zajedništva, a praćena je dosadom i doživljajem socijalne marginalnosti.

Rezultati prethodnih istraživanja pokazuju da, kada su u pitanju starosne razlike u usamljenosti, krivulja odnosa životne dobi i usamljenosti ima oblik slova „U“ (Anderson, 1998). To znači da se najviše razlike u usamljenosti pronalaze kod adolescenata i osoba starijih od 75 godina. Ipak, rezultati nekih studija ukazuju na negativan odnos starosti i usamljenosti (Woodward & Frank, 1988), rezultati drugih na pozitivan odnos između ovih varijabli (Brage & Meredith, 1994), dok rezultati trećih ne idu u prilog postojanju ovog odnosa (Brennan & Auslander, 1979). Rezultati ukazuju i na to da je usamljenost posebno izražena u adolescenciji i predadolescenciji (Goossens, 2006), te da postoje razlike unutar samog doba adolescencije (Brage, Meredith & Woodward, 1993).

U jednoj studiji tokom pandemije koronavirusa (Luchetti, Lee, Aschwanden, Sesker, Strickhouser, Terracciano & Sutin, 2020) ispitivana je promena usamljenosti kao odgovor na mere društvenog ograničenja preduzete za suzbijanje širenja koronavirusa. Suprotno očekivanjima, nije bilo značajnih promena usamljenosti. Ispitanici su uočili povećanu podršku drugih tokom perioda praćenja. Stariji odrasli su prijavili manju usamljenost u poređenju s mlađim starosnim grupama, ali su imali povećanje usamljenosti tokom akutne faze izbivanja. Pojedinci koji žive sami i oni sa najmanje jednim hroničnim stanjem prijavili su da su se osećali usamljenije na početku, ali nisu povećali usamljenost tokom sprovođenja mera društvenog distanciranja. Uprkos određenom štetnom uticaju na ugrožene pojedince, na ovom uzorku nije bilo velikog povećanja usamljenosti, već izuzetne otpornosti kao odgovor na COVID-19.

Kada je reč o psihološkim korelatima usamljenosti, u prethodnim istraživanjima utvrđena je pozitivna povezanost različitih mera usamljenosti sa stidljivošću (Jackson, Fritch, Nagasaka & Gunderson, 2002), negativnim aspektima perfekcionizma (Arslana, Hamartaa, Ürea & Özyeüila, 2010), pesimizmom (Ivanov, Penezić & Gregov, 1998), ali-

jenacijom (Bruno, Lutwak & Agin, 2009), depresijom (Levin & Stokes, 1986), neuroticizmom (Loucks, 1974; Stokes, 1986), socijalnom anksioznošću (Neto & Barros, 2000; Weiss, 1973, Parkes, 1973) i alkoholizmom (Medora & Woodward, 1991). Usamljenost je negativno povezana sa samopoštovanjem (Lacković-Grgin, Penezić & Šorić, 1998), ekstraverzijom (Levin & Stokes, 1986), socijalnom kompetentnošću (Jackson et al., 2002), merom samoefikasnosti (Ivanov i sar., 1998), percepcijom socijalne podrške (Jackson, Soderlind & Weiss, 2000).

Postoji više pokušaja određenja uzroka usamljenosti i njihovih taksonomija. Najpotpuniji model uzroka usamljenosti (Rokach, 1989) sastoji se od tri klastera koji uključuju osam faktora. Jedan od klastera, identifikovan kao nedostatak interpersonalnih veza, čine tri faktora: socijalna alijenacija, neadekvatan sistem socijalne podrške i problematični odnosi. Prvi se odnosi na iskustvo fizičke izolacije osobe od poznate okoline, drugi na manjak prijatelja i osoba kojima je stalo do pojedinca i nedostatak socijalne podrške koja bi zadovoljila njegove potrebe, dok se treći odnosi na disharmonične intimne odnose.

1.2. Opažena socijalna podrška

Većina pojedinaca ima ograničene kapacitete sopstvenih resursa. U trenucima kada se dogode neželjeni životni događaji od pojedinaca se očekuje da koriste lične kapacitete članova u okviru svoje socijalne mreže dopunjavajući time svoj lični kapacitet kroz proces socijalne podrške. Ovaj proces može smanjiti negativne efekte stresnih životnih događaja na zdravlje.

Mnogi autori razlikuju opaženu socijalnu podršku s obzirom na izvor, te su se bavili istraživanjima konsekvencata opažene socijalne podrške iz različitih izvora. Naime, neki istražачi (Turner & Lloid, 1999; Turner & Marino, 1994) bavili su se merenjem opažene podrške partnera, rođaka, prijatelja i saradnika. Rezultati pokazuju da opažena podrška ima glavne negativne efekte i na simptome depresije i na komplikovanije depresivne poremećaje. Ovim rezultatima posreduju varijable poput pola, starosti, bračnog statusa i socioekonomskog statusa. Rezultati drugih istraživanja upućuju na slično. Percipirana socijalna podrška (tj.

imati nekoga s kim razgovarati) ima glavni negativan efekat na depresiju, posreduje pojedinim pozitivnim efektima na brak i obrazovanje, ali ne i na porodične prihode (Ross & Mirovski, 1989). Podrška supružnika smanjuje depresivni efekat svih pet istraženih vrsta stresora, dok podrška prijatelja igra slične uloge samo za dve vrste stresora (Jackson, 1992). Podrška partnera ima glavni negativan efekat na depresiju kod ispitanika oba pola, dok podrška saradnika ima značajno dejstvo na depresiju samo kod muškaraca, i ublažava pozitivan depresivni efekat kratkih rokova samo na uzorku muškaraca (Roxburgh, 2006).

Autori Multidimenzionalne skale percipirane socijalne podrške (MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988), razlikuju tri izvora podrške: porodicu, prijatelje i posebnu osobu. Rezultati nekih istraživanja u kojima je korišćena ova skala ukazuju na to da je percipirana socijalna podrška posebne osobe i porodice značajno pozitivno predviđala kvalitet života i zdravlje (Arkar, Sari, & Fidaner, 2004), te da opažena podrška iz sva tri izvora negativno korelira s usamljenošću, od čega je podrška prijatelja najjači korelat usamljenosti, a podrška porodice najslabiji (Duru, 2007). U istom istraživanju utvrđena je negativna korelacija podrške porodice i starosti.

U istraživanju rađenom za vreme pandemije koronavirusa (Mariani, Renzi, Di Trani, Trabucchi, Danskin, & Tambelli, 2020) ispitan je efekat strategija suočavanja i percipirane socijalne podrške na depresivnu i anksioznu simptomatologiju, gde zaključuju da podrška porodice smanjuje osećaj usamljenosti i ima isključivu ulogu u ublažavanju simptoma depresije.

1.3. Problem i cilj istraživanja

Problem ovog istraživanja jeste da li postoje efekti percipirane socijalne podrške na doživljaj usamljenosti za vreme pandemije koronavirusa kod ispitanika različitog uzrasta. Cilj ovog istraživanja je da se utvrde parcijalni doprinosi opažene podrške porodice, prijatelja i posebne osobe u objašnjenju usamljenosti kod ispitanika različite starosne dobi za vreme pandemije.

1.4. Hipoteze istraživanja

Opšta hipoteza:

Percipirana socijalna podrška statistički je značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti.

Specifične hipoteze:

H1. Percipirana podrška ^(a) prijatelja, ^(b) porodice i ^(c) posebne osobe statistički je značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti na uzorku ispitanika do 25 godina.

H2. Percipirana podrška ^(a) prijatelja, ^(b) porodice i ^(c) posebne osobe statistički je značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti na uzorku ispitanika od 26 do 35 godina.

H3. Percipirana podrška ^(a) prijatelja, ^(b) porodice i ^(c) posebne osobe statistički je značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti na uzorku ispitanika od 36 do 45 godina.

H4. Percipirana podrška ^(a) prijatelja, ^(b) porodice i ^(c) posebne osobe statistički je značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti na uzorku ispitanika od 46 do 55 godina.

H5. Percipirana podrška ^(a) prijatelja, ^(b) porodice i ^(c) posebne osobe statistički je značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti na uzorku ispitanika preko 55 godina.

2. Metod

2.1 Uzorak

Uzorak je prigodan i činilo ga je 442 ispitanika, od čega je 41% muškog pola. Završenu srednju školu ima 170 ispitanika, 172 osnovne studije, 80 master studije, dok 20 ispitanika ima završene magistarske ili doktorske studije. Od ukupnog broja ispitanika zaposleno je 71,9%. Prosečna starost ispitanika je 38,31 godina, s rasponom od 20 do 82 godine. Do 25 godina ima 82 ispitanika, od 26 do 35 godina ima 112 ispitanika, od 36 do 45 ima 122 ispitanika, od 46 do 55 ima 91 ispitanik, dok 35 ispitanika ima preko 55 godina.

2.2 Varijable i instrumenti

Kriterijumska varijabla u ovom istraživanju jeste usamljenost koja je operacionalizovana Skalom usamljenosti UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles – UCLA Loneliness Scale; Russell, Peplau & Cutrona, 1980). Ova jednodimenzionalna skala sadrži 20 stavki, a ispitanici na četvorostepenoj skali procenjuju koliko često se doživljavaju situacije iz pitanja stavki. Primer pitanja je: *Koliko često osećate da ste sami?*

Prediktorska varijabla operacionalizovana je Višedimenzionalnom skalom percipirane socijalne podrške (Multidimensional Scale of Percieved Social Support – MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet & Farley, 1988) koja je namenjena za merenje percipirane socijalne podrške iz tri izvora – porodice, prijatelja, bolje polovine (posebna osoba). Skala sadrži 12 tvrdnji, a ispitanici na petostepenoj skali Likertovog tipa procenjuju u kojoj meri se slažu ili ne slažu sa svakom tvrdnjom. Primeri stavki za merenje percipirane socijalne podrške iz različitih izvora jesu sledeći: porodica – *Moja porodica zaista pokušava da mi pomogne*, prijatelji – *Mogu računati na svoje prijatelje kada stvari krenu po zlu*, posebna osoba – *Postoji posebna osoba u mom životu na koju mogu da se oslonim kada mi je to potrebno*.

Kategorijalna varijabla starost definisana je kroz pet kategorija: *do 25 godina, od 26 do 35, od 36 do 45, od 46 do 55, više od 55 godina*.

2.3 Postupak istraživanja

Istraživanje je sprovedeno u periodu od januara do marta 2021. godine, putem *Google Forms* ankete, distribuirane ispitanicima po preporuci, putem društvenih mreža, uz informisanu saglasnost. Informisana saglasnost je podrazumevala davanje informacija o svrsi istraživanja, anonimnosti i načinu korišćenja podataka.

2.4 Analiza podataka

Sve analize rađene su na pet poduzoraka ispitanika određenih prema starosnim kategorijama. Interkorelacije skala proverene su biva-

rijatnom korelacionom analizom, distribucija skorova na svim skalama deskriptivnom analizom, a pouzdanost skala Kronbahovim koeficijentom interne konzistencije. Višestruka regresiona analiza korišćena je za proveru prediktorske vrednosti percipirane socijalne podrške iz tri izvora u objašnjenju usamljenosti.

3. Rezultati

U Tabeli 1 prikazani su rezultati korelacione analize, rezultati deskriptivne statistike i koeficijenti pouzdanosti skala na uzorcima ispitanika pet starosnih kategorija.

Tabela 1 – Korelacije između skala percipirane socijalne podrške i usamljenosti, aritmetičke sredine i standardne devijacije na skalama i pouzdanost skala na uzorcima ispitanika različitog uzrasta

Starosne kategorije	Varijable	SO	Fam	Fri	AS	SD	α
Do 25 godina (N = 82)	SO	1			4,33	0,84	0,73
	Fam	0,42**	1		4,29	0,86	0,89
	Fri	0,36**	0,12	1	4,16	1,00	0,92
	Usamljenost	-0,31**	-0,33**	-0,62**	2,04	0,51	0,90
Od 26 do 35 godina (N = 112)	SO	1			4,44	0,80	0,74
	Fam	0,43**	1		4,40	0,87	0,90
	Fri	0,38**	0,41**	1	4,32	0,72	0,87
	Usamljenost	-0,36**	-0,40**	-0,54**	1,90	0,49	0,90
Od 36 do 45 godina (N = 122)	SO	1			4,46	0,72	0,78
	Fam	0,55**	1		4,43	0,78	0,90
	Fri	0,44**	0,29**	1	4,29	0,75	0,89
	Usamljenost	-0,28**	-0,34**	-0,52**	1,87	0,46	0,91

	SO	1			4,35	0,77	0,80
Od 46 do 55 godina (N = 91)	Fam	0,71**	1		4,40	0,73	0,89
	Fri	0,60**	0,58**	1	4,19	0,79	0,90
	Usamljenost	-0,64**	-0,59**	-0,66**	1,88	0,46	0,91
	SO	1			4,46	0,80	0,75
Preko 55 godina (N = 35)	Fam	0,35*	1		4,41	0,70	0,84
	Fri	0,44**	0,44**	1	4,41	0,62	0,86
	Usamljenost	-0,52**	-0,59**	-0,69**	1,88	0,48	0,92

Napomena: SO – percipirana socijalna podrška posebne osobe; Fam – percipirana socijalna podrška porodice; Fri – percipirana socijalna podrška prijatelja;

* $p < 0,05$; ** $p < 0,01$

Rezultati korelacione analize pokazuju da je socijalna podrška iz sva tri izvora statistički značajan negativan korelat usamljenosti, a kao najjači korelat konzistentno se u svih pet starosnih kategorija izdvaja percipirana podrška prijatelja. Pored toga, interkorelacije percipirane socijalne podrške iz sva tri izvora na svim uzorcima statistički su značajne i pozitivnog usmerenja, s izuzetkom utvrđene statistički neznčajne korelacije podrške porodice i prijatelja na uzorku ispitanika do 25 godina. Na osnovu deskriptivnih pokazatelja, može se uočiti da ispitanici do 45 godina i iznad 55 godina podršku posebne osobe ocenjuju kao najviše prisutnu, dok je kod ispitanika od 46 do 55 godina najviše zastupljena podrška porodice. Kod ispitanika svih starosnih kategorija, najmanje je zastupljena podrška prijatelja. Usamljenost je nešto izraženija kod ispitanika do 25 godina, dok je kod ispitanika ostalih starosnih kategorija njena izraženost približno jednaka.


U Tabeli 2 i na Grafikonu 1 prikazani su rezultati višestruke regresione analize na uzorcima ispitanika pet starosnih kategorija, gde su prediktorske varijable tri izvora percipirane socijalne podrške, a kriterijumska varijabla usamljenost.

Tabela 2 – Rezultati regresione analize

Prediktori		Starosne kategorije ispitanika				
		Do 25 godina	26–35 godina	36–45 godina	46–55 godina	Više od 55 godina
SO	β	0,01	-0,13	0,51	-0,30**	-0,21
Fam	β	-0,26**	-0,18	-0,23*	-0,15	-0,33*
Fri	β	-0,59**	-0,42**	-0,48**	-0,39**	-0,43**
	R^2	0,45	0,34	0,31	0,54	0,59
	ΔR^2	0,42	0,32	0,30	0,53	0,55
	F	20,85	18,63	17,94	34,19	14,82

Napomena: Kriterijumska varijabla: Usamljenost; SO – percipirana socijalna podrška posebne osobe, Fam – percipirana socijalna podrška porodice, Fri – percipirana socijalna podrška prijatelja; $p_{(F)} < 0,01$; * $p < 0,05$; ** $p < 0,01$

Grafikon 1 – Grafički prikaz parcijalnih doprinosa percipirane socijalne podrške



Napomena: Kriterijumska varijabla: Usamljenost; SO – percipirana socijalna podrška posebne osobe, Fam – percipirana socijalna podrška porodice, Fri – percipirana socijalna podrška prijatelja;

Na osnovu rezultata višestruke regresione analize, može se zaključiti da su regresioni modeli na svih pet uzoraka ispitanika različitih starosnih kategorija, u kojima percipirana socijalna podrška iz tri izvora predviđa usamljenost, statistički značajni. Naime, modeli objašnjavaju 30–55% ukupne varijanse usamljenosti, a najveću ulogu u objašnjenju usamljenosti percipirana socijalna podrška ima kod ispitanika starijih od 45 godina.

U svih pet modela percipira podrška prijatelja je statistički značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti i kod ispitanika svih starosnih kategorija opažena podrška iz ovog izvora izdvaja se kao najjači prediktor usamljenosti. Percipirana podrška porodice statistički je značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti kod ispitanika do 25 godina, od 36 do 45 godina i starijih od 55 godina, dok je podrška posebne osobe statistički značajan negativan prediktor samo na uzorku ispitanika od 46 do 55 godina. Shodno ovome, potvrđeno je 9 od 15 hipoteza, odnosno hipoteze 1_(a), 1_(b), 2_(a), 3_(a), 3_(b), 4_(a), 4_(c), 5_(a), i 5_(b).

4. Diskusija

Cilj ovog istraživanja bio je da se ispita odnos opažene socijalne podrške i usamljenosti za vreme pandemije koronavirusa kod ispitanika različite starosti. Drugim rečima, cilj je bio da se utvrdi koji je od tri izvora percipirane socijalne podrške, porodice, prijatelja ili posebne osobe, najjači negativan prediktor usamljenosti s obzirom na starosnu kategoriju ispitanika. Od početnih petnaest hipoteza koje pretpostavljaju da opažena socijalna podrška iz sva tri izvora statistički značajno negativno predviđa usamljenost kod ispitanika pet starosnih kategorija, potvrđeno je devet. Pored ovih rezultata, ukratko će se prodiskutovati i rezultati deskriptivne i korelacione analize, koji nisu obuhvaćeni hipotezama.

Na osnovu deskriptivnih pokazatelja, uočava se blagi pad usamljenosti kod ispitanika starijeg uzrasta u odnosu na ispitanike starosti do 25 godina. Ovakva distribucija skorova donekle je u skladu s rezultatima istraživanja rađenog za vreme pandemije koronavirusa (Luchetti et al., 2020), gde su stariji odrasli prijavili manju usamljenost u poređenju s mlađim starosnim grupama. Pored ovoga, deskriptivni pokazatelji

varijabli opažene socijalne podrške ukazuju na to da su one izraženije kod ispitanika starijih od 25 godina, tj. na to da su starije osobe, u nekoj meri, imale doživljaj veće podrške iz sva tri izvora.

Na osnovu rezultata korelacione analize, koji ukazuju na negativnu povezanost socijalne podrške iz sva tri izvora s usamljenošću i to na svim poduzorcima, uviđa se važnost mreže socijalne podrške iz sva tri izvora. Naime, kod osoba koje opažaju podršku prijatelja, porodice i posebne osobe manje je izražen doživljaj usamljenosti, odnosno odbačenosti, otuđenosti ili neshvaćenosti od strane drugih. Ovakvo neprijatno emocionalno stanje u korelaciji je s drugim nepovoljnim aspektima psihičkog funkcionisanja, između ostalog s depresijom (Levin & Stokes, 1986). Nedostatak socijalne mreže i emocionalne intimnosti, definisane kroz podršku okruženja, značajno utiče na to da se pojedinac oseća neprilagođeno u socijalnim odnosima, tačnije da se oseća usamljeno. Ovi rezultati su u skladu s rezultatima prethodnih istraživanja (e.g. Jackson et al., 2000).

Nadalje, rezultati ukazuju na to da, iako postoji statistički značajna negativna povezanost sva tri izvora opažene podrške i usamljenosti, u regresionom modelu kao konzistentan i najjači negativan prediktor usamljenosti izdvaja se podrška prijatelja. Ovi rezultati su u skladu s rezultatima nekih od prethodnih istraživanja gde se podrška prijatelja izdvojila kao najjači korelat usamljenosti (Duru, 2007). Na našem uzorku, podrška prijatelja je opažena kao najmanje prisutna. Bez obzira na uzrast ispitanika, podršku posebne osobe i porodice, nedostatak uključenosti u prijateljske grupe koje pružaju podršku predstavlja najjači faktor rizika od osećanja usamljenosti. Ovim su potvrđene hipoteze $1_{(a)}$, $2_{(a)}$, $3_{(a)}$, $4_{(a)}$ i $5_{(a)}$. Nadalje, kod ispitanika uzrasta do 25 godina, te onih od 36 do 45 i preko 55 godina, opažena podrška porodice takođe se izdvaja kao statistički značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti, čime su potvrđene hipoteze $1_{(b)}$, $3_{(b)}$ i $5_{(b)}$. Upravo je na navedenim uzorcima podrška porodice takođe ocenjena kao manje zastupljena od podrške posebne osobe, a više zastupljena od podrške prijatelja. Shodno ovim rezultatima, može se zaključiti da je kod osoba navedenih starnosnih kategorija, pored nedostatka podrške prijatelja, nedostatak podrške porodice od presudnog značaja za stvaranje osećanja usamljenosti. Ovo je u skladu s nalazima istraživanja rađenog za vreme COVID-19 pandemije

koji ukazuju na to da upravo podrška porodice smanjuje osećaj usamljenosti i ima isključivu ulogu u ublažavanju simptoma depresije (Mariani et al., 2020). Na kraju, kod ispitanika između 45 i 55 godina, pored podrške prijatelje, kao statistički značajan negativan prediktor usamljenosti izdvaja se opažena podrška posebne osobe, čime je potvrđena hipoteza 4_(c), dok kod ispitanika između 26 i 35 godina jedino nedostatak podrške prijatelja doprinosi osećanju usamljenosti. Dakle, kao značajni prediktori usamljenosti ispitanika svih starosnih kategorija izdvojili su se oni izvori koji su ocenjeni kao najmanje podržavajući. Naime, osujećenje podrške iz određenog izvora u najvećoj meri dovodi do osećanja usamljenosti. Ovo ide u prilog Maslovljevoj pretpostavci da osujećenje neke potrebe stavlja tu potrebu u prvi plan, te da osujećenje potrebe za pripadanjem i ljubavlju dovodi do neprilagođenosti (Maslow, 1954), u našem istraživanju do usamljenosti. S druge strane, podrška iz izvora koji je u najvećoj meri ocenjen kao zastupljen na svakom od pet uzoraka ispitanika ne izdvaja se kao značajan prediktor usamljenosti. Shodno ovim nalazima, deluje da su izdvojeni faktori rizika od doživljaja usamljenosti, a ne kapaciteti za njegovo prevladavanje.

4.1. Generalni zaključak

Na osnovu rezultata ovog istraživanja u vreme pandemije koronavirusa može se zaključiti da je opažena socijalna podrška porodice, prijatelja i posebne osobe negativan korelat usamljenosti. Ipak, kao značajan prediktor usamljenosti ne izdvaja se doživljaj podrške koji je kod ispitanika određene starosne kategorije u najvećoj meri prisutan, te deluje da su izdvojeni faktori rizika, a ne kapaciteti za prevladavanje usamljenosti. Opažena podrška prijatelja, koja je kod ispitanika svih starosnih kategorija najviše osujećena, ujedno je konzistentno najjači negativan prediktor usamljenosti.

4.2. Ograničenja i preporuke za naredna istraživanja

Jedno od ograničanja ovog istraživanja odnosi se na uzorak koji je prigodan i relativno mali uzorak, naročito ispitanika preko 55 godina. S obzirom na ovo ograničenje, rezultati ne mogu da se generalizuju.

Drugo, iako je napomenuto da je istraživanje rađeno za vreme pandemije koronavirusa, ovo se smatra još jednim ograničenjem, s obzirom na izmenjene okolnosti socijalnog i psihičkog života ispitanika. Treće, iako je utvrđeno da su se kao značajni prediktori usamljenosti izdvojili oni izvori podrške koji su ocenjeni kao najviše osujećeni, preporuka je da se u nakom od narednih istraživanja razmotre interakcijski efekti izvora opažene socijalne podrške na doživljaj usamljenosti.

4.3. Praktične implikacije

Ovo istraživanje ima praktične implikacije pre svega u domenu mentalnog zdravlja ljudi i to za psihoterapeute, savetnike i psihologe kod čijih se klijenata javlja problem usamljenosti. Oni mogu da identifikuju izvor podrške koji je najmanje zastupljen i da svoj rad s klijentom usmere ka jačanju mreže podrške iz datog izvora.

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THE EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED SOCIAL SUPPORT ON LONELINESS

ABSTRACT: The principal objective of this research is to test the effects of perceived social support on loneliness with various age-dependent respondents during the COVID-19 pandemic. The sample is made up of 442 respondents (41% male), who are arranged into five age categories: up to 25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, over 55 years old. These subsamples are administered according to the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell et al., 1980) and The Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (Zimet et al., 1988), which measures perceived social support from three sources – family, friends, and significant other. The results of regression analysis show that in all five models the perceived support of a friend is a statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness, while the perceived support of family is a significant negative predictor of loneliness with respondents up to 25, from 36 to 45 and over 55. Support of significant other is a statistically significant negative predictor only in the sample of respondents from 46 to 55 years old. Results show that a significant predictor of loneliness for respondents of a specific age category is the sense of support from a person who is largely not fulfilling that role.

KEY WORDS: loneliness, perceived social support, old age, COVID-19 pandemic

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1. Introduction

Loneliness as a universal experience of every person during his or her lifetime is one of the indicators of mental health. During the still on-going COVID-19 pandemic which has caused changes in psychosocial functioning of humanity, the question not only of physical, but also mental health comes to the forefront. For the feeling of loneliness lack of social interactions which can gratify one of the basic human needs – the need for emotional attachment and love is of crucial importance (Weiss, 1974). According to Maslow (Maslow, 1954) persons who do not succeed in gratifying needs of companionship and love are prone to feel abandoned, alienated and rejected; in other words, the frustration of these needs forms the core of inadaptability.

1.1 Loneliness

Even though there is no consensus in literature about the definition of loneliness, it can be qualified as an unpleasant emotional state which occurs when a person feels rejected, alienated or misunderstood by others and when a person longs for company, for social activities and emotional intimacy (Rook, 1984).

Still, loneliness should be differentiated from other forms of alienation such as states of physical seclusion, isolation and solitude. Loneliness can be defined as a perceived frustration regarding the number and quality of interpersonal relationships (Peplau, Russell, & Heim, 1979; Anderson, 1998). These frustrations appear when the support network is less satisfactory than the person desires. Similarly to these authors, the social-cognitive model (Sermat, 1978) views loneliness as incongruence between the person's actual and desired levels of interpersonal relationships. This model takes into consideration the possibility that the person does not feel loneliness in spite of the objectively low frequency of social contacts and vice-versa, that someone feels loneliness despite a high frequency of social activity. On the other hand, the interactionist approach (Weiss, 1973, 1974) emphasizes interactional effects of personal and social factors on the phenomenon of loneliness. This approach distinguishes between emotional and social loneliness.

Emotional loneliness occurs as a consequence of an individual lacking close, intimate, romantic relations and is accompanied by anxiety, restlessness, sense of emptiness and abandonment. Social loneliness occurs as a consequence of non-involvement in a social network, that is to say, lack of friendship and togetherness, accompanied by boredom and a sense of social marginalization.

When examining differences among age groups regarding loneliness, the results of previous studies show that the curve showing the relation between age group and loneliness has a U-shaped form (Anderson, 1998). This means that the greatest contrasts regarding loneliness are found among adolescents and persons older than 75. However, the results of some studies point towards a negative connection between age and loneliness (Woodward & Frank 1988), the results of other studies display a positive connection between these variables (Brage & Meredith 1994), while yet another study does not support a connection of any kind (Brennan & Auslander, 1979). Some studies, on the other hand, suggest not only that loneliness is especially prominent in adolescence and preadolescence (Goossens, 2006), but also that there are differences within adolescent age groups (Brage, Meredith & Woodward, 1993).

One study during the COVID-19 pandemic (Luchetti, Lee, Aschwanden, Sesker, Strickhouser, Terracciano, & Sutin, 2020) focused on changes regarding loneliness as a response to social limitation measures taken in the effort to suppress the spread of the coronavirus. Contrary to expectations, there were no significant changes. The respondents noticed an increase in support of others during the period. Older adults reported that they felt lonely less frequently in comparison to younger age groups, but increasingly so during the acute phase of the outbreak. Individuals who live alone and those with at least one chronic condition reported that they felt lonelier in the beginning, but their loneliness did not exacerbate during social distancing measures. In spite of a certain negative effects on individuals at risk, this sample did not show significant escalation regarding loneliness but rather exceptional resilience as a response to COVID-19.

Considering psychological correlates of loneliness, previous research established a positive connection of various indices of loneliness

with shyness (Jackson, Fritch, Nagasaka & Gunderson, 2002), negative aspects of perfectionism (Arslana, Hamartaa, Ürea, & Özyeúila, 2010), pessimism (Ivanov, Penezić, & Gregov, 1998), alienation (Bruno, Lutwak, & Agin, 2009), depression (Levin & Stokes, 1986), neuroticism (Loucks, 1974; Stokes, 1986), social anxiety (Neto & Barros, 2000; Weiss, 1973, Parkes, 1973) and alcoholism (Medora & Woodward, 1991). Loneliness is negatively related to self-respect (Lacković-Grgin, Penezić, & Šorić, 1998), extraversion (Levin & Stokes, 1986), social competence (Jackson et al., 2002), measure of self-efficiency (Ivanov et al. 1998) and perception of social support (Jackson, Soderlind, & Weiss, 2000).

There have been many attempts to determine the cause of loneliness and to define its taxonomy. The most comprehensive model of the causes of loneliness (Rokach, 1989) comprised three clusters, which include eight factors. One of the clusters, identified as lack of interpersonal relationships is made up of three factors: social alienation, inadequate system of social support, and problematic relationships. The first factor refers to the experience of physical isolation of the person from the familiar environment, the second to the lack of friends and persons who care about the individual and the lack of social support that would gratify the individual's needs, while the third factor refers to disharmonious intimate relationships.

1.2. Perceived social support

Most individuals have limited capacities of their own resources. When unwanted life events occur, the individual expects to use personal capacities of the members of his or her social network thus supplementing his or her own capacities through the process of social support. This process can appease the negative effects of stressful life events on health. Many authors differentiate perceived social support regarding source and have conducted research on consequences of perceived social support from different sources. Some researchers (Turner & Lloyd, 1999; Turner & Marino, 1994) measured perceived support from the partner, relative, friend and co-worker. Their findings suggest that perceived support has, for the most part, negative effects both on symptoms of depression and on more complex depression disorders. These findings

are mediated by variables such as sex, age, marital status, and socioeconomic status. Other studies report similar findings. Perceived social support (e.g. having someone to talk to) brings forth suppressive effects on depression, and mediates certain positive effects on marriage and education, but not on family income (Ross & Mirovski, 1989). Spousal support diminishes the depression effect in all five types of stressors studied, while the support of a friend takes a similar role only in two types of stressors (Jackson, 1992). Partner support has a mainly suppressive effect on depression among respondents of both sexes, while co-worker support has a significant effect on depression only among men, as it reduces the short term positive depression effect only in the male sample (Roxburgh, 2006).

Authors of the multidimensional scale of perceived social support MSPSS; (Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988) differentiate three sources of support: family, friends and significant other. Results of some studies using this Psychometric scale show that the perceived social support of the significant other and of the family significantly positively predicted the quality of life and health (Arkar, Sari, & Fidaner, 2004), and thus the perceived support from all three sources negatively correlate with loneliness; with which support of friends being the strongest and the family support the weakest correlate with loneliness (Duru, 2007). The same research ascertained the negative correlation between family support and age.

The study conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic (Mariani, Renzi, Di Trani, Trabucchi, Danskin, & Tambelli, 2020) probed the effect of confrontation strategies and perceived social support on symptomatology of depression and anxiety. It was concluded that family support reduces the feeling of loneliness and has an explicit role in alleviating the symptoms of depression.

1.3. Research problem and aim

The problem of this research is to find out whether perceived social support has any effects on the experience of loneliness during the COVID-19 pandemic within different age groups of the respondents. The goal of this research is to determine partial contributions of per-

ceived family support, support of friends and of the significant other to the explanation of loneliness within different age groups of the respondents during the pandemic.

1.4. Research hypothesis

General hypothesis: Perceived social support is a statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness.

Specific hypotheses:

H1. Perceived support of (a) friend, (b) family and (c) significant other is statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness in the sample of respondents up to 25 years of age.

H2. Perceived support of (a) friend, (b) family and (c) significant other is statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness in the sample of respondents from 26 to 35 years of age.

H3. Perceived support of (a) friend, (b) family and (c) significant other is statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness in the sample of respondents from 36 to 45 years of age.

H4. Perceived support of (a) friend, (b) family and (c) significant other is statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness in the sample of respondents from 46 to 55 years of age.

H5. Perceived support of (a) friend, (b) family and (c) significant other is statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness in the sample of respondents over the age of 55.

2. Method

2.1 Sample

We relied on an ad-hoc sample comprising 442 respondents of which 41% are male. 170 respondents have a high school diploma, 172 university bachelor's degrees, 80 master's studies completed, while 20 respondents have completed master or doctoral studies. Of the total number of respondents 71.9% were employed. The average age of respondents is 38.31 years with the range of 20 to 82 years of age. 82

respondents are in the up to 25 years old group, 112 respondents are in the 26 to 35 group, 91 respondents were in the 46 to 55 group while 35 respondents were over 55 years of age.

2.2 Variables and instruments

In the present study, the criterion variable was loneliness operationalized by the UCLA Loneliness Scale (University of California, Los Angeles - UCLA Loneliness Scale; Russell, Peplau, & Cutrona, 1980). This one-dimensional scale contains 20 four-point Likert items relating to situations described by the specific item, while respondents determine on a four-point scale how often they experience the situations described in the item questions. For instance: *How often do you feel you are alone?*

The predictor variable is operationalized by the multidimensional scale of perceived social support (Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support – MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988) intended to measure perceived social support from three sources: family, friends, and the significant other. It consists of 12 five-point Likert scale items assessing the extent to which respondents agree or disagree with the particular statement. An example of an item for measuring perceived social support from different sources is the following: family – *My family is really trying to help me*; friends - *I can count on my friends when things take a bad turn*; significant other - *There is a significant other in my life whom I can depend on when I need to*.

The categorial variable of age is defined in five categories: *up to 25 years old; from 26 to 35; from 36 to 45; from 46 to 55; over 55 years old*.

2.3 Research procedures

The study was conducted from January to March 2021 using Google Forms surveys distributed to respondents by recommendation through social networks with informed consent. Informed consent covers giving information about the purpose of the study, assurance of anonymity and the way data will be used.

2.4 Data analysis

All analyses are done on five subsamples of respondents categorized by age groups. Intercorrelations of psychometric scales are assessed utilizing bivariate correlation analysis, the distribution of scores on all scales with a descriptive analysis, and the reliability of scale by Cronbach's coefficient of internal consistency. Multiple regression analysis is used to check predictor values of perceived social support from the three sources.

3. Results

Table 1 shows the results of correlational analysis, results of descriptive statistics and the reliability coefficients on the sample of respondents in five age categories.

Table 1 – Correlations between scales of perceived social support and loneliness, mean and standard deviation on scales and the reliability scale of the sample of respondents of different age groups

Age group	Variable	SO	Fam	Fri	AS	SD	α
up to 25 (N=82)	SO	1			4,33	0,84	0,73
	Fam	0,42**	1		4,29	0,86	0,89
	Fri	0,36**	0,12	1	4,16	1,00	0,92
	Loneliness	-0,31**	-0,33**	-0,62**	2,04	0,51	0,90
From 26 to 35 (N=112)	SO	1			4,44	0,80	0,74
	Fam	0,43**	1		4,40	0,87	0,90
	Fri	0,38**	0,41**	1	4,32	0,72	0,87
	Loneliness	-0,36**	-0,40**	-0,54**	1,90	0,49	0,90
From 36 to 45 (N=122)	SO	1			4,46	0,72	0,78
	Fam	0,55**	1		4,43	0,78	0,90
	Fri	0,44**	0,29**	1	4,29	0,75	0,89
	Loneliness	-0,28**	-0,34**	-0,52**	1,87	0,46	0,91

	SO	1			4,35	0,77	0,80
From 46 to 55 (N=91)	Fam	0,71**	1		4,40	0,73	0,89
	Fri	0,60**	0,58**	1	4,19	0,79	0,90
	Loneliness	-0,64**	-0,59**	-0,66**	1,88	0,46	0,91
	SO	1			4,46	0,80	0,75
Over 55 (N=35)	Fam	0,35*	1		4,41	0,70	0,84
	Fri	0,44**	0,44**	1	4,41	0,62	0,86
	Loneliness	-0,52**	-0,59**	-0,69**	1,88	0,48	0,92

Note: SO – perceived social support of significant other; Fam – perceived social support of family; Fri – perceived social support of friend;

* $p < 0,05$; ** $p < 0,01$

Correlation analysis shows that social support from all three sources is a statistically significant negative correlate to loneliness. The perceived support of friends consistently stands out in all five age group categories as the strongest correlate. Apart from that, there is intercorrelation of perceived social support from all three sources in all sub-samples; all samples are statistically significant and positive with the exception of the correlation between family support and friend support in the sample of respondents up to 25, which failed to reach statistical significance. On the basis of descriptive indicators, it can be noticed that respondents up to 45 and above 55 years of age evaluate the support of the significant other as most present, while in respondents from 46 to 55 years old family support is the most prevalent. Among respondents of all age groups, friend support is least represented. Loneliness is somewhat more prominent among respondents up to 25 years of age, while there were no statistically significant differences with respect to loneliness among the remaining four age groups.


Table 2 and Figure 1 show the results of multiple regression analysis results on the sample of respondents in five age categories with predictor variables of the three sources of perceived social support and loneliness as the criterion variable.

Table 2 – Regression analysis

Predictors		Respondent age categories				
		Up to 25	26-35	36-45	46-55	Over 55
SO	β	0,01	-0,13	0,51	-0,30**	-0,21
Fam	β	-0,26**	-0,18	-0,23*	-0,15	-0,33*
Fri	β	-0,59**	-0,42**	-0,48**	-0,39**	-0,43**
	R ²	0,45	0,34	0,31	0,54	0,59
	Δ R ²	0,42	0,32	0,30	0,53	0,55
	F	20,85	18,63	17,94	34,19	14,82

Note: Criterion variable: Loneliness; SO – perceived social support of significant other, Fam – perceived social support of family, Fri – perceived social support of friend; $p_{(F)} < 0,01$; * $p < 0,05$; ** $p < 0,01$

Figure 1 – Partial contribution of perceived social support



Note: Criterion variable: Loneliness; SO – perceived social support of significant other, Fam – perceived social support of family, Fri – perceived social support of friend;

On the basis of the results of multiple regression analysis it can be concluded that the regression models of all five samples of respondents of various age categories within which perceived social support from the three sources predicts loneliness are statistically significant. That is, the models explain 30-55% of the total variance of loneliness. Perception of social support plays the most important role in the explanation of loneliness among the respondents older than 45.

The perceived support of friends is a statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness in all five models and among the respondents of all age categories the perceived support from this source stands apart as the strongest predictor of loneliness. The perceived support of family is a statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness among respondents up to 25, from 36 to 45 and older than 55, while the support of the significant other is a statistically significant negative predictor only among the respondents of the sample from 46 to 55 years of age. Thus, 9 out of 15 hypotheses were confirmed. These are the hypotheses 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), 3(a), 3(b), 4(a), 4(c), 5(a), and 5(b).

4. Discussion

The aim of this research has been to test the connection between perceived social support and loneliness during the COVID-19 pandemic with respondents of various ages. In other words, the objective has been to determine which of the three sources of perceived social support, family, friends or significant other, is the strongest negative predictor of loneliness within each respondent age group. Of the initial 15 hypotheses which assume that perceived social support from all three sources is a statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness for respondents of five age categories, 9 were confirmed. Now a short discussion of the results of the descriptive and correlation analysis which were not encompassed by the hypotheses will follow. Based on descriptive indicators a slight drop regarding loneliness can be noticed among the respondents more advanced in age in comparison to those up to 25. This distribution of scores is up to a certain point in accordance with the results of the research conducted during the period of COVID-19 pan-

demic (Luchetti et al., 2020); then older adults were reported to complain less frequently about loneliness in comparison with younger age groups. Moreover, the descriptive indicators of variables of perceived social support point toward more prominence among respondents older than 25, that is to say, older persons, up to a point, had a greater feeling of support from all three sources.

Since the correlation analysis indicates that there is a negative connection between social support from all three sources and loneliness in all five subsamples, the importance of the network of social support from all three sources has been demonstrated. In specific, persons who perceive support from friends, family and significant other have a less pronounced feeling of loneliness, that is to say, abandonment, alienation or being misunderstood by others. This distressing emotional state is in correlation with other unfavourable aspects of psychological functioning, with depression, among others (Levin & Stokes, 1986). The absence of emotional attachment defined through the support from the social environment has a significant impact on the individual's feeling of being maladapted in social relationships, more specifically, that an individual feels lonely. These findings correspond to the results of previous studies (e.g. Jackson et al., 2000).

Furthermore, the data demonstrate that, even though there is a statistically significant negative connection between all three sources of perceived support and loneliness, the regression model singles out support of friends as the consistent and strongest negative predictor of loneliness. These results are in accordance with the results of some previous investigations which had the support of friends stand out as the strongest (negative) correlate of loneliness (Duru, 2007). In our sample, support of friends is markedly least represented. Regardless of the age of the respondent, support of significant other and family, the lack of engagement with a group of friends that give support represents the strongest risk factor for loneliness. This confirms hypotheses 1(a), 2(a), 3(a), 4(a) and 5(a). Moreover, within the groups of respondents up to 25, those from 36 to 45 and over 55, perceived support of family also stands out as a statistically significant predictor of loneliness which confirms hypotheses 1(b), 3(b) and 5(b). In the above-mentioned samples, family support is less represented than the significant other support but more

so than the support of friends. According to these results, it can be concluded that for persons in the categories mentioned, apart from support of friends, the absence of family support is of key importance for the feeling of loneliness. This agrees with the findings of the research done during COVID-19 pandemic that show that it is exactly the family support that lessens the feeling of loneliness and has an exclusive role in decreasing symptoms of depression (Mariani et al., 2020). In the end, with respondents between 45 and 55 years of age, besides support of friends, the support of significant other stands out as a statistically significant negative predictor of loneliness which confirms hypothesis 4(c). Among respondents between 26 and 35 years of age only the absence of friend support contributes to the feeling of loneliness. Therefore, as most significant predictors of loneliness among respondents of all age categories show, those that stand out are the sources which are assessed as the least supportive. In other words, lack of support from a specific source largely leads to the feeling of loneliness. This finding corroborates Maslow's hypothesis that frustration of the gratification of a need for belonging and love leads to maladaptation (Maslow, 1954), or in the present study to loneliness. On the other hand, support from a source which is largely assessed as represented in every one of the five samples of respondents does not stand out as a significant predictor of loneliness. Thus it appears that what have been specified are the risk factors for the feeling of loneliness and not the capacities for its overcoming.

5. General Conclusion

On the basis of the results of the present study conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic it can be concluded that the perceived support of family, friends and significant other is a negative correlate of loneliness. However, the sense of support present mostly among respondents of a specific age category does not stand out as a significant predictor of loneliness. Thus it seems that our data call attention to risk factors for loneliness, but not to the capacities for overcoming it. The perceived support of friends, whose absence is noticeable for the respondents within all age groups, is, at the same time, consistently the strongest negative predictor of loneliness.

5.2. Limitations and recommendations for further research

One of the limitations of this research is related to an ad-hoc sample which was convenient and relatively small, especially when it comes to respondents in the 55+ category. Considering this limitation, the results cannot be generalized. Secondly, the research was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, which is to be considered another limitation, due to altered conditions of social and psychological life of the respondents. Thirdly, even though it was established that those sources of support which were evaluated as for the most part frustrated stood out as significant predictors of loneliness, the recommendation is that in some future study the interactive effects of the sources of perceived social support on the feeling of loneliness should be studied.

5.3. Practical implications

This research has practical implications above all else in the domain of human mental health specifically for psychotherapists, counsellors and psychologists whose clients have a problem with loneliness. They can identify the source of support least represented and to direct the work with their client towards strengthening the network of support from the given source.

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UTICAJ PANDEMIJE COVID-19 NA EKONOMIJU²

REZIME: Pandemija COVID-19 je u potpunosti promenila svet. Za nepune dve godine trajanja ugrozila je čitavo društvo, živote i ekonomiju. Pandemija COVID-19 je najvća pandemija u modernoj istoriji, posle Španskog gripa, koja je značajno ugrozila ekonomske aktivnosti, posebno u uslužnom sektoru. Cilj rada jeste analiza uticaja pandemije COVID-19 na ekonomiju. Kako bi se ostvario postavljeni cilj, u radu analiziramo kratkoročni uticaj na ekonomiju u prvim mesecima pandemije COVID-19, troškovni i sektorski uticaj kao i ekonomska očekivanja. Osnovni zaključak jeste da je pandemija značajno uticala na ekonomske aktivnosti, na smanjenje bruto domaćeg proizvoda, na povećanje nezaposlenosti, najveći pad maloprodaje u odnosu na sve recesije u poslednjih 40 godina, ali je uticala pozitivno na ubrzaniji razvoj digitalne ekonomije.

KLJUČNE REČI: pandemija, COVID-19, rizik, BDP, ekonomija.

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1. Uvod

Reč pandemija etimološki vodi poreklo od grčke reči *pandemos* koja ima značenje „odnosi se na sve ljude”, a izvedena je iz reči *pan-* „svi” i *demos* „narod, ljudi”. Prema Svetskoj zdravstvenoj organizaciji (SZO), pandemija predstavlja globalno širenje nove bolesti. Početkom decembra 2019. godine, tačnije 8. decembra, u metropoli Vuhan, provinciji Hubej u Kini, potvrđen je prvi slučaj zaraze kasnije nazvanim korona virusom SARS-CoV-2, virusom odgovornim za pandemiju COVID-19. Svetska zdravstvena organizacija je 11. marta 2020. proglasila globalnu pandemiju virusa COVID-19. Pandemija COVID-19 po uticaju na ljudske živote, ekonomiju i društvo u celini najveća je u modernoj istoriji, posle Španskog gripa. U trajanju od skoro dve godine pandemije zaraženo je preko 250 miliona ljudi, a umrlo je preko pet miliona ljudi, dok je svetska ekonomija opala do nivoa koji je bio sličan početnom padu svetske ekonomske krize tridesetih godina dvadestog veka.

Čovek je od svojih prapočetaka bio suočen s rizicima i potrebom za njihovim upravljanjem (Njegomir, 2018). Pandemija COVID-19, s kojom se svet suočava, jedan je od rizika koji utiče na zdravlje i živote ljudi, ali i na ekonomiju i društvo uopšte. U fokusu rada su ekonomski izazovi uzrokovani pandemijom COVID-19. Cilj rada jeste analiza uticaja pandemije COVID-19 na ekonomiju. Kako bi se ostvario postavljeni cilj, u radu analiziramo kratkoročni uticaj na ekonomiju u prvim mesecima pandemije COVID-19, troškovni i sektorski uticaj kao i ekonomska očekivanja.


2. Kratkoročni uticaj pandemije COVID-19 na ekonomiju

Prvi pokazatelj uticaja korona virusa na ekonomske aktivnosti bio je udar na Dow Jones indeks industrijskog proseka koji je za samo jedan dan, 12. marta 2020. godine, pao za 9,99%. Ovaj indeks je imao najveći pad još od „crnog ponedeljka” iz 1987. godine, kada je pao za 22%. Standard & Poor's indeks opao je za 9,5%, takođe je reč o najvećem padu od 1987. godine, a Nasdaq kompozitni indeks opao je za 9,4%. Ovi drastični padovi indeksa javili su se zbog toga što administracija

Donalda Trampa nije na vreme ukazala na primenu mera koje pogađaju ekonomiju usled korona virusa. Međunarodni monetarni fond (MMF, 2020) ukazao je 4. marta da se projekcije o globalnom ekonomskom rastu od 2,9% neće ostvariti.

U 2020, zahvaljujući korona virusu, u SAD je za samo 21 dan došlo do pada za 20% (kao što smo ukazali, u samo jednom danu za 10%). Pad proizvodnje u Kini odrazio se na globalnu ekonomiju. Ovo je sasvim razumljivo ako se zna da se u Kini ostvaruje jedna trećina svetske proizvodnje (Njegomir, 2020 oktobar 02). Osim toga, Kina predstavlja i ogromno tržište za automobilsku industriju, turizam i druge sektore, čiji će rezultati izostati kako zbog smanjenja tražnje u Kini, tako i zahvaljujući izbijanju korona virusa u Evropi i u SAD. Suštinski, sa smanjenjem proizvodnje u Kini u jednom kvartalu, svet je zašao u recesiju. Već početkom pandemije postala su primetna bankrotstva, kao i gubljenje poslova, pre svega u turizmu. SAD su pokrenule mehanizam kvantitativnog popuštanja sa snižavanjem kamatnih stopa na nivo u rasponu od 0% do 0,25% i povećanjem mase novca u opticaju kroz otkup aktive (hartija od vrednosti) za 700 milijardi dolara (FED, 2020). Banka Engleske takođe je smanjila nivo kamatnih stopa na 0,1% (Bank of England, 2021). Evropska centralna banka odlučila je da poveća masu novca u opticaju kroz investiranje u imovinske i dužničke finansijske instrumente u Evrozoni u iznosu od 750 milijardi evra (EC, 2020). Ove mere primenjene su kako bi se suzbila potencijalna finansijska kriza. Za razliku od 2008. godine, stanovništvo je znatno zaduženije kako u SAD, tako i u Evropi. S druge strane, zahvaljujući brznoj stabilizaciji virusa i oporavka proizvodnje već u prvom kvartalu 2020. godine, u Kini su se beležile najbolje performanse finansijskog tržišta (Grafikon 1). Na primer, samo se ChiNext, indeks visokotehnoških kompanija, koji predstavlja pandan američkom Nasdaq indeksu a deo je Šenžen berze, povećao za 10% od početka 2020. godine. Grafikon 1 predstavlja rast berzanskih indeksa u Kini u odnosu na pad u ostatku sveta u prvom kvartalu 2020. godine.

Grafikon 1: Kretanje berzanskih indeksa Kine i ostatka sveta, sa baznim periodom 1. januar 2020. god.



Izvor: The Economist.

Kratkoročni ekonomski uticaji pandemije na industrijsku proizvodnju odražavaju strogost vladinih politika zatvaranja. Zemlje koje su uvele strože mere zatvaranja, takođe su zabeležile oštiri pad industrijske aktivnosti.

Digitalizacija društva je u središtu ekonomskih i društvenih promena XXI veka (Tirol, 2019). Digitalizacija ekonomskih aktivnosti dovela je do snižavanja troškova prodaje, posebno digitalnih proizvoda, globalne distribucije, ali i do bolje komunikacije između ljudi širom sveta. Ekonomija „sada” proizlazi iz potrebe potrošača da su im proizvodi i usluge, kao i mogućnost komuniciranja s kompanijom, dostupni uvek, dvadeset četiri časa, sedam dana nedeljno. Kompanije koje nisu u mogućnosti da svoju ponudu vrednosti isporučuju na takav način neće ostvariti željene rezultate, a vrlo brzo će gubiti kupce (Njegomir, 2018). Pandemija je dodatno uticala i na veći značaj digitalne ekonomije, posebno zbog povećanog učešća rada na daljinu, ali i zatvaranja, što je uticalo da se ljudi više okrenu onlajn (engl. *online*) kupovini. Ovakav rast značaja digitalne ekonomije, koji je uslovljen trendom većeg broja

ljudi onlajn, uzrokovao je i porast verovatnoće ostvarenja i intenziteta šteta u ostvarenju sajber rizika (Njegomir, 2021). Ubrzano prihvatanje onlajn servisa i daljinskog načina rada širom sveta tokom pandemije COVID-19, počevši od marta 2020. godine, postalo je evidentno (Živković, 2021). To je dovelo do još snažnije upotrebe engleskog jezika kao primarnog jezika poslovne komunikacije (Živković & Šuković, 2019).


3. Ekonomski troškovi pandemije COVID-19

U prvom mesecu nakon izbijanja pandemije, vlade su se usredredile prvenstveno na kratkoročne mere kako bi se preduzeća održala tokom zatvaranja, zadržala zaposlenost i podržala prilagođavanje industrijskih firmi novoj realnosti. Vladine politike su se takođe koncentrisale na pružanje brze finansijske pomoći preduzećima u rešavanju problema duga i novčanog toka. Na strani ponude, mere politike su obezbedile kontinuiranu zaštitu radnika i promovisale brzo ponovno pokretanje ponude. Na strani tražnje, vlade su sprovele politike javnih nabavki i uvele subvencije za potrošnju. Dokazi pokazuju da srednjoročne i dugoročne mere igraju sve značajniju ulogu s ciljem preusmeravanja preduzeća kako bi ih bolje pripremila za 'novu normalu' u post-COVID svetu. Osnovno obrazloženje je da oporavak od ovog šoka neće omogućiti povratak u prethodno stanje „uobičajenog poslovanja”. OECD, na osnovu istraživanja malih i srednjih preduzeća u zemljama OECD-a, zaključuje da su pored kratkoročnih mera politike, kao što su odlaganje poreza, plaćanje duga, garancije za kredite i direktno pozajmljivanje, neophodne strukturne politike kako bi vlade pomogle firmama da identifikuju nova tržišta i nove prodajne kanale i efikasno nastave svoje poslovanje pod preovlađujućim ograničenjima (OECD, 2020). Cilj ovih politika jeste jačanje strukturne otpornosti industrijskih firmi i podsticanje njihovog rasta.

Za indirektno troškove pandemije COVID-19 već se predviđalo da će biti mnogo veći od direktnih zdravstvenih troškova lečenja. Zaista, indirektni troškovi bolesti daleko će nadmašiti troškove testiranja, lečenja i hospitalizacije pacijenata. Obim ovih indirektnih troškova, uključujući ekonomsku štetu, zavisice od toga koliko pandemija bude dugo-

trajna, od koraka koje vlade preduzimaju da bi je suzbile, uticaja i pri-
 državanja javnih mera ponašanja, kao što je fizičko distanciranje, koje
 su vlasti nametnule i od ekonomske podrške vlada i razvojnih agencija.
 Napominjemo da se u to vreme smatralo da će s letom pandemija proći.

Slika 1: Sumarni prikaz ekonomskih troškova pandemije COVID-19



Izvor: prilagođeno prema Shretta (2020).

Kao što se vidi na slici, direktni troškovi uključuju troškove te-
 stiranja i traženja kontakata, pored troškova hospitalizacije, intenzivne
 medicinske nege, kontrolnih intervencija i plata zdravstvenih radnika.

Takođe uključuju troškove vakcina, tretmana, brzih dijagnostičkih testova i testova na antitela. Pravi direktni troškovi takođe bi uključivali troškove istraživanja i razvoja novih terapija i vakcina, mada dodeljivanje vrednosti njima može biti izazov. Direktni troškovi takođe uključuju troškove koje će pojedinci i privreda platiti iz svojih sredstava. U zemljama s niskim i srednjim prihodima to može činiti do 50% svih zdravstvenih troškova ako vlade ne donesu odredbe o besplatnom testiranju i lečenju pacijenata sa COVID-19. Navedeni izdaci uključuju troškove prevoza do/iz bolnica za testiranje i lečenje i druge izdatke kao što su troškovi mera zaštite na koje domaćinstva/preduzeća inače ne bi potrošila novac, na primer kupovina sredstva za dezinfekciju i dezinfekciju ruku.

Indirektni troškovi su svi dodatni troškovi povezani s pandemijom ili ekonomskim uticajem ponašanja usvojenih da bi se izbegla zaraza. Uključuju gubitke produktivnosti koji nastaju zbog izostanka radnika, zbog morbiditeta i smrtnosti, uključujući gubitak zarada i oportunitetne troškove. Oni takođe uključuju efekte preliivanja na ekonomiju koje mogu izazvati mere prevencije koje vladine institucije nameću ili su samonametnute kako bi se izbegla izloženost virusu. Ishod ovih efekata izaziva šokove i ponude i tražnje. Šok u snabdevanju proizlazi iz zatvaranja preduzeća, hotela, restorana i drugih preduzeća koja se smatraju „nebitnim”. Šok tražnje rezultat je smanjene potrošnje, putovanja, transporta i drugih nepotrebnih troškova u pandemiji.

4. Sektorski uticaj pandemije COVID-19

Usporavanje ekonomske aktivnosti – i ograničenja transporta – u pogođenim zemljama imaće uticaja na proizvodnju i profitabilnost određenih globalnih kompanija, posebno onih koje se bave proizvodnjom gotovih proizvoda ili sirovina koje se koriste u preradi. Mala i srednja preduzeća, posebno preduzeća koja se oslanjaju na repromaterijal iz pogođenih regiona i koja nisu u stanju da se lako prebace na druge izvore snabdevanja, mogu imati veće poteškoće da prežive prekide u proizvodnji i snabdevanju. Vraćanje preduzeća u normalno funkcionisanje nakon ovako ozbiljnih poremećaja biće izazovno, jer će većina industrija morati da reaktivira čitav svoj lanac snabdevanja.

Preduzeća širom sveta gubila su prihode i imala poremećene lance snabdevanja usled gašenja kineskih fabrika. Kina je postala primarni izvor mnogih presudnih medicinskih lekova, uključujući penicilin, heparin i lekova neophodnih za operacije. Do 80% osnovnih svetских sastojaka za proizvodnju antibiotika proizvodi se u Kini. Američka farmaceutska industrija izvestila je o strahu od nestašice lekova pošto se Indija 24. marta suočila s blokadama. Indija je vodeći svetski proizvođač sterilnih injekcionih lekova, isporučuje gotovo polovinu generičkih lekova koji se koriste u zemljama poput SAD. Američka uprava za hranu i lekove (FDA, 2020) objavila je 27. februara 2020. godine izjavu u kojoj se navodi da SAD doživljava prvu nestašicu lekova direktno povezanu s pandemijom COVID-19.

Istovremeno, lanci snabdevanja su doživeli sistemske šokove tražnje (ovaj trend nastavio se i u prvom i drugom kvartalu 2021. godine). U prva dva kvartala 2020. godine došlo je do nestašice, možemo reći globalne nestašice, maski, rukavica i druge lične zaštitne opreme, pored nedostatka broja respiratora. Povrh svega, neki pojedinci su stvarali velike zalihe namirnica i predmeta za domaćinstvo pripremajući se za poštovanje ograničenja kretanja, u nekim slučajevima kupujući robu za nekoliko meseci u jednom danu. Klasičan primer za to jesu higijenski proizvodi, poput toaletnog papira, sredstava za dezinfekciju ruku i površinskih dezinficijensa, koji su zabeležili nagle skokove tražnje, što je dovelo do panične kupovine i stvaranja zaliha. Nestašica se komplikovala s problemima transporta proizvoda. Istraživanje Instituta za upravljanje snabdevanjem (ISM, 2020) otkrilo je da je više od 80% kompanija verovalo da će njihova organizacija preživeti određeni udar zbog poremećaja usled pandemije COVID-19. Od toga je 16% kompanija izjavilo da je već prilagodilo ciljeve prihoda u proseku za 5,6% manje zbog pandemije. Pandemija COVID-19 pokazala je da poremećaji u lancu snabdevanja mogu da izazovu veći haos za globalnu ekonomiju nego što je većina vlada shvatila. Preduzeća koja su dovoljno spretna da zamene dobavljača i koja imaju dovoljno likvidnosti da prežive periode slabe prodaje i prihoda, imaće konkurentsku prednost.

Ograničenja u kretanju, a time i ekonomske aktivnosti, takođe imaju uticaj na trgovinu i investicije, kao i smanjenu tražnju za robom i uslugama. Globalni pad ekonomske aktivnosti smanjiće trgovinu i uti-

cati na uvoz robe široke potrošnje iz zemalja u razvoju, posebno onih s visoko koncentrisanom trgovinskom izloženošću prema EU i SAD.

Putovanja i turizam su najteže pogođeni ekonomskim poremećajem uzrokovanim pandemijom COVID-19, s uticajima na ponudu i tražnju putovanja, kao i ogromnim gubicima radnih mesta. U 2018. godini sektor putovanja i turizma imao je 319 miliona radnih mesta širom sveta. Većina avio-kompanija je već smanjila svoj letaćki kapacitet za najmanje 75% i najavila otkaze. Flybe, britanski regionalni prevoznik, bila je jedna od prvih avio-kompanija koja je prestala s radom nakon pojave pandemije. Prema Međunarodnom udruženju vazdušnog saobraćaja (IATA, 2020), očekuje se da će COVID-19 koštati avio-kompanije 252 milijarde dolara samo u 2020. godini.³ Svetska turistička organizacija Ujedinjenih nacija (UNVTO, 2020) procenjuje da bi međunarodni dolasci turista mogli da se smanje za 70% do 75% u 2020. To bi rezultiralo gubitkom od 300 do 450 milijardi dolara u prihodima od međunarodnog turizma. Teški akutni respiratorni sindrom (SARS), prethodno izbijanje bolesti izazvano drugim novonastalim korona virusom, a koje je imalo mnogo uži geografski domet i kraći uticaj, rezultiralo je gubicima od 30 do 50 milijardi dolara. Navedeno sugerise da bi potencijalni gubici od pandemije COVID-19 mogli biti daleko veći od prethodno iznetih procena. Zemlje na koje će najverovatnije uticati negativno jesu one koje se u velikoj meri oslanjaju na međunarodni turizam. Na primer, na Maldivima putovanja i turizam doprinose više od 60% nacionalnog bruto domaćeg proizvoda (BDP).

5. Ekonomska očekivanja


Dugotrajni ekonomski poremećaj koji je posledica pandemije COVID-19 verovatno će dovesti do smanjenja potrošačkog i poslovnog poverenja i time smanjenja lične potrošnje u širokom spektru kategorija, s efektima preliivanja na mnoštvo drugih sektora. Na primer, trgovci na malo širom sveta obustavljaju ili otkazuju narudžbine odeće, preteći milionima fabričkih poslova u Aziji. Preduzeća koja su zadržavala za-

³ Deeper Revenue Hit from COVID-19, IATA, 2020, <https://www.iata.org/en/about/worldwide/ame/blog/march-25-iata-updates-covid-19>

poslene uskoro će početi da ih otpuštaju, što znači da će domaćinstva stoga imati manje prihoda za trošenje. Tokom epidemije SARS-a 2003. godine, rast maloprodaje u Kini opao je za skoro 3%. Tražnja u nekim oblastima, posebno za hranom i robom široke potrošnje, verovatno će manje opasti jer su neophodni, a kupovina ove robe ne uključuje visok rizik od zaraze. Međutim, drugi sektori, poput nebitne robe, luksuzne robe i restorana, teško su pogođeni.

Nacionalni biro za ekonomska istraživanja (NBER, 2020) utvrdio je da se vrhunac mesečne ekonomske aktivnosti dogodio u američkoj ekonomiji u februaru 2020. godine, označavajući kraj najduže zabeleženog ekonomskog uspona SAD, započetog u junu 2009. godine. Grafikon 2 prikazuje procentualnu razliku u realnom (prilagođenom inflaciji) bruto domaćem proizvodu (BDP) od vrhunca poslovnog ciklusa do tromesečja, kada se BDP vratio na nivo prethodnog vrhunca poslovnog ciklusa za nedavne recesije. Od najnovijeg vrhunca u četvrtom kvartalu 2019. godine, Sjedinjene Američke Države su zabeležile dva uzastopna kvartalna pada BDP-a; čak je rekordno zabeležen najstrmiji kvartalni pad ekonomske proizvodnje, pad od 9,1% u drugom kvartalu 2020. godine. Da bi se ova kontrakcija stavila u istorijski kontekst, kvartalni BDP nikada nije doživeo pad veći od tri procenta (po kvartalnoj stopi) od početka vođenja evidencije 1947. godine (Routley, 2020).


Grafikon 2: Procentualna promena bruto domaćeg proizvoda u odnosu na vrh poslovnog ciklusa u SAD



Izvor: US Bureau of Economic Analysis 1980–2020 i NBER

Grafikon 3 prikazuje procenat promene zaposlenosti u odnosu na vrhove poslovnog ciklusa. Gubici radnih mesta povezani s COVID-19 izbrisali su 113 meseci rasta zaposlenosti, pri čemu je ukupna zaposlenost u nepoljoprivrednim proizvodima u aprilu pala za 20,5 miliona radnih mesta. Pandemija COVID-19 i s njom povezano ekonomsko pogoršanje stvorili su krizu za sve radnike, ali je uticaj bio veći za žene, radnike koji nisu belci, one koji imaju manje zarade i one sa nižim obrazovanjem. U decembru 2019. žene su po prvi put imale više poslova na platnim spiskovima nego muškarci tokom perioda rasta; do maja 2020. taj odnos je preokrenut, delom odražavajući gubitak posla u industriji razonode i ugostiteljstva, gde žene čine 53 procenta radnika.

Grafikon 3: Procenat promene zaposlenosti u odnosu na vrh poslovnog ciklusa u SAD




Izvor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, NBER.

Kriza uzrokovana pandemijom COVID-19 takođe je dovela do dramatičnih promena u potrošnji domaćinstava. Prodaja na malo, koja prvenstveno prati prodaju robe široke potrošnje, opala je za 8,7% od februara do marta 2020. godine, što je najveći pad iz meseca u mesec od kada popisni biro prati podatke. Iako su neke maloprodaje (npr. prehrambene prodavnice, apoteke i maloprodaje) zabeležile porast tražnje

kako su započele mere zaključavanja, druge (npr. prodavnice odeće, prodavnice nameštaja i bele tehnike, prehrambene usluge i mesta za piće, prodavnice sportske i hobi opreme i benzinske pumpe) zabeležile su pad. Početkom maja, kako su neke države ukinule zatvaranja, prodaja je počela da se oporavlja u većini robnih sektora. Sveukupno, američka maloprodajna prodaja porasla je za 17,7% od aprila do maja, što je najveći mesečni skok, nadoknađujući 63% martovskih i aprilskih gubitaka. Rast maloprodaje nastavljen je i tokom leta: do avgusta prodaja na malo je bila 2,6% iznad nivoa iz avgusta 2019. Da bi se te promene stavile u istorijski kontekst, Grafikon 4 pokazuje procentualnu promenu maloprodaje od vrhunca poslovnog ciklusa tokom recesija između 1980. i 2020. godine.

Grafikon 4: Procenat promene maloprodaje u odnosu na vrh poslovnog ciklusa u SAD




Izvor: US Census Bureau, NBER.

Tokom proteklih 12 meseci, pandemija je najviše naštetila siromašnim i ranjivim, a preti da će milione drugih gurnuti u siromaštvo. Ove godine, nakon decenija stalnog napretka u smanjenju broja ljudi koji žive sa manje od 1,90 dolara dnevno, COVID-19 će započeti prvi preokret u borbi protiv ekstremnog siromaštva u generaciji. Poslednja analiza upozorava da je COVID-19 samo tokom 2020. godine gurnuo

dodatnih 88 miliona ljudi u ekstremno siromaštvo. U najgorem scenariju, brojka bi mogla biti i 115 miliona. Svetska banka (WB, 2020a) predviđa da će najveći deo „novih siromašnih” biti u južnoj Aziji i pod-saharskoj Africi. Prema najnovijem izveštaju o siromaštvu i zajedničkom prosperitetu, „mnogi novi siromašni verovatno će biti angažovani u neformalnim uslugama, građevinarstvu i proizvodnji – sektorima u kojima su privredne aktivnosti najviše pogođene blokadama i drugim ograničenjima mobilnosti“ (Blake & Wadhwa, 2020)

Ograničenja usvojena u cilju smanjenja efekata pandemije i u pravcu kontrole širenja virusa imala su ogroman uticaj na ekonomski rast. U junskom izdanju Globalnih ekonomskih izgleda Svetske banke navedeno je (WB, 2020b): „COVID-19 je pokrenuo globalnu krizu kao nijedna druga pandemija – globalnu zdravstvenu krizu koja, pored ogromnih ljudskih gubitaka, dovodi do najdublje globalne recesije od Drugog svetskog rata.” Prognoze na kraju 2020. godine ukazuju da će se globalna ekonomija, kao i prihodi po stanovniku smanjiti.

Grafikon 5: Recesija COVID-19 zabeležila je najbrži i najgori pad u projekcijama rasta među svim globalnim recesijama od 1990. godine (globalno)



Izvor: Consensus Economics, World Bank.

Ovaj ekonomski pad otežava sposobnost zemalja da efikasno odgovore na zdravstvene i ekonomske efekte pandemije. Čak i pre širenja pandemije COVID-19, gotovo polovina svih zemalja s niskim prihodima već je bila u dugovanju ili je bila pod visokim rizikom, ostavljajući malo fiskalnog prostora da pomogne siromašnima i ugroženima koji su najteže pogođeni. Iz tog razloga su Svetska banka i Međunarodni monetarni fond u aprilu 2020. godine pozvali na obustavu servisiranja duga za najsiromašnije zemlje kako bi im omogućili da usmere resurse na borbu protiv pandemije. Inicijativa za obustavu duga omogućila je ovim zemljama da oslobode milijarde dolara za svoj odgovor na pandemiju COVID-19. Ipak, izdaci za servisiranje duga bilateralnim poveriocima nametnuće veliko breme u godinama koje dolaze, a biće potrebne brze akcije za smanjenje duga kako bi se izbegla nova izgubljena decenija.

Globalne ekonomske perspektive su se znatno poboljšale poslednjih meseci, čemu su doprinele smanjene mere zabrana, kao i najave dodatne fiskalne podrške u nekim zemljama. Međutim, postoje znaci sve većih razlika u aktivnosti u različitim sektorima i ekonomijama. Očekivanja za snažnijim oporavkom ogledaju se i na finansijskim i robnim tržištima, a prinosi američkih dugoročnih obveznica i cene nafte vraćaju se na nivo pre pandemije.

U glavnim evropskim ekonomijama tempo oporavka bio je skromniji, što odražava produžene poremećaje pandemije i s tim povezano smanjenjenog radnog vremena u mnogim uslužnim sektorima. Različita sektorska specijalizacija ekonomija takođe utiče na rast, što jasno ukazuje činjenica da ekonomije koje su najviše zavisne od međunarodnih putovanja i turizma uglavnom beleže veći pad BDP-a u 2020. godini. Tabela 1 pokazuje kretanja bruto domaćeg proizvoda u regionu.

Tabela 1: Pad BDP-a u regionu u 2020. godini

Zemlje	BDP promena u %
Crna Gora	-12,0%
Hrvatska	-9,0%
Slovenija	-6,7%
Bosna i Hercegovina	-6,5%
Makedonija	-5,4%
Srbija	-2,5%

Izvor: World Bank.

U regionu je situacija bila loša kao što prikazuje Tabela 1. Sve zemlje su ostvarile negativan ekonomski rast. Najveći negativni ekonomski rast bio je u Crnoj Gori i iznosio čak -12%, zatim u Hrvatskoj -9%, Sloveniji -6,7%, Bosni i Hercegovini -6,5% i Makedoniji -5,4%, dok je ekonomski rast u Srbiji bio -2,5%. Čak 114 miliona ljudi ostalo je bez posla u 2020. godini, a prognoze za 2021. godinu takođe su negativne (ILO, 2021). Porast nezaposlenosti i gubitak radnih sati prisutan je i u najoptimističnijim prognozama.

Predviđa se da će rast globalnog BDP-a biti 5,6% 2021. godine i 4,9% 2022. godine (MMF, 2021).

Tabela 2: Privremene ekonomske prognoze OECD-a, mart 2021. godine (realni rast bruto domaćeg proizvoda)

	2020.	2021.		2022.	
		Privremene projekcije	Razlika u odnosu na decembar	Privremene projekcije	Razlika u odnosu na decembar
Svet	-3,4	5,6	1,4	4,0	0,3
G20	-3,2	6,2	1,5	4,1	0,4
Australija	-2,5	4,5	1,3	3,1	0,0
Kanada	-5,4	4,7	1,2	4,0	2,0
Evro regija	-6,8	3,9	0,3	3,8	0,5
Nemačka	-5,3	3,0	0,2	3,7	0,4
Francuska	-8,2	5,9	-0,1	3,8	0,5
Italija	-8,9	4,1	-0,2	4,0	0,8
Španija	-11,0	5,7	0,7	4,8	0,8
Japan	-4,8	2,7	0,4	1,8	0,3
Koreja	-1,0	3,3	0,5	3,1	-0,3
Meksiko	-8,5	4,5	0,9	3,0	-0,4
Turksa	1,8	5,9	3,0	3,0	-0,2
Velika Britanija	-9,9	5,1	0,9	4,7	0,6
SAD	-3,5	6,5	3,3	4,0	0,5
Argentina	-10,5	4,6	0,9	2,1	-2,5
Brazil	-4,4	3,7	1,1	2,7	0,5

Kina	2,3	7,8	-0,2	4,9	0,0
Indija	-7,4	12,6	4,7	5,4	0,6
Indonezija	-2,1	4,9	0,9	5,4	0,3
Rusija	-3,6	2,7	-0,1	2,6	0,4
Saudijska Arabija	-4,0	2,6	-0,6	3,9	0,3
Južnoafrička Republika	-7,2	3,0	-0,1	2,0	-0,5

Izvor: Strengthening the recovery: The need for speed, OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report, Paris, March 2021.

Podrška fiskalne i monetarne politike trebalo bi da nastavi da podupire tražnju. Smanjena nesigurnost, poboljšano samopouzdanje i, na kraju, bolji izgledi na tržištu rada omogućiće domaćinstvima da postepeno smanjuju štednju, mada sve veća koncentracija štednje među domaćinstvima s višim prihodima može usporiti oporavak potrošnje u nekim zemljama. Preokret u industrijskoj proizvodnji i trgovini robom takođe bi trebalo da unapredi izgled ekonomija integrisanih u regionalne lance snabdevanja. Više cene roba i spor oporavak turizma, međutim, predstavljaće ograničenje napretka za neke ekonomije u razvoju. Globalni BDP trebalo bi da do sredine 2021. godine bude iznad nivoa pre pandemije, iako to nije slučaj u svim zemljama. Značajna heterogenost u kratkoročnim kretanjima verovatno će i dalje postojati, kako između naprednih ekonomija i zemalja u razvoju, tako i između regiona. Rizik troškova od pandemije takođe ostaje visok, a predviđa se da će globalna proizvodnja krajem 2021. ostati slabija nego što se prethodno očekivalo. Ovo je posebno slučaj u mnogim ekonomijama zemalja u razvoju (OECD, 2021). Brzi odgovori centralnih banaka, zajedno s vladinim programima podrške poslovanju, i dalje podržavaju uslove na finansijskim tržištima.

6. Zaključak

Prekid lanaca snabdevanja i proizvodnje stvorio je finansijske probleme firmama, a posebno onima s velikim dugom. Investitori u hartije od vrednosti mogu zauzeti investicione pozicije koje su neprofitabilne u trenutnim uslovima, stvarajući nepoverenje u finansijske instrumente i tržišta HOV. To bi moglo dovesti do daljeg pada cena na tržištu kapitala i poremećaja finansijskog tržišta. Teško je proceniti uticaj COVID-19 na ekonomiju s direktnim i indirektnim posledicama, dok se pandemija ne završi. Mere za saniranje posledica COVID-19 obuhvataće mere ekonomske politike i inovativne mehanizme, kako bi se najugroženiji zaštitili od ekonomske propasti i postigla finansijska stabilnost. Istovremeno, zemlje će morati da daju prioritet merama i aktivnostima, koje će u budućnosti smanjiti negativne ekonomske posledice od zdravstvenih rizika.

Tržišta u nastajanju i ekonomije u razvoju biće pod posebno lošim ekonomskim posledicama pandemije COVID-19 i to u više pravaca: pritiskom na slabe zdravstvene sisteme, gubitkom trgovine i turizma, smanjenim doznakama, prigušenim tokovima kapitala i lošim finansijskim uslovima usred rastućeg duga. Izvoznici energenata ili industrijskih proizvoda posebno će biti pogođeni. Tražnja za metalima i robama povezanim s transportom, poput gume i platine koji se koriste za delove vozila, takođe je opala. Iako su poljoprivredna tržišta dobro snabdevena na globalnom nivou, trgovinska ograničenja i poremećaji u lancu snabdevanja mogu na nekim mestima pokrenuti pitanja sigurnosti hrane.

Osim negativnog uticaja, pandemija je dodatno podstakla razvoj digitalne ekonomije. Za razliku od ostvarenja brojnih rizika i negativnog uticaja pandemije na povećanje verovatnoće i/ili intenziteta rizika, ona je stvorila i mogućnosti za pojedine delatnosti. Zbog brojnih zatvaranja čitavih ekonomija, ostvaren je u velikoj meri prelaz sa „fizičke” na „virtuelnu” ekonomiju. Naime, onlajn prisustvo je zahvaljujući pandemiji postalo neophodno, za razliku od prethodnog perioda kada je bilo alternativni kanal promocije i prodaje. Velike globalne kompanije koje su imale onlajn prisustvo značajno su ga unapredile, dok su lokalne kompanije razvile onlajn prisustvo i prezentaciju interneta i posebno

društvenih mreža. Mnogi privredni subjekti, poput onih u turizmu i ugostiteljstvu, ostvarili su velike gubitke i otpuštanja zaposlenih, dok su drugi, poput onlajn prodavnica kao što je Amazon, ostvarili značajne pozitivne rezultate. Na primer, samo kompanija Amazon prihodovala je u uslovima pandemije rekordnih 386,1 milijardu dolara, što je za čak 38% povećanje u odnosu na 2019. godinu, dok je u prvom kvartalu 2021. godine zabeležen rast između 33% i 40% u odnosu na isti period prethodne godine.

Ekonomski rast nije moguće ostvariti bez značajnijih intervencija vlada. Bogatije zemlje već podržavaju napore firmi da se restrukturiraju i preorijentišu svoje poslovanje. Takve mere politike sve više prelaze u središte pažnje jer kratkoročne mere počinju da se smanjuju zbog budžetskih ograničenja ili zato što su tradicionalni poslovni modeli počeli da gube održivost. Preduzeća se moraju brzo preusmeriti na talente, pokrenuti nove poslovne modele, povećati produktivnost, razviti novi proizvodi i promeniti svoje poslovanje. Vlade bi trebalo da se usredsrede na uslovljavanje poslovne podrške kako bi osigurale da se preduzeća u skladu s tim restrukturiraju. Nemačka, na primer, uslovljava poslovnu podršku ulaganjem u buduće tehnologije kako bi podstakla zeleni rast. Osvežena industrijska strategija Novog Zelanda kao odgovor na COVID-19 ima za cilj da „resetuje” sektore međunarodnog obrazovanja i turizma, da ojača otpornost energetskog, transportnog i logističkog sektora i da pređe s obima na vrednost u građevinskoj, naprednoj proizvodnji i agroindustriji uz jačanje digitalizacije u svim granama. Pored sveobuhvatnih ekonomskih mera namenjenih svim ekonomskim sektorima, za pogođene sektore treba uvesti specifične mere podrške. Takve mere uključuju podršku razvoju novih poslovnih modela, nadogradnju tehnologija, inovacije, istraživanje novih izvora inputa i identifikovanje novih tržišta za proizvode. Veliki deo ove podrške može doći u obliku razmene znanja i tehnologije, ali mora biti usklađen s kreditnim šemama i promocijom investicija. Postoje ograničeni dokazi o tome koje od kratkoročnih, srednjoročnih i dugoročnih mera – bilo da su usredsređene na pomoć ili na strukturnu preorijentaciju – efikasno promovišu industrijski razvoj. Ekonomska istraživanja, stoga, treba da nastave da procenjuju ekonomske performanse zemalja na osnovu nedavnih reformi. Rezultati takvih istraživanja biće, međutim, dostupni samo u sred-

njem roku. Rizici nakon pandemije za industrije u zemljama u razvoju vrlo su stvarni i mogli bi da dovedu do ozbiljnih zastoja u njihovim performansama. U ovim vremenima bez presedana, kontinuitet poslovanja je ključan. To zahteva razborit odgovor na neželjene reakcije na ponudu i tražnju čim se ukinu mere ograničavanja. U industrijama za koje je budućnost sigurna, vlade treba da primene inicijative koje osiguravaju da proizvodnja može biti stabilnija u slučaju prekida u lancima snabdevanja. To može uključivati preorijentaciju ka lokalnom snabdevanju, naglašavajući razvoj domaćih lanaca snabdevanja i istraživanje novih proizvoda i tržišta.

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THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON THE ECONOMY²

ABSTRACT: Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the world has changed completely in less than two years' time. The pandemic has threatened human lives, society, and global economy. As the largest pandemic of modern times, second only to the Spanish flu, it has had a significant negative impact on the economy, especially the service sector. The goal of this paper is to analyse the impact of COVID-19 on the economy. The analysis includes short-term economic effects in the first months of the outbreak, cost- and sector-specific impact, and economic expectations. The overall conclusion is that the pandemic has had severe negative impacts on the global economy, causing a significant GDP loss, increased unemployment, and the greatest decline in retail trade, compared to other recessions in the past 40 years. However, the pandemic has also accelerated the development of the digital economy.

KEYWORDS: pandemic, COVID-19, risk, GDP, economy

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1. Introduction

Etymologically, the word *pandemic* stems from the Greek word *pandemos*, meaning “pertaining to all people”, and is derived from the prefix *pan-*, meaning “all” and *demos*, meaning “people”. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), a pandemic is the worldwide spread of a new disease. On December 8, 2019, the first case of an infection caused by a new type of virus subsequently named SARS-CoV-2 was first confirmed by officials in Wuhan, Hubei province, China; this was the virus that would later cause the outbreak of COVID-19. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the global pandemic. In terms of its effects on human lives, global economy, and society as a whole, this pandemic is the most widespread in modern history, coming second only to the Spanish flu. In less than two years, over 250 million people have been infected and more than 5 million have died; at the same time, the global economy has experienced a crisis not unlike that of the 1930s.

Since prehistoric times, humankind has faced various risks and experienced the need to manage their impact (Njegomir, 2018). The ongoing pandemic is a threat not only to human health and lives but also to the economy and society in general. This paper focuses on the economic challenges brought about by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and aims to analyse its impact on the economy. The analysis includes short-term economic effects in the first months of the outbreak, cost- and sector-specific impact, and economic expectations.


2. COVID-19 Pandemic Short-term Economic Impact

The first indicator of the impact of the coronavirus on economic activities was the blow to the Dow Jones Industrial Average index, which dropped by 9.99% in a single day, on March 12, 2020, suffering the worst day since the 1987 “Black Monday” market crash, when it fell by 22%. Similarly, Standard & Poor’s 500 index dropped by 9.5%, the biggest drop since 1987, and the Nasdaq Composite index fell by 9.4%. These drastic drops in market indices reflect the Trump administration’s

failure to respond to the pandemic in due time. On March 4, the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2020) indicated that it would not be possible to meet the global economic growth rate projection of 2.9%.

In 2020, the US stock market indices lost 20% of their value in only 21 days on account of the coronavirus pandemic (as already stated, there was a 10% drop in a single day). China's manufacturing decline had an immediate impact on the global economy, which is to be expected as China accounts for a third of the world's manufacturing output (Njegomir, 2020, October 2). China is also a large market for the automotive industry, tourism, and other sectors; however, all of these experienced a decline when China's import demand decreased, and the pandemic spread throughout Europe and the USA. Essentially, China's single-quarter decline in manufacturing plunged the world into a recession. At the very beginning of the pandemic, bankruptcies and job loss were on the rise, mostly in tourism. The USA launched the massive quantitative easing program by cutting interest rates to zero (0-0.25%) and increasing the amount of money in circulation through the \$700 billion worth of assets purchases (FED, 2020). The Bank of England also cut the interest rates to 0.1% (Bank of England, 2021). The European Central Bank decided to increase the amount of money in circulation through €750 billion worth of investments into different asset and debt instruments in the Eurozone (EC, 2020). All these measures were taken to combat a potential financial crisis. In both Europe and the USA, the public debt is now significantly higher than it was in 2008. On the other hand, due to its rapid COVID-19 crisis recovery in manufacturing in the first quarter of 2020, China recorded the best financial market performance in the world (Graph 1). For example, the ChiNext (Chinese equivalent to the American Nasdaq index and part of the Shenzhen stock market) had increased by 10% since early 2020. Graph 1 shows the rise of stock market indices in China relative to their fall in the rest of the world in the first quarter of 2020.

Graph 1: Stock market indices movement in China and the rest of the world from January 1, 2020



Source: The Economist

The short-term economic effects of the pandemic on industrial manufacturing reflect the severity of different governments' lockdown policies. Countries that have imposed stricter lockdown measures have also seen a sharper decline in industrial activity.


Digital transformation of society is at the heart of the economic and social changes of the 21st century (Tirole, 2019). The use of digital technologies in business has led to lower sales costs (especially of digital products), easier global distribution, and better communication worldwide. The Now Economy arises from the consumers' need to have products, services, and communication with a business available 24/7. Businesses which cannot meet consumers' expectations are bound to fall behind (Njegomir, 2018). The pandemic has further increased the importance of the digital economy; frequent lockdowns and remote working have prompted more and more people to turn to online shopping and other activities. The growing number of online consumers also increased the importance of cyber security (Njegomir, 2021). There has been an evident surge in online services and remote working since March 2020, when the pandemic began (Živković, 2021). The use of English as the dominant language of business communication has also increased (Živković & Šuković, 2019).

3. COVID-19 Pandemic Economic Costs

In the first month of the pandemic, national governments focused mainly on short-term policy measures to keep businesses afloat, prevent job loss, and support industries in adapting to new circumstances. Government policies also aimed to provide businesses with rapid financial assistance in tackling debt and cash flow problems. On the supply side, government actions ensured the continuous protection of workers and quick revival of domestic supply. On the demand side, governments implemented public procurement policies and introduced consumption subsidies. Evidence suggests that the role of medium to long-term measures is becoming increasingly significant in the COVID-19 policy mix; these measures are aimed at reorienting businesses to better prepare them for the 'new normal' in the post-COVID era. The basic rationale is that the recovery from this shock will not allow companies to return to the previous state of 'business as usual'. Based on the research carried out on small and medium-sized businesses in OECD member countries, OECD reached the conclusion that in-depth structural policies, as well as short-term measures such as deferral of tax, debt payments, loan warranties, and direct lending, have to be implemented in order to help businesses find new markets and sales channels under the restrictive measures (OECD, 2020). These policies aim to strengthen the structural resilience and stimulate the growth of industries.

The indirect costs of the COVID-19 pandemic had already been predicted to surpass the direct costs of medical treatments. The indirect costs were expected to greatly exceed the costs of tests, treatments, and hospitalisations. It was estimated that the indirect cost amount, including the damage to the economy, would depend on several factors: how long the pandemic would last; what government measures would be implemented; the impact and public compliance with safety measures such as physical distancing; and the financial support provided by governments during the immediate impact of the pandemic and its aftermath. It should be noted that, in early 2020, the general expectation was that the pandemic would be over by summer.

Figure 1: COVID-19 pandemic economic costs summary



Source: Adapted from Shretta (2020)

Figure 1 shows that direct costs include the costs of testing and contact tracing, as well as the costs of hospitalisation, intensive care, control interventions, and health care staff wages. They also include the costs of vaccines, treatments, rapid diagnostic tests and antibody tests. Proper direct costs would also include research and development of new medications and vaccines; however, assigning values to these may pose a challenge. Direct costs also include out-of-pocket expenses borne by individuals and the economy. If governments fail to make provisions for free testing and treatment of COVID-19 patients in low and middle-

income countries, these costs can amount to 50% of all medical expenses. These out-of-pocket expenses include the costs of transport to and from hospitals for testing and treatment purposes and other expenses such as the costs of protective measures that households and businesses would not need otherwise, such as disinfectants and hand sanitisers.

Indirect costs are all the additional costs incurred by either the pandemic or the economic impact of infection avoidance behaviours. These costs include not only productivity losses resulting from absenteeism caused by morbidity and mortality, but also wage losses and opportunity costs. Indirect costs also involve spillover effects on the economy caused by either government- or self-imposed preventative measures to avoid the virus exposure. These have caused both supply and demand shocks. Supply shocks arise from the closing of 'non-essential' businesses, namely hotels, restaurants, and similar establishments. Demand shocks arise from reduced consumption, travel, transportation, and other expenses that are not considered essential in the pandemic.

4. COVID-19 Pandemic Sectoral Impact

Economy slowdown and transportation restrictions in the affected regions will impact production rates and profits of global businesses, especially those manufacturing finished goods or raw materials for processing. Small and medium-sized businesses, especially those that rely on raw materials from the affected regions and cannot easily switch to other supply sources, may struggle to survive disruptions to production and supply chain. Returning to normal will be a challenge for most businesses, as most industries will have to restart the entire supply chain.

Business worldwide suffered losses and supply chain disruptions due to manufacturing shut down in China. China became the main supplier of essential medications, such as penicillin, heparin, and surgery medications. Nearly 80% of essential ingredients for antibiotic production are manufactured in China. On March 24, 2020, the US pharmaceutical industry expressed concerns about potential medication

shortages, due to India experiencing supply chain disruptions. India is the leading global manufacturer of sterile injectables, exporting nearly 50% of generic drugs production to US and other countries. On March 27, 2020, the US Food and Drugs Administration (FDA, 2020) announced that US was experiencing the first drug shortage directly linked to the COVID-19 pandemic.

At the same time, supply chains experienced systemic demand shocks, in both the first and second quarter of 2021. In the first two quarters of 2020, there were global shortages of facemasks, surgical gloves, and other personal protective equipment; the ventilators were also in short supply. Moreover, people were buying large quantities of foodstuffs and household items in preparation for lockdowns. The demand for hygienic products, such as toilet paper, hand sanitizers and disinfectants, rose sharply, leading to panic buying and stockpiling. The shortages were compounded by transportation problems. According to the Institute for Supply Management (ISM, 2020), more than 80% of businesses were convinced that they would be affected by the disruptions due to the pandemic. 16% of businesses reported that they had already accounted for an average revenue loss of 5.6%. The pandemic has shown that supply chain disruptions can wreak havoc on global business, more than any government could predict. Only businesses which are flexible enough to switch to other suppliers and have enough liquid assets to survive low sales and revenues will remain competitive.

Restrictive measures, such as curfew, affect trade and investments, and reduce demand for goods and services. Global economic downturn will reduce trade and affect the import of consumer goods from developing countries, especially those countries which depend on trade with the EU and U.S.

Travel and tourism is among the most affected sectors, with the slump in demand and massive job loss. In 2018, the sector employed 319 million people worldwide. Most airline companies have already reduced the size of their fleets by at least 75% and announced impending layoffs. UK regional airline Flybe was one of the first to collapse after the pandemic outbreak. IATA (2020) estimates that revenue loss for the

airline industry due to the pandemic would be \$252 billion globally³. UNWTO expects international tourist arrivals to be down about 70-75% in 2020, resulting in the revenue loss of US\$330-450 billion. The SARS epidemic, smaller in size and scale than the COVID-19 pandemic, caused revenue losses of US\$30 to 50 million. This implies that the loss due to the current pandemic could be much higher than what the estimates suggest. The countries which rely on international tourism are most likely to be affected; in the Maldives, for instance, travel and tourism sector contribute more than 60% to GDP.


5. Economic Outlook

The long-term economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to cause a decline in consumer trust, which in turn leads to a wide-ranging consumer spending decrease, spilling over to many sectors. Retailers worldwide have delayed or cancelled clothing shipments, threatening millions of manufacturing jobs in Asia. Businesses which managed to keep jobs will soon be forced to lay off workers, resulting in income loss for households. During the 2003 SARS epidemic, retail in China dropped by nearly 3%. The demand for food and consumer goods is likely to remain high because they are essential and buying them carries no great risk of infection. Other sectors, such as non-essential goods, luxury goods, and hospitality, have been severely affected.

According to NBER, the US economic growth reached its peak in February 2020, which marked the end of the longest growth period in the US which began in June 2009. Graph 2 shows the percentage change between the BDP at the peak of the business cycle (adjusted for inflation) and the BDP level in the quarter after the recession. Since the most recent GDP peak in the fourth quarter of 2019, the U.S. recorded two subsequent BDP drops, the U.S. economy experienced a sharp GDP decline of 9,1% in the second quarter of 2020, the steepest GDP decline since records began in 1947 (Routley, 2020).

³ Deeper Revenue Hit from COVID-19, IATA, 2020, <https://www.iata.org/en/about/worldwide/ame/blog/march-25-iata-updates-covid-19>


Graph 2: Percentage change in GDP since the peak of the business cycle in the US



Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis 1980-2020 and NBER

Graph 3 shows the percentage of employment growth change since the peak of the business cycle. Job loss due to the COVID-19 pandemic wiped out 113 straight months of employment growth, with 20.5 million jobs in non-agricultural production lost in April 2020. The pandemic and the resulting economic downturn hit workers across sectors: however, women, non-white workers, low wage and low education workers were more severely affected. In December 2019, during the period of economic growth, women held more jobs than men for the first time. However, by May 2020 the situation had been reversed, due to job loss in hospitality and entertainment, where 53% of workers were women.

Graph 3: Percentage of employment growth change since the peak of the business cycle



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, NBER.

The pandemic also caused dramatic changes in household consumption. Retail sales, together with consumer goods sales, fell by 8.7% from February to March 2020, the largest month-to-month drop since records began. Some retailers (e.g., groceries, pharmacies, supermarkets) experienced a surge in demand during lockdowns; others (clothes, furniture, home appliances, sports gear and equipment, gas stations, restaurants and cafes). In early May 2020, as some lockdowns were lifted, most affected sectors began to recover. The U.S. retail sales rose by 17.7% from April to May, the biggest month-to-month rise, compensating for 63% of loss in March and April. Retail sales continued to rise throughout summer; by August 2020, retail rate was 2.6%, higher than August 2019. To put this into context, graph 4 shows percentage change in retail rates since the peak of the business cycle during recessions from 1980 to 2020.

Graph 4: Percentage of retail rate change since the peak of the business cycle in the US




Source: US Census Bureau, NBER.

Over the past 12 months, the pandemic has harmed the poor and vulnerable the most, and it is threatening to push millions more into poverty. In 2021, after decades of steady progress in reducing the number of people living on less than US\$1.90 per day, COVID-19 will usher in the first reversal in the fight against extreme poverty in a generation. The latest analysis warns that COVID-19 has pushed an additional 88 million people into extreme poverty this year. In a worst-case scenario, the figure could be as high as 115 million. The World Bank Group forecasts that the largest share of the “new poor” will be in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the latest Poverty and Shared Prosperity report, “many of the new poor are likely to be engaged in informal services, construction, and manufacturing – the sectors in which economic activity is most affected by lockdowns and other mobility restrictions” (Blake & Wadhwa, 2020).

Those restrictions, enacted to control the spread of the virus, have had an enormous impact on economic growth. The June edition of the World Bank Global Economic Prospects (WB, 2020b), declared: “COVID-19 has triggered a global crisis like no other – a global health

crisis that, in addition to an enormous human toll, is leading to the deepest global recession since the Second World War.” At the end of 2020, it was forecast that the global economy as well as per capita incomes would shrink.

Graph 5: COVID-19 recession has seen the steepest downgrades in consensus growth projections among all global recessions since 1990



Source: Consensus Economics, World Bank.

This economic fallout is hampering countries’ ability to respond effectively to the pandemic’s health and economic effects. Even before the spread of COVID-19, almost half of all low-income countries were already in debt distress or at a high risk of it, leaving them with little fiscal room to help the poor and vulnerable who were hit hardest. For this reason, in April 2020, the World Bank and IMF called for the suspension of debt-service payments for the poorest countries to allow them to focus resources on fighting the pandemic. The Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) has enabled these countries to free-up billions of dollars for their COVID-19 response. Yet, debt service outlays to bilateral creditors will impose a heavy burden for years to come, and quick action to reduce debt will be needed to avoid another lost decade.

Global economic prospects have significantly improved in recent months, due to relaxing of containment measures and announcements of additional fiscal support packages in some countries. However, there are increasing signs of divergence across sectors and countries. Expectations for a stronger recovery are also being reflected in commodity and financial markets, with US long-term bond yields and oil prices returning to pre-pandemic levels.

In major European economies the pace of the recovery has been more modest, reflecting extended disruptions from renewed virus outbreaks and associated reductions in working hours in many service sectors. The different sector specialization of economies is also affecting growth, with economies most dependent on international travel and tourism generally experiencing a larger GDP decline in 2020.

Table 1 shows the GDP change in the Western Balkans region.

Table 1: GDP decline in the Western Balkans in 2020

Countries	GDP change in %
Montenegro	-12.0%
Croatia	-9.0%
Slovenia	-6.7%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-6.5%
North Macedonia	-5.4%
Serbia	-2.5%

Source: World Bank

As Table 1 shows, all the Western Balkans economies experienced a negative growth. Montenegro had the highest negative growth of -12%, followed by Croatia (-9%), Slovenia (-6.7%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (-6.5%), Macedonia (-5.45), and Serbia (-2.5%). Global employment loss in 2020 was 114 million jobs and the projections for 2021 are also negative (ILO, 2021). Even the most optimistic projections forecast global unemployment increase and working-hour losses.

The global GDP rise is projected to be 5.6% in 2021. and 4.9% in 2022 (IMF, 2021).

Table 2: OECD temporary economic outlook, March 2021 (GDP increase)

	2020	2021		2022	
		Interim projections	Difference from December	Interim projections	Difference from December
World	-3,4	5,6	1,4	4,0	0,3
G20	-3,2	6,2	1,5	4,1	0,4
Australia	-2,5	4,5	1,3	3,1	0,0
Canada	-5,4	4,7	1,2	4,0	2,0
Euro region	-6,8	3,9	0,3	3,8	0,5
Germany	-5,3	3,0	0,2	3,7	0,4
France	-8,2	5,9	-0,1	3,8	0,5
Italy	-8,9	4,1	-0,2	4,0	0,8
Spain	-11,0	5,7	0,7	4,8	0,8
Japan	-4,8	2,7	0,4	1,8	0,3
Korea	-1,0	3,3	0,5	3,1	-0,3
Mexico	-8,5	4,5	0,9	3,0	-0,4
Turkey	1,8	5,9	3,0	3,0	-0,2
UK	-9,9	5,1	0,9	4,7	0,6
USA	-3,5	6,5	3,3	4,0	0,5
Argentina	-10,5	4,6	0,9	2,1	-2,5
Brazil	-4,4	3,7	1,1	2,7	0,5
China	2,3	7,8	-0,2	4,9	0,0
India	-7,4	12,6	4,7	5,4	0,6
Indonesija	-2,1	4,9	0,9	5,4	0,3
Russia	-3,6	2,7	-0,1	2,6	0,4
Saudi Arabia	-4,0	2,6	-0,6	3,9	0,3
South Africa	-7,2	3,0	-0,1	2,0	-0,5

Source: Strengthening the recovery: The need for speed, OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report, Paris, March 2021

Current fiscal and monetary policy support should continue to underpin demand. Reduced insecurity, improved confidence, and better labour market outlook will allow households to reduce saving gradually, though the increasing concentration of saving amongst higher-income households may slow the spending rebound in some countries. The upturn in global industrial production and merchandise trade should also help boost the outlook for those economies integrated into regional supply chains. Higher commodity prices and a delayed recovery in tourism will however be stumbling blocks for developing economies. Global GDP should be above the pre-pandemic level by mid-2021, although this is not the case in all countries. Considerable heterogeneity in short-term developments is likely to persist, both between advanced and emerging-market economies and between wider regions. The risk of pandemic-induced costs also remains high, with global output at the end of 2021 projected to remain weaker than expected. This is particularly the case in many emerging-market economies (OECD, 2020). Rapid responses by central banks, along with business support government programmes, continue to support financial market conditions.

6. Conclusion

Manufacturing and supply chain disruptions caused financial problems for many businesses, especially those with high debts. Equity investors may take up investment positions that are currently unprofitable, thus creating distrust in financial instruments and securities market. This might lead to further decline in capital market prices and disruptions to financial markets. The full impact of COVID-19 on economies, with the direct and indirect costs, will only be known when the pandemic is over. The pandemic recovery measures will have to combine economic policies and innovative mechanisms in order to protect the most vulnerable population from poverty and to achieve financial stability. At the same time, countries will have to prioritize measures and activities that mitigate the economic fallout of health crises.

Emerging markets and developing economies will experience a severe economic downturn across sectors: pressure on strained health systems, trade and tourism losses, remittance decline, subdued capital flow and financial instability due to debt distress. Energy and industrial goods exporters will be seriously affected. The demand for metals and transport-related materials, such as rubber and platinum for car industry, has also declined. Although agricultural markets are well stocked globally, trade restrictions and supply chain disruptions may raise the issue of food insecurity.

Beside the negative impact, the COVID-19 crisis has considerably accelerated digitalisation. The crisis has created new opportunities for some sectors. The pandemic and associated lockdowns have prompted the transition from physical to virtual economy. Online presence has become a necessity, whereas before the pandemic the online presence was seen only as an alternative to real-world advertising and sales. Global business giants had markedly improved their global presence, while smaller businesses developed their online presence, especially on social media. Tourism and hospitality sectors suffered heavy losses in revenues and jobs, while other businesses, such as Amazon, generated large profits. For instance, in 2020 Amazon delivered a record performance of US\$ 386.1 billion in revenue, a 38% increase from 2019. During the first quarter of 2021, Amazon had a 33-40% revenue increase, surpassing the same quarter of 2020.

Economic growth cannot be achieved without considerable government interventions. High-income economies have provided support for businesses' efforts to reform and reorganize their activities. These policies are becoming increasingly important as short-term support begins to decline due to budget restrictions or unsustainability of traditional business models. Businesses must rapidly focus on their talents, develop new business models, increase productivity, develop new products, and reform their operations. Governments should focus on business support contingent on these strategies. For instance, Germany provides support contingent on investment in future technologies in order to spur green growth. The New Zealand COVID-19 business support framework has several goals: to reset international travel and

tourism, strengthen the resilience of energy, transport, and logistics sectors, to help construction and agricultural industry to move up the value chain, and to spur digitalization process across sectors. In addition to wide economic measures for all sectors, severely affected sectors should be given specific support. This includes support for new business models, technology enhancements, innovations, investigating new input sources, and identifying new markets. Most of the support can take the form of knowledge and technology exchange, but it must be harmonised with loan schemes and investment promotion. There is limited evidence to the efficacy of short-, medium-, and long-term measures, whether directed at financial support or structural reform, in promoting industrial growth. Therefore, further economic research should continue to make estimates on economic performance of countries based on recent reforms. However, the results of this research will be available only in medium term period. Post-pandemic risks for developing countries' industries are very real and could lead to serious slowdowns in their performances. In these unprecedented times, business continuity is essential. It requires a rational response to adverse reactions of supply and demand as soon as restrictions are lifted. For thriving industries, governments should initiate strategies which ensure that manufacturing remains stable in case of supply chain disruptions. This may involve changing orientation towards local supply chains and exploring new products and markets.

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STEPEN POZNAVANJA POSLOVNOG ENGLSKOG JEZIKA MEĐU ZAPOSLENIMA U POJEDINIM INOSTRANIM USLUŽNIM KOMPANIJAMA U SRBIJI

REZIME: Zbog globalizacije i sve većeg učešća u međunarodnom tržištu, poslovna korespondencija se pretežno odvija na engleskom jeziku, te je engleski jezik postao *lingua franca* u međunarodnoj trgovini. Ovim radom se prikazuje u kojoj meri je engleski jezik kao jezik struke važan u pojedinim inostranim uslužnim kompanijama u Srbiji i istražuje se veza između pozicije u kompaniji, upotrebe i razumevanja jezika. Uz navođenje primera iz sprovedenog istraživanja, daju se odgovori na pitanja koje su pozicije u kompanijama najpodložnije uticaju engleskog jezika, tj. na kojim se pozicijama engleski jezik kao jezik struke najbolje poznaje.

KLJUČNE REČI: poslovni engleski jezik, međunarodna trgovina, uslužne kompanije, poslovna korespondencija, stepen poznavanja jezika

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1. Uvod

Kako je engleski danas globalni jezik, sveprisutan u svim oblastima, stičemo utisak da se više ne pridaje dovoljno važnosti samom procesu učenja engleskog jezika što pokazuje i podatak da na zvaničnom sajtu Zavoda za unapređivanje obrazovanja i vaspitanja, u katalogu seminara za stručno usavršavanje, nije pronađen nijedan seminar koji bi pomogao zaposlenima da usavrše poslovni engleski jezik. S pojavom globalizacije dolazi do očiglednih razlika i promena u ekonomiji, a samim tim i u poslovnoj komunikaciji i međunarodnoj trgovini. Izloženost stranim jezicima u našem svakodnevnom životu znači da se učenje jezika često dešava na nesvesnom nivou. Kao posledica, mnogo ljudi ima problema pri komuniciranju na engleskom jeziku, a naročito osobe koje se bave međunarodnom trgovinom, gde je poznavanje registra poslovnog engleskog jezika od krucijalne važnosti.

Poznato je da je u svetu mnogo radova i knjiga napisano na temu globalnog jezika i engleskog jezika kao internacionalnog jezika. U svojoj doktorskoj disertaciji, Karmela Briguljo (Briguglio, 2005) ukazuje da je stanovnicima u Maleziji i Hong Kongu potrebno dodatno usavršavanje poslovnog registra engleskog jezika čak iako im je engleski jedan od zvaničnih jezika. U prvom delu rada, biće prikazani koncept globalizacije i međunarodne trgovine, fenomen engleskog jezika kao globalnog jezika, kao i termin *lingua franca*. Drugi deo predstavlja pogled na rezultate izvršenog istraživanja.

2. Engleski jezik kao globalni jezik

Radi lakše i efektivnije komunikacije, potrebno je da obratimo pažnju na sve aspekte komunikacije – svakodnevne, globalne i poslovne. Jezik dobija globalni status kada se razvije u tolikoj meri da ima posebnu ulogu koja se prepoznaje u svakom društvu, bez obzira da li je uloga maternjeg jezika ili obaveznog drugog jezika (Crystal 2003: 3). Kristal takođe kaže da jezik ne postaje globalni jezik na osnovu broja ljudi koji ga govore, već na osnovu statusa govornika, što znači da ljudi govore onim jezikom koji će im doneti sigurnost. Ukoliko je jedan jezik *lingua*

franca, on služi za različite namene, te se, na osnovu ovoga, mogu izdvojiti *lingua academica* (naučni jezik), *lingua emotiva* (jezik Holivuda), *lingua frankensteinia* (osvajajući jezik), *lingua cultura* (jezik zasnovan na engleskim književnim tekstovima) (Phillipson 2008: 250, 251).

„Od svih svetskih jezika engleski jezik verovatno ima najbogatiji, najheterogeniji i naraznovrsniji rečnik. U ovom jeziku, na neki način, ogleda se okamenjena, ili sa još uvek vidljivim tragovima asimilovanja, čitava istorija Engleske, nacionalna kao i internacionalna, politička kao i istorija društva...” (Radosavljević 2009: 25). Gradol (Graddol) u svom delu *English Next* tvrdi da pored konvencionalnog deljenja engleskog jezika na: staroengleski to jest anglosaksonski engleski jezik, srednjovekovni engleski jezik i moderni engleski jezik, sada možemo pričati i o periodu „globalnog engleskog jezika” (Graddol 2006: 60). Gradol takođe kaže da bi nam ovaj, četvrti, period omogućio dodatno proučavanje engleskog jezika kao jezika *lingua franca*, kao i posmatranje kulturoloških, lingvističkih, političkih i ekonomskih problema koji nas okružuju.

Postoje dva faktora koja utiču na postavljanje jednog jezika – engleskog jezika u status globalnog i to su: geografsko-istorijski faktor, koji čine vojna osvajanja kroz istoriju i politički uticaj; i sociokulturološki faktor, pomoću kojeg se jezik širi po svetu kroz umetnost – naročito nakon pojave interneta.

Radi lakše razmene dobara i lakšeg obavljanja međunarodnih transakcija od primitivnih vremena pa sve do danas, morao je postojati zajednički jezik kako bi se prevazišle prvenstveno jezičke, a onda i kulturološke barijere.

Engleski jezik je postao svetski jezik u internacionalnom i globalnom smislu. Internacionalno, kao medijum književnosti i kulturnih dešavanja u svetu, a naročito u zemljama nekadašnje britanske imperije; a globalno, kao podrazumevani jezik tehnoloških dostignuća i širenja informacija (Briguglio 2005: 27).

Karmela Briguljo je sprovela detaljno istraživanje na temu engleskog jezika kao globalnog jezika i njegovog uticaja na poslovanje. Njeno istraživanje je pokazalo da poslovna korespondencija umnogome zavisi od jezičkih struktura i veština koje se koriste.

Kroz istoriju, u svetu nikada do sada nije postojalo vreme u kojem toliko različitih nacija mora da komunicira jedna sa drugom i nikada pre nije postojala ovoliko jaka potreba za globalnim jezikom radi lakše integracije i obavljanja poslova (Crystal 2003: 14).

2.1. Engleski jezik kao *lingua franca* u međunarodnoj trgovini

„Svaki jezik je prikladno i dovoljno sredstvo za obavljanje komunikacijskih potreba zajednice kojoj služi” (Bugarski 1996: 25). Ranko Bugarski u svom delu *Uvod u opštu lingvistiku* (1996) govori o terminu *lingua franca* koji definiše kao jezik šire komunikacije, tj. kao međunarodni i svetski jezik. Početkom 2000. godine strane kompanije su počele da sve više dolaze u Srbiju i otvaraju svoje filijale. S dolaskom inostranih kompanija, javljala se potreba za zajedničkim jezikom među svim zaposlenima, te se od tada u svakoj uslužnoj kompaniji zahteva poznavanje engleskog jezika. Usavršavanje ESP-a³ smatra se jednim od najizazovnijih vidova usavršavanja jezika s obzirom da se, u okviru učenja, naglasak stavlja na praktične rezultate korišćenja jezika i učenje samog posla umesto na standardno izučavanje jezičkih veština (Radosavljević 2009).

Kako je globalizacija pretežno ekonomski pojam, jedna od glavnih posledica globalizacije jeste slobodan protok kapitala, što predstavlja dodatni dokaz za važnost globalnog jezika. S vremenom, pojam BELF⁴ je usvojen širom sveta, te se povećava uticaj engleskog jezika kao globalnog jezika trgovine.

Učenje i korišćenje BELF-a svakako pruža pogodnosti u smislu funkcionisanja u poslovnom svetu iz razloga što sociološki, politički, psihološki i ideološki principi ostaju u drugom planu i nisu smetnja pri obavljanju posla. Kako *lingua franca* mora biti neutralan jezik, tako BELF moraju učiti i nativni govornici engleskog jezika. Razlog ovome jeste taj da BELF ne sadrži žargonske izraze; karakterišu ga smanjena pravila u lingvističkom smislu: jezik se koristi isključivo za obavljanje posla, te se mogu izostavljati članovi, određene množine imenica, ak-

³ ESP – English for Specific Purposes

⁴ BELF – Business English as Lingua Franca

centovanje, kao i striktna gramatička pravila koja su karakteristična za standardni engleski jezik.

Pri učenju standardnog engleskog jezika, nenativni govornik pokušava da imitira izvornog govornika; pri učenju BELF-a, govornik želi da obavi posao.

1. Nenativni govornik se smatra za učenika koji usporava posao i zahteva pažnju (standardni engleski jezik); govornik je u pravu (BELF).
2. U standardnom engleskom jeziku glavna komunikacija je usmerena na greške; u BELF-u se komunikacija usmerava na povećanje vokabulara i brzo davanje odgovora.
3. U standardnoj varijanti engleskog jezika nenativni govornici pokušavaju da isprave greške; širenje vokabulara i brza komunikacija glavne su osobine BELF-a.
4. Kultura zemlje domaćina je važna u standardnom engleskom jeziku; u BELF-u je važna globalna poslovna kultura.
5. Cilj govornika jeste povećanje razumevanja „savršenog” engleskog jezika (standardni engleski jezik); cilj je povećanje razumevanja engleskog jezika za globalno poslovanje – BELF (Živković, M. 2015: 731).

Mark Elis (Mark Ellis) i Kristina Džonson (Christine Johnson) u knjizi *Učenje poslovnog engleskog jezika* (1994: 7–13) karakterišu poslovni engleski jezik i njegove potrebe za uspešno poslovanje kroz pet aspekata:

1. Jezik koji koriste poslovni ljudi često se upotrebljava;
2. Društveno poslovni kontakti su često oponašani;
3. Jasna informacija mora da bude prenesena za kratko vreme;
4. Jezik koji se koristi u biznisu neće biti s bogatim fondom reči, niti će biti vezan za kulturu kao standardni jezik izvornih govornika, već će biti baziran na osnovnim strukturama i poslovnom fondu reči;
5. Kursevi poslovnog engleskog jezika razlikovaće se u svojim ciljevima od standardnih kurseva jezika.

Engleskim jezikom, kao oficijelnim jezikom poslovanja, služi se čak 85% međunarodnih korporacija i organizacija, štaviše, u azijskom i regionu Pacifika stepen upotrebe engleskog jezika kao zvaničnog jezika poslovanja iznosi 90%; dok su proučavanjem komunikacije putem interneta, statistički podaci pokazali da ga koristi 536 miliona ljudi na svetu, što čini 1/3 internet korisnika (Martins 2017: 61).

Ekonomista Pol Samjuelson (Paul Samuelson) izneo je 1949. godine svoju teoriju trgovine na kojoj se danas zasniva poslovanje Svetske banke i MMF-a⁵. Teorija Pola Samjuelsona imala je za cilj da dokaže da slobodna međunarodna trgovina može dovesti do izjednačavanja cene rada i kapitala u celom svetu, te iz ovoga proizlazi iskaz da ekonomska globalizacija sledi princip „čitav svet – jedno tržište” (Radović 2013: 221–224).

Imajući u vidu da se na međunarodnom tržištu nalaze ljudi iz različitih zemalja, različitih kultura i različitih shvatanja pojma poslovanja, postavlja se pitanje koliki uticaj ima globalizacija na komunikaciju među kompanijama. Ukoliko je princip globalizacije „čitav svet – jedno tržište”, taj princip, onda, podrazumeva i jedan jezik za sve učesnike – svaka zemlja ima zvanični jezik, pa bi tako i čitav svet trebalo da ima zajedničko sredstvo komunikacije.

3. Istraživanje i rezultati

Cilj ovog rada je da se pokaže u kojoj meri je zaposlenima u pojedinim inostranim uslužnim kompanijama u Srbiji potreban poslovni engleski jezik. Kako bi se navedeno pokazalo, urađeno je istraživanje u Srbiji u drugoj polovini 2018. godine. Rezultati su dobijeni preko strukturiranog upitanika, a postavljene su dve hipoteze:

1. Stepenn poznavanja poslovnog engleskog jezika među zaposlenima u uslužnim kompanijama u Srbiji direktno zavisi od pozicije u kompaniji.
2. Zaposleni u uslužnim kompanijama u Srbiji ne mogu uspešno poslovati u međunarodnoj trgovini ukoliko ne poznaju poslovni engleski jezik svoje struke.

⁵ Međunarodni monetarni fond

Upitnik se sastojao iz tri različita dela. U prvom delu, ispitanici su za zadatak imali da za određene termine koji se tiču međunarodne trgovine i poslovanja⁶ zaokruže odgovor⁷ koji smatraju najprikladnijim. U sledećem delu prikazano je ukupno dvanaest termina iz prethodne tabele i pored njih su dati mogući prevodi za te termine. Ispitanici su imali za zadatak da zaokruže slovo ispred srpskog termina za koji smatraju da najbolje odgovara engleskom terminu. Treći deo je bio malo drugačiji i sastojao se od osam rečenica od kojih je svaka imala veze s međunarodnom trgovinom. Zadatak je bio da se zaokruži *DA* ukoliko ispitanik razume rečenicu u potpunosti, ili *NE* ukoliko je ne razume. Upitnici su deljeni u telekomunikacijskim kompanijama „Telenor”, čije je sedište u Norveškoj, i u kompaniji „Vip” sa sedištem u Austriji. Potom, u osiguravajućoj kompaniji „Grawe” i u Erste banci koje, isto kao i prethodna kompanija, imaju sedište u Austriji. Kompanije u kojima se takođe vršilo ispitivanje jesu „Veletabak”, „DRÄXLMAIER Group” – nemačka kompanija, kompanija „Talent 4 Blinds” iz Belgije i kompanija „Essex Group” iz Francuske. Učestvovalo je ukupno 65 ispitanika na 32 profesionalne pozicije. Ispitanici su bili na pozicijama direktora, menadžera, predstavnika prodaje, sekretara itd. Starosna struktura ispitanika je, takođe, bila od velikog značaja za istraživanje, jer se iz tog podataka moglo videti da li iskustvo u poslu ima ulogu u poznavanju engleskog jezika.

Nakon analiziranih podataka, došlo se do zaključka da pozicija u kompaniji igra bitnu ulogu budući da su ispitanici na višim pozicijama bolje poznavali poslovnu terminologiju iako neki termini nisu bili u njihovoj sferi poslovanja. Kao primer za ovo može se uzeti pozicija *direktora logistike* na kojoj su zaposlena dva ispitanika. Zaposleni

⁶ Termini koju su se koristili jesu: *upit, proizvodi, cena za prevoz robe, pravila u međunarodnoj trgovini, odredba, nadoknaditi, tražena ponuda, kupoprodajni ugovor, avansno plaćanje, plaćanje pouzećem, obeštećenje, novčana doznaka, korisnik, likvidnost, zakonito sredstvo plaćanja, dostava, imovina, netražena ponuda, odobrenje banke, odnos rizika i dobiti, osiguranje, nepredviđene okolnosti, faktura, platežna sposobnost, obaveze.*


⁷ Ponudeni odgovori su: a) *Poznat mi je termin i koristim ga;* b) *Poznat mi je termin, ali ga ne koristim;* c) *Termin mi nije poznat, ali sam ga viđao/la;* d) *Termin mi nije poznat i ne koristim ga.*

koji je pohađao časove iz poslovnog engleskog jezika odgovarao je na pitanja dosledno i pokazao bolje znanje, iako oba ispitanika rade isti posao. Kako su se ispitivali zaposleni na nižim pozicijama, tako je i nivo poznavanja poslovnog engleskog jezika opadao. Ispitanici koji su zaposleni isključivo na prodajnim pozicijama smatrali su neke termine zbunjujućim, što se pokazalo u njihovim odgovorima – govorili su da znaju termin, ali posle nisu znali da ga prevedu iako su imali ponuđene odgovore.

Ustanovljeno je da je učenje engleskog jedan od glavnih prioriteta u obrazovanju imajući u vidu da samo tri ispitanika (što čini 5% ukupno ispitanih) nikada nije učilo jezik (Grafikon 1). Samo devet ispitanika ne koristi engleski jezik u svom poslu, jedan ispitanik ga koristi povremeno, dok ga svi ostali ispitanici upotrebljavaju svakodnevno (Grafikon 2). Ispitanici su takođe imali za zadatak da izraze svoje mišljenje o sopstvenom poznavanju registra poslovnog engleskog jezika: 73% smatra da poznaje poslovnu terminologiju, dok 27% misli da ne poznaje (Grafikon 3). Interesantan podatak jeste da su se svi zaposleni složili i rekli da usavršavanje poslovnog engleskog jezika treba da bude obavezno u svakoj kompaniji.

S razvijanjem informacionih tehnologija, engleski jezik je postao podrazumevani jezik komunikacije putem interneta, a teži da postane i podrazumevani jezik poslovanja, imajući u vidu da je stepen njegovog korišćenja prilično visok (Martins 2017: 61). Ispitanici su bili podeljeni u tri grupe po starosnoj strukturi: od 20 do 34, od 35 do 50, od 51 do 60 godina. Očekivalo se da ispitanici iz prve grupe (od 20 do 34) najbolje poznaju jezik jer koriste internet u većoj meri od ostalih (Grafikon 4). Istraživanjem se pokazalo da to nije slučaj i da poznavanje poslovne terminologije zavisi isključivo od profesionalne pozicije u firmi. Ispitanici koji više koriste internet poznaju standardni engleski jezik bolje, ali im je potrebno dodatno obrazovanje u domenu poslovnog engleskog jezika.


Grafikon 1




Grafikon 2



Grafikon 3



Grafikon 4



4. Zaključak

Svest o važnosti poslovnog engleskog jezika raste iz dana u dan, a ciljevi, misija i vizija svake kompanije umnogome doprinose tome. S razvojem informacionih tehnologija, potreba za jednim zajedničkim jezikom javila se kod svake osobe koja ga koristi.

Ukoliko posmatramo inostrane uslužne kompanije, jasno je da poznavanje poslovnog engleskog jezika treba da se poboljša da bi zaista postao *lingua franca*, tj. BELF.

Kako se engleski širi kroz kulturu, razumljivo je da ljudi misle da poznaju jezik i ne obraćaju previše pažnju na poslovni aspekt jezika, iako postoje jasne razlike između standardnog jezika i BELF-a. Doba globalizacije je donelo mnogo promena, društva i kulture se spajaju i povećavaju potrebu za zajedničkim jezikom radi lakše komunikacije.

Istraživanje je sprovedeno na 65 ispitanika koji rade na 32 profesionalne pozicije. Pokazano je da je zaposlenima u pojedinim inostranim uslužnim kompanijama, bez obzira na poziciju i godine, potrebno dobro poznavanje engleskog jezika. Obe hipoteze su se dokazale, što je još jedna potvrda da je potreban globalni jezik. Vrednost ovog istraživanja leži u činjenici da je ovo jedan od retkih radova koji pruža uvid u važnost engleskog jezika za poslovanje u Srbiji. Može se zaključiti da postoji potreba za uključivanjem časova poslovnog engleskog jezika u srednje škole u Srbiji.

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THE LEVEL OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE COMPETENCE AMONG EMPLOYEES IN FOREIGN TRADING COMPANIES IN SERBIA

SUMMARY: Due to the globalization and high demand of international market, business correspondence is being performed mainly in English, making the English language *lingua franca* in international trade. This paper shows in what degree the English language is, as the language for specific purposes, important in the international trading companies; it studies the connection between the professional position of an employee in a company, the usage and understanding of the language. Together with examples from the research conducted, this paper provides some answers to the questions – what professional positions are most likely to change in terms of the English language usage, that is, on which professional positions is the language known best?

KEYWORDS: Business English, international trade, trading companies, business correspondence, knowledge of business English

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1. Introduction

The English language is a global language, present in all areas of expertise and life, thus we have the impression that learning the language is not of the high importance. Due to the globalization many differences can be seen in economy, as well as in business correspondence and in foreign trade. Foreign languages and our exposure to them, in our everyday lives, influence our behavior and our acquisition of foreign languages is often at the unconscious level.

Not being conscious enough, that is, not knowing English language for specific purposes, people face difficulties in communication, especially in international trade. At the official website of the Institute for the improvement of education, there are no lectures and seminars about business English, and the acquisition of business English language is crucial step in successfully done foreign trade.

There are many published books and articles on the subject of global language and the English language as an international mean of communication. In her doctoral dissertation, Carmela Briguglio proved that people in Malesia and Hong Kong need further education in business English even though English language is one of the official languages. In this paper, notions of globalization and international trade in language contest are defined, as well as the phenomenon of the English language as a global language. Moreover, the term *lingua franca* is explained. The second part of this paper displays precise and clear findings from a research, conducted with the help of structure questionnaire.

2. English as a global language

If we want to communicate in an easier way, we need to pay attention on every aspect of communication – everyday communication, global and business communication. A language receives global status when it is developed in such amount that it plays special role, recognized in every society and every occasion (Crystal 2003: 3). Crystal also states that one language does not become global from the number of

people who speak it, but it becomes global on the basis of the social status of people, which means people speak the language that bring them security. If one language is *lingua franca* it serves different purposes, so we can distinguish several types such as: *lingua academica* (the language of science), *lingua emotiva* (the language of Hollywood), *lingua frankensteinia* (the language of conquest), *lingua cultura* (language based on literary text in English language) (Filipson 2008: 250, 251).

“Of all world-languages English probably has the vocabulary which is the most copious, heterogeneous and varied. In it, as it were, there it lies fossilized or still showing signs of the freshness of its assimilation, the whole English history, external and internal, political and social...” (Radosavljević 2009: 254). In his work *English Next*, Graddol claims that next to conventional division of the English language on Anglo-Saxon and modern English language, we can now talk about the period of the global English language (Graddol 2006: 60). Graddol also says that this gives us opportunity to further examine what *lingua franca* is, and observe cultural, linguistic, political and economic problems that surround us.

There are two factors that make English language a global language and those are: geographical-historical factor which is made of political influence and conquests throughout the history (for example English language was spared from all former British, and the role of the United States and the Great Britain in both World Wars); and sociocultural factor by which English language is spread through music, movie industry and especially after the development of the Internet. In order to be a part of international trade and international transactions, from the beginning of the time till the day being there is a need for one common language to overcome firstly language, and then cultural barriers.

English language has become the world's language both in international and global sense - international as a media of literary and cultural happenings in the world especially in countries of former British Empire; and globally as a default language of technology and social events (Briguglio 2005: 27). As previously mentioned, Carmela Briguglio did a significant research on the subject of global language and its influence on business. She proved that business correspondence can vary depending on the type of language strictures and skills which were used.

Throughout history, there was never a time where so many different nations need to communicate with each other and the need for bilingualism and one global language for the purposes of integration and business has never been higher (Crystal 2013: 14).

2.1. English language as *lingua franca* in international trade

“Every language is an adequate and sufficient medium for communication purposes to the society it serves” (Bugarski 1996: 25). In his book *The Introduction to General Linguistics* (1996), Ranko Bugarski writes about the term *lingua franca* which he defines as a language of wider communication i.e. the international language and the language of the world.

With the beginning of the 21st century, many foreign companies started their business in Serbia. With foreign companies' appearance in our country the need for one universal language emerged, so trading companies demand good command of the English language among their employees. ESP³ is one of the most challenging ways to learn a language bearing in mind that an individual learns how to use the language and how to do business in it, rather than learning basic language skills (Radosavljević 2009).

One of the main consequences of globalization, as globalization is mainly economic term, is free flow of assets and this is an additional proof of the importance of one global language. By time, the term BELF⁴ is acquired all over the world and it makes English language more important than ever before.

Learning BELF provides many conveniences in functioning in the world of business. The main reason for this is that sociological, political, ideological and psychological principles stay aside and are not in the way to language learning. As *lingua franca* needs to be a neutral language, even native speakers of English have to learn BELF because

³ ESP – English for Specific Purposes

⁴ BELF – Business English as Lingua Franca

BELF does not have slangs; it does not have as much rules in linguistics; it is used exclusively for business so we can omit articles, plural, and other grammar units which standard English language has. Moreover, we have interesting differences between standard language and BELF:

1. When learning standard variant of the English language, non-native speaker tries to imitate a native speaker while during the process of learning BELF the speaker's only goal is doing business.
2. Non-native speaker is considered to be an individual who needs attention and is not good enough for business (standard English language); the speaker is always right (BELF).
3. In standard variant of the English language we try to correct mistakes: BELF is all about expanding vocabulary and fast communication.
4. The culture of each country is important (standard English language), global business culture is important (BELF).
5. The aim is the understanding of the "perfectly" spoken English language (standard language); the aim is to understand the language for business purposes (BELF) (Živković 2015: 731).

In the book *Teaching Business English* (1994: 7-13), Mark Ellis and Christine Johnson explain business English language through five aspects:

1. Language which business people speak is often used.
2. Socio-business contacts are often imitated.
3. Clear information needs to be transferred in short amount of time.
4. Business language does not have rich vocabulary and is not bound to one culture but it is based on basic structures and business vocabulary.
5. Different courses of business English language are different depending on the goal of learning.

English language is the official language of business in 85% of international companies and organizations, moreover, in Asia that

number is 90%. Statistical data show that on the Internet 536 million people use English language, which is the 1/3 of all Internet users (Martins 2017: 61).

In the year of 1949, economist Paul Samuelson brought his theory of trade on which the business of The World Bank and IMF⁵ is based. Paul Samuelson's theory was brought with the goal to equalize labor cost and capital in the whole world. His definition serves as the base for globalization principle which is "whole world – one market" (Radović 2013: 221-224). Having in mind that there are many different nations in the international market and each individual has a different understanding of the term business, one question arises – In which extent does globalization influence communication among companies? If the principle of globalization is "whole world – one market", then we can say that the same principles implies one language for all participants in international trade - each country has its own language; thus the whole world should have one common language.

3. Research and results

The aim of this paper was to show in which extent do employees in trading companies in Serbia need business English, so detailed research was conducted. The empirical research was done in Serbia during the second half of the year 2018. The results were obtained with the help of the structured questionnaire, and two hypotheses were set:

1. The degree of ESP, among employees in trading companies in Serbia, depends on professional position in one company.
2. Employees in trading companies cannot do business successfully without ESP.

Questionnaire was made of three parts. In the first part, respondents had to circle the answer⁶ which they find suitable as they

⁵ IMF – International Monetary Fund

⁶ Answers in the 1st part were a) *I know the term and I use it;* b) *I know the*

were given a table with twenty five terms about international trade and business and they had to give their opinion.⁷ The second part was made out of twelve terms from the previous table and each term was accompanied with three translation equivalents. The third and the last part of the questionnaire was somewhat different – it consisted of eight sentences which were about international trade. The task was to circle *YES* if a respondent understands the sentence, or *NO* if a respondent does not understand. Questionnaires were given in telecommunication companies “Telenor” and “Vip”, insurance company “Grawe” and in “Erste” bank. Furthermore, in distributional company “Veletabak”, German company „DRÄXLMAIER Group”, in “Talent 4 Blinds” company from Belgium, French company “Essex Group” and “MK Commerce” company from Novi Sad – Serbia. Total of sixty-five respondents on thirty-two professional positions participated. Respondents were directors, managers, referees, sales representatives, secretaries, etc. Also, the age structure of respondents played an important part of this research, in order to see whether experience plays a role in English language knowledge.

After the research, it was concluded that the position in a company plays an important role because respondents on higher positions showed better knowledge of business vocabulary even though some vocabulary units were not in their area of business. The example to this are two respondents on *the director of logistics* position. Both respondents, of course, do the same job, but the respondent who had had lessons of business English did better as his answers were consistent. As lower positions in companies were questioned the level of ESP competence was lower and we can clearly see that in the example of sales associate position – respondents found terms to be confusing and they gave somewhat ambiguous answers, they had circled that they know the term but they did not know to translate them even though the answers were given.


term but I do not use it; c) I do not know the term but I have seen it; d) I do not know the term and I do not use it.

⁷ Used terms were: *enquiry, commodities, freight, Incoterms, provision, reimburse, solicited offer, contract of sale, carriage paid to – CPT, carriage forward, reimbursement, remittance, beneficiary, liquidity, legal tender, delivery, assets, unsolicited offer, credit entry, risk-return trade-off, insurance, contingencies, invoice, customer status, liabilities.*


It was noticed that learning English is becoming one of the main priorities in education as only three respondents (5% of respondents) have never learned the language (*1st graph*). Another important thing is that only nine respondents do not use English in their job, one respondent use it occasionally and all other respondents use it daily (*2nd graph*). Respondents had to answer the question whether they think they know the business terminology in English language: 73% of respondents think they know business terminology, and 27% think otherwise (*3rd graph*). One more interesting fact is that every respondent said that learning business English should be obligatory in every corporation.

With the development of informational technologies the usage of the English language increased as English is default language on the Internet and it certainly tends to become default language of business (Martins 2017: 61). Respondents were divided in three groups considering age span: from twenty to thirty-four, from thirty-five to forty and from fifty- one to sixty; it was expected that respondents from the first group (age span from twenty to thirty-four) know the terminology best because they use the Internet more often than other two groups (*4th graph*). The research showed that this was not the case and that knowledge depends directly on professional position in the company. Employees who use the Internet at the great extent, knew standard variant of the language better but they need further education in ESP, i.e. BELF.


1st graph




2nd graph



3rd graph



4th graph



4. Conclusion

The awareness of the importance of business English language is rising every day. The goal, mission and vision of the company contribute to the extent of English language knowledge. With the development of informational technologies, the need for one common language was integrated in each individual.

Language serves the purpose of communication in one community and we all need to understand it. So, if we observe trading companies, it is clear that business English should be perfected so that it actually becomes *lingua franca* or BELF.

Having in mind that the language is spread through culture, it is somewhat understandable that people think they know the language and they are not paying attention to business aspect of it, although there are clear differences between standard language and BELF. The age of globalization brings us certain changes and one of them is that societies and cultures merge and that we need one common language. Certainly, there are difficulties in learning a global language, even among native speakers, and that shows us how English language as *lingua franca* is.

The research on this subject was conducted on sixty-five employees on thirty-two professional positions, and it showed that employees in foreign trading companies in Serbia need good command of the English language at every position and in every age span. Both hypotheses have been proven right and that is another proof that the need for one global language, in this case English, is enormous.

This work represents one of the rare researches where employees in trading companies in Serbia were questioned, so we have an insight in the importance of English language in business in Serbia. The conclusion is, among other things, that there is a need for incorporating lessons of business English in high schools in the Republic of Serbia. Finally, this work may represent the basis for some future researches about this topic, which could further contribute to better understanding of this important subject.

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„TAKO OČIGLEDNO I TAKO NEZAMISLIVO”: EKO-DISTOPIJA U TRILOGIJI *LUDADAM* MARGARET ATVUD

APSTRAKT: Margaret Atvud se u svojim delima već dugo bavi temom prirode i nasiljem nad prirodom od strane čoveka. I sama autorka je ekološka aktivistkinja, koja se bavi aktuelnim pitanjima u vezi sa zaštitom životne sredine i klimatskim promenama. Još od svog prvog romana *Izranjanje* (1972), preko najznačajnijeg dela *Sluškinjina priča* (1986), sve do trilogije *Ludadam* (koju čine romani *Antilopa i Kosac* (2003), *Godina potopa* (2009) i *Ludadam* (2013)), Atvudova kritikuje stav čovečanstva prema prirodi i drugim živim bićima, koji se sastoji u tome da čovek nad njima vlada i potčinjava ih sebi. U aktuelnom kontekstu kulturološke i ekološke krize u svetu, ovaj rad analizira trilogiju *Ludadam* kroz prizmu ekološke književne kritike i razmatra koliko autorkina vizija ekološke distopije odražava stvarno stanje u svetu.

KLJUČNE REČI: ekološka kritika, eko-distopija, Margaret Atvud, trilogija *Ludadam*, distopija

1. Uvod

U poslednjih nekoliko godina, u javnosti kao da je utihnula debata o pojmu klimatskih promena i uticaju klimatskih promena na životnu sredinu i čovečanstvo. Umesto toga, raste strepnja da se klimatske

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promene neće odvijati sporo, i u dalekoj budućnosti. Štaviše, prisutne su ovde i sada, i svake godine postaju sve vidljivije: uragani i snažne oluje pustoše priobalne oblasti, bujične poplave odnose živote i čitava domaćinstva, čak i u najrazvijenijim zemljama; usevi propadaju, a ljudi i životinje stradaju usled talasa žestokih vrućina; zagađenje vode i vazduha nekontrolisano se povećava; šumski požari besne sve jače. Čini se da prirodne nepogode nikada nisu bile tako učestale kao poslednjih godina. Sem toga, uzrok izbijanja pandemija, kao što je pandemija COVID-19, vezuje se za ugrožavanje prirodnih staništa od strane čoveka. Usled aktivnosti poput sečenja šuma i nedozvoljenog lova, životinjske vrste, koje inače nikada ne bi došle u kontakt s čovekom, sada mogu da nam prenesu nepoznate i opasne patogene klice. Zbog svega navedenog, naučnici koji se bave zaštitom životne sredine i ekološki aktivisti, posebno s engleskog govornog područja, sada govore o „klimatskoj krizi”.

Neki mediji s engleskog govornog područja, poput britanskog časopisa *The Guardian*, britanskog javnog servisa BBC, i američke agencije AP, objavili su 2019. godine da će nadalje koristiti termine „klimatsko vanredno stanje” ili „klimatska kriza” umesto termina „klimatske promene”, jer „se smatra da izraz klimatske promene ne odražava dovoljno jasno koliko je situacija ozbiljna” (*The Guardian*, 16. oktobar 2019). Na veb-stranici Ujedinjenih nacija (<https://www.un.org/en/un75/climate-crisis-race-we-can-win>) navodi se da „klimatske promene predstavljaju presudni momenat našeg doba, a odvijaju se i brže nego što smo strahovali [...] ni najudaljeniji krajevi naše planete nisu imuni na razorne posledice klimatskih promena”. Uvodni tekst opisuje košmarnu situaciju u svetu:

Porast temperatura izaziva sve veće uništavanje životne sredine, prirodne nepogode, ekstremne vrućine i hladnoće, nestašice vode i hrane, ekonomsku nestabilnost, sukobe, i terorističke aktivnosti. Nivo mora se podiže, glečeri na Arktiku se tope, koralni grebeni izumiru, okeanska voda postaje kisela, šume stradaju od požara. Jasno je da ne možemo dalje kao da se ništa ne dešava. Sada je trenutak za odlučno i udruženo delovanje, dok cena koju plaćamo zbog klimatskih promena nije postala previsoka.

Međutim, čini se da se veći deo sveta i dalje ponaša kao da se ništa ne dešava. Nedavno održana konferencija o klimi u Glazgovu u organizaciji UN (COP26) završena je pozivom da se sve države obavežu da će smanjiti emisiju gasova koji izazivaju efekat staklene bašte. Više od 200 država iznova se obavezalo da će smanjiti zagađenje metanom, krčenje šuma i ulaganje u fosilna goriva. Dve države koje su najveći zagađivači ugljenikom, SAD i Kina, pristale su da tokom ove decenije sarađuju u cilju ograničavanja globalnog zagrevanja, kako se ono ne bi povećalo više od 1,5 stepen Celzijusa. Međutim, Kina i Indija, najveći potrošači uglja na svetu, nisu se obavezale da se u potpunosti odreknu upotrebe fosilnih goriva. Naučnici i aktivisti koji se bave klimatskim promenama smatraju da je učinjen korak napred, ali da to nije dovoljno da bismo se izborili s klimatskom krizom (CNBC, 16. novembar 2021).

Trenutna klimatska kriza u svetu jezivo podseća na situaciju koju Margaret Atwood opisuje u svom romanu *Godina potopa* (2009), koji se bavi posledicama bezobzirnog uništavanja životne sredine:

Znala sam da se u svetu dešavaju ružne stvari, pričali su o tome, vidala sam to u vestima. Ali te ružne stvari dešavale su se negde drugde. [...] Svi su znali. Niko nije hteo da prizna da zna. Kad bi drugi počeli da pričaju o tome, zanemarivali ste ih, jer je ono što su govorili istovremeno bilo tako očigledno i tako nezamislivo.

Trošimo Zemlju. Gotovo je potrošena. (Godina potopa, 282)

U kontekstu kulturološke i ekološke krize u svetu, ovaj rad se bavi analizom trilogije *Ludadam* kroz prizmu ekološke kritike i ispituje koliko autorkina vizija eko-distopije odražava trenutno stanje u stvarnosti. Teme koje se obrađuju u trilogiji posebno su aktuelne u ovom trenutku. Pre izbijanja pandemije COVID-19, smatralo se da su klimatske promene ili klimatska kriza najveća pretnja za čovečanstvo i za globalnu ekonomiju. Svetski lideri i međunarodne organizacije najviše su se bavili pitanjem kako da istovremeno ostvarujemo ekonomski rast i napredak, a da time ne nanosimo štetu biosferi. Treba naglasiti da je tek mali broj svetskih lidera i organizacija razmatrao mogućnost da se potpuno odustane od čitave doktrine ekonomskog rasta. Gotovo nikome nije padalo na pamet da je ugroženo nešto mnogo važnije od globalne ekonomije.

U svom govoru na klimatskom samitu UN u Katovicama 2018. godine, mlada ekološka aktivistkinja Greta Tunberg izjavila je da ako se rešenje ne može naći u postojećem sistemu, onda moramo da promenimo sam sistem (*Democracy Now*, 13. decembar 2018.). Međutim, za tako nešto izgleda još nema ni volje ni spremnosti. Dešavaju se ružne stvari, ali za većinu ljudi, pogotovo u razvijenim zemljama, te ružne stvari mogu i dalje da se dešavaju, pod uslovom da su negde drugde.

Sada, dok se čitav svet bori s pandemijom COVID-19, dok nam prete recesija, otkazi, nezaposlenost i ekonomski kolaps, postajemo svesni koliko je naš svakodnevni život lako narušiti i kakvu pustoš za sobom ostavlja bezobzirno uništavanje životne sredine. U ovom radu razmatra se da li je eko-apokalipsa koja je opisana u trilogiji *Ludadam* neizbežna: da li čovečanstvo mora doći do same ivice opstanka pre no što se opameti? Možemo li da obuzdamo svoje destruktivne nagone i promenimo svoj odnos prema prirodi?

2. Ekološka kritika u književnosti

Počeci ekološke kritike u književnosti vezuju se za regionalni pokret američkih književnih kritičara koji su se interesovali za književna dela koja su se bavila prirodom i životnom sredinom. Tokom poslednjih trideset godina, od devedesetih godina prošlog veka do danas, nastala je interdisciplinarna zajednica naučnika i istraživača koji u svojim radovima iskazuju sve veću zabrinutost zbog ekološke krize u svetu. Svi se slažu da je ova kriza nastala usled pogrešnog poimanja prirode uopšte, i posebno čovekove prirode (Gersdorf & Mayer, 2006: 9). Kako navodi Greg Garrard (2004), tekst koji je od ključne važnosti za ekološku kritiku jeste „Basna o sutrašnjici” (“A Fable for Tomorrow”), u delu Rejčel Karson iz 1962. godine *Tiho proleće* (*Silent Spring*). Putem pesničkog jezika i podražavanjem žanrova pastorale i apokalipse, autorka upozorava na rizik od upotrebe organskih pesticida i izlaže naučne dokaze o tome kakvu pretnju ovi pesticidi predstavljaju za živi svet i čovekovo zdravlje. Upravo ova mešavina književnih aluzija i naučnih dokaza čini ovaj tekst ključnim za ekološku kritiku (Garrard, 2004: 3). Jedna od prvih antologija ekološke književne kritike jeste *The Ecocriticism Reader*

(1996), gde je data dosta široka definicija ekološke književne kritike kao „izučavanje odnosa između književnosti i fizičke sredine” (Glotfelty & Fromm, 1996: xvii; citirano u Gersdorf & Mayer, 2006: 11). Krajem XX i početkom XXI veka u javnosti sve više raste strepnja da se bliži ekološka kriza, čemu doprinose dešavanja poput nesreće u Černobilju, izlivanje nafte u more kraj obala Aljaske, bolest ludih krava, kao i sve češće i ekstremnije prirodne nepogode. U to vreme i ekološka kritika postaje i aktuelna i priznata, jednako kao i kritički pravci poput feminističke kritike, postkolonijalizma i novog istorizma (Gersdorf & Mayer, 2006: 9).

Novi vek je doneo sve veći broj prirodnih nepogoda (cunami, uragani, poplave, suše, šumski požari) i pandemija (SARS, ptičiji grip, svinjski grip, COVID-19). Postaje jasno da čovečanstvo vrši negativan uticaj na prirodu u dosada neviđenim razmerama. U XXI veku prvi put je naučno dokazano da su globalno zagrevanje i nestajanje biljnih i životinjskih vrsta posledice klimatskih promena koje je izazvao čovek. Hemičar Pol Krucen (Paul J. Crutzen) i biolog Judžin Stormer (Eugene Stoermer) upotrebili su 2000. godine izraz „antropocen” kako bi opisali „dominantni uticaj čoveka na biološke, hemijske i geološke procese na planeti Zemlji” (Crutzen & Schwagerl, 2011; citirano u Mohr, 2017: 26). Uticaj čoveka na prirodnu sredinu stavljen je tako u istu ravan kao epohalni prirodni fenomeni iz prošlosti, poput udara meteora ili pomeranja kontinenata. Naše društvo i kultura suočavaju se s velikim izazovima i pretnjama, kao što su hiperkonzumerizam i zagađenje životne sredine, pri čemu jaz između bogatih i siromašnih postaje sve veći, jer su siromašnije države podložnije štetnim uticajima zagađenja. Istovremeno, raste i interesovanje za ekološku kritiku, pa se štampa sve veći broj članaka i publikacija iz ove oblasti. Neki ekološki kritičari (Kerridge & Sammells, 1988; Coupe, 2000) preispituju tvrdnju da književnost i umetnost treba da budu etički i estetički odvojene od stvarnosti. Ovi kritičari tvrde da je cilj ekološke kritike da procenjuje književna dela i ideje iznete u njima na osnovu toga koliko su korisne za borbu protiv ekološke krize, i da podstakne otpor i pobunu protiv zagađenja i uništenja životne sredine (Gersdorf & Mayer, 2006: 11). U tom smislu, u ovom radu se razmatra kako se u trilogiji *Ludadam* shvata ekološka kriza i kakva rešenja se nude.

3. Distopija kao književni žanr

Trilogija *Ludadam* prikazuje jednu distopijsku viziju društva budućnosti koje je izgubilo svoje humane karakteristike zbog nezajažljivosti korporacijske privrede i nekontrolisane potrošnje. Pri tome, ovo društvo živi u senci zagađivanja i uništavanja životne sredine. Distopijsko društvo je sastavni deo književne distopije, koja predstavlja podžanr naučne fantastike. Književna distopija opisuje svet u kome je kvalitet života značajno pogoršan, pogotovo kada se radi o ljudskim pravima i slobodama (Živković, 2017: 89). Sve književne distopije poseduju neke zajedničke karakteristike: represivni, totalitarni režimi, gušenje svake individualnosti, otuđenost ljudi od prirode, upotreba nauke i tehnologije u svrhu podjarmljivanja ljudi. Još jedna karakteristika književne distopije jeste glavni lik koji se, manje ili više uspešno, suprotstavlja represiji.

Nema sumnje da je distopija kao književni žanr u XX i XXI veku doživela pravi procvat (vidi Živković, 2014: 18–19). Nije ni čudo što je tako, s obzirom na dosad neviđeni napredak u nauci i tehnologiji, s jedne strane, a s druge strane, na katastrofalne posledice tog napretka: dva svetska rata, nuklearno i hemijsko oružje, trošenje prirodnih resursa, globalno zagrevanje i drugo. Društvo u književnoj distopiji svoj uspon doživljava zahvaljujući uspešnoj manipulaciji ljudskim umom i jezikom. U nekim društvima vlada se pomoću represije, nasilja i straha, kao što je to slučaj u Orvelovom romanu *1984* (1949) ili Berdžesovoj *Paklenoj pomorandži* (1962). U nekim drugim, opet, kao što vidimo u Hakslijevom *Vrlom novom svetu* (1932), koriste se suptilnija sredstva, kao što je udružena moć propagande i opojnih droga koje država deli narodu kako bi ga držala u pokornosti (Živković, 2019: 110–113).

Iz svega navedenog, jasno je da književne distopije odslikavaju prošle i sadašnje događaje u ljudskoj istoriji. Nekada je ta sličnost toliko velika da u čitaoce unosi nemir. Isto tako, stvarni događaji u svetu odslikavaju distopijske situacije u književnosti, a nekada ih po svojoj ozbiljnosti i prevazilaze. Dovoljno je setiti se puritanske vizije Novog sveta kao „Grada što leži na gori”, teokratske utopije koju su izgradili moćni muškarci koji su pri tome mogli da žene (i druge muškarce) po svojoj

volji optuže za bavljenje vradžbinama (Evans, 1994: 180–181), totalitarnih režima u Nemačkoj za vreme Hitlera, u Rusiji za vreme Staljina, ili u Kambodži za vreme Pola Pota, ili savremenih autoritarnih država koje se oslanjaju na kontrolu medija i propagandu.

Tokom svoje istorije, ljudi su mnogo puta svedočili pokušajima da se stvori idealna zajednica ili država, to jest utopija. Svaki put bi se, međutim, to pretvorilo u košmar distopije (Živković, 2017: 90). Kao što primećuje Zapovednik, antagonist iz *Sluškinjine priče*, „Bolje nikad ne znači bolje za sve [...] uvek znači gore za neke” (*Sluškinjina priča*, 211). Atvudova je za svoja distopijska društva smislila jedan novi naziv: „ustopija [...] kombinacija utopije i distopije, pošto je svaka utopija istovremeno i distopija, i obrnuto” (Atwood, 2011, navedeno u Mohr, 2015: 290).

4. Distopijske teme u romanima Margaret Atvud

U delima Margaret Atvud u prvom planu je uvek složeni međusobni odnos prirode, ljudskog društva i pojedinca: njeni junaci i junakinje pokušavaju da dostignu individualnu slobodu i samoostvarenje u indiferentnoj ili čak neprijateljskoj društvenoj sredini (npr. romani *Izranjanje* (1972), *Sluškinjina priča* (1985), *Mačje oko* (1988), *Alijas Grejs* (1996), *Slepi ubica* (2000)). Takođe, uvek je prisutna i kritika društva, ponekad u formi satire, koja se po svojoj oštrini može meriti sa satiričnim delima Džonatana Svifta, kao što su mnogi književni kritičari primećivali (vidi npr. Grace, 1995; Palumbo, 2000; Vevaina, 2006; Howells, 2006; Wilson, 2006; Canavan, 2012; Mohr, 2017). Po rečima same autorke, književnost je „instrument kroz koji posmatramo društvo – ona posreduje između jezika i onoga što smatramo stvarnošću” (Ingersoll, 1992: 246; navedeno u Howells, 2000: 139). Od svog prvog romana *Izranjanje* (1972), preko najznačajnijeg dela *Sluškinjina priča* (1985), pa do trilogije *Ludadam* (2003–2013), autorka je u svojim delima kritikovala odnos čoveka prema prirodi, u kome priroda mora da bude potčinjena čoveku i njegovim potrebama. Književna kritičarka Dunja Mor (Mohr, 2017: 55) primećuje da je u ranijim delima Atvudove bio prisutan stav da je priroda sila koja se mora nadjačati kako bi čovek opstao (narrativ o

opstanku koji je jedna od konvencija kanadske književnosti). U njenim kasnijim delima, međutim, prisutan je stav da sada priroda mora da se bori za opstanak nasuprot čoveku koji je uništava.

U *Sluškinjinoj priči*, čija se radnja odvija na američkom tlu krajem dvadesetog veka, Atvudova po prvi put uspostavlja direktnu uzročno-posledičnu vezu između uništenja životne sredine i propadanja društva. Masovna potrošnja i nekontrolisana glad za profitom prouzrokuju zagađenje vazduha, vode i zemljišta, što dovodi do naglog pada stope rađanja i povećanja steriliteta. Posledica ovih pojava je jačanje radikalnih desničarskih političkih i verskih struja, koje postepeno preuzimaju kontrolu nad reproduktivnim procesom, abortus stavljaju van zakona, i počinju sve više da se mešaju u privatne živote ljudi (Howells, 2006: 161). Konačno, to dovodi do pada demokratske vlasti i uspostavljanja teokratsko-totalitarnog režima u kome odabrani pojedinci, tačnije muškarci na pozicijama moći, imaju sve privilegije. Ljudska i građanska prava svih ostalih, i muškaraca i žena, ukinuta su i zamenjena strogom hijerarhijom u kome svako mora da igra svoju ulogu (Živković, 2018: 431). Dakle, jedna od posledica uništenja životne sredine jeste i propast demokratskog uređenja i uspon totalitarizma.

Radnja *Sluškinjine priče* sadrži jasnu aluziju na osamdesete godine XX veka u SAD, kada je došlo do jačanja neokonzervativnih političkih i religijskih ideologija, koje su osuđivale feminističke organizacije i pokrete (Howells, 2006: 162). Međutim, intimna i politička distopija u *Sluškinjinoj priči* isuviše jasno podseća na sadašnju situaciju u svetu, obeleženu pandemijom, usponom populizma, sve većom nejednakošću, političkim ekstremizmom i polarizacijom, sve većim nadzorom države nad stanovništvom, u kome vladaju postistina, lažne vesti i teorije zavere. Sluškinjina priča nastavlja tradiciju političkih distopija, kao što je Orvelova *1984*, pošto se bavi kršenjem ljudskih prava i ugnjetavanjem žena u fundamentalističkom režimu. U trilogiji *Ludadam*, autorka opisuje drugačiju vrstu distopije, koja je manje socijalno i politički obojena, a bavi se zloupotrebom naučnih saznanja i ekonomske moći u svrhu beskrupulozne eksploatacije prirodnih resursa, što dovodi do potpunog uništenja životne sredine.

5. Eko-distopija u trilogiji *Ludadam*

Trilogija *Ludadam* se često svrstava u naučnu fantastiku (Hengen, 2006; Howells, 2006; Canavan, 2012; Watkins, 2012; Mohr, 2015; Mohr, 2017), a i književna distopija se smatra za podžanr naučne fantastike (Živković, 2014: 21). Međutim, Margaret Atvud je više puta naglašavala da je u pitanju spekulativna proza, a ne naučna fantastika, i da u romanu *Antilopa i Kosac* nema ničega što čovek već nije izumeo ili nije na putu da stvori (<http://www.oryxandcrake.co.uk/perfectstorm.asp>). Bilo da se slažemo s autorkom ili ne, sva tri romana prepoznatljivo opisuju zapadno društvo XXI veka, koje karakterišu hiperpotrošnja, neoliberalna ekonomija, opsednutost mladošću i lepotom, odbojnost prema starenju, u kome su znanje, priroda, i sam život postali roba (Watkins, 2012; Mohr, 2015). U romanima Margaret Atvud nalazimo sliku jednog dehumanizovanog društva budućnosti, koje je ipak bliže stvarnosti nego nekoj futurističkoj viziji. Stoga se može reći da, kako smatraju neki kritičari, njena dela ne spadaju u „čistu” naučnu fantastiku, već u jedan specifični podžanr pod nazivom „transrealizam”, mešavinu realizma i naučne fantastike (Škobo, 2019: 81–83).

Podžanr naučne fantastike pod nazivom „klimatska fantastika” (Hughes & Wheeler, 2013: 2), koji je postao popularan u poslednjih petnaest godina, predstavlja književni odgovor na krizu izazvanu klimatskim promenama. Najveći broj dela u ovom podžanru odnosi se kritički prema čovekovoj težnji da upravlja prirodom. Ova težnja najčešće dovodi do globalnog uništenja ekosistema, pa i do potpunog istrebljenja čovečanstva i drugih biljnih i životinjskih vrsta (Canavan, 2012; Watkins, 2012). Možemo zaključiti da se u trilogiji *Ludadam* opisuje baš takvo društvo, nazvano „eko-distopija” (Hughes & Wheeler, 2013; Mohr, 2015). Ovakva društva bezobzirno i neumereno iskorištavaju i konzumiraju prirodna staništa i biljne i životinjske vrste, ne shvatajući da to vodi ka raspadu i konačnoj propasti samog društva. Teme kojima se eko-distopijski žanr bavi jesu, pre svega, otuđenje čoveka od prirode i upotreba nauke i tehnologije u svrhu podjarmljivanja prirode.

Osim elemenata naučne i klimatske fantastike, u trilogiji *Ludadam* zapažamo i elemente satire, koja oštro kritikuje trenutno stanje u društvu i istovremeno upozorava na teške posledice neumerene eksplo-

atacije prirodnih resursa. Kao epigraf romana *Antilopa i Kosac*, autorka je upotrebila citat iz čuvenog satiričnog romana Džonatana Svifta *Guliverova putovanja*. Zaista, može se reći da ova dva romana imaju mnoge zajedničke crte: oba satirično opisuju društvo, sadrže naučno-fantastične elemente, i smešteni su u nepoznati novi svet u kome protagonisti moraju da se bore za opstanak.

Centralna tema romana *Antilopa i Kosac* jesu posledice pandemije koja je pokosila čitavo čovečanstvo. Poreklo ove pandemije je van svake sumnje poznato – tvorac smrtonosnog virusa je genijalni ali razočarani naučnik po imenu Kosac (engl. *Crake*). Kosac je ubeđen da je čovečanstvo skoro iscrpelo sve prirodne resurse i da se nalazi na putu samouništenja. Kao genijalni mladi naučnik na Institutu Votson-Krik, Kosac dobija vrhunski tim i sva potrebna sredstva kako bi postigao najbolje rezultate. On istovremeno radi na dva paralelna projekta, koja će, kako veruje, ponuditi rešenje za ekološku krizu XXI veka, naročito po pitanju prenaseljenosti. Prvi je pilula „ekstradost”, lek koji produžava mladost, sprečava polno prenosive bolesti i istovremeno deluje kao afrodisijak i kontraceptiv. Drugi, tajni projekat jeste stvaranje nove humanoidne vrste putem genetskog inženjerstva, koju naziva Koščići (engl. *Crakers*). Koščići su zapravo stvoreni da zauzmu mesto ljudske vrste u prirodi, nakon istrebljenja čovečanstva putem pilule „ekstradost” koja sadrži smrtonosni virus nalik hemoragijskoj groznici (Sentov, 2015: 170).

Početak romana *Antilopa i Kosac* smešten je u postapokaliptični svet, kojim više ne vladaju čudi čoveka, već sile prirode. Taj svet posmatramo kroz oči Džimija, Koščevog prijatelja, koji je, kako se čini, jedini preostali pripadnik ljudske vrste. Prema Koščevom planu, Džimi ostaje živ i imun na virus kako bi služio kao učitelj i zaštitnik Koščića. Džimi, ili Snežni (engl. *Snowman*), sada predstavlja „kariku koja nedostaje” između izumrle ljudske vrste i humanoida koji su zauzeli njeno mesto, a koji su mnogo sposobniji da prežive u novom svetu. Klimatske promene izazivaju neprekidno smenjivanje talasa vreline i žestokih tropskih oluja. Genetski modifikovane životinje su se prilagodile ovoj klimi mnogo bolje nego Džimi, i sada predstavljaju pretnju njegovom opstanku, pošto jedu njegove zalihe hrane ili ga posmatraju kao plen. „Svinjoni” (engl. *Pigoons*) posebno su opasni jer poseduju skoro pa ljudsku inteligenciju, zahvaljujući kombinaciji svinjskih i ljudskih gena. Tako su se protiv

čovaka okrenula bića koja je sam stvorio. Poruka autorke je da čovek uzalud pokušava da upravlja prirodom i prirodnim procesima, jer ishod može biti samo njegovo sopstveno uništenje (Sentov, 2015: 170–171).

Na kraju romana *Antilopa i Kosac* dolazi do neočekivanog preokreta: ispostavlja se da Džimi/Snežni ipak nije poslednji čovek na svetu. On slučajno nailazi na još troje preživelih: dva muškarca i jednu ženu. Krijući se u žbunju, Snežni razmišlja kako da postupi – da li da im se mirroljubivo predstavi, ili da ne rizikuje i da puca na njih? Ova dilema predstavlja metaforu izbora pred kojim se čovečanstvo neprestano nalazi: da li se prepustiti svojim mračnim nagonima, ili ih obuzdavati? Autorka ne nudi rešenje ove dileme. Snežni donosi odluku da se pokaže, ali ishod ostaje nepoznat (Sentov, 2015: 171).

Radnja drugog romana u nizu, *Godina potopa* (2009), obuhvata gotovo isti vremenski period kao i *Antilopa i Kosac* (Bergthaller, 2010: 737). Kao i prethodni roman, *Godina potopa* se bavi posledicama pandemije smrtonosnog virusa kroz vizuru dve žene, Tobi i Ren, koje su bile pripadnice verske sekte „Božiji baštovani”. Fabula romana prati njihovo preživljavanje i pronalaženje ostalih preživelih pripadnika sekte. U poslednjem poglavlju romana otkriva se kakav je bio ishod Džimijevog susreta s troje preživelih, te se tako fabula dva romana spaja u jednu.

Roman *Godina potopa* daje mnogo detaljniji prikaz šireg društva, u kome su sve nadležnosti države prepuštene beskrupoloznim privatnim preduzećima (Bergthaller, 2010: 738). Ovo pre-pandemijsko društvo naizgled iznad svega ceni obrazovanje i znanje, i ne diskriminiše po pitanju rase, verskog opredeljenja ili etničke pripadnosti. Međutim, stanovništvo se deli na dve klase – povlašćenu klasu kojoj pripadaju direktori korporacija i naučnici koji rade za njih, koja živi u luksuznim naseljima sa najvišim nivoom obezbeđenja, i potčinjenu klasu običnih ljudi koja živi u prenaseljenim i zagađenim „plebejama”, nekadašnjim metropolama. Korporacije su preuzele sva institucionalna ovlašćenja, a njihova moć je istovremeno neprimetna i sveprisutna. Jedina vidljiva manifestacija njihove moći jeste Korpolicija, privatno preduzeće koje je zauzelo mesto državne policije i služi interesima Korporacija. Međutim, njihov glavni zadatak jeste da se bave onim poslovima za koje se interesuju Korporacije, a ne da štite javni red.

Sekta „Božji baštovani” nastaje u plebejama i u početku su njeni pripadnici samo obespravljani i marginalizovani članovi društva, pa ih stoga Korpolicija smatra bezopasnim čudacima. Kroz vizuru protagonista, možemo videti sav luksuz koji uživa povlašćena klasa, koji opstaje na račun masovne potrošnje, raširenog siromaštva i eksploatacije prirode. S druge strane, način života „Božjih baštovana”, i pored nekih aspekata verskog fanatizma i strogih pravila ponašanja, deluje mnogo humanije, jer je prožet verom u jednakost svih živih bića i u očuvanje životne sredine.

U romanu *Ludadam* (2013) naizmenično se prikazuju sadašnjost i prošlost. U sadašnjosti, preživeli Baštovani uče da opstanu u novom okruženju i da dele životni prostor sa Košćićima, genetski modifikovanim životinjama i Pejnboleima (kriminalcima – učesnicima nasilnog rijaliti programa Pejnbol (engl. *Painball*)). U prošlosti, pratimo nastanak radikalnog krila „Božjih baštovana” pod nazivom „Ludadam” koje se bori protiv vlasti putem ekoterorizma. Na kraju, pripadnike ovog krila vrbuje Kosac, i oni se priključuju njegovom projektu „Rajski vrt”, to jest stvaranju Košćića. Neki od njih uspevaju da prežive apokalipsu i ponovo se sreću s preostalim Baštovanima. U ovom romanu, razorni uticaj čoveka na prirodu prikazan je kroz niz epizoda i anegdota koje govore kako zagađenje životne sredine postaje sve veće, kako veštačka ili genetski modifikovana hrana zamenjuje pravu, kako priobalni gradovi nestaju usled povećanja nivoa mora, i kako su ljudi i životinje primorani da se presele ili da gladuju usled vremenskih nepogoda.

Tema poslednjeg romana u trilogiji jeste povratak prirodi i prilika da se ljudska priroda, koja je dovela čovečanstvo do ivice opstanka, ipak promeni. Preživeli ljudi ostvaruju miran suživot s Košćićima, iako se glavna junakinja Tobi i dalje pribojava negativnog uticaja „starih” ljudi na nevine „nove” ljude. Uprkos svemu, kao i *Godina potopa*, kraj romana *Ludadam* uliva nadu da preživeli ljudi, svinjoni i Košćići mogu da žive zajedno i da poštuju jedni druge.

Na kraju trilogije, ostaje nada da „stari” ljudi mogu i žele da uče i od onih koji nisu pripadnici ljudske vrste. „Stari” ljudi se ponovo prilagođavaju životu u skladu s prirodom i pokušavaju da obuzdaju svoje destruktivne nagone, kao što su pohlepa i ljubomora. Da li će u tome

i uspeti, ostaje nejasno, ali stav autorke je više nego jasan: Priroda će, zahvaljujući svojoj beskrajnoj prilagodljivosti i otpornosti, preživeti sve što joj čini čovek, i opet biti prelepa. Pitanje je samo da li će čovek moći da uživa u toj lepoti (Hengen, 2006: 82).

6. Zaključna razmatranja

Po rečima književnog kritičara T. Mojlana (Moylan, 2000; navedeno u Howells, 2006), mnoge distopije su zapravo upozorenja koja nam upućuje autor književnog dela. Ako zaslužujemo upozorenje, to znači da još uvek imamo izbora; a ako ima izbora, ima i nade. Ove reči su posebno primenljive na „ustopije” Margaret Atvud. Trilogija *Ludadam* može se tumačiti kao poziv na korenite promene u društvenim odnosima i na odricanje od onog načina života koji ugrožava životnu sredinu (Canavan, 2012; Mohr, 2015). U prva dva romana, čini se da je potpuno uništenje živog sveta i ljudske vrste neizbežno. Međutim, u poslednjem romanu se prikazuje svet novog doba, posle antropocena (doba ljudi), i uspostavljanje savezništva između različitih vrsta: „prirodnih” ljudi (Baštovana i Ludadamovaca), genetski modifikovanih životinjskih vrsta, postljudi (Koščića), i inteligentnih ljudsko-životinjskih hibridnih vrsta (svinjoni) (Mohr, 2015: 294). Konačno, možemo zaključiti da ova trilogija istovremeno upućuje upozorenje na to kuda nas može odvesti uništenje životne sredine i poziv da se ozbiljno pozabavimo ekološkom krizom i počnemo više da cenimo živi svet koji nas okružuje.

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“SO OBVIOUS AND SO UNTHINKABLE“: ECO-DYSTOPIA IN MARGARET ATWOOD’S *MADDADDAM* TRILOGY

*We’re using
up the Earth. It’s almost gone.*

(Margaret Atwood,
The Year of the Flood)

ABSTRACT: Themes of Nature and humanity’s abuse of it have long featured in Margaret Atwood’s works: poetry, fiction and non-fiction. The author is an environmental activist herself, taking an active interest in current environmental and climate change issues. From one of her earliest novels *Surfacing* (1972) to her seminal work *The Handmaid’s Tale* (1985) to the more recent *MaddAddam* trilogy (comprising the novels *Oryx and Crake* (2003), *The Year of the Flood* (2009) and *MaddAddam* (2013)), Atwood has commented on and criticized humanity’s treatment of nature as something to be dominated and beaten into submission. In the context of the current cultural and environmental crisis the world is experiencing, this paper will analyze Atwood’s *MaddAddam* trilogy through the lens of ecocriticism and examine how closely her vision of eco-dystopia reflects the current state of affairs in the world.

KEYWORDS: ecocriticism, eco-dystopia, Margaret Atwood, *MaddAddam* trilogy, dystopia

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1. Introduction

In recent years, the much-debated concept of climate change and its effect on the environment and humanity has given way to a new and worrying realization: climate change will not be happening slowly or in the distant future. It is very much present here and now, becoming more evident with each passing year: hurricanes and violent storms ravage coastal regions; flash floods take away lives and livelihoods even in the most developed countries; severe heat spells have crops withering and people and animals suffocating; air and water pollution have grown exponentially; forest fires rage with an ever-growing pace. It seems that natural disasters have never been such a frequent occurrence as in the past twenty years. Moreover, pandemic outbreaks such as the most recent COVID-19 pandemic, have been linked to humanity encroaching upon natural habitats. Human activities, such as poaching and deforestation, make it easier for animal species that otherwise would have never come into contact with humans to transfer the unknown and dangerous pathogens to them. All these phenomena have prompted environmental scientists and activists, primarily in the English-speaking countries, to label the current state of affairs „climate crisis“.

In 2019, some English-language media, such as *The Guardian*, the BBC, and the US news agency AP, announced that “climate emergency” or “climate crisis” is to be used instead of “climate change”, because “climate change is no longer considered to accurately reflect the seriousness of the overall situation” (*The Guardian*, 16 October 2019). According to the UN website (<https://www.un.org/en/un75/climate-crisis-race-we-can-win>), “climate change is the defining crisis of our time and it is happening even more quickly than we feared... no corner of the globe is immune from the devastating consequences of climate change“. The introductory note goes on to describe a nightmarish scenario:

Rising temperatures are fuelling environmental degradation, natural disasters, weather extremes, food and water insecurity, economic disruption, conflict, and terrorism. Sea levels are rising, the Arctic is melting, coral reefs are dying, oceans are acidifying, and forests are burning. It is clear that business as usual is

not good enough. As the infinite cost of climate change reaches irreversible highs, now is the time for bold collective action.

Despite the encouraging final words of this passage, it seems that the world at large still goes on with the business as usual. The U.N. COP26 climate conference in Glasgow ended with calls on governments to pledge to decrease greenhouse gas emissions. More than 200 nations made new pledges to slash methane gas pollution, deforestation, and coal financing. Two largest emitters of carbon, the U.S. and China, agreed to cooperate during this decade to prevent global warming from surpassing 1.5 degrees Celsius and ensure that progress result from the conference. However, China and India, the world's biggest burners of coal, were reluctant to pledge to give up fossil fuels entirely. Climate scientists and activists argue that despite these accomplishments, the final deal out of Glasgow resulted in insufficient progress which will prove inadequate to address the climate crisis (CNBC, 16 November 2021).

The current state of affairs in the world with regard to the climate crisis is unnervingly close to the situation that Margaret Atwood describes in *The Year of the Flood* (2009), her work of speculative fiction dealing with the consequences of environmental degradation and ultimate destruction:

I knew there were things wrong in the world, they were referred to, I'd seen them in the onscreen news. But the wrong things were wrong somewhere else. [...] Everybody knew. Nobody admitted to knowing. If other people began to discuss it, you tuned them out, because what they were saying was both so obvious and so unthinkable.

We're using up the Earth. It's almost gone. (YF², 282)

In the context of the cultural and environmental crisis the world is experiencing, this paper will analyse Atwood's *MaddAddam* trilogy through the lens of ecocriticism and examine how closely her vision of eco-dystopia reflects the current state of affairs. The issues that the

² *The Year of the Flood*, abbr.

MaddAddam trilogy raises seem particularly apt at the present moment. Before the global pandemic, the climate change or climate crisis was seen as the greatest challenge to humanity and global economy: world leaders and organizations seemed to be addressing the problem of how to reconcile the need for economic growth and progress with the damage it was doing to the biosphere. It is worth noting that at the time very few of them was considering the possibility of abandoning the doctrine of progress, or that there might be something more at stake than global economy. The young climate activist Greta Thunberg remarked in her speech at the U.N. Climate Summit in Katowice in 2018 that if there is no solution to be found within the system, then we must change the system itself (*Democracy Now*, 13 December 2018). That, however, we still seem to be unprepared or unwilling to do. There are things that are wrong, but for most people, especially for those in the developed world, they can go on being wrong, as long as it is somewhere else.

With the world in the grip of a COVID-19 pandemic, and fears of economic recession, job loss, unemployment, and collapse, we have been forcefully reminded of the fragility of our current state and the devastation that our ruthless exploitation of nature leaves in its wake. The paper will attempt to answer the question of the inevitability of eco-apocalypse that seems to permeate the *MaddAddam* trilogy: whether humankind as we know it must bring itself to the brink of extinction before coming to its senses, or whether there is a possibility to curb our destructive impulses and change our attitude towards Nature.

2. Eco-criticism

Over the past thirty years, ecocriticism has evolved from a regional movement of the U.S. literary scholars who were interested in nature writing and environmental literature to an international and interdisciplinary community of scholars and researchers who express an ever-growing concern over the current environmental crisis and agree that this crisis is a material expression of modern culture's understanding of nature and humanity (Gersdorf and Mayer, 2006: 9). According

to Greg Garrard (2004), modern environmentalism's founding text was 'A Fable for Tomorrow', in Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962). Using poetic language and relying on the literary genres of pastoral and apocalypse, the author warns against using organic pesticides and goes on to present scientific evidence of the threat they pose both to wildlife and to human health. This amalgamation of literary allusions and scientific evidence is what makes this book a seminal work of ecocriticism (Garrard, 2004: 3). One of the first anthologies of ecocriticism was Glotfelty & Fromm's *The Ecocriticism Reader* (1996), which defines ecocriticism rather broadly as "the study of the relationship between literature and the physical environment" (Glotfelty & Fromm, 1996: xvii; qtd in Gersdorf & Mayer, 2006: 11). At the turn of the 21st century, prompted by the sense of approaching environmental crisis, which manifested in the 1980s and 1990s in incidents such as the Chernobyl disaster, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, mad cow disease, and increasingly frequent instances of weather extremes, ecocriticism becomes as relevant and recognized as such established methodologies as feminist criticism, post-colonialism, or new historicism (Gersdorf & Mayer, 2006: 9).

The new century has brought in an ever-increasing number of natural disasters, such as tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, draughts, forest fires, and pandemics such as SARS, Bird Flu, and COVID-19. It has become clear that humanity influences nature in never-before seen and devastating ways. Global warming and increased species extinction have become documented evidence of climate change caused by human interference. In 2000, chemist Paul J. Crutzen and biologist Eugene Stoermer introduced the term "Anthropocene" to describe "the human dominance of biological, chemical, and geological processes on Earth" (Crutzen & Schwagerl, 2011; qtd in Mohr, 2017: 26). Human impact upon the natural world is thus put on a scale of past epochal events such as continent shifts or meteoric strikes. Human hyper-consumption and widespread pollution, along with unevenly distributed consequences of such activities, with less wealthy nations often left vulnerable to environmental threats, pose considerable challenges for human society and culture. Consequently, the interest in ecocriticism has increased, which is evident in a growing number of ecocritical essays and publications. Some ecocritical scholars (Kerridge & Sammells, 1988; Coupe, 2000)

challenge the assumption that literature and art as aesthetically and ethically separate entities, and state that the objective of ecocriticism is to evaluate texts and ideas in terms of their usefulness as responses to environmental crises, and to encourage resistance to environmental pollution and degradation (Gersdorf & Mayer, 2006: 11). It is with this view in mind that Atwood's *MaddAddam* trilogy will be examined: how this text engages with the environmental crises and what are the solutions it offers.

3. Dystopia as a Literary Genre

The *MaddAddam* trilogy projects a dystopian vision of a future society dehumanized by corporate greed and mass consumerism and threatened by pollution and environmental degradation. A dystopian society is an integral part of literary dystopia, a sub-genre of science fiction, which depicts a world where the quality of life, usually in terms of human rights and liberties, is significantly worse than in reality (Živković, 2017: 89). The common features of literary dystopia are an oppressive, totalitarian state which crushes individuality, separates humans from nature and employs science and technology not to enrich human lives but to subjugate them. Another common feature of literary dystopias is the character of a protagonist who opposes the oppression by more or less successful means.

There can be little doubt that dystopia as a literary genre has flourished in the 20th and 21st century (see Živković, 2014: 18-19), with the unprecedented advances of science and technology on the one hand, and on the other hand, disastrous effects that those same advances have brought about – two world wars, nuclear and chemical warfare, depletion of natural resources, global warming, etc. Societies of literary dystopia also thrive on manipulation of the human mind and language: some rule by oppression, force, and fear, such as those of Orwell's *1984* (1949) or Burgess' *A Clockwork Orange* (1962); others, as seen in Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932), by using more subtle means, such as the combined power of propaganda and state-sanctioned drugs distributed to the populace to keep it in submission (Živković, 2019: 110-113).

Clearly, literary dystopias resemble humankind's historical and present experiences rather too close for comfort. From the Puritan vision of the New World as "a City upon a Hill", a theocratic utopia of men in power who had the authority to accuse women (and other men) of witchcraft (Evans, 1994: 180-181), to totalitarian regimes of Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, or Pol Pot's Cambodia, which destroyed countless lives and livelihoods, to modern authoritarian states that rely on media control and propaganda, literary dystopias have constantly been reflected in and sometimes surpassed by real-world events. Throughout history, humankind has witnessed many attempts to create an ideal community or state – a utopia – only for it to degenerate into a dystopian nightmare (Živković, 2017: 90). As Atwood's character Commander remarks, "Better never means better for everyone [...]. It always means worse for some." (*The Handmaid's Tale*, 211). Atwood herself coined a new name for her fictional societies - "(u)topia [...] combining utopia and dystopia", because "each contain a latent version of the other" (Atwood, 2011; qtd in Mohr, 2015: 290).

4. Dystopian Themes in Margaret Atwood's Novels

In Margaret Atwood's works, the complex interrelationship between culture/society, nature, and the individual have always been at the forefront: her protagonists strive to achieve individual freedom and self-fulfilment against the backdrop of indifferent or hostile social environment (e.g., the novels *Surfacing* (1972), *The Handmaid's Tale* (1985), *Cat's Eye* (1988), *Alias Grace* (1996), *The Blind Assassin* (2000)). At the same time, Atwood includes a social commentary, sometimes taking the form of a biting satire to rival those of Jonathan Swift, which has been the subject of numerous articles and books (see e.g., Grace, 1995; Palumbo, 2000; Vevaina, 2006; Howells, 2006; Wilson, 2006; Canavan, 2012; Mohr, 2017). As Atwood commented, she thinks of fiction as "a vehicle for looking at society – an interface between language and what we choose to call reality" (Ingersoll, 1992: 246; qtd in Howells, 2000: 139). From one of her earliest novels *Surfacing* (1972) to her seminal work *The Handmaid's Tale* (1985) to the more recent *MaddAddam* trilogy (2003-2013), Atwood has commented on and criticized humanity's

treatment of nature as something to be dominated and beaten into submission. Mohr (2017: 55) comments on how Atwood has significantly moved away from her initial view of Nature as a force against which humans must struggle to survive (a survival narrative typical of Canadian literature) to the view that Nature must struggle to survive humankind.

In *The Handmaid's Tale*, her most famous novel, Atwood establishes a direct causal connection between environmental and social degradation, which she only hinted at in her earlier works. The mass consumerism and rampant corporate greed in Atwood's fictional version of late 20th-century North America have caused a widespread pollution of air, water, and soil, which in turn leads to a plummet in birth-rate and increase of sterility. As a result, the right-wing political and religious ideologies became ever more radical, attempting gradually and almost imperceptibly to control the reproduction process, ban abortions, and interfere with private lives and choices of citizens (Howells, 2006: 161). Ultimately, this brings about the overthrow of democracy and the establishment of a theocratic totalitarian regime in which select individuals – men in power – hold privileged positions, while the civil and human rights of everyone else, men and women both, are stripped away, and replaced by a strict hierarchy in which everyone must play their role (Živković, 2018: 431). Thus, one of the consequences of environmental destruction is the disintegration of democratic society and the rise of a totalitarian regime.

This state of affairs clearly alludes to the historical context of the 1980s United States, with the rise of neo-conservative political and Christian ideologies and deep hostility to the feminist movement (Howells, 2006: 162). However, the personal and political dystopia of *The Handmaid's Tale*, engendered by environmental destruction, is also chillingly reminiscent of the situation in our own pandemic-plagued world, dominated by rising inequality, right-wing populism, political extremism and polarization, pervasive state surveillance, post-truths, fake news, and conspiracy theories. *The Handmaid's Tale* represents one type of Atwood's dystopian vision, focusing on human rights abuses and the oppression of women under a fundamentalist regime, in the tradition of political dystopia, represented by Orwell's *1984*. The other vision, less social and political in its agenda, is given shape in the *Madd-*

Addam trilogy, which focuses on the abuse of scientific knowledge and corporate power to ruthlessly exploit natural resources and bring about environmental destruction.

5. Eco-Dystopia in the *MaddAddam* Trilogy

The *MaddAddam* trilogy is often classified as science fiction (Hengen, 2006; Howells, 2006; Canavan, 2012; Watkins, 2012; Mohr, 2015; Mohr, 2017). Literary dystopia itself has been regarded as a sub-genre of science fiction (Živković, 2014: 21). However, Atwood has repeatedly rejected the label, insisting that *Oryx and Crake*, the first instalment, is “a speculative fiction, not a science fiction proper. It contains no intergalactic space travel, no teleportation, no Martians. As with *The Handmaid’s Tale*, it invents nothing we haven’t already invented or started to invent“ (<http://www.oryxandcrake.co.uk/perfectstorm.asp>). Whether we acknowledge the distinction or not, all three novels describe a recognisable 21st-century Western society, focused on hyper-consumerism, obsessed with youth and beauty, disgusted by aging, bent on commodification of knowledge, nature, human and animal life, existing in a profit-driven neoliberal economy (Watkins, 2012; Mohr, 2015). Atwood’s novels offer a model of a dehumanized future that is, nevertheless, more based on the actual reality of post industrialist consumer society than futuristic vision, and therefore, according to some critics belongs not to science fiction proper, but to a specific stylistic area of transrealism, blending realism with sci-fi (Škobo, 2019: 81-83).

Another subgenre of science fiction is the climate fiction, or “cli-fi” (Hughes & Wheeler, 2013: 2), a recent body of work that has proliferated in the past fifteen years, as a literary response to accelerating climate change. Most of these works have chosen to criticise humankind’s attitude of dominance over the natural world, which usually results in global devastation of ecosystems, or sometimes in complete annihilation of humans and other species (Canavan, 2012; Watkins, 2012). Atwood’s *Maddaddam* trilogy undoubtedly describes such a society. These fictional societies, called *eco-dystopias* (Hughes & Wheeler, 2013; Mohr, 2015) ruthlessly exploit natural habitats and species for human consumption and comfort yet fail to realise that this road leads

to disintegration and ultimate destruction of society itself. The focus of these eco-dystopias is the alienation of humans from nature and the use of science and technology to subjugate nature.

The trilogy, aside from the sci-fi and cli-fi elements, works best as a biting satire on the current state of humanity, as well as a warning against the careless exploitation of natural resources. The epigraph of *Oryx and Crake*, the first novel in the series, is a quote from Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726): "I could perhaps like others have astonished you with strange improbable tales; but I rather chose to relate plain matter of fact in the simplest manner and style; because my principal design was to inform you, and not to amuse you." Swift's and Atwood's novels share common themes of social satire, fantastical and science-fiction elements, and are set in a strange new world in which an out-of-place protagonist must learn to survive.

Oryx and Crake deals with the aftermath of a global pandemic, indisputably of human origin – engineered by the brilliant but disillusioned genius scientist Crake. Crake, the apparent antagonist of the novel, is convinced that humanity is close to exhausting its resource base, and on the path of self-destruction through reckless exploitation of the environment. As a brilliant young scientist employed by the Watson-Crick Institute, Crake is given his own institution and freedom to choose his own team, in order to achieve the best results. He creates two simultaneous projects that he thinks will solve the environmental challenges of the 21st century, particularly overpopulation. One is the BlyssPlus pill, a medication that prolongs youth, has aphrodisiac effects, prevents sexually transmitted diseases, and serves as birth control. The other, secret project is the creation of a genetically engineered humanoid species which he dubs the Crakers. While showing them to his friend Jimmy, Crake insists that the Crakers are only exhibits, meant to demonstrate the possibilities of genetic engineering, and that people will soon be able to place an order for a baby of any race, features or personality that they choose. In truth, Crake has bred the new species to replace the human race after the BlyssPlus pill, which contains the virus for "a rogue haemorrhagic" (OC 325), wipes out the human race (Sentov, 2015: 170).

³ *Oryx and Crake*, abbr.

At the novel's beginning, we find Jimmy as "the last man on Earth" in a post-apocalyptic world, a world governed not by whims of mankind, but by forces of nature. Jimmy must attune again to the natural surroundings, as (seemingly) the sole surviving specimen of the human race. He tries to find solace in being a sort of mentor for the Crakers, who call him Snowman (short for The Abominable Snowman – a legendary creature, "the missing link" between the extinct humanity and the humanlike race that has replaced it) and who are much better equipped to survive in the post-apocalyptic world. The climate changes brought on by pollution have resulted in a hostile climate of scorching heat interrupted by violent storms. The genetically spliced animals have adapted to the new surrounding much better than Jimmy, and now pose a threat to his survival, both by eating his food resources and hunting him as a prey. The "Pigoons" turn out to be particularly dangerous, since they possess a nearly human intelligence, due to the combination of pig and human genes. The creatures made by man have turned against him. It is ultimately futile to attempt to manipulate nature, Atwood seems to say; only our own destruction will be the outcome (Sentov, 2015: 170-171). "The rules of biology are as inexorable as those of physics: run out of food and water and you die. No animal can exhaust its resource base and hope to survive. Human civilizations are subject to the same law" (<http://www.oryxandcrake.co.uk/perfectstorm.asp>).

The novel ends with a startling revelation for Jimmy/Snowman. It turns out he is not the last man after all – he comes across three more survivors, two men and one woman. Hidden in the bushes, Snowman debates what to do – should he approach them peacefully, or shoot them and not take any chances? Snowman's dilemma stands for the choice that the human race continuously has to make: should we succumb to our destructive impulses, or restrain them? Still, the novel remains open-ended. Snowman finally comes to a decision: "Zero hour. ... Time to go." (OC 433), but the outcome remains unknown to the readers (Sentov, 2015:171).

The Year of the Flood (2009) covers roughly the same time span as *Oryx and Crake*, and indeed was meant to be a "simultaneous" to the earlier novel (Bergthaller, 2010: 737). Both novels share a similar narrative pattern: they follow survivors of the fatal pandemic. In *The Year*

of *the Flood*, the survivors are two women, Toby and Ren, both former members of a religious sect the God's Gardeners. The plot builds up to their reunion with other surviving members of the sect, until in the final chapter the narrative joins up with the ending of *Oryx and Crake*, revealing the outcome of Snowman's meeting with the three survivors he stumbled upon.

The Year of the Flood gives us a significantly more detailed account both of the larger society, "where all the functions of the state have been devolved to the villainous private corporations" (Bergthaller 2010: 738) and of the organization of the religious sect God's Gardeners. The pre-pandemic society seems to value individual's education and knowledge above all else, regardless of race, religion or ethnicity; however, people are essentially divided into two classes – the privileged class of corporations' CEOs and scientists working for them who live in "Compounds", luxury estates with maximum security, and the underprivileged class of common people living in overpopulated and polluted "pleeblands", former metropolitan cities. the Corporations (capitalised by Atwood, to stress that they make up a single controlling structure) have taken over all authority, and their power is both invisible and omnipresent. The only visible manifestation of their power is the CorpSeCorps, a security company which at first provided its services to the Compounds, but as the local police forces shut down due to insufficient funds, CorpSeCorps took over. Its job is to keep tabs only on the affairs that might interest the Corporations, not to maintain law and order. Thus, CorpSeCorps strikes deals with local criminal groups – pleemafias, which hold sway over pleeblands, to get rid of any disrupting elements; in return, CorpSeCorps turns a blind eye to their criminal activities.

The God's Gardeners cult takes root in the pleeblands, attracting the members from the marginalized social groups, so that at first CorpSeCorps leaves them alone, thinking them harmless eccentrics. Through the protagonists' eyes, we witness the life of luxury that the Compounds can provide to the select few, on the account of mass poverty, aggressive consumerism, and reckless exploitation of natural resources. On the other hand, the Gardeners' way of life, despite "the less appealing features one would expect from religious fanatics" (*YF*, 739), such as rigid code of conduct and extreme asceticism, comes across as

much more relatable, with their beliefs in the equality of all species, preservation of the environment, and strict limitation of the use of natural resources.

MaddAddam (2013) alternates between the present, in which the survivors of the God's Gardeners sect struggle for survival and learn to share their living space with the Crakers, the genetically spliced animals, and the escaped Painballers (hardened criminals who participated in a violent reality show Painball). It recounts the emergence of a more radical wing of God's Gardeners, that eventually splits from the sect and continues to oppose the authorities using ecoterrorism. In the end, this radical wing is enticed/blackmailed by Crake to join his Paradise project – designing the Crakers. A number of MaddAddamites survive the plague and reunite with the remaining God's Gardeners in the final novel. In *MaddAddam*, the devastation the humans wreak upon the natural world is told through a series of episodes and anecdotes recounting the pollution of environment, the replacement of real foodstuffs with synthetic or genetically modified products, the sinking of coastal cities, the climate disasters that force people and animals to move or starve.

The final novel deals with the return to Nature, and the possibility of change of human nature that ultimately brought humankind to the brink of extinction. The survivors contend daily with plants and animals that had taken over the planet, and learn to live together with the Crakers, although the main protagonist, Toby, is concerned about the old humans' influence on the innocent humanoids. Despite that, like *The Year of the Flood*, *MaddAddam* ends on a hopeful note: the surviving humans and Pigoons work together to eliminate the common threat of violent Painballers, with the help of Crakers, acting as interpreters between old humans and animals. After the battle, they honour their dead together, both human and Pigoon, and pledge not to attack each other.

The trilogy concludes with the hope that old humans can and will also learn from their non-human fellows: three human women have given birth to Craker babies, and the whole group is raising them together. Old humans are also adapting to the ways of nature and trying to curb the humankind's more destructive impulses, such as greed and sexual jealousy. Whether they will ultimately change remains open to

interpretation, but Atwood's position on one thing is clear: Nature, in its profound resourcefulness, will survive humankind's abuse of it, and continue to be beautiful, although we may not be there to witness it (Hengen, 2006: 82).

6. Concluding remarks

"Many dystopias are self-consciously warnings. A warning implies that choice, and therefore hope, are still possible" (Moylan, 2000; quoted in Howells, 2006). These words seem to relate particularly well to all of Atwood's *ustopias*. The MaddAddam trilogy can be read as an allegorical call for a radical change in our social relations and a warning against anti-ecological lifestyles (Canavan, 2012; Mohr, 2015). In the first two novels, the ecoapocalypse seems unavoidable, leading to the ultimate extinction of the human race. The final book, however, centres on the post-Athropocene world and the gradual establishment of a new interspecies alliance, composed of "natural" humans (ecocritical Gardeners and MaddAddam scientists), new bioengineered species, the posthumans (the Crakers) and intelligent and sentient transgenic human/animal hybrids (the pigoons or "Pig Ones") (Mohr, 2015: 294). Ultimately, Atwood's trilogy functions both as a dire warning of the looming ecological crisis and "the slippery slope" (<http://www.oryxandcrake.co.uk/perfectstorm.asp>) of hyper-consumerism and environmental destruction that may lead humankind to its doom, and a hopeful invitation to engage with the ecological crisis and inspire a more responsible and respectful attitude towards natural environment.

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SOCIJALNA MOTIVACIJA I EMOCIONALNA KOMPETENTNOST KOD STUDENATA

REZIME: Osnovni problem istraživanja bio je otkrivanje određenih relacija između strukture socijalne motivacije i emocionalne kompetentnosti kod studenata različitih psihosocijalnih karakteristika. Istraživanje je realizovano na Filozofskom fakultetu i na Ekonomskom fakultetu u Istočnom Sarajevu. Uzorak u ovom istraživanju činili su studenti prve i četvrte godine studija. Uzorkom je obuhvaćeno 228 ispitanika – studenata. U istraživanju smo koristili upitnik socijalne motivacije i upitnik emocionalne kompetentnosti. Rezultati istraživanja će biti korisni kao dodatna motivacija za dalja istraživanja, kao i u praktičnom radu sa studentima i formiranju programa u zaštiti mentalnog zdravlja studenata.

KLJUČNE REČI: socijalna motivacija, emocionalna kompetentost, studenti

1. Uvod

Posmatrajući i analizirajući ljudsko ponašanje i postupanje, možemo izvesti zaključak da čovek poseduje određenu potrebu, tj. motiv koji ga „pokreće”. U zavisnosti od kolike je važnosti neko ljudsko angažovanje za egzistenciju čoveka, zavise vrsta, intenzitet i usmerenost motivacionog angažovanja. Pod motivima podrazumevamo organske,

¹ Doktorand psihologije na Fakultetu društvenih znanosti dr. Milenka Brkića Sveučilišta Hercegovina u Mostaru, master studije završila na Fakultetu za pravne i poslovne studije dr Lazar Vrkić u Novom Sadu, e-mail jelena.colakovic991@gmail.com

psihološke i socijalne faktore koji pokreću čoveka, usmeravaju njegovo ponašanje, njegove postupke, mišljenje, opažanje i učenje, bilo na ličnom ili društvenom planu. Za svakog čoveka važi pravilo da se, u pogledu inventara bioloških motiva, ljudi ne razlikuju. Svaka ljudska individua se rađa s biološkim (organskim) motivima. Ovi motivi su neophodni za održanje vrste. Za razliku od bioloških motiva, postoje i motivi koji imaju ulogu da motivišu ličnost u socijalnoj interakciji i sličnim situacijama koje čoveku pružaju osećaj zadovoljstva i oni su odgovorni za ljubav, saradnju, određivanje uloga u socijalnoj grupi, empatiju, način komunikacije s drugim osobama, zalaganje na radu i sl. Ova vrsta motivacije je socijalna motivacija i ona je od čoveka do čoveka različitog obima, intenziteta i prirode, jer zavisi od niza faktora, kako ličnih, tako i faktora koji se odnose na socijalni ambijent u kome osoba živi i radi. Od socijalne motivacije, njenog obima, vrste i intenziteta umnogome zavisi uspeh studenata, kako opšti uspeh na studijama, tako i na širem (životnom) planu. U našem radu smo se motivisali ovom činjenicom i istražili smo one delove socijalne motivacije koji se odnose na potrebu za postignućem (ciljanje ka izvrsnosti, postignuće u odnosu na set standarda, težnju ka uspehu), zatim potrebu za druženjem (želja za prijateljskim i bliskim međuljudskim odnosima) i potrebu za moći (potrebu da se ponašaju na način kako mi mislimo da treba da se ponašaju). Pored socijalne motivacije, fokus našeg istraživanja je bila i emocionalna kompetentnost. Emocionalna inteligencija je u poslednjih dvadesetak godina prešla granice psihologije i postala je privlačna za mnoge medije, a naročito posle pojave knjige Danijela Golemana (Daniel Goleman), predavača na američkom univerzitetu Harvard i dopisnika „New York Timesa”, koja nosi naziv „Emocionalna inteligencija”. Emocionalna inteligencija ima veliku ulogu „u prilagođavanju studenata na životne situacije tako da možemo reći da se oni studenti koji poseduju takve sposobnosti smatraju prilagođenim i emocionalno veštima, oni koji ne poseduju ove sposobnosti, u dovoljnoj meri, mogu biti oštećeni u emocionalnom i socijalnom funkcionisanju” (Bogdanović, 2013).

2. Struktura socijalne motivacije

Teorija za postignućem ponekad se naziva i teorijom potreba za ostvarenjem rezultata i teorijom socijalne motivacije. Osnivači ove teorije su Dejvid Meklilend (David C. McClelland) i Atkinson (John William Atkinson). Ova teorija se definiše kao individualna dispozicija da se teži ka uspehu. Dispozicija se određuje kao relativno trajna osobina ličnosti. Strukturu socijalne motivacije čine sledeće komponente: potreba za moći, potreba za postignućem i potreba za afilijacijom. Potreba za moći može se definisati kao „tendencija jednog socijalnog aktera, bio to pojedinac ili grupa, da utiče na ponašanje drugih ljudi” (Franceško, 2013). Pored ovoga, potrebom za moći smatra se osećanje vlastite vrednosti i sposobnosti. Motiv za postignućem je motivaciona dispozicija koja je u prošlosti, ali i sada, veoma često predmet istraživanja. Pod motivom za postignućem podrazumevamo snažnu tendenciju individue da se takmiči s ciljem da se prevaziđu lična ili tuđa dostignuća u nekoj oblasti ljudskog angažovanja, profesionalnog i životnog. U novijim istraživanjima motiva za postignućem (motiva za uspehom, za ostvarenjem) Franceško i saradnici izdvojili su u svojim nalazima „četiri komponente koje dodatno opisuju ovu složenu motivacionu dispoziciju“ (Franceško i sar., 2002).

To su:

- „Takmičenje sa drugim ljudima
- Ostvarivanje cilja kao izvor zadovoljstva
- Istrajnost u ostvarivanju ciljeva
- Tendencija ka planiranju“ (Franceško i sar., 2002).

U nekim istraživanjima utvrđena je pozitivna korelacija između stepena izraženosti motiva postignuća i koeficijenta inteligencije, kao i sa školskim uspehom. U ispitivanjima izvršenim u razvijenim zemljama utvrđeno je da je motiv postignuća mnogo razvijeniji kod nekih profesija, kao što su privredni preduzetnici, rukovodioci, advokati i sl. (prema Đurić, Franceško, Kostić, 2010). Treća komponenta socijalne motivacije jeste afilijativni motiv i on se odražava u želji pojedinca da bude u nepo-

srednom kontaktu s osobama, da se udružuje s drugim pojedincima na različitim životnim poljima. Pojedinci udruživanjem s drugima postaju članovi različitih organizacija, grupa i sl., a sve u cilju zadovoljavanja svojih potreba za afilijacijom. Svaka radna organizacija trebalo bi da u svojoj sredini otkriva zaposlene i da forsira prijem osoba kod kojih je ovaj motiv izražen, jer je ovaj motiv važan kako za uspeh zaposlenog, tako i za uspeh organizacije.

3. Emocionalna kompetentnost²

Emocionalna kompetentnost izaziva interesovanje mnogih naučnika i stručnjaka, sociologa, medicinara, pa i šire javnosti, a naročito posle pojave knjige pod naslovom „Emocionalna inteligencija”, Danijela Golemana, predavača na američkom univerzitetu Harvard i dopisnika „New York Timesa”. Međutim, poznato je da se interesovanje za emocionalnu inteligenciju pojavilo u davnoj prošlosti. Još je Aristotel u „Nikomahovoj etici” skrenuo pažnju na ovaj fenomen svojom jednostavnom ali mudrom umotvorinom: „Svako se može razljutiti – to je lako. Ali naljutiti se na pravu osobu, u pravu meri, zbog valjanog razloga i na pravi način – to nije lako.” U ovoj čuvenoj rečenici jeste sva suština emocionalne kompetentnosti. Osnovni konstrukti emocionalne kompetentnosti sadržani su u mnogobrojnim modelima opšte inteligencije.

Sternberg je došao do podataka da snalaženje u svakodnevnom životnim situacijama, naročito u sferi međuljudskih odnosa, zahteva i neke druge sposobnosti od onih sposobnosti koje mere klasični testovi inteligencije. Goleman je pojam emocionalne kompetentnosti suprotstavio pojmu akademske inteligencije, pri čemu je odabrao niz efektnih primera u prognozi različitih oblika uspešnosti u svakodnevnom životu pojedinca, a koji ukazuju na prednost emocionalne kompetentnosti nad akademskom. Golemanova knjiga prilično intigrantnog naslova „EI –

2 Neki autori upotrebljavaju i druge termine kada govore o istom sklopu veština i sposobnosti, zato u literaturi susrećemo pojmove kao: emocionalni kvocijent, emocionalna pismenost i emocionalna kompetentnost

važnija od IQ” bila je dve godine bestseler u SAD. Velika popularnost ove knjige dovela je i do nekritičnog širenja okvira definicije. Vladimir Takšić je za ove posledice rekao da su dovele do nemilosrdne komercijalizacije koja je upakovana u goleme programe različitih programa čiji je cilj razvoj emocionalne kompetentnosti. Ovo se naročito osetilo na području rukovođenja i edukacije. Programi se nekritički reklamiraju kao panacea (lek za sve moguće bolesti). U naučnoj literaturi se emocionalna inteligencija prvi put pojavila u ranim devedesetim godinama. Prvi koncept ovog fenomena vezuje se uz imena dva čoveka, Pitera Saloveja (Petera Salovey) s Univerziteta Jejl i Džona D. Majera (John D. Mayer) s Univerziteta Nju Hempšir. Oni su objektivno, postepeno i sistematski, u okvirima naučne metodologije, razvijali modele i instrumentarij za procenu emocionalne kompetentnosti. S aspekta njihovog koncepta, pod emocionalnom kompetentnošću podrazumeva se skup emocionalnih sposobnosti koje doprinose da ličnost tačnije procenjuje i prepoznaje kvalitet emocionalnog izražavanja kako svojih emocija i sposobnost, tako i tuđih, i da se odabere ispravan način upotrebe emocija i nesvesnih instinktivnih mehanizama u interakciji s drugim ljudima, a sve radi planiranja i postizanja optimalnih životnih ciljeva i njihove realizacije.

Dakle, emocionalna inteligencija uključuje, delimično rečeno informatičkim rečnikom, sposobnost procesiranja emocionalnih informacija. Ako se merenjem dođe do nalaza da osoba, u našem slučaju student, raspolaže visokim stepenom emocionalne kompetentnosti, smatra se dobro prilagođenim i emocionalno veštim pojedincem, dok osoba koja ne raspolaže dovoljnim stepenom ove sposobnosti može biti oštećena na emocionalnom i socijalnom funkcionisanju. Nizak nivo emocionalne kompetentnosti kod studenta ima za posledicu često upadanje u konfliktne situacije kako sa samim sobom, tako i s okolinom, kolegama, profesorima, roditeljima, partnerom i sl. Sve to može loše da utiče na njegovo mentalno zdravlje i na inače ukupan mentalni status. Nizak nivo emocionalne kompetentnosti dovodi i do lošijih rezultata na svim poljima angažovanja. Školski psiholozi i nastavnici za specijalno obrazovanje prvi su koji su povezali ono što nazivamo emocionalnom inteligencijom s akademskim radom i uspehom u školi” (Šapiro, 1998). Postoje u struci i nauci mišljenja da bi trebalo uvesti u škole predmet koji bi imao za cilj razvoj emocionalne kompetentnosti.

4. Metodologija istraživanja

4.1. Problem i zadatak istraživanja

Problem istraživanja je otkrivanje određenih relacija između strukture socijalne motivacije i emocionalne kompetentnosti kod studenata različitih psihosocijalnih karakteristika.

4.2. Zadaci istraživanja

- Utvrditi da li postoji statistički značajna povezanost strukture socijalne motivacije i emocionalne kompetentnosti kod studenata.
- Utvrditi da li postoji statistički značajna razlika u emocionalnoj kompetentnosti po demografskim varijablama ispitanika: pol i vrsta fakulteta.

4.3. Hipoteze istraživanja

Na osnovu navedenih zadataka istraživanja postavili smo sledeće istraživačke hipoteze:

H1: Postoji statistički značajna povezanost između strukture socijalne motivacije i emocionalne kompetentnosti.

H2: Postoji statistički značajna razlika u emocionalnoj kompetentnosti po demografskim varijablama ispitanika posmatrano prema polu i vrsti fakulteta.

4.4. Instrumenti istraživanja

1. Upitnik socijalne motivacije (test je definisan na bazi teorije naučenih potreba Dejvida Meklilenda (David MC Clelland)) – upitnik je dat u okviru publikacije „Managing Today” Stivena Robinsa (Stephen P. Robbins, Prentice Hall, 1977). Meklilend je proučavao stečene potrebe koje meri ovaj upitnik. Te potrebe su sledeće: potreba za postignućem, potreba za afilijacijom/druženjem i potreba za moći.

2. Upitnik emocionalne kompetentnosti, UEK-45, autora prof. dr Vladimira Takšića s Odseka za psihologiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Rijeci (2002. godine). Upitnik sadrži sledeće supskale: skalu sposobnosti uočavanja i razumevanja emocija, skalu sposobnosti izražavanja i imenovanja emocija i skalu sposobnosti regulacije i upravljanja emocijama.

4.5. Uzorak istraživanja

Uzorak u ovom istraživanju činili su ispitanici – studenti 1. i 4. godine studija, s Filozofskog i Ekonomskog fakulteta u Istočnom Sarajevu. Uzorkom je obuhvaćeno 228 ispitanika. Uzorak je ujednačen po određenim parametrima (pol, starost, vrsta fakulteta). Uzorak ima karakteristike namernog i prigodnog uzorka.

4.6 Organizacija istraživanja i postupci za obradu podataka

Istraživanje je realizovano na Filozofskom fakultetu i Ekonomskom fakultetu u Istočnom Sarajevu. Organizacija istraživanja je bila u domenu autora rada i uz asistenciju stručnih saradnika s pomenutih fakulteta. Podaci su se obrađivali u adekvatnom kompjuterskom, statističkom, paket-programu. Koristili smo postupke korelativne analize i T-test u skladu s postavljenim zadacima istraživanja.

5. Rezultati istraživanja

Prezentovaćemo dobijene rezultate istraživanja prema postavljenim hipotezama.

I Postoji statistički značajna povezanost strukture socijalne motivacije i emocionalne kompetentnosti kod studenata

Tabela 1. Korelacije između strukture socijalne motivacije i emocionalne kompetentnosti

Struktura socijalne motivacije	Postignuće	Moć	Afilijacija	Emocionalna kompetentnost
Postignuće	1	-,321	,489	,851
	-	,000	,000	,000
	228	228	228	228
Moć	-,321	1	-,281	-,490
	,000	-	,000	,000
	228	228	228	228
Afilijacija	,489	-,281	1	,557
	,000	,000	-	,000
	228	228	228	228
Emocionalna kompetentnost	,851	-,490	,557	1
	,000	,000	,000	-
	228	228	228	228

Gledajući Tabelu 1, evidentno je da postoji statistički značajna povezanost između emocionalne kompetentnosti i strukture socijalne motivacije. Veoma visoka pozitivna korelacija pokazala se između postignuća i emocionalne kompetentnosti. Negativna korelacija pokazala se kod moći u odnosu na emocionalnu kompetentnost, pri čemu zaključujemo da veći nivo moći upućuje na manji stepen emocionalne kompetentnosti i obrnuto.

II Postoji statistički značajna razlika u emocionalnoj kompetentosti prema polu i vrsti fakulteta ispitanika

Tabela 2: Razlika u emocionalnoj kompetentosti između ispitanika prema polu ispitanika

		Broj ispitanika	Aritmetička sredina	Standardna devijacija	T-test	Značajnost
Pol	muški	114	125,1316	35,71185	162,788	.000
	ženski	114	176,0877	23,30238		
Ukupno		228	150,6096	39,46081		

Testirajući razlike između aritmetičkih sredina među studentima prema polu, ustanovili smo da su studentkinje emocionalno kompetentnije u odnosu na studente i dobijena razlika je statistički značajna.

III Postoji statistički značajna razlika u emocionalnoj kompetentosti između ispitanika prema vrsti fakulteta

Tabela 3: Razlike u emocionalnoj kompetentosti između ispitanika prema vrsti fakulteta

		Broj ispitanika	Aritmetička sredina	Standardna devijacija	T test	Značajnost
Fakultet	Filozofski fakultet	114	159,9561	26,65758	13,495	,000
	Ekonomski fakultet	114	141,2632	47,34136		
Ukupno		228	150,6096	39,46081		

Iz rezultata koji su predstavljeni u Tabeli 3, može se videti da, na nivou uzorka, postoji značajna razlika u globalnom skorom emocionalne kompetentnosti između studenata s različitih fakulteta. Naime, studenti sa Filozofskog fakulteta pokazali su se emocionalno kompetentnijim u odnosu na studente Ekonomskog fakulteta.

6. Diskusija i zaključak

Na osnovu teorijskih razmatranja može se izvesti zaključak da je problem socijalne motivacije kompleksan i veoma važan u životu svake osobe i karakteriše ga specifičan način razmišljanja, rešavanja svakodnevnih, ličnih, profesionalnih i životnih teškoća u socijalnom ambijentu u kome čovek živi i radi. Bez energetskeg potencijala koji čovek crpi iz sfere socijalne motivacije, on ne bi mogao pronaći sebe i, kao svesno biće, ne bi mogao afirmisati one ljudske funkcije koje su neophodne da bi upravljao svetom i prirodom. Samo u interakciji s drugim ljudima, čovek realizuje prosocijalne vrednosti (odnos prema sebi, drugim ljudima i grupama). Iako je emocionalna kompetentnost kasno doživela svoju afirmaciju, ona je važna za postizanje ciljeva i održavanja zdravih odnosa, a time i ukupnog zdravog mentalnog statusa svake ličnosti. Jedna od najvećih pobeda jeste pobediti sebe i upoznati samog sebe. Osobe koje upoznaju sebe i ovladaju sobom (dostignu zavidan nivo samopouzdanja, samopoštovanja itd.) bolje upravljaju svojim životom i donose racionalnije i pragmatičnije odluke, uz minimalnu ili nikakvu kontaminaciju patoloških faktora kao što su depresivnost, anksioznost, fobičnost, hipersenzitivnost, impulsivnost, opsesivnost itd.

Kao što smo naveli, utvrđena je statistički značajna povezanost strukture socijalne motivacije i emocionalne kompetentnosti kod studenata i to u onom delu socijalne motivacije koji se odnosi na postignuće i emocionalnu kompetentnost. To znači da su veština prepoznavanja i kontrola emocija značajni faktori za nivo postignuća i obratno. Studenti koji su tokom vaspitanja bili eksponirani vaspitnim postupcima koji su ih podsticali da se takmiče (ne po svaku cenu) s drugima i da dobro obavljaju svoje zadatke, i koja su bili nagrađivani za uspeh, razvili su snažan motiv za postignućem. Ovaj nalaz ukazuje na neophodnost podsticanja mladih u toku vaspitanja u porodici i školi na uspeh, a pri tome je neophodno koristiti sistem adekvatnih stimulativnih mera i postupaka koji izazivaju prijatne emocije kod deteta. Ako dete bude podsticano da se takmiči s drugima i da dobro obavlja razne zadatke koji mu budu postavljeni, i ako bude, nakon postignutog uspeha, nagrađivano – verovatno je da će doći do razvijanja snažnog motiva za postignućem. Ako se ne bude podsticala kompeticija i ne bude pozitivno reagovalo na po-

stignuti uspeh deteta, verovatno je da se neće razviti ovaj motiv. Ukratko, može se pretpostaviti da će sticanje i razvitak ovog motiva zavisiti od određenih postupaka roditelja prema deci. S druge strane, neophodno je podsticati i vežbati decu od „malih nogu” da razvijaju emocionalnu kompetentnost.

U delu relacija između nivoa moći i emocionalne kompetentnosti dobili smo negativnu korelaciju. Veći nivo moći upućuje na manji stepen emocionalne kompetentnosti. Očito da emocije i moć, tj. potreba za moći i emocionalna kompetentnost „ne idu ruku pod ruku”. Ovaj nalaz očito zahteva dalja istraživanja.

Dobili smo nalaz da su studentkinje emocionalno kompetentnije u odnosu na studente i dobijena razlika je statistički značajna. Ovaj nalaz je donekle očekivan i potvrđuje neka ranija iskustva o razlikama među polovima. Naime, pri proceni ličnosti na „prvi pogled” iskustva govore da su osobe ženskog pola bolje „ispekle” ovaj „zanat” od muškaraca. Razlog zašto je to tako leži u tome što su žene stalno obuzete svojim izgledom, brinu se o njemu i o tome šta će sredina misliti o njima. Izgled je kod žena važan faktor uspeha na mnogim poljima. Otuda posvećivanje pažnje spoljašnjosti, u našem slučaju emocionalnim ekspresijama, pokazuje da su studentkinje bolje ovladale ovom veštinom, što rezultira boljom emocionalnom kompetentnošću. Osobe ženskog pola su u evolucionom razvoju stekle takođe i određenu dozu emocionalne kompetentnosti koja im pomaže u negovanju deteta. Majka preko plača svog deteta prepoznaje njegove potrebe itd.

U našem istraživanju dobili smo i zanimljive rezultate koji se odnose na prirodu relacija između emocionalne kompetentnosti između studenata sa različitih fakulteta. Dobili smo rezultat da su emocionalno kompetentniji studenti sa Filozofskog fakulteta u odnosu na studente Ekonomskog fakulteta. Očito da vrsta sadržaja koji se izučava (studira) ima uticaj na razvoj kompetentnosti. Opšte je poznato da su, na primer, studenti psihologije na neki način senzibilirani emocionanošću uopšte, jer su u njihovom budućem zanimanju prepoznavanje emocija, kontrola emocija, itd., veoma važne veštine za uspešnost u poslu.

Teorijski značaj ovog istraživanja jeste u samom izboru problema istraživanja kojim smo se bavili. Posmatrajući današnje knjižare,

biblioteke i onlajn biblioteke, možemo shvatiti koliku pažnju čitalaca različitih profila okupiraju tema motivacije i tema emocionalne kompetentosti, budući da skoro svaki treći naslov knjige sadrži reč „motivacija”, „emocionalna inteligencija” i sl. Danas postoje različiti programi samopomoći, različiti kursevi, onlajn vodiči koji se bave ovim temama, što dokazuje koliko su ovi fenomeni aktuelni, ali u moru ponuđenih „brzih rešenja” za bolji uspeh i za bolju kontrolu emocija, izražavanja emocija i itd., treba pronaći one prave, koji studentu zaista mogu pomoći. Postoji nada da, kada bi studenti podrobnije „upoznali” ove komponente, najpre na teorijskom nivou, uspeali bi na taj način da bolje detektuju svoje slabe „strane” i da pokušaju da ih poboljšaju, jer bi ih to moglo dovesti do većeg zadovoljstva sobom, većeg samopouzdanja, boljeg uspeha na fakultetu, boljih međuljudskih odnosa, odnosa s roditeljima, kolegama s fakulteta...

Uzimajući u obzir dobijene rezultate istraživanja, možemo izvesti generalni zaključak da se oni mogu primeniti u praktičnom radu sa studentima na planu otklanjanja teškoća u učenju, ponašanju, intimnoj sferi u savetodavnom radu, organizovanju različitih psiholoških programa i radionica za studente za podizanje kvaliteta određenih segmenata socijalne motivacije i za razvoj emocionalne inteligencije kod studentske populacije i slično. Takođe, rezultati su primenjivi u praksi za očuvanje mentalnog zdravlja studenata pri savetovalištim za studente. Naše istraživanje i uočene relacije ukazuju na izuzetnu složenost ovih fenomena i neophodnost daljih istraživanja multidisciplinarnog karaktera. Ovaj rad otvara i nova pitanja i ideje u smislu otkrivanja uticaja patoloških konativnih faktora na nivou socijalne motivacije i emocionalne kompetentnosti.

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SOCIAL MOTIVATION AND EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE IN STUDENTS

ABSTRACT: The goal of the research was to identify relations between social motivation structure and emotional competence among students of different psychosocial characteristics. The research was conducted at the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Economics, East Sarajevo University. The sample consisted of 228 first- and fourth-year students. For the study purposes, we used the social motivation questionnaire and the emotional competence questionnaire. The results of the research will be useful as motivation for further research, as well as in teaching and designing programs which promote students' mental health.

KEY WORDS: social motivation, emotional competence, students

1. Introduction

Observing and analysing human behaviour and actions, we conclude that every person has certain needs, i.e., motives that drive them. The type, intensity and direction of motivation will depend on how important an activity that an individual engages in is for their existence. Motivation involves any physiological, psychological, or social factors that drive a person, direct their behaviour, actions, thinking, perception, and learning, on a personal or social level. As a rule, there is

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no difference between people regarding the inventory of biological motives. Every individual is born with biological (physiological) motives, which are necessary for the species survival. Unlike biological motives, there are motives that motivate a person in social interactions and similar situations that give a person a sense of satisfaction. They are responsible for love, cooperation, group role, empathy, communication with others, work commitment, etc. This type of motivation is called social motivation. Social motivation varies from person to person in scope, intensity, and nature, because it depends on several factors, both personal and environmental. Students' academic achievement, as well as success in life, largely depends on the scope, type, and intensity of social motivation. Inspired by this, we examined those elements of social motivation that relate to the need for achievement (targeting excellence, achieving a set of standards, striving for success), then the need for affiliation (desire to have close and friendly relationships) and the need for power (the need to make people behave the way we think they should behave).

The other subject of our research was emotional competence. In the past twenty years, the concept of emotional intelligence has crossed the boundaries of psychology and into mass media, especially after Daniel Goleman, a lecturer at Harvard University and a correspondent for the New York Times, published his book *Emotional Intelligence*. Emotional intelligence is one of the crucial factors "in students' adjustment to real-life situations; we can say that students who possess such abilities are considered well-adjusted and emotionally skilled, whereas those who do not possess these abilities can be less skilled in their emotional and social functioning." (Bogdanović, 2013) “.

2. The structure of social motivation

Achievement theory is sometimes called the need for achievement theory or social motivation theory. The founders of this theory are McClelland and Atkinson. This theory is defined as the individual's disposition to strive for success. Disposition is defined as a relatively permanent personality trait. The structure of social motivation consists of the following components: the need for power, the need for achievement

and the need for affiliation. The need for power can be defined as “the tendency of one social actor, be it an individual or a group, to influence the behaviour of other people” (Franceško, 2013). The need for power also involves feelings of self-worth and ability. The need for achievement has frequently been the subject of research. It involves a strong tendency towards competition, with the goal of surpassing one’s own or others’ achievements, in professional or private life. A recent study on the need for achievement (success, self-actualization) by Franceško et al. (2002), “four components that further describe this complex motivational disposition” were identified.

These are:

- favouring competition
- achieving goals as a source of satisfaction
- perseverance in achieving goals
- tendency towards planning (Franceško et al., 2002)

Some studies have found a positive correlation between the degree of achievement motivation and IQ, and academic achievement. The studies conducted in developed countries found that the need for achievement is much more developed among certain occupations, such as entrepreneurs, executives, lawyers, etc. (see Đurić, Franceško, Kostić, 2010). The third component of social motivation is the need for affiliation, which involves the desire to be in direct contact with people or to associate with others in different areas of life. Every organization should aim to identify these individuals among their employees and recruit people who exhibit a strong affiliation need, because it is important both for the individual employee’s success and for the success of the organization.

3. Emotional competence²

Emotional competence is a phenomenon which has attracted the interest of researchers in psychology, sociology, medicine, as well

² Some authors use other terms when talking about the same set of skills and abilities, such as: emotional quotient, emotional literacy, and emotional competence.

as the general public, especially since the publication of the book *Emotional Intelligence* by Daniel Goleman, Harvard University lecturer and The New York Times correspondent. However, interest in emotional intelligence first appeared in the distant past. In his book *Nicomachean's Ethics*, Aristotle referred to this phenomenon in his simple but wise saying: "Anybody can become angry, that is easy; but to be angry with the right person, and to the right degree, and at the right time, and for the right purpose, and in the right way, that is not within everybody's power, that is not easy." This famous saying contains the whole essence of emotional competence. The basic constructs of emotional competence are contained in numerous models of general intelligence.

Sternberg concluded that coping in everyday situations, especially in the sphere of interpersonal relationships, requires other abilities than those measured by conventional intelligence tests. Goleman contrasted the notion of emotional competence with the notion of academic intelligence, showing by effective examples the advantage that emotional competence can have over academic competence in everyday life. Goleman's book with its intriguing title *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ* was a bestseller in the USA for two years. The great popularity of this book has also led to an uncritical expansion of the concept definition. According to Vladimir Takšić, this led to a ruthless commercialization of the concept, through an ever-expanding number of various training programs aimed at developing emotional competence, especially in the field of leadership and education. These training programs are uncritically advertised as a cure-all. The concept of emotional intelligence first appeared in scientific publications in the early 1990s. This phenomenon was first examined by two researchers, Peter Salovey from the University of Yale, and John D. Mayer from the University of New Hampshire. Objectively, gradually, and systematically, using scientific methodology, they developed models and tools for assessing emotional competence. According to their research, emotional competence is a set of emotional abilities that enable a person to more accurately assess and recognize the type of emotional expression of their own and others' emotions and abilities and to choose the right way to use emotions and unconscious instinctive mechanisms in interactions with other people, for the purpose of planning and achieving optimal life goals.

To use an IT expression, we can say that emotional intelligence includes the ability to process emotional information. If the measurement shows that a person, in our case a student, has a high degree of emotional competence, they are considered a well-adjusted and emotionally skilled individual, while a person who does not have a sufficient degree of this ability may be less skilled emotionally and socially. The low level of emotional competence in students results in frequent conflict situations with oneself, as well as with the environment, peers, teachers, parents, partners, etc. Consequently, their mental health may suffer. Low emotional competence may also lead to poorer results in any activity. "School psychologists and special education teachers were the first to link what we call emotional intelligence with academic work and achievement" (Shapiro, 1998). Many psychology researchers and practitioners agree that a subject aimed at developing emotional intelligence should be included in the school curriculum.

4. Research Methodology

4.1. Research Problem and Objective

The research problem is to identify the relationship between the structure of social motivation and emotional competence among students of different psychosocial characteristics.

4.2. Research Goals

- To determine whether there is a statistically significant correlation between the structure of social motivation and emotional competence among students
- To determine whether there is a statistically significant variation in emotional competence by demographic variables of respondents: gender and type of faculty

4.3. Research Hypotheses

Based on the stated research goals, the research hypotheses were formulated as follows:

H1: There is a statistically significant correlation between the structure of social motivation and emotional competence

H2: There is a statistically significant variation in emotional competence by demographic variables of respondents: gender and type of faculty

4.4. Research Instruments

1. Social Motivation Questionnaire (based on David McClelland's Learned Needs Theory; see *Managing Today*, Stephen P. Robbins (ed.), Prentice Hall, 1977). McClelland studied acquired needs, which are measured using this questionnaire. These needs are the following: the need for achievement, the need for affiliation / socializing and the need for power.
2. Questionnaire of Emotional Competence, QEC-45 by Professor Vladimir Takšić from the Faculty of Philosophy in Rijeka, Department of Psychology (2002). The questionnaire contains the following subscales: the ability to perceive and understand emotions scale, the ability to express and name emotions scale, and the ability to regulate and manage emotions scale.

4.5. Research Sample

The sample consisted of 228 first- and fourth-year students from the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Economics, East Sarajevo University. The sample is uniform according to certain parameters (gender, age, type of faculty). The sample was chosen using probability cluster sampling.

4.6. Research Organization and Data Processing Procedures

The research was conducted at the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Economics, East Sarajevo University. The study was conducted by the author and research assistants from the aforementioned institutions. The data was processed using appropriate computer software programs, correlational analysis, and T-tests.

5. Results

The results will be presented in order of the hypotheses proposed.

I There is a statistically significant correlation between the structure of social motivation and emotional competence among students.

Table 1. Correlations between the structure of social motivation and emotional competence

The structure of social motivation	Achievement	Power	Affiliation	Emotional competence
Achievement	1	-,321	,489	,851
	-	,000	,000	,000
	228	228	228	228
Power	-,321	1	-,281	-,490
	,000	-	,000	,000
	228	228	228	228
Affiliation	,489	-,281	1	,557
	,000	,000	-	,000
	228	228	228	228
Emotional competence	,851	-,490	,557	1
	,000	,000	,000	-
	228	228	228	228

Table 1 shows that there is an evident and statistically significant correlation between emotional competence and the structure of social motivation. A very high positive correlation is evident between achievement

and emotional competence. Negative correlation exists between power and emotional competence, leading us to conclude that a higher level of power indicates a lower degree of emotional competence and vice versa.

II There is a statistically significant difference in emotional competence according to the gender and type of faculty of the respondents

Table 2. Difference in emotional competence between respondents according to gender

		Number of respondents	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	T test	Significance
Gender	Male	114	125,1316	35,71185	162,788	.000
	Female	114	176,0877	23,30238		
Total		228	150,6096	39,46081		

Testing the differences between arithmetic means between students by gender, we found that female students are more emotionally competent than male students, and the difference obtained is statistically significant.

III There is a statistically significant difference in emotional competence between respondents by type of faculty

Table 3. Differences in emotional competence between respondents by type of faculty

		Number of respondents	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	T test	Significance
Faculty	Faculty of Philosophy	114	159,9561	26,65758	13,495	,000
	Faculty of Economics	114	141,2632	47,34136		
Total		228	150,6096	39,46081		

Table 3 results show that there is a significant difference in the total score of emotional competence between students from different faculties on the sample level. Namely, the Faculty of Philosophy students have been shown to be more emotionally competent compared to the Faculty of Economics students.

6. Discussion and conclusion

Based on theoretical considerations, it can be concluded that the problem of social motivation is complex and very important in the life of every individual. It involves a specific way of thinking and solving everyday personal, professional and life problems in the social environment in which people live and work. Without the energy we draw from social motivation, no human being could reach self-awareness and perform the social functions which are essential for governing the world around us. Only through interactions with others can an individual enact prosocial values (attitude towards self, others, and groups). Although the importance of emotional competence was recognized only recently, emotional competence is essential for achieving goals, maintaining healthy relationships, and individual mental health. Knowing and governing oneself is one of the greatest victories a person can achieve. People who possess self-knowledge and self-control (who have reached an enviable level of self-confidence, self-esteem, etc.) can govern their lives better and make more rational and pragmatic decisions, with minimal or no contamination from pathological factors such as depression, anxiety, phobia, hypersensitivity, impulsivity, obsession, etc.

As shown above, we found a statistically significant correlation between the structure of social motivation and emotional competence among students; more specifically the part of the social motivation related to achievement and emotional competence. This implies that the skill of recognizing and controlling emotions is an important factor for the level of achievement and vice versa. Students who during their upbringing were exposed to educational practices that encouraged them to compete (not at any cost) with others, to excel in their tasks, and who were rewarded for success, developed a strong achievement motivation.

This finding indicates the need to encourage young people to succeed during upbringing, both in the family and school. It is also essential to use a system of adequate stimulative measures and actions that evoke pleasant emotions in the child. If children are encouraged to compete with others and to perform well in their tasks and if they are rewarded for their achievements, it is likely that they will develop a strong achievement motive. If, on the other hand, competition is not encouraged and if there is no positive response to the child's achievement, it is likely that this motive will not develop. In short, we can safely assume that the acquisition and development of this motivation will depend on parents' behavior towards children. On the other hand, it is necessary to encourage and train children to develop emotional competence from a young age.

The results have shown a negative correlation between the level of power and emotional competence. A higher level of power indicates a lower degree of emotional competence. Apparently, emotions and power, i.e., the need for power and emotional competence do not "go hand-in-hand". This finding evidently warrants further research.

The results have also shown that female students are more emotionally competent than male students, with a statistically significant difference. This result was not altogether unexpected, as it confirms some already existing opinions of gender differences. Indeed, experience has confirmed that women are better than men in assessing personality at first glance. The reason for this is women's preoccupation with their appearance and what others think of them. Women's appearance is an important factor of achievement in many fields. Hence the attention paid to the exterior, in this case emotional expressions. The female students are likely to have developed this skill to a higher degree, which results in a higher emotional competence. Over the long years of evolutionary development, women were those who acquired an amount of emotional competence that helped them in child-rearing, e.g., mothers can identify her child's needs by the child's crying, etc.

The research also yielded interesting results related to the nature of the relationship between emotional competence of students from different faculties. The results have shown that students from the Faculty

of Philosophy are more emotionally competent than students from the Faculty of Economics. Obviously, the content of their studies has an impact on the development of competence. It is generally known that, for instance, psychology students are in some way sensitized to emotionality in general, because the skills such as identifying and controlling emotions are very important for success in their future occupation.

The research relevance is related to the choice of the research problem itself. Browsing through book shops and online and physical libraries, it is evident that the subjects of motivation and emotional have captured the attention of the reading public, as nearly one third of all the book titles contain words such as “motivation” or “emotional intelligence”. Another argument in favour of the relevance of these phenomena is a multitude of self-help programmes, training courses, and online guidebooks. However, in a host of quick fixes that promise higher achievement and better emotional control, it is not an easy task to find the right ones. If students acquired theoretical knowledge of these components and then applied it in their day-to-day life, it is to be hoped that they would be better equipped to identify their weaknesses and then improve them. This would lead to a higher self-satisfaction, self-confidence, and academic achievement, as well as better interpersonal relationships with parents and peers.

The results obtained can be applied in practice, in areas such as resolving students’ learning or behavioural difficulties, students’ mental health care units, counselling, designing programmes and workshops for students aimed at improving elements of social motivation, developing emotional intelligence among students, etc. This research and the correlations observed demonstrate the high complexity of these phenomena and the necessity of further multidisciplinary research. The future implications of this research could be related to exploring new ideas about the influence of pathological conative factors on social motivation and emotional competence.

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TRADICIONALNI I SAVREMENI MODEL RADA POLICIJE NA BEZBEDNOSNOM SEKTORU²

APSTRAKT: U radu se kazuje o sektorskom načinu rada kao okosnici efikasnog policijskog delovanja. Prvo će se obraditi ovaj model delovanja u periodu socijalizma i društvene samozaštite, a nakon toga i period posle 2000. godine u kome je započela implementacije iskustava razvijenih zemalja oličenih u konceptu policije u zajednici.

U periodu socijalizma sektorski način rada prepoznat je kao vid decentralizacije poslova milicije i pogodna forma za ostvarivanje preventivnog rada i još efikasnije ostvarivanje uloge milicije u sistemu društvene samozaštite. Terenski policajac – pozornik uživao je poverenje i poštovanje građana, bio je ustaljen na određenom sektoru više godina, zbog čega je najbolje poznao lica, teritoriju i bezbednosnu problematiku tog područja. Sektorski način rada (i konceptualno i praktično) ima mnogo dodirnih tačaka s modelom policije u zajednici čijim se ostvarivanjem treba postići preobražaj klasičnog načina obavljanja policijskih poslova i povratiti poverenje građana u policiju. Policija u zajednici donela je reafirmaciju policajca pozornika i sektorskog rada, a

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² Rad je nastao kao rezultat aktivnosti na projektima MPNTR „Razvoj institucionalnih kapaciteta, standarda i procedura za suprotstavljanje organizovanom kriminalu i terorizmu u uslovima međunarodnih integracija” br. 179045, kao i internim projektima KPU „Položaj i uloga policije u multisektorskom pristupu rešavanja lokalnih bezbednosnih problema” i „Policajac u pozoričkoj delatnosti – razvoj i uloga u radu policije u zajednici”.

njeni mnogobrojni programi, tehnike, radnje i aktivnosti po kojima je prepoznatljiva mogu doprineti fokusiranju i primeni vrednosti tradicionalnog sektorskog načina rada u savremenim uslovima.³

KLJUČNE REČI: rad na sektoru, pozornik, policija u zajednici, prevencija, društvena samozaštita.

1. Uvod

Rad policije može biti organizovan kao teritorijalni, linijski i objektni. Teritorijalnim radom su obuhvaćeni svi policijski poslovi na celoj teritoriji za koju je obrazovana teritorijalna organizaciona jedinica policije. Organizuje se na nivoima područnih policijskih uprava, policijskih stanica i ispostava, odnosno bezbednosnih sektora i policijskih odeljenja. Linijski rad je nastao diferencijacijom teritorijalnog rada po funkcionalnom principu, a objektni rad realizuju teritorijalno i funkcionalno diferencirane organizacione jedinice policije, čiji su pripadnici radno raspoređeni na pojedine, bezbednosno ugrožene objekte (Subošić, 2020, str. 162–163).

Radi lakšeg obavljanja poslova iz delokruga MUP-a Republike Srbije, a prihvatajući pre svega teritorijalni princip u svom radu, celokupno područje svake policijske stanice podeljeno je na bezbednosne sektore i ukupno ih ima oko 1000. Radi lakšeg organizovanja pre svega preventivnog oblika delovanja, područje skoro svakog bezbednosnog sektora podeljeno je na pozorničke rejone, kojih ukupno ima 458, i patrolne rejone kojih ukupno ima 1817 (Nikač, 2019, str. 219).

Da bismo bolje sagledali teritorijalni način rada policije, izvršiće se podela na vremenski period do 2000. godine, koji je obuhvatao period socijalizma i ostvarivanja društvene samozaštite, i demokratski period nakon toga, u kome je započela implementacija koncepta policije u zajednici.

U periodu socijalizma organi unutrašnjih poslova obavljali su svoju delatnost kroz represivne poslove kao državni organi, i preventivne, u okviru kojih se prepoznaju kao subjekt društvene samozaštite.

Značajna pažnja se posvećivala pitanju decentralizacije milicije, tj. iznalaženju najbolje forme njene organizacije za još efikasnije ostva-

rivanje uloge milicije u sistemu društvene samozaštite. Razlog je bilo to što se uviđalo da decentralizacija doprinosi približavanju policije građanima i njihovoj neposrednoj saradnji. Sektorski način rada prepoznat je kao jedan način decentralizacije poslova milicije i pogodna forma za ostvarivanje preventivnog rada, budući da je za uspešno izvršavanje poslova i zadataka iz delokruga policije neophodno poznavanje lica (lica kriminogenog i drugog asocijalnog ponašanja, lica pod pojačanim nadzorom, deportovana lica, strance, lica koja s obzirom na položaj ili radno mesto mogu uočiti kriminalne aktivnosti, penzionasane policajce i sl.), teritorije (naseljena mesta, važne objekte, komunikacije, zemljište, šume i planine) i bezbednosne problematike (stanje ugroženosti, ugroženi objekti, gustina naseljenosti, površina staničnog područja, stanje putne mreže) (Gaćeša, 2001). Shodno tome, neophodno je da postoji policijski službenik (milicionar) koji najbolje poznaje lica, teritoriju i bezbednosnu problematiku. Zbog toga on mora biti ustaljen da određenom sektoru više godina i imati uporište u zajednici i uživati poverenje i poštovanje građana.

Deset godina nakon društvene samozaštite, nastoji se uvesti nov model rada policije u zajednici. Policija u zajednici viđena je kao jedna od ključnih oblasti rada, čijim se ostvarivanjem treba postići preobražaj klasičnog modela obavljanja policijskih poslova. Primarni strategijski cilj naše policijske organizacije jeste da povrati poverenje građana u svoju policiju. U Srbiji se u toku 2002. godine otpočelo s temeljitim reformama policije, koje su se između ostalog odnosile na reafirmaciju policajca pozornika, sektorskog rada i uvođenje školskog policajca (Simonović, Vojnović, & Sekulić, 2003, str. 132).

Sektorski način rada ima mnogo dodirnih tačaka s konceptom policije u zajednici. Mnogobrojni programi, tehnike, radnje, aktivnosti po kojima se prepoznaje, tj. koji proizlaze iz modela rada policije u zajednici, kao što su problemski orijentisan rad, timski rad, mapiranje kriminala, rad sa socijalno ranjivim grupama, prevencija kao primarno delovanje, mogu doprineti unapređenju tradicionalnog sektorskog načina rada. Iako je pozornička delatnost kao način vršenja operativno-preventivnog delovanja odavno poznata, ona se uz dobru organizaciju i adekvatan sadržaj rada može uklopiti u savremene društvene procese i dati značajne rezultate u sprečavanju raznih društveno nepoželjnih i štetnih pojava i razvijanju (i produbljivanju) bezbednosti zajednice.

Ovaj rad će sadržati dva glavna poglavlja. Jedan koji će obuhvatiti one oblike i načine rada koji su se pod istim ili sličnim nazivima održali već decenijama, tj. od Drugog svetskog rata do danas. Razume se uz neophodne varijacije, tj. upodobljavanje datim prilikama i promenama u zemlji. U drugom delu izložiće se sektorski način rada uz primenu elemenata i sistema vrednosti koncepta policije u zajednici, tj. unapređen savremenim oblicima delovanja modela policije u zajednici.

2. Tradicionalni model

Još se u Zakonu o narodnoj miliciji („Službeni list FNRJ”, br. 101/46) iz 1946. u članu 1 propisuje da je milicija organizovana po teritorijalnom principu, tj. sektorskom načinu rada. Ovakav način rada milicije bio je propisan i kasnije donetim zakonima. Međutim, rukovođenje milicijom je bilo organizovano pretežno na centralizovan način, uz postojanje izvesne samostalnosti organa rukovođenja i komandovanja sreskim i opštinskim sekretarijatima i stanicama milicije.

Šezdesetih godina prošlog veka javila se društvena samozaštita kao novi oblik (društvene) svesti o tome da bezbednost nije problematika kojom se bave samo organi unutrašnjih poslova, već svi subjekti društvene samozaštite (radni čovek i građanin – kao osnovni subjekti, organizacije udruženog rada i mesne zajednice, društveno-političke i druge organizacije i društveno-političke zajednice, pravosudni organi, organi unutrašnjih poslova i drugi državni organi) (Ristović, 2020, str. 331–339).

Društvena samozaštita, koja je preferirala sektorski rad, zasnivala se na stanovištu da rukovodilac sektora, pozornici i ostali sektorski milicionari, uz podružku i pomoć građana i radnih ljudi, mogu biti veoma efikasni u zaštiti zajednice i očuvanju bezbednosti na sektoru.

Sektorski rad se pokazao kao najpogodnija forma i metod delovanja jer je davao najveće mogućnosti za preventivni rad i približavanje radnim ljudima i građanima. Sektor nije predstavljao samo bezbednosnu jedinicu na kojoj zajednički deluju milicija i radni ljudi i građani, nego i adekvatnu organizaciju preventivnog delovanja milicije i jedan od oblika podružtvljavanja funkcije bezbednosti. Slično današnjem problemski orijentisanom radu policije, „zadatak kriminalne prevencije koju sprovode milicionari na sektoru bezbednosti, sastojao se u sveopštem sagledavanju problema i izučavanju pojava, kao i u metodološkom

eliminisanju uzroka kao kriminogenih faktora” (Petrović, 1986, str. 119). Sektor opšte nadležnosti smatran je „formom decentralizacije poslova bezbednosti i primarno, sadržaj preventivnog rada u cilju zaštite svih vrednosti društva na tom području” (Dejanović, 1985, str. 136–137). Na principima sektorskog rada, nastojalo se obezbediti sveopšte učešće radnog naroda u vršenju poslova bezbednosti.

Sektor je obuhvatao područje jedne ili više mesnih zajednica na području opštine, što je zavisilo od stanja bezbednosti, ekonomske razvijenosti, broja stanovnika, gustine naseljenosti, konfiguracije terena, privredne strukture, saobraćaja itd. Sektor je predstavljao bezbednosnu celinu uz uvažavanje specifičnosti određenih delova područja. U zavisnosti od složenosti bezbednosne situacije, vršena je kategorizacija sektora na I, II i III kategoriju. Od toga zavisi organizacija rada, broj milicionara, njihov stručni profil i sl.

Oblici i načini operativnog delovanja milicionara na bezbednosnom sektoru ogledali su se, pre svega, u ličnom angažovanju na: 1. praćenju i analizi bezbednosne situacije na sektoru; 2. pravilnoj primeni operativno-taktičkih radnji u sprečavanju krivičnih dela i prekršaja; 3. stvaranju operativnih veza u skladu s ovlašćenjima i planovima operativne delatnosti; 4. korišćenju raznih dokumentacija, izveštaja i informacija kojima raspolažu svi organi unutrašnjih poslova; 5. ostvarivanju konkretnih bezbednosnih zadataka po uputstvima rukovodioca jedinice milicije ili u zajednici s ovlašćenim radnicima linijskih službi bezbednosti; 6. saradnji s građanima i radnim ljudima i pružanju stručne i druge pomoći u ostvarivanju društvene samozaštite (Dinić, 198, str. 54–55).

Na sektoru su se pored klasičnih policijskih poslova (patrolne i pozorničke delatnosti, privođenja, legitimisanja), obavljali i poslovi koji spadaju u domen društvene samozaštite: saradnja s radnim ljudima i građanima i drugim subjektima društvene samozaštite, njihovo adekvatno informisanje o problemima i pojavama bezbednosnog karaktera, bezbednosno vaspitanje građana, pružanje stručne pomoći, proučavanje društvenih odnosa i pojava iz oblasti bezbednosti, predlaganje rešenja i sl. Saradnja s radnim ljudima i građanima odvijala se kroz svakodnevne kontakte, uzajamnu pomoć, izgradnju međusobnog poverenja, zaštitu lične i imovinske sigurnosti, pomoć u ostvarivanju prava, konkretnih uputstava za postupanje u pojedinim bezbednosnim prilikama itd. (Ristović, 2020).

Za sektor je bio zadužen određen broj radnika milicije koje treba da karakterišu komunikativnost, zainteresovanost za probleme građana i inicijativa u njihovom rešavanju. Od radnika na sektoru očekivalo se da informiše, učestvuje u bezbednosnom vaspitanju građana, saraduje na polju bezbednosti, prati društvene odnose i pojave na području svog delovanja. On poznaje područje, građane i bezbednosnu problematiku. Tadašnjim propisima i pravilima službe precizirane su obaveze milicionara na sektoru i metode postupanja u cilju rasvetljavanja kriminalnih i društveno nepoželjnih slučajeva. Milicionar ne sme nikako biti pasivan u radu na sektoru, već proaktivan tako što će upoznati građane i rejon, svakodnevno uočavati pojave i događaje od značaja za bezbednost, pratiti i analizirati kriminalna dešavanja, osmišljavati sadržaj svog rada na dnevnom nivou, stvarati operativne veze unapređujući veze i kontakte s građanima i ostalim subjektima društvene samozaštite. Milicionari su na sektoru stacionirani dugi niz godina, tako da imaju mogućnosti i vremena da upoznaju područje svog delovanja, građane i njihove bezbednosne probleme, da prate i razumeju odnose i pojave na svom sektoru i blagovremeno reaguju.

S druge strane, sektorski način rada karakterišu dobrovoljnost i inicijativa radnih ljudi i građana, saradnja s milicijom, ostvarivanje različitih aktivnosti uz stručnu pomoć milicije, informisanost i zainteresovanost za bezbednost zajednice, visok nivo bezbednosnog vaspitanja.

Ovakav način rada davao je dobre rezultate, pre svega jer je bila drugačija društvena klima, milicija je uživala veliki ugled i u obavljanju svojih poslova i zadataka nailazila na podršku i pomoć građana. Dešavalo se da građani sami uhvate učinioca na delu ili neposredno pomognu miliciji u njegovom hvatanju. Građani su 2. novembra 1976. godine, u Njegoševoj 7, uhvatili kriminalca naoružanog automatom prilikom pljačkanja banke na Cvetnom trgu u Beogradu. Takođe, 9. marta 1983. godine dvojica jermenskih atentatora ubili su turskog ambasadora u Beogradu, a građani su, za današnje generacije teško shvatljivom hrabrošću i požrtvovanjem, pokušali da ih uhvate.

3. Savremeni model

Iako je dosadašnja praksa ostvarivanja sektorskog rada pokazala da je to dobar i efikasan oblik organizacije i metod rada policije, neophodno je njegovo dalje oblikovanje, usavršavanje i prilagođavanje

aktuelnoj, savremenoj bezbednosnoj problematici. Da bi sektorski rad bio efikasniji, neophodno je pravno regulisanje organizacije i načina rada policije na sektoru, što je i učinjeno Uputstvom o organizovanju poslova i načinu rada policije u zajednici, na sektorima i policijskim odeljenjima (MUP RS, 2020).

Prema aktuelnom Uputstvu o organizovanju poslova i načinu rada policije u zajednici, na sektorima i policijskim odeljenjima, sektori i policijska odeljenja utvrđuju se na području ispostava i obuhvataju područje jedne ili više mesnih zajednica, tj. određenu prirodnu i bezbednosnu celinu na kojoj se može efikasno pratiti stanje bezbednosti i organizovati obavljanje policijskih poslova. Broj sektora i njihova kategorizacija utvrđuju se aktom o unutrašnjem uređenju i sistematizaciji radnih mesta u Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova.

Podela područja na sektore zavisi od procene javne bezbednosti i mnogobrojnih faktora od neposrednog uticaja na stanje i aktuelna dešavanja bezbednosnih pojava i događaja u konkretnoj lokalnoj zajednici: broja i gustine naseljenosti stanovništva, stepena urbanizacije, privredne i ekonomske razvijenosti, broja i značaja objekata i resursa, dužine i kategorije puteva, razvijenosti saobraćajne infrastrukture, broja i vrste vozila, naplatnih stanica i turizma, blizine državne granice, graničnih prelaza i drugih regionalnih i lokalnih karakteristika određenog područja. Sektor na koje je neophodno stalno prisustvo grupe (tima) policijskih službenika određuje se kao sektor prve kategorije (*Ibid*). Područje sektora se može podeliti na pozorničke i patrolne rejone.

Uputstvo o organizovanju poslova i načinu rada policije u zajednici, na sektorima i policijskim odeljenjima određuje da pozornički rejon obuhvata područje jedne ili više ulica ili deo ulice, naselja ili dela naselja, a izuzetno i šire područje, na kojem ostvarivanje bezbednosne zaštite zahteva stalno ili povremeno prisustvo policijskih službenika. „Pozornička delatnost vrši se vidljivim prisustvom policijskih službenika u uniformi na pozorničkom rejonu, neposrednim opažanjem, ostvarivanjem stalne komunikacije i pružanjem pomoći građanima, prikupljanjem obaveštenja, održavanjem javnog reda i mira, sprečavanjem vršenja krivičnih dela i prekršaja i obavljanjem drugih zadataka” (*Ibid*).

Patrolni rejon obuhvata područje ispostave i, po pravilu, obuhvata područje sektora/policijskog odeljenja. Može obuhvatiti i područje više sektora/policijskih odeljenja ili njihove delove. „Patrolna delatnost vrši se obilaženjem, opserviranjem i vidljivim prisustvom policijskih

službenika u uniformi na patrolnom rejonu, neposrednim opažanjem, ostvarivanjem stalne komunikacije i pružanjem pomoći građanima, prikupljanjem obaveštenja, sprečavanjem i otkrivanjem krivičnih dela i prekršaja, pronalaženjem i hvatanjem učinilaca, održavanjem javnog reda i mira i obavljanjem drugih zadataka” (*Ibid*).

Za uspešan sektorski rad, važna je suštinska, nikako deklarativna, samostalnost područnih policijskih uprava, a umesto subordinacije treba da dominira koordinacija u radu. Ovako postavljena samostalnost treba da fokusira delovanje policije na probleme karakteristične za određeni sektor, a ne samo na izvršavanje naloga viših instanci koje ne poznaju bezbednosnu problematiku konkretne zajednice.

I za policiju u zajednici, koja preferira decentralizaciju organizacije i funkcije policije u Srbiji, kao imanentna organizaciona forma i metod rada pokazao se sektor, zato što se sektorskim radom policija praktično približava građanima i ima mogućnost da ostvaruje neposrednu saradnju s njima u reagovanju na aktuelnu problematiku kriminala i drugih pojava ugrožavanja bezbednosti na određenom rejonu, te daje i najveće mogućnosti za proaktivan preventivni rad policije i zajednice. Na tom stanovištu se zasniva i Uputstvo o organizovanju poslova i načinu rada policije u zajednici, na sektorima i policijskim odeljenjima, koje propisuje bit delotvornosti modela policije u zajednici: „Rad policije u zajednici obuhvata aktivnosti policije na sektorima i policijskim odeljenjima koje su usmerene na jačanje poverenja građana i zajednice u policiju, saradnju i partnerstvo policije sa zajednicom, razvijanje bezbednosne prevencije, problemski orijentisan rad na ostvarivanju bezbednosne zaštite i na uvažavanje različitosti” (*Ibid*).

Policija u zajednici podrazumeva intenzivnu komunikaciju s građanima i predstavnicima zajednice, privrednih i društvenih subjekata, marginalizovanih i socijalno ranjivih grupa. Kroz tu komunikaciju oni se informišu o bezbednosnoj situaciji i identifikuju se glavni uzroci i uslovi koji pogoduju vršenju kriminala. Kao najneposredniji eksponent te komunikacije i saradnje prepoznaje se policajac u zajednici, tj. pozornik, koji je ustaljen na području jednog bezbednosnog sektora i koji svoj posao obavlja pešice i u uniformi. Njegovo vidljivo i svakodnevno prisustvo omogućuje mu da se upozna s osobenostima zajednice, njenim običajima, kulturom, navikama, interesima, izazovima i potrebama. Shodno tome svoje delovanje usmerava saglasno prioritetima zajednice i očekivanjima građana, uz uvažavanje i prilagođavanje različitostima.

Od pozornika se očekuje da na bezbednosnom sektoru pri istraživanju problema građana primenjuje problemsko-orijentisani rad i ispolji svoju stručnost i kreativnost u rešavanju problema, a smanji preduzimanje prisilnih metoda. Zajedno s građanima, koordinisano i sinhronizovano uočava i rešava bezbednosne probleme. U članu 6 Pravilnika o načinu obavljanja pojedinačnih policijskih poslova utvrđuje se da se problemski orijentisani rad policije sprovodi putem sledećih aktivnosti: 1) praćenjem i sagledavanjem stanja bezbednosti radi identifikovanja pojava i događaja koji ugrožavaju bezbednost zajednice; 2) analiziranjem pojava i događaja radi identifikovanja njihovih uzroka; 3) planiranjem i preduzimanjem aktivnosti radi delovanja na uzroke i posledice; 4) ostvarivanjem saradnje s partnerima u zajednici, radi zajedničkog delovanja na uzroke i posledice, kada je to potrebno; 5) analizom procene stanja i ostvarenih rezultata („Sl. glasnik RS”, br. 63/2018. i 72/2018).

Pozornik (policajac u susedstvu), pošto najbolje poznaje situaciju na bezbednosnom sektoru, može dati ogroman (možda i najveći) doprinos usmeravanju prevencije i razvoju bezbednosti na području koje operativno pokriva. On može učestvovati u predlaganju, osmišljavanju, izradi i sprovođenju preventivnih programa, akcija i mera; osmišljavanju sadržaja svoga rada uz uvažavanje bezbednosnih potreba građana; prilagođavanju sadržaja i organizacije svoga rada bezbednosnim karakteristikama sektora (zajednice, lokalnog područja); kontinuirana (konstantna) prisutnost na terenu olakšava mu uspostavljanje komunikacije i izgradnje poverenja s građanima, kao i upoznavanje s problemima ranjivih i socijalno ugroženih društvenih grupa i preduzimanje aktivnosti na njihovoj zaštiti. Budući da najbolje poznaju okolnosti određenog sektora, treba uvažavati njihove preporuke.

Jedan od najvažnijih principa rada pozornika jeste da on mora biti ustaljen, što znači da on svoju delatnost obavlja isključivo na sektoru za koji je određen, tj. samo izuzetno može biti angažovani na drugom području ili na drugim poslovima. Ovo pokazuje da su u pravu oni policijski eksperti koji kazuju da je prevaga tzv. posebnih jedinica policije u odnosu na ustaljenu organizaciju policijskih jedinica dovela do slabljenja sektorskog oblika i načina rada, pa time i do bujanja kriminala i drugih pojava ugrožavanja bezbednosti (i naročito!), gubljenja poverenja građana u policiju. Ustaljenost omogućava policajcu da se upozna s bezbednosnim prilikama i okolnostima na sektoru svog delovanja, gradi poverenje i uspostavlja dobre odnose s građanima. „Vezivanje policajaca

za određenu teritoriju stvara kod njih osećaj odgovornosti i pripadnosti tom delu zajednice, kreira podsticaje za angažovanje u aktivnostima za rešavanje problema sa ciljem redukovanja kriminala i narušavanja javnog reda i mira na toj teritoriji” (Simonović, 2006, str. 322).

Neustaljenost policajca dovodi do njegovog distanciranja i nezainteresovanost za bezbednosnu situaciju na sektoru, pa samim tim i odsustvo lične odgovornosti (Milidragović, & Milić, 2019, str. 76).

Neophodno je uspostaviti punu odgovornost pozornika i vođe sektora za bezbednosnu situaciju na terenu. Ona se pretežno svodi na ažurno vođenje dosijea sektora, poštovanje pravnih propisa i sl. Da bi se prevazišla ovakva formalna odgovornost, pozornik mora da ima utvrđene precizne ciljeve i konkretne zadatke, a praćenjem njihove realizacije, utvrdio bi se njegov konkretan učinak na sektoru. S druge strane, tako precizirana zaduženja, uz istovremeno smanjenje poslova koji se odnose na provere, asistencije, obezbeđenja i sl., ostavljaju prostora za ispoljavanje inicijative i kreativnosti u rešavanju nekog problema na sektoru i podstiču motivaciju za rad. Inicijativa i kreativnost bi postali novi kriterijumi u procesu vrednovanja ostvarenih rezultata rada pozornika.

Pored svih prednosti koje sektorski način rada nudi u organizacionom i funkcionalnom smislu, on neće biti efikasan ako se ne obezbedi kvalitetan personalni sastav pripadnika policije koji će raditi na sektoru. Da bi policijski službenik uspešno obavljao poslove pozornika, neophodno je da postoji afinitet prema ovom poslu, da ima opštu kulturu i obrazovanje, da poznaje zakonske propise i pravila službe koje svakodnevno primenjuje, kao i stručnu osposobljenost i edukovanost da shvati suštinu prevencije i ulogu policije u tome u skladu sa savremenim tendencijama. Takođe, pozornik mora da poseduju stručne, radne i moralne kvalitete, kao i da ima potreban nivo kooperativnosti, međusobnog uvažavanja, poštovanja i saradnje s građanima. Istovremeno, treba da ima veću samostalnost u radu, kako bi mogao da osmisli sadržaj svoga rada i ispolji kreativnost u rešavanju problema na sektoru. Preduslov toga je sveobuhvatna i kvalitetna analiza i na njoj zasnovana prognoza kriminala, na osnovu čega bi on mogao sačinjavati preventivne programe svog delovanja i preduzimati konkretne radnje i mere.

Da bi se obezbedilo stručno i profesionalno izvršavanje zadatka i kako bi rad pozornika na sektoru bio u skladu s očekivanjima građana, treba sprovesti naučno istraživanje o sektorskom načinu rada i njegovom uticaju na bezbednosno stanje, koje bi obuhvatilo ispitivanje

stavova i policijskih službenika i građana. Na ovaj način bi se došlo do postupanja policije s očekivanjima građana i istovremeno do njihove veće podrške policiji.

Dobar primer predstavlja sprovođenje pilot-projekta *Policija u zajednici* u Kragujevcu (period jesen 2002 – proleće 2004) u okviru kog je izvršena implementacija policajca u susedstvu tako što je izvršena podela u okviru svih gradskih sektora na manje teritorijalne celine na kojima živi oko pet hiljada stanovnika. Selektovani su policajci iz sektora koji su odgovorni za stanje bezbednosti u susedstvu i implementaciju projekata prevencije. Sagledani su pozitivni i negativni efekti ovog projekta koji se mogu ubuduće koristiti za poboljšanje rada pozornika (Simonović, 2006, str. 406–407).

4. Zaključak

Sektorski rad čini okosnicu policijskog delovanja, i u prošlosti i sad. Zasniva se na proaktivnom i osmišljenom preventivnom delovanju, s tom razlikom što je u prošlosti potencirano njegovo ostvarivanje putem koncepta i sistema društvene samozaštite, a danas putem policije u zajednici.

U oba slučaja sektorski rad doprinosi razvoju prevencije: vidljivim prisustvom policije na terenu, blagovremenim otkrivanjem uzroka i uslova kriminala, realizacijom različitih preventivnih programa i po potrebi uključivanjem građana u konkretne preventivne aktivnosti i radnje.

U funkciji efikasnog obavljanja poslova i očuvanja bezbednosti na sektoru neophodno je: osavremeniti normativna akta kojima se uređuje sektorski rad, uz zadržavanje onih rešenja za koje je praksa pokazala da su dobra; za pripadnike policije na bezbednosnom sektoru osmisliti i uspostaviti kontinuiranu obuku i osposobljavanje za sektorski način rada; sastav pripadnika policije na sektoru mora biti formiran uz poštovanje stručnih, radnih, moralnih i drugih poželjnih kriterijuma, a njihov položaj i ovlašćenja moraju biti nedvosmisleno određeni i vrednovani.

Koncept policije u zajednici može doprineti unapređenju sektorskog načina rada uvođenjem noviteta, kao i korišćenjem naših iskustava iz perioda socijalizma i primene društvene samozaštite. Ukoliko se policija u zajednici bude implementirala u punom obimu, ona će s

vremenom prestati da bude samo policijski projekat i postaće projekat čitave zajednice u koju vraća duh zajedništva i brigu za opšte dobro i svakog pojedinca.

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THE TRADITIONAL AND THE MODERN MODEL OF POLICE WORK IN THE SECURITY SECTOR²

ABSTRACT: The paper discusses sector work as the basis of efficient policing. There are two models to be discussed. The first model is the model applied during the period of socialism and social self-protection and the second is the one in the period after the year 2000 when implementation of community policing experiences taken from the developed countries started.

In the period of socialism, the sector work was recognized as a form of decentralization of the police force, a suitable form for conducting preventive work and as a way to incorporate the police force into the system of social self-protection successfully. The patrolman in a sector enjoyed the trust and respect of the citizens. Being deployed in a particular sector for several years, he knew the people, the territory, and the security problems in that area. The sector work (both conceptually and practically) has many similarities with the community policing model whose implementation should lead to the transformation of the conventional way of doing police work and restore the confidence of citizens in the police. Community policing brought the reaffirmation of

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the patrolman and sector work, and taking on many of its recognizable programs, methods and techniques can contribute to adaptation and application of the traditional sector work to modern conditions.

KEY WORDS: sector work, patrolman, community policing, prevention, social self-protection.

1. Introduction

Police work can be organized as territorial, linear and objective. The territorial work comprises all the police work to be done in an entire territory for which the territorial organizational unit of the police force was formed. It is organized at the level of regional police departments, stations and sub-stations, in other words, security sectors and police divisions. Linear work was developed by modifying territorial work in accordance with the functional principle, and objective work is carried out by territorially and functionally separate organizational units of the police force whose members are assigned to specific objects at risk (Subošić, 2020:162-163).

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia accepted the territorial principle of organizing; dividing the entire theatre of operations of each police station into security sectors whose total number is about 1000, in order to facilitate confronting the tasks within its scope. To facilitate the organization of preventive forms of action, first and foremost, the area of activity of almost every sector is divided into patrolman beat, with the total number of 458, and patrol-unit beat, with the total number of 1817 (Nikač, 2019: 219).

To understand better the territorial approach to police work, we will distinguish two periods: the period up to the year 2000, the period of socialism and social self-protection, and the period of democracy after the year 2000, when the implementation of the concept of community policing began.

During the period of socialism, the organs of internal affairs conducted their affairs through repressive activities – as a state authority,

and preventive activities, through which they were recognized as a subject of social self-protection.

In this period, the focus was on decentralization of the police force – militia. The central problem was to find the best form of organization which would make possible a more purpose-serving incorporation of the police within the system of social self-protection. It was because, according to the then widely accepted point of view decentralization should contribute to bringing the police closer to the citizens through their direct cooperation. The division-into-sectors method of work was recognized as a kind of decentralization of the police force and a suitable form for doing preventive work. The reason being that for a successful performance it is indispensable to be acquainted with persons (with criminal past or other antisocial behavior, persons under increased supervision, deportees, foreigners, persons who are able to notice, due to their position or experience, criminal activities, such as retired police officers, etc.), territories (populated places, important facilities, communications, land, forests and mountains) and security problems (objects under threat, facilities at risk, population density, square measure of the area, road network condition) (Gaćeša, 2001). Thus it was thought to be necessary to have a police officer who knows the people, territory, and understands security matters in the area well, one who is present in the area for some time, who is, as it were, part of that community enjoying the trust and respect of citizens.

Ten years after social self-protection, efforts are being made to introduce a new model of work - the police-in-community. Community policing is seen as one of the key areas of police work whose realization should contribute to the transformation of the classical model of conducting affairs. The primary strategic goal of our police organization is to restore the citizens' confidence in the police. In Serbia, thorough police reforms began in 2002, including, among other things, the reaffirmation of the policeman-in-the-street or neighborhood, sector work, and introducing policeman-in-schools (Simonović, Vojnović & Sekulić, 2003: 132).

The sector work has a lot in common with the concept of community policing. Numerous programs, techniques, operations,

activities through which sector work is recognized come from community policing models, such as problem-oriented work, teamwork, crime mapping, working with socially vulnerable groups, prevention as a primary goal - these all contribute to the improvement of traditional sector work. Although policeman-in-the-street or neighborhood (patrolman) model has been known for a long time as a way of performing operational-preventive activities, with good organization and adequate work content, it can be incorporated into modern social processes and achieve significant results in preventing various socially undesirable and harmful incidents thus developing (and strengthening) community security.

This paper contains two main parts. The first, that includes forms and methods of work which were designated by the same or similar terms for decades, from World War II to the present day, with some variation, that is, adaptation to the given circumstances and changes in the country, as a matter of course. The second part presents the division-into-sectors model of work improved by additional elements - the value system and some forms of activities inherent to the concept of police-in-community.

2. The traditional model

Article 1 of the Law concerning People's Militia ("Službeni list FNRJ", No. 101/46) from 1946 stipulates that the police force - militia is organized on a territorial principle - their work divided into sectors. The same method of police work was prescribed by laws enacted later. However, the organization of the police force was centralized allowing for certain independence of local governing bodies and command of district and municipal secretariats and police stations.

During the 1960s, the system of social self-protection emerged as a new form of (social) awareness, based on a doctrine that security is not a problem of internal affairs only, but one to be addressed by all subjects of social self-protection (working people and citizens - as primary subjects; organizations of labor and local-district communities, socio-political and other organizations and socio-political communities,

judicial bodies, internal affairs, and other governmental authorities) (Ristović, 2020: 331-339).

Social self-protection was based on the doctrine that the police force – the police commissioners, policemen-in-the-street and other members of the police force in a given sector - with the support and assistance of citizens and working people could be very effective in protecting the community and maintaining security in the sector.

Sector work was confirmed as the most suitable form and method of police work, since it opened up possibilities for effective crime prevention and, in the same time, made the right approach to working people and citizens. The sector was not only a security unit in which the police, working people and citizens work together, but also an adequate organization of preventive action of the police and one of the forms of socializing the security function. Similarly to today's problem-oriented work of the police, "the task of criminal prevention carried out by police officers in the security sector consisted in comprehensive understanding of the problem and study of phenomena, as well as the methodological elimination of causes as criminogenic factors" (Petrović, 1986: 119). The sector of general law enforcement was considered as "a form of decentralization of security affairs and, primarily, the content of preventive work with the aim of protecting all the values of society in that area" (Dejanović, 1985: 136-137). The principles of sector work are designed to promote general participation of working people in conducting affairs of security.

A sector comprised an area of one or more local district communities within a municipality, depending on security situation, economic development, number of citizens, population density, terrain configuration, economic structure, traffic etc. A sector represented a security unit as a whole respecting the specifics of the area. Depending on the complexity of the security situation, the sector was divided into I, II and III category influencing the organization of work, the number of police officers engaged, their professional profile etc.

The forms and methods of operative work of the members of the militia on a security sector comprised their personal engagement in 1) monitoring and analyzing the security situation in the sector; 2)

right application of tactical and operational methods for the purpose of preventing criminal acts and offences; 3) creating operational links within one's authority and in accordance with operative plans; 4) using various documents, reports and any piece of information available to organs of internal affairs; 5) carrying out concrete assignments according to the instructions of the commanding officer or together with authorized members of security services; 6) cooperating with citizens and working people, providing professional or other assistance in realizing social self-protection (Dinić, 198: 54-55).

In addition to regular police business in the sector (patrol, identification, apprehension) the policemen performed other duties that belonged to the domain of social self-protection such as cooperation with working people, citizens and other subjects of social self-protection, giving them accurate information about the problems and events pertaining security, security education of the citizens, providing professional assistance, analyzing social relations and events pertaining security, proposing solutions to problems etc. The cooperation with working people and citizens developed through maintaining daily contacts, mutual assistance, building mutual confidence, personal and property protection, assistance in establishing legal claims, giving specific instructions how to handle certain security issues.

Each sector was entrusted to a certain number of workers of the militia characterized by communicative skills, interest in problems of the people and personal initiative for solving them. It was expected from a policeman in a sector to inform, educate the citizens, to be cooperative and keep an eye on social relations and events in his area. The man in the field is well acquainted with the area, people and security problems, rules and regulations of service and duties of the members of the militia in the sector and, of course, knows the methods of procedure that enable him to investigate effectively offences and other socially undesirable cases. He must not be passive, but proactive, getting to know the people and the area, observing and analyzing things and events relevant for security, rationally plans his activities on a daily basis, creates operational contacts enhancing contact and communication with citizens and other subjects of social self-protection. The members of the militia would stay in the area for some period of time that enabled them to get to know

the area, the citizens and their problems, understand the relations and events in the sector, so that they could react appropriately.

As a result working people and citizens cooperated with the police force willingly and even show initiative participating in various activities; and, what is more, the people were well informed and involved in the safety of their community indicating high level of security awareness.

This system worked well. Above all, this was due to trends in the society in that period; the militia enjoyed great respect among the people and had support and help from them in doing their job. It had happened that the citizens themselves caught the perpetrator in the act or directly helped the militia to apprehend the criminal. For example, on November 2nd, 1976, in Njegoš Street 7 in Belgrade, a criminal was caught while robbing a bank armed with a machine gun by the citizens themselves. Also, when on March 9th, 1983, in Belgrade, two Armenian terrorists assassinated the Turkish ambassador, the citizens tried to capture them with courage and dedication hardly imaginable today.

3. The present model

Although past experience has established division-into-sectors as a superior and efficient form of organization and method of police work, it should be further developed and improved in order to adapt to current problems and actual concerns in security. To improve efficiency it is indispensable to regulate legally the organization and methods of operation in a sector and precisely this has been done in *the Instruction concerning organization of work and procedures of the police in community, in sectors and police departments* (Uputstvo o organizovanju poslova i načinu rada policije u zajednici, na sektoru i policijskim odeljenjima) (MUP RS, 2020). According to the present *Instruction*, sectors and police departments are to be established on the territory of the section sub-stations and should comprise one or more local district communities, forming a natural whole and a security unit, in which the state of security can be effectively controlled and the police business

organized. The number of sectors and their categorization is determined in the official document concerning the internal organization and systematization of workplaces in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The division of areas into sectors depends on the assessment of public security and many other factors directly affecting the state of security in a particular territory, facts and events of concern in a local community such as the number of inhabitants, population density, the degree of urbanization, economic development, the number and importance of facilities and resources, length of roads and their categorization, the development of communication infrastructure, the number and types of vehicles, toll stations and tourism, proximity of the state border, border crossings and other regional and local characteristics of that particular area. The sector for which a constant presence of a group (team) of police officers is necessary is defined as the sector of the first category (MUP RS, 2020). An area of a sector can be divided into patrolman beats and patrol-unit beats.

The Instruction concerning the organization of work and procedures of police in the community, in sectors and police departments stipulates that a patrolman beat covers an area of one or more streets or parts of a street, a locality, or part of a locality, or, exceptionally, a broader area in which security protection requires permanent or occasional (periodical) presence of police officers. “The duty of a patrolman is exercised by visible presence of police officers in uniform in the patrolman beat, by direct observation, constant communication with and assistance to citizens, gathering information, maintaining order and peace, preventing crimes and offenses, and performing other tasks” (MUP RS, 2020).

The patrol-unit beat covers the area of a sub-station, and as a rule, covers the area of the sector/police division. It may also cover the area of several sectors or divisions or their parts. The duties of a patrol-unit are exercised by making rounds, observation and visible presence of police officers in uniforms in the patrol beat, by means of direct observation, constant communication with and assistance to citizens, gathering information, preventing crimes and offenses, detecting, and apprehending perpetrators, maintaining order and peace and performing other tasks” (MUP RS, 2020).

For successful sector work independence of local police department is essential, and by no means just declarative; coordination and not subordination should be dominant. Independence so defined will make possible for the police to focus their activities on the problems that characterize the sector and not just carrying out (executing) the orders of higher instances who are not properly acquainted with concrete problems in a certain community.

For the police-in-community in Serbia decentralization of organization and functioning is preferable. The sector method of work and organizational form has established itself as the most suitable one, because in this way the police force is brought closer to the citizens and has the opportunity to cooperate with them in solving problems of criminal behavior and other things that jeopardize security in a certain area, and, in the same time, making possible proactive preventive work of the police and community. Precisely this point of view is the one the *Instruction* is based on. It prescribes the essence of efficient work in community policing: “The work of police-in-community comprises activities in sectors and departments aimed at boosting confidence of citizens and community in the police force, strengthening cooperation and partnership with the citizens, developing preventive work, problem oriented approach to security protection and respect for diversity (MUP RS, 2020).

Community policing implies intensive communication with citizens and representatives of the community, with economic and social subjects, with marginalized and socially vulnerable groups. Through this communication, they become better informed about the security situation, and are able to identify the main causes and conditions that may contribute to committing a crime. The sector policeman in the community – the patrolman, who does his job on foot and in uniform being well known in the area of one security sector, is recognized as the most immediate exponent of that communication and cooperation. His visible daily presence allows him to get acquainted with the peculiarities of the community, its customs, culture, habits, interests, challenges and needs. He may adjust his actions accordingly to the priorities of the community and expectations of the citizens at the same time respecting and adapting to differences. It is expected from

the patrolman in a security sector to apply problem-oriented methods while investigating the problems of citizens and exhibit competence and creativity in solving them simultaneously reducing the use of coercive methods. Together with the citizens, he observes and solves security problems in a coordinated and synchronized manner. According to the article 6 of *Regulations concerning case-by-case procedure of doing police business* problem-oriented police work is performed through the following activities: 1) monitoring and keeping track of the security situation in order to identify occurrences and events that may threaten community security; 2) analyzing occurrences and events in order to identify their causes; 3) planning and undertaking activities to affect causes and consequences; 4) establishing cooperation with partners in the community, for the purpose of undertaking joint-action affecting causes and consequences, when necessary; and 5) analyzing situation assessment and the achieved results.- („Sl. glasnik RS”, no. 63/2018 and 72/2018).

The patrolman (a police officer in the neighborhood), since he is well acquainted with the situation in the sector, can make a substantial contribution (perhaps the most important one) to directing preventive acts and so enhancing security in the area he covers operationally. He may plan, propose and implement preventive programs, actions and measures; rationally organize his work respecting the needs of citizens adapting the content and organization of his work to the security characteristics of the sector (locality, community). His constant presence in the field facilitates creating communicative connections and building up confidence with the citizens, getting to know the problems of vulnerable and socially handicapped groups and taking actions to protect them. His suggestions should be welcomed, since he knows best the circumstances in a certain sector.

One of the most important characteristic of the patrolman in a sector is his permanence. That is to say, he performs his duty exclusively in the sector he is assigned to; he may only exceptionally be engaged to do some other duty in some other area. This shows that those police experts who claim that the domination of the so-called ‘special police units’ in the organization of the police force resulted in weakening the sector work and thus led to crime escalation and other forms of security

threats, and (ultimately!) to the loss of public confidence in the police, are right. Permanence makes it possible that the police officer becomes acquainted with the situation and circumstances pertaining security in the sector, to build up confidence and good relationship with the citizens. "Binding a police officer to a certain territory generates in him a sense of responsibility and attachment to that part of community creating incentive to engage in activities whose purpose is to reduce crime and disorderly conduct in that territory" (Simonović, 2006: 322). By contrast, transitory assignments may lead to his distancing and becoming disinterested in the security situation in the sector and, consequently, lack of personal responsibility (Milidragović & Milić, 2019: 76).

It is necessary both for the patrolman and commanding officer in the sector to take full responsibility. This amounts to keeping up-to-date dossiers (files) of the sector, observing rules and regulations etc. To overcome such purely formal responsibility the police officer has to have precise goals and specific tasks whose fulfillment would be the measure of his achievement in the sector. On the other hand, such specific tasks together with reducing duties regarding inspections, assistance, safeguarding etc. should create enough space for demonstrating initiative and creativity in solving problems in the sector and stimulate motivation for work. Initiative and creativity should become new criteria in the process of achievement evaluation of the police officer in the sector.

A serious setback, despite the organizational and functional advantages of the sector work, would be the lack of quality personnel working in the sector, since without them the level of efficiency expected could never be achieved. For the police officer to perform the duties of the patrolman successfully, apart from the affinity for the work itself, it is indispensable not only to have good education and general knowledge, to know the rules and the regulations of service (which he applies every day), but also professional training to understand the essentials of preventive work according to current tendencies. What is more, the patrolman should possess professional, working and moral qualities and, also, to be cooperative, respectful in his communication with the citizens. In the same time, he should be independent in his work planning the contents and creative problem solving in his sector.

The necessary condition to the latter is anticipation of crime based on a systematic analysis and taking appropriate preventive actions and measures to control crime.

In order to enhance professionalism and make sure that the performance of the patrolmen is in accordance with the expectations of the citizens, further scientific research should be conducted into sector work and its impact on the state of security which would include both the attitudes of police officers and of citizens, so that the support of the citizens to the police would rise and their performance be in accordance with the expectations.

A good example is the realization of the pilot project “The police in a community” in Kragujevac (autumn 2002 - spring 2004), in which the implementation of policeman in the neighborhood was carried out by dividing all urban sectors into smaller territorial units with about five thousand residents. Police officers from the sector were selected, who were responsible for the state of security in the neighborhood and for the implementation of preventive projects. The positive and negative effects of this project were taken into account and these can be used in the future to improve sector work (Simonović, 2006: 406-407).

Conclusion

In the past, as in the present, sector work has been the foundation of successful police work. It is based on a proactive and rationally planned preventive approach. The difference is that, in the past, its implementation was achieved through the concept and system of social self-protection, whereas today through the concept of police-in-community. In both cases, sector work contributes to the development of prevention, due to the visible presence of the police in the field, timely detection of the causes and conditions of crime, promoting various preventive programs and, if necessary, involving citizens in specific preventive activities.

In order to increase the efficiency of performance and preserve security in the sector it is necessary to modernize laws that regulate sector work, in the same time, retaining solutions proven to be good in

practice. For the members of the police force in the sector continuous training and education for this kind of work should be designed and organized. The selection of officers in the sector should adopt criteria that satisfy high standards of professional competence and moral integrity and other desirable traits, while their position and authority should be unambiguously determined and evaluated.

The concept of community policing can contribute to the improvement of sector work, on the one hand by introducing innovations and on the other hand, by using experiences from the period of socialism and application of the system of social self-protection. If the concept of community policing should be implemented root and branch, it would cease to be just a police project and become a project of the whole community in which it would bring back the spirit of fellowship, care for the common good and for each individual.

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ANALIZA SPOLJNE POLITIKE RUSKE FEDERACIJE PREMA GRUZIJI KROZ PRIZMU NEOIMPERIJALNIH REGIONALNIH AMBICIJA

SAŽETAK: Kavkaz, ili „evroazijski Balkan”, kako ga je Zbignjev Bžežinski nazvao, bližnje zarubežje (rus. *ближнее зарубежье*) kako ga Rusi percipiraju, predstavlja objedinjenu zonu interesa Rusije, i prostor na kom se odražavaju spoljnopolitički potezi Rusije, s primarnim ciljem pozicioniranja sebe kao regionalnog hegemonu i odvratanja zapadnog uticaja. Rad posmatra spoljnu politiku RF prema Gruziji u periodu posle dezintegracije Sovjetskog Saveza, uz primenu komparativne metode i metode analize sadržaja, oslanjajući se na teorijski okvir ofanzivnog strukturalnog realizma. Koristeći studije slučaja Južne Osetije i Abhazije, rad teži da pokaže kako se razvila neoimperijalna spoljna politika Rusije, te kako se, zavisno od dela Kavkaza na kom se sukob odigrava i stepena antiruskog uticaja u njemu, i sama spoljna politika Rusije menja. Rezultati pokazuju da je Rusija pažljivo stvorila uslove i odabrala trenutak da iskoristi sukob, to jest secesije na prostoru Gruzije da pozicionira sebe kao regionalnog hegemonu.

KLJUČNE REČI: Kavkaz, regionalna bezbednost, Rusija, Evroazija, spoljna politika Rusije, Abhazija i Južna Osetija

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Uvod

U slučaju Abhazije i Južne Osetije radi se o dve republike koje su priznate od strane tek nekoliko država, koje, s izuzetkom Rusije, imaju mali značaj za njihovo priznavanje u međunarodnom kontekstu, budući da se radi o Venecueli, Nikaragvi, Nauru i Siriji, kao i Vanuatu koja priznaje Abhaziju, ali ne i Južnu Osetiju. Pri tome, i samo priznanje od strane Rusije može se pre tumačiti kao politički potez načinjen s ciljem pozicioniranja sebe kao regionalnog hegemonu i s motivom odvratanja uticaja koji dolazi sa zapada, a ne kao znak vere u samoopredeljenje naroda koji žive na teritorijama Abhazije i Južne Osetije. Rad posmatra region u periodu od raspada Sovjetskog Saveza posle kojeg je nastalo mnoštvo država – njih petnaest, s još nekoliko naroda koji pokazuju pomenute etnoseparatističke težnje, sve do aktuelnog perioda i novih događanja vezanih za sukob u Nagornom-Karabahu, koji je nakratko buknuo – šest nedelja intenzivnog rata, pa je ponovo zamrznut, posredstvom Rusije (i Turske). Abhazija i Južna Osetija nastavljaju da postoje, ali pod plaštom ruskog pokroviteljstva, od Rusije zavisni u egzistencijalnoj meri, kako u ekonomskom, tako i u vojnom, političkom i drugim aspektima, tako da mogu biti posmatrani kao ruski protektorati.

Kroz sagledavanje delovanja Rusije na primerima dva sukoba, analizira se način na koji se spoljna politika Rusije adaptira i menja naspram situacije u pitanju. Prati se promena od inicijalnog prepuštanja Gruziji da balansira situaciju u Abhaziji i Južnoj Osetiji do otvorenog rata avgusta 2008. godine, potkrepljenog željom Gruzije da se pridruži NATO alijansi, pod plaštom „prava na zaštitu” (engl. *right to protect*) agende, koja podrazumeva obavezu zaštite ruskih građana na teritorijama dve republike, a kojoj je prethodilo masovno izdavanje pasoša. Isto tako se prati promena od aktivnijeg učešća i prodaje oružja Jermeniji, u vrednosti od jedne milijarde dolara tokom devedesetih godina prošlog milenijuma, do vođenja odmerenije politike i balansiranja Jermenije i Azerbejdžana prodajom oružja obema stranama i sprečavanjem prodiranja NATO uticaja po svaku cenu, izolovanjem regiona od neželjenog uticaja.

Rad počinje pregledom literature gde se daje objašnjenje teorijskog okvira realizma, odnosno ofanzivnog strukturalnog realizma Džona Miršajmera (*John Mearsheimer*). Nakon toga, sledi poglavlje koje razmatra i objašnjava razvoj spoljne politike Ruske Federacije, počevši od raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, posle kog je Rusija nakratko bila okrenuta ka prozapadnom liberalizmu, ali se nakon niza događaja, koji su se odlikavali u širenju snage i uticaja SAD u regionu, ipak odlučila za sprovođenje neoevroazijske politike sa snažnim neoimperijalnim regionalnim ambicijama. Potom sledi poglavlje koje objašnjava istorijske korene sukoba u Gruziji, odnosno Abhaziji i Južnoj Osetiji, a nakon toga sledi studija slučaja Abhazije i Južne Osetije, posmatrana upravo kroz prizmu neoimperijalističkih ambicija Ruske Federacije, odnosno toga kako se sukob odigrao, te kako je Rusija kreirala uslove da, kad se ukaže prava prilika, sukob iskoristi za pozicioniranje sebe kao suverenog regionalnog hegemonu. Posle toga sledi zaključak u okviru koga su sumirani stavovi i pogledi izneti u samom radu.

Pregled literature

Teorijski pristup realizma imao je ogroman uticaj na razvoj polja studija bezbednosti, usredsređivanjem na koncepte moći, straha i anarhije kao faktore putem kojih su pružana objašnjenja od centralnog značaja za sukob i rat. Realizam je doživeo šest varijanti, a to su klasični realizam, neoklasični realizam, realizam uspona i pada, te neorealizam, kao i ofanzivni i defanzivni strukturalni realizam (Vilijams 2012).

Prema shvatanjima klasičnih realista, volja za moć ukorenjena je u iskvarenoj ljudskoj prirodi, a države se neprekidno angažuju u borbi za povećanje vlastite moći, pa je tako i rat objašnjavan prirodom agresivnih državnika ili karakterom unutrašnjeg političkog sistema. Tako je realistički karakter bezbednosti označavao da države mogu održati svoju bezbednost samo osloncem na svoju vojnu moć ili na udruživanje, najčešće u vojnopoličke saveze (Marković 2014).

Defanzivni strukturalni realizam polazi od pretpostavke da države teže bezbednosti u anarhičnom međunarodnom sistemu, tj. da

glavna pretnja njihovoj dobrobiti dolazi od drugih država. Defanzivni strukturalni realisti pozivaju se na to da preovlađujuća tehnologija ili geografske okolnosti često pogoduju odbrani, oteći izvori se ne dodaju lako na one koje metropole već poseduju, domine ne padaju, a moć je teško održavati na daljinu, te skladno tome, oni zastupaju stanovište da države treba da podržavaju *status quo*, budući da je osvajanje u takvom svetu teško (Vilijams 2012).

Ipak, ofanzivni strukturalni realisti ne slažu se s postavkama defanzivnog strukturalnog realizma da države treba samo da teže odgovarajućoj meri moći. Glavni zastupnik ove teorije je Džon Miršajmer, koji u svom delu *Tragedija politike velikih sila* dokazuje da se države suočavaju s nesigurnim međunarodnim okruženjem u kojem bi svaka država mogla da koristi svoju moć kako bi nautila nekoj drugoj državi (Vilijams 2012). Njegova teorija sadrži pet pretpostavki: međunarodni sistem je anarhičan; velike sile poseduju izvesnu ofanzivnu vojnu sposobnost i stoga mogu naškoditi jedne drugima; države nikad ne mogu biti sigurne u namere drugih država; opstanak je prvenstveni cilj velikih sila; i velike sile su racionalni činiooci. Miršajmer iz tih hipoteza izvodi zaključak da se velike sile plaše jedne drugih, da za svoju bezbednost mogu da se oslone samo na sebe i da je uvećanje relativne moći najbolja strategija za države da obezbede svoj opstanak (Marković 2014). Miršajmer tvrdi da bezbednost iziskuje akumulaciju što je moguće više moći u odnosu na druge države, odnosno dokazuje da krajnju bezbednost može da postigne samo najsnažnija država u sistemu.

Ipak, „zaustavljajuća snaga vode” čini takvu globalnu hegemoniju nemogućom, te je drugi i mnogo verovatniji cilj dostizanje regionalne hegemonije, tj. dominiranje regionom u kome se velika sila nalazi. Pored toga, čak i u odsustvu oba tipa hegemonije, države teže da povećaju i bogatstvo i vojnu moć. On razaznaje različite vrste sila: kontinentalne i ostrvske velike sile, i regionalne hegemonie. Kontinentalna velika sila će težiti regionalnoj hegemoniji, ali kada ne može da postigne tu dominaciju, težiće uvećanju svojih relativnih moći koliko god je to moguće. Ostrvska velika sila pre će težiti ravnoteži s državama nego što će pokušati da bude regionalni hegemon, pa tako država poput Velike Britanije deluje kao spoljni uravnotežitelj, mešajući

se samo kada neka kontinentalna sila preti da postigne primat. Treća vrsta velikih sila prema Miršajmeru jeste regionalni hegemon kao što su SAD, a regionalni hegemon je država koja će težiti da brani postojeći povoljan raspored moći (Vilijams 2012).

Miršajmerova teorija iz ugla država koje se ne mogu klasifikovati kao velike sile, obiluje neprihvatljivim hegemonim stavovima, zanemaruje ulogu međunarodnih institucija i ne doprinosi međunarodnoj bezbednosti za sve, bez obzira na moć država. Važan faktor u tumačenju neoimperijalnih regionalnih ambicija Ruske Federacije ima i teorija bezbednosne dileme, tj. beskrajna „igra” nadmetanja koja zahteva stalno povećavanje odbrambenih sposobnosti država radi odgovora na pretnje drugih država, iako to, zapravo, upućuje signale za druge države i vodi u spiralu stalnog jačanja vojne moći i/ili trke u naoružavanju država (Marković 2014). Koristeći teorije ofanzivnog strukturalnog realizma i teorije o bezbednosnoj dilemi, moguće je, na studiji slučaja Južne Osetije i Abhazije, bolje sagledati i analizirati spoljnu politiku Ruske Federacije kroz prizmu petodnevnog rata s Gruzijom iz 2008. godine.

Pregledom literature može se zaključiti da se većina autora koji su se bavili spoljnom politikom Ruske Federacije većinski oslanja na teorijski pristup realizma, ili ofanzivnog realizma Džona Miršajmera, naglašavajući želju Moskve da bude regionalni hegemon, što čini neophodnost sprovođenja neoimperijalističkog projekta na Kavkazu, regionu koji Rusija smatra tradicionalno svojim. Spoljna politika Rusije se na Kavkazu odslikava tako da Rusija smatra da u regionu može postupati po svom slobodnom nahođenju, raspoređujući svoje trupe duž regiona, što predstavlja jasan znak da Rusija ne može da prihvati nezavisnost i suverenitet država nastalih posle raspada bivše države. Po raspadu SSSR-a, Rusija je jedno vreme balansirala između evroatlantske i evroazijske politike, pa je nakratko, pod Jeljcinom, imala period „zapadnjačkog” liberalizma, ali se ipak odlučila za koncept sprovođenja evroazijske politike i pozicioniranja sebe kao lidera u regionu, što je i navedeno kao zadatak u strateškim aktima iz 1992. i 1993. godine.

Takođe, Rusija je smatrala da bi sve bivše republike trebalo da pristupe Zajednici nezavisnih država (ZND), i da bi međunarodna

zajednica i druge sile (poput Kine i SAD koje su pokazale interes za region) trebalo da priznaju rusku supremaciju u regionu, te da bi duž spoljne granice ZND s Turskom i Iranom trebalo postaviti ruske vojnike (Abushov 2009). O’Lear (2011) objašnjava kako granica nije samo granica, tj. teritorijalni limit države, već da ona predstavlja okvir koji poseduje političku, ekonomsku i kulturnu dimenziju unutar kog postoji lokalno posredovanje, kao i postojeće strukture, a koje oblikuju individualno delovanje. To se nadovezuje na činjenicu da je Rusija bila lider regiona u proteklih 200 godina, što za posledicu ima da se politika Rusije prema zemljama u regionu i šire – kako na Kavkazu, tako i prema Belorusiji, Ukrajini i u centralnoj Aziji – sprovodi tako da ostvari rusku dominaciju nad njima, bilo putem saradnje, bilo putem prinude (Blank 2013; Abushov 2009).

Da bi Rusija uspela u sprovođenju tog neoimperijalističkog projekta i pozicioniranja sebe kao regionalnog hegemonu, autori smatraju da će ona, u tom pohodu, koristiti svoju političku, vojnu i ekonomsku moć da kontroliše države koje su bile bivše republike SSSR-a (Sushentstov & Neklyudov 2020). Naime, Rusija smatra da će kroz ostvarivanje regionalne hegemonije eliminisati bilo kakvu mogućnost da druga sila deluje u regionu koji smatra „tradicionalno svojim” (Karagiannis 2012). Sprovođenje neoimperijalističkog projekta s ekspanzijom na Kavkaz i centralnu Aziju rezultuje potvrđivanjem koncepta kao što su bližnje zarubežje (rus. *ближнее зарубежье*), „ruska zona interesa” i koncepta države (rus. *держава*) koji podrazumeva snažno multietničko carstvo s Rusijom kao primarnim akterom (Abushov 2009). Jedna od posledica raspada Sovjetskog Saveza jeste što je nestao „lepak” koji je sve držao pod kontrolom, pa status autonomnih oblasti pojedinih naroda nije više bilo moguće održati i usledio je porast secesionizma. Markedonov, koji se u svom radu bavi pitanjima defakto država i malih država u evroazijskom regionu i njihovim odnosima s drugim međunarodno priznatim državama, navodi kako je problem tog regiona, samim tim i međunarodne zajednice, činjenica da sve te države imaju ogromnu podršku naroda koji živi na toj teritoriji za politiku ekstremizma i secesionizma (2015).

Spoljna politika Rusije

Ruska spoljna politika je od decembra 1991. godine prošla kroz brojne reforme s različitim fazama. Nedugo po raspadu bivše države, u Rusiji su se pojavile dve glavne škole mišljenja u kom pravcu bi spoljna politika i koncepcija države trebalo da se odvija – prva škola mišljenja bila je evroatlanska, a druga neoevroazijska (Meshabi 1993: 181). Evroatlantska škola mišljenja bila je predvođena prozapadnim liberalima čiji je primarni cilj bio formiranje međunarodnog okruženja koji bi omogućio unutrašnji ekonomski razvitak. Dalje, oni su verovali da bi trebalo odbaciti istorijsku ideju o specijalnoj ulozi koju Rusija ima kao „most” između Evrope i Azije i okrenuti se ka Evropi (Light 2003: 44; Kropatcheva 2012: 375). To je bio kamen temeljac spoljne politike prve godine vlade Borisa Jeljcina (*Борис Ельцин*) (1992) kada je Jegor Gajdar (*Егор Гайдар*) bio premijer. Ipak, postati deo Zapada značilo je baciti senku na tradicionalnu ideju o Rusiji kao velikoj sili, a suverenitet i uloga države oslabili su pod uticajem cilja o transformaciji u tržišnu demokratiju. Liberalna prozapadna politika nije bila dugog životnog veka, te je zamenjena idejom o suverenoj Rusiji, s većom ulogom države i ideji o preporodu u vidu nezavisne velike sile (Kuchins & Zevelev 2012: 149). Dakle, posle kratkog perioda idealizovanja i pokušaja približavanja Zapadu, krajem 1992. godine odlučeno je da se spoljna politika usmeri u pravcu ostvarivanja regionalne hegemonije nad postsovjetskim prostorom (Abushov 2009: 191).

Druga škola mišljenja – neoevroazijska – imala je nekoliko podgrupa i uključivala je neoimperijaliste, zagovornike zone ruskog interesa (bližnje zarubežje) i etnonacionaliste. U osnovi, zajednička im je bila želja za obnovom države unutar granica bivšeg Sovjetskog Saveza, tj. regionalna dominacija oličena kroz snažnu i suverenu Rusiju, koja bi sebi potčinila druge bivše države Sovjetskog Saveza kroz ekonomsku, političku i vojnu moć, kao i kroz osnivanje više defakto protektorata, tj. država zavisnih od Rusije (Kuchins & Zevelev 2012: 151). Nov pogled ogledao se u tome da bi novonastale nezavisne države u regionu koji čini zonu tradicionalnih interesa Rusije – bližnje zarubežje – trebalo da budu fokus spoljne politike. Ruske vlade su postsovjetski prostor posmatrale

kroz koncept „države” (rus. „держава императорская”) satkanu od neoimperijalnih namera, što je iziskivalo sekuritizaciju Kavkaza kao regiona u kom se odlikavaju potencijalne pretnje po suverenitet i integritet Rusije (Abushov 2019: 4; Rezvani 2020: 7). Neoimperijalizam, kao kamen temeljac spoljne politike, predstavlja prikrivenu formu imperijalizma kroz koju država može priznati nezavisnost druge države, ali ipak nastaviti da dominira državom kroz kontrolu tržišta ili resursa (Abushov 2009: 188). Na Kavkazu se ispoljavaju tri faktora koji krucijalno oblikuju spoljnu politiku Rusije, a to su rivalitet između Rusije i Turske, kao i Rusije i SAD, zatim lokalni konflikti poput onih u regiji Nagorno-Karabah i Južnoj Osetiji i Abhaziji, ali i činjenica da je Kavkaz dom za etnoseparatističke i terorističke pretnje, što se moglo videti i u Čečeniji, zbog koje je Rusija vodila dva rata (Sushentsov & Neklyudov 2020: 5).

Na proleće 1993. godine, tadašnji predsednik Jeljcin i ministar spoljnih poslova Andrej Kozirev (*Андрей Козырев*) uputili su čak formalan zahtev UN da priznaju ulogu i značaj Rusije kao garantora očuvanja mira u više etničkih sukoba na prostoru bivšeg Sovjetskog Saveza, s obzirom na stepen njene uloge u zamrzavanju tih sukoba, kroz intervenciju ruskih trupa (Trenin 2009: 8). Po završetku hladnog rata primarni ciljevi bili su uklanjanje vredne infrastrukture iz drugih zemalja kako ne bi pale pod tuđi uticaj, zatim izgradnja odnosa s prijateljskim državama poput Belorusije, Jermenije i Kazahstana i obnova izgubljenog uticaja na postsovjetskom prostoru (Sushentsov & Neklyudov 2020: 4). Uopšteno, retorika korišćena u to vreme ukazivala je na želju da se postsovjetski prostor preuredi kao zona ruskog interesa i, skladno tome, formirana je strategija čija je implementacija trebalo da rezultuje obnovom imperijalne nadmoći nad regionom, uključujući Baltik, Kavkaz, monopolizaciju Kaspijskog mora, te dozvoljavanje novonastalim državama samo ograničenu dozu suvereniteta, a Zajednica nezavisnih država (ZND) i Ugovor o kolektivnoj bezbednosti (Taškentski pakt, posle Organizacija dogovora o kolektivnoj bezbednosti) predviđeni su kao nove alatke koje će doprineti ispunjavanju tog cilja (Abushov 2009: 191). Bivša država jeste nestala, ali i posle tog istorijskog događaja Rusija je ostala snažno povezana sa zbivanjima na postsovjetskom prostoru koji je u okvirima Zajednice nezavisnih država. Samim tim,

prostor koji ZND pokriva poprimio je obrise međunarodne arene u kojoj su koncentrisani medijatorski naponi Rusije u sukobima koji se na tom prostoru događaju (Morozova 2009: 671). Zajednica nezavisnih država, koja je uključila sve bivše države (sa izuzetkom baltičkih), pokazala se kao tranzicioni mehanizam putem kojeg je Rusija uspjela da sačuva vlasništvo nad nuklearnim oružjem bivše države, permanentno sedište Rusije u SBUN, kao i imovinu i infrastrukturu bivše države u inostranstvu, uključujući i ambasade (Trenin 2009: 7). Od 1993. pa sve do dolaska Vladimira Putina, na vrhuncu moći SAD i unipolarnosti, Rusija je predstavljala sebe kao silu, iako to nije bila. Zapravo, u tom periodu Rusija je bila najslabija, te je u tom periodu težila balansiranju iliti suzdržavanju uticaja SAD u regionu (Kuchins & Zevelev 2012: 154; Rezvani 2020: 9). Ipak, događaj koji je nagnao Rusiju na promenu strategije povodom Kavkaza bio je NATO bombardovanje SR Jugoslavije (Karagiannis 2013: 84; Hughes 2013: 994; Zellner 2006: 393, Fabry 2012: 667). Iz tog događaja Rusija je uvidela kako demokratije, pod plaštom brige za ljudska prava, mogu da ratuju zarad svoje koristi (Wolff & Peen Rodt 2013: 814). Osim toga, nakon bombardovanja i usled proširenja NATO-a u Evropi (Poljska, Mađarska i Češka), prvi put u 250 godina, Rusija je prestala da bude sila u Evropi, to jest, sada je bila samo bivši Sovjetski Savez, ni manje ni više od toga (Trenin 2009: 9; Marten 2015: 189; Kazantsev, Rutland, Medvedeva & Safranchuk 2020: 3). Ruska spoljna politika prema regionu postala je po dolasku Vladimira Putina koherentnija i konstantnija, oličena u centralizaciji moći Kremlja, kao i u ograničavanju slobodne volje drugih država u regionu, tj. njihovom potčinjavanju volji Moskve, uključujući i one u Severnom Kavkazu. Takođe, od momenta njegovog (Putinovog) dolaska na vlast, Kremlj i nije imao drugu opciju nego da sprovodi konzistentnu politiku prema Kavkazu, budući da je od 1994. Zapad vođen ekonomskim interesima (kako SAD, tako i EU) počeo da se probija u region i takmiči za uticaj u njemu, počevši od potpisivanja sporazuma između Azerbejdžana i deset velikih korporacija koji je dozvoljavao istraživanje azerbejdžanskog dela Kaspijskog mora (Abushov 2009: 197).

Gruzija (Južna Osetija i Abhazija)

Da bi se razumela spoljna politika Rusije prema Gruziji i celom Kavkazu uopšte, sagledavanjem kroz sukobe u Južnoj Osetiji i Abhaziji, neophodno je, pre toga, razumeti izvore sukoba u te dve defakto državnice. Gruzija je, kao jedna od 15 republika Sovjetskog Saveza, u sebi imala dve podjedinice – Abhaziju i Adžariju – koje su imale status autonomnih socijalističkih sovjetskih republika, kao i autonomnu oblast Južnu Osetiju (Sotiriou 2017: 2).

Južna Osetija je status autonomne oblasti (po hijerarhiji slabiji od statusa autonomne socijalističke sovjetske republike koje su imale Abhazija i Adžarija) stekla aprila 1922. godine kao manjina u Gruziji. Prema popisu stanovništva, Južna Osetija je 1989. godine imala populaciju manju od 100000 ljudi, od kojih su se njih 66% izjašnjavali kao Osetijanci, a 29% kao Gruzini (Tuathail 2008: 673–674). Južna Osetija je bila autonomna oblast SSR Gruzije od 1936. do 1991. godine, a prema izveštaju iz 1988. godine, 86% Osetijaca nije umelo da se služi gruzinskim jezikom (Sotiriou 2017: 2). Tokom kasnih 80-ih godina, pojavio se u Južnoj Osetiji pokret Ademon Nykhaz („narodni parlament”; „narodna reč”), mreža osetijskih nacionalista tražila je ujedinjenje sa Severnom Osetijom, kao i unapređenje statusa iz autonomne oblasti u status autonomne socijalističke sovjetske republike, koja bi činila sastavni deo Gruzije, ali s mogućnošću potencijalne secesije u budućnosti. Gruzijски parlament je 10. novembra 1989. godine pristao na taj zahtev, ali je narednog dana svoju odluku opozvao (Tuathail 2008: 676; Cooley & Mitchell 2010: 61). Gruzijски nacionalni lider Zviad Gamsakurdija (*Звиад Гамсахурдия*) organizovao je protest ka Chinvaliju, glavnom gradu Južne Osetije, protiv zakona regionalnog parlamenta koji se tiče osetijskog jezika, pod plaštom izgovora o odbrani gruzijskog naroda. Osetijски nacionalisti i demonstranti su put ka Chinvaliju blokirali, gde su se i sukobili s pristalicama Gamsakurdije i u kojima je više ljudi povređeno (Karagiannis 2012: 77). Od tog momenta pa do dana današnjeg, teritorijalni integritet Gruzije pod znakom je pitanja (Tuathail 2008: 676). Oktobra 1990. godine Gamsakurdija je postao lider Gruzije i pod namerom sprovođenja slogana „Gruzija Gruzijcima” lišio je Južnu

Osetiju autonomije, što je kulminiralo otvorenim sukobom 1991. godine (German 2016: 157). Strah od izbijanja lokalnog sukoba, kao i dolazak Eduarda Ševarnandzea (Эдуард Шеварднадзе) na mesto predsednika Gruzije marta 1992. godine, rezultiralo je staloženijim pristupom koji je doveo do mirovnog sporazuma 24. juna 1992. godine, nakon čega su duž zone sukoba raspoređene mirovne trupe iz snaga Gruzije, Južne Osetije i Rusije (Karagiannis 2012: 78; German 2016: 157), a pored toga, jula 1992. godine je u Južnu Osetiju upućena i OEBS misija s ciljem utvrđivanja svih činjenica (Nishimura 2007: 32). Ševarnandze je bio uporan u nameri da povрати teritorijalni integritet Gruzije, ali je odbio mogućnost upotrebe vojne sile u tu svrhu, te je južnoosetijski sukob postao zamrznut (Karagiannis 2012: 78).

Abhazija je u periodu između 1922. i 1931. godine imala status SSR, ali je nakon toga ujedinjena sa SSR Gruzijom i u okviru nje je imala status autonomne socijalističke sovjetske republike od 1931. do 1991. godine. Po ujedinjenju, nad narodom Abhazije sprovedena je represija i diskriminatorna politika s ciljem urušavanja abhazskog kulturnog identiteta. Mediji koji su izveštavali na abhaskom jeziku ugašeni su, a škole u kojima je nastava vođena na abhaskom jeziku zamenjene su nastavom na ruskom ili gruzinskom jeziku. Sprovedenje ove politike ukinuto je po Staljinovoj smrti, ali je to ipak ostavilo snažan otisak, budući da je 75% Abhaza (od oko 220000 koliko ih ima, prema procenama) tečno govorilo ruski jezik, dok je ta brojka kod Gruzina u Abhaziji iznosila 56%. Takva politika probudila je abhaski nacionalizam koji je od 1930-ih više bio uperen ka borbi za secesiju od Gruzije, nego što je brinuo o dominaciji (od strane) Rusije. S usponom „narodnog parlamenta” u Južnoj Osetiji, abhaski nacionalisti osnovali su Abhaski narodni forum („Abkhaz Popular Forum – Aıdgyłara“) putem kog su se Moskvi obratili za zaštitu abhaskih interesa (Sotiriou 2017: 2–3; Kereselidze 2015: 311). Secesionistički pokreti u Abhaziji i regiji Nagorno-Karabah tražili su pravo na samoopredeljenje, ali to nije bilo u skladu s Ustavom SSSR-a (Coppeters 2018: 996–997). Pre nego što je došlo do dezintegracije Sovjetskog Saveza, lideri Abhazije zatražili su obnovu statusa koji je Abhazija uživala pre 1931. godine i secesiju od Gruzije, a avgusta 1990. godine Vrhovni sovjet Abhazije deklarirao je suverenost republike (Murinson 2010: 8). Gruzija je svoju

nezavisnost proglasila 31. marta 1991. godine pozivajući se na Ustav iz 1921. godine, prema kom su i Abhazija i Južna Osetija nedeljivi delovi Gruzije (Sotiriou 2017: 3), što je u Abhaziji izazvalo ponovno uvođenje Ustava iz 1925. godine, prema kom Abhazija jeste bila u specijalnoj uniji s Gruzijom, ali koji je omogućavao secesiju kako iz SSSR, tako i iz Zakavkaske Sovjetske Federativne Socijalističke Republike. Usvojeni su grb i zastava, a država je preimenovana iz ASSR Abhazija u Republika Abhazija. Abhaski lider Vladislav Ardzinba (*Владислав Ардзинба*) isticao je kako to ne treba posmatrati kao akt secesije, ali je to za posledicu ipak imalo invaziju gruzijskih trupa 14. avgusta 1992. godine, čime je započet rat u Abhaziji (Murinson 2010: 8). Gruzijske trupe držale su prestonicu Abhazije Suhumi skoro četrnaest meseci, sve do iznenadnog napada septembra 1993. godine koji je omogućio prodor abhaskim snagama, što je za posledicu imalo masovni odlazak gruzijske populacije iz Abhazije (Fawn & Cummings 2007: 84). Gruzija je bila uverena kako Abhazi nisu mogli voditi rat bez spoljne podrške i logistike, tj. bez pomoći Rusije. Eduard Ševarnandze je, povodom toga, optužio pripadnike vojske Ruske Federacije, ističući kako podržavaju Abhaze s namerom potiranja nezavisnosti Gruzije, podržavajući separatističke namere Abhaza do nivoa fašizma (Fawn 2007: 132). Oktobra 1993. godine Ševarnandze se pokorio pritisku Rusije i pristao na otvaranje vojnih baza i luka, nakon čega su Abhazija i Gruzija potpisale primirje. Takođe, Ševarnandze je preokrenuo i poziciju i stav svog prethodnika Gamsakurdije, čime se Gruzija 8. oktobra 1993. pridružila Zajednici nezavisnih država, zauzvrat očekujući pomoć Rusije u suzdržavanju secesionističkih sukoba na teritoriji Gruzije i strahujući od totalnog kolapsa (Fawn & Cummings 2007: 85–87; Fawn 2007: 136). Treba istaći i to kako je međunarodna misija za utvrđivanje činjenica tokom sukoba u Gruziji, u izveštaju poznatom kao „Taljavini izveštaj” utvrdila da su Južna Osetija i Abhazija imale pravo na samoopredeljenje, ne samo kao manjine već i prema objektivnim karakteristikama, poput zajedničkog jezika, kulture i religije, kao i prema istaknutoj nameri da oforme svoju političku zajednicu. Istovremeno, u izveštaju se navodi da pravo na samoopredeljenje ne implicira pravo na secesiju Južne Osetije i Abhazije (Markedonov 2015: 198–199).

Ipak, Ševarnandze je, u svojoj nameri da povrati suverenitet nad Južnom Osetijom i Abhazijom, bio nezadovoljan podrškom Moskve, te je od 1995. pa nadalje počeo da traži podršku i partnerstvo sa SAD i NATO-om, s ciljem balansiranja uticaja Rusije u regionu, na koji se, iz ugla Gruzije, gledalo kao na primarni izvor nestabilnosti regiona (Devdariani 2005: 167–173). Gruzija je 1997. aplicirala za članstvo u NATO, a pored toga, pružala je utočište čečenskim izbeglicama i borcima. Naredni udarac po prisustvo Rusije u regionu došao je na OEBS samitu u Istanbulu 1999. godine, nakon koga je Rusija morala da ukloni sve vojne baze s teritorije Gruzije, uključujući i one u Abhaziji, budući da je Gruzija sumnjala da je kroz te baze pružana podrška separatističkim režimima. Na OEBS samitu takođe je došlo do sporazuma između Gruzije, Azerbejdžana i SAD povodom izgradnje Baku–Tbilisi–Čejhan naftovoda koji bi zaobilazio postojeći Novorosijsk, tj. putem kog bi se vršio transport energenata iz kaspijskog basena do evropskih tržišta. Balansirajući naponi Gruzije i Azerbejdžana s kraja 90-ih doveli su do pojave regionalne alijanse GUUAM (Gruzija, Ukrajina, Uzbekistan (koji je GUUAM napustio 2005. godine), Azerbejdžan i Moldavija), a koji je od strane Moskve percipiran kao instrument za ograničavanje ruskog uticaja u zoni koja tradicionalno pripada upravo Moskvi, potpomognut od strane Zapada (Abushov 2009: 197). Gruzija je 1999. godine napustila tadašnji Ugovor o kolektivnoj bezbednosti, koji je potom, na inicijativu Vladimira Putina, reorganizovan u Organizaciju dogovora o kolektivnoj bezbednosti (Kazantsev, Rutland, Medvedeva & Safranchuk 2020: 9). Rusija je bila nezadovoljna pro-NATO sloganima i odbijanjem Ševarnandzea da joj pruži pomoć u sukobu s Čečenijom, što je dovelo do strožih mera od strane Kremlja. Počevši od 1999. godine, Rusija je promenila svoj izolacionistički stav prema Južnoj Osetiji i Abhaziji, otvorivši granice s Abhazijom i ignorišući embargo, a takođe, davana je podrška zapošljavanju rezervista i penzionisanih veterana Rusije u bezbednosnim strukturama Južne Osetije i Abhazije. Od 2000. godine Rusija je uspostavila vizni režim prema Gruziji, istovremeno vršeći naturalizaciju stanovništva Abhazije i Južne Osetije, izdavajući im pasoše, objašnjavajući to humanim gestom, s obzirom da življe tog područja na drugi način ne bi moglo da putuje. Na taj način je Rusija zadržala pravo intervencije u obe defakto države u slučaju napada od strane Gruzije (Abushov 2009: 199).

Revolucija ruža, koja se zbila 2003. godine, dovela je na čelo gruzijske države Mihaila Sakašvilija (*Михаил Саакашвили*). Sakašvili se tokom kampanje zalagao za jačanje odnosa Gruzije s Evropom i SAD, uz obećanje da će ponovo ujediniti zemlju kroz reintegraciju Južne Osetije (Killingsworth 2012: 229; Tuathail 2008: 681). Putin je, inicijalno, podržavao promenu režima u Tbilisiju, nadajući se da će usled toga doći do poboljšanja u bilateralnim odnosima Gruzije i Rusije, međutim, nadanja nisu bila dugog životnog veka, te se i Putin ubrzo okrenuo protiv Sakašvilija. Iz ruske perspektive, ružičasta revolucija nije bila istinski demokratski događaj, već dobro iskoordinirana akcija sa zapada, s ciljem izolovanja Rusije (Nodia 2012: 722; Abushov 2009: 199; Karagiannis 2012: 78). Sakašvili ne samo da je otvoreno isticao kako je prozapadno orijentisan već je, u zamenu za američku pomoć i podršku prilikom apliciranja Gruzije za članstvo u NATO, poslao 2000 gruzijskih trupa u Irak, čime je Gruzija postala treća zemlja po broju trupa koje učestvuju u ratu, odmah iza američkih i britanskih (Tuathail 2008: 682). Maja 2004. godine Sakašvili je primorao lidera Adžarije Aslana Abašidzea (*Аслан Абашидзе*) da dà ostavku i time je reintegrirao Adžariju u Gruziju, što nije naišlo na otpor od strane Rusije. Sakašvili se nadao sličnom scenariju u Južnoj Osetiji, pa je juna 2004. godine izbio manji sukob duž granice Gruzije i Južne Osetije, ali situacija je sada bila drugačija. Gruzija je naišla na otpor Rusije, kako vojni, tako i politički. Genadij Savčenko (*Геннадий Савченко*), izaslanik pri Ministarstvu inostranih poslova Rusije, izjavio je kako Rusija poštuje princip teritorijalnog integriteta, ali da je u slučaju Gruzije teritorijalni integritet pre mogućnost nego politička i pravna realnost (Abushov 2009: 199; Karagiannis 2012: 78). Zvaničnici Gruzije su više puta istakli kako će nastaviti borbu za svoj teritorijalni integritet, ali su u međuvremenu bilateralni odnosi, kako oni između Gruzije i Južne Osetije i Abhazije, tako i između Gruzije i Rusije, dodatno narušeni i delovalo je kao da su došli do tačke iza koje nema povratka.”

Jednostrano proglašenje nezavisnosti tzv. Republike Kosovo 17. februara 2008. godine nagovestilo je kakva će biti dinamika same godine, stavivši nov pritisak na već postojeća žarišta širom Kavkaza (Cheterian 2012: 703). Zvaničnici sa Zapada (koji su priznali tzv. Republiku Kosovo) isticali su kako je to jedinstven slučaj, ali je priznanje

ipak imalo za posledicu izjave lidera Abhazije i Južne Osetije da će ubrzo zatražiti od Rusije, Zajednice nezavisnih država, Ujedinjenih nacija, kao i drugih međunarodnih organizacija da priznaju njihovu nezavisnost (Caspersen 2013: 929). Aprila 2008. godine ruski ratni avion oborio je gruzijsku bespilotnu letelicu u vazдушnom prostoru Abhazije, usledilo je mnoštvo optužbi s obe strane, stvorila se ratna atmosferu između dve zemlje, ali se iz tog događaja dalo videti koliko je Rusija osetljiva na bilo kakvu vrstu vojnog upada u Abhaziju, a ruski zvaničnici su više puta isticali kako će braniti svoje građane u Abhaziji i Južnoj Osetiji po svaku cenu, čak i upotrebom sile, ako za tim bude bilo potrebe. 18. aprila 2008. godine Vladimir Putin je dao instrukcije o uspostavljanju zvaničnih odnosa Rusije sa dve defakto republike, stavivši time Gruziji do znanja da njihova reintegracija u Gruziju nije mogućnost (Abushov 2009: 200; Karagiannis 2012: 79). Gruzijske snage su se za rat pripremale nedeljama pre samog početka sukoba, preuzimajući strateške pozicije oko Chinvalija, raspoređujući svoje trupe i oružje duž regiona i preraspoređujući mirovne trupe unutar zone sukoba (Antonenko 2008: 23). Naime, tokom jula 2008. godine sprovedene su brojne vojne vežbe, s jedne strane u sadejstvu SAD–Gruzija pod imenom „Trenutni odgovor 2008”, a sa druge „Kavkaz 2008” u režiji Rusije. Krajem jula je serija bombaških napada u Chinvaliju ubila nekoliko Gruzina, što je izazvalo revolt osetijskih separatističkih grupa koje su počele da napadaju gruzijska sela i vojne pozicije u Južnoj Osetiji. Tokom noći 7. avgusta gruzijske vojne snage napale su Chinvali, preuzimajući kontrolu nad većim delom grada, usmrтивši pri tome mnoštvo civila i nekolicinu pripadnika mirovnih trupa iz redova ZND-a, koji su tu bili stacionirani još od rata iz prošlog veka. Odgovor ruskih trupa usledio je približno dvanaest sati nakon započinjanja gruzijske ofanzive, s vazдушnim i pešadijskim napadima. 9. avgusta su, zajedno sa abhaskim saveznicima, otvorili drugi front u Kodori dolini, a nedugo potom ušli su u zapadni deo Gruzije i zauzeli luku Poti. Do 10. avgusta su preuzeli kontrolu nad Chinvalijem i započeli s napadima protiv gruzijske vojske koja je počela da se povlači u matičnu zemlju. Ruske trupe su narednog dana bombardovale i zauzele neosporivi deo Gruzije, uključujući i grad Gori. Predsednik Rusije Dmitrij Medvedev (*Дмитрий Медведев*) oglosio se 12. avgusta porukom kako je cilj operacije ruske vojske u primoravanju

Gruzije na mir postignut, te kako je odlučeno da se obustavi operacija, čime je petodnevni rat završen (Killingsworth 2012: 229; Karagiannis 2012: 79). Suštinski, gruzijski naponi za ponovnim uspostavljanjem kontrole nad Južnom Osetijom izazvali su Rusiju na vojnu invaziju. Uzevši u obzir da je Rusija godinama unazad davala pasoše građanima Južne Osetije i Abhazije, to su iskoristili kao razlog i motiv za pokretanje vojne operacije na teritoriji Gruzije. Nakon što su obezbedili region, Moskva je otišla korak dalje i formalno priznala nezavisnost Južne Osetije i Abhazije 26. avgusta 2008. godine. Prema Izveštiju, rat je posmatran kao najznačajniji podvig Medvedevljevog mandata, putem kog se Rusija na velika vrata vratila na geopolitičku mapu sveta. Jednostrano proglašenje nezavisnosti tzv. Republike Kosovo poslužilo je takođe kao izgovor za ofanzivu, koji je Rusija iskoristila da kazni Gruziju za približavanje NATO alijansi, ali i da demonstrira Zapadu da je Kavkaz region koji „pripada” Rusiji (O’Lear 2011: 270; German 2012: 1654).

Posle završetka rata, Rusija je ažurirala svoju legislativu, dajući predsedniku mogućnost da raspoređuje ruske trupe van granica Rusije pod izgovorom odbrane „časti i dostojanstva” ruskih građana širom postsovjetskih zemalja. Prema zakonu donetom 11. avgusta 2008. godine, ruske vojne jedinice mogu biti upotrebljene van granica Rusije u slučajevima kada je potrebno uzvratiti napad protiv napadnutih ruskih vojnih trupa van granica Rusije, u slučaju kada je potrebno sprečiti ili uzvratiti agresiju protiv druge zemlje, zarad borbe protiv piraterije i osiguravanja sigurnog prolaska brodova i, najzad, zarad odbrane ruskih državljana van granica Rusije. Zakon bi bio pravni osnov za ofanzivnu projekciju vojne sile Rusije, kao i za bilo kakav budući napad protiv Gruzije, ali bi pružio i osnovu za upotrebu sile protiv bilo koje države od Baltika do Centralne Azije, pod plaštom odbrane časti i dostojanstva ruskih građana (Blank 2013: 6).

Abhazija i Južna Osetija okupiraju unikatnu poziciju na postsovjetskom prostoru, budući da nijedan drugi politički entitet u regionu nema dublju povezanost s Rusijom od njih, što ih čini defakto ruskim protektoratima. Rusija je od krucijalne važnosti za njihov opstanak, s obzirom na to što je jedna od retkih zemalja koja priznaje njihovu nezavisnost. Abhaziju je priznalo sedam država (Ruska Federacija, Nikaragva, Venecuela, Nauru, Vanuatu, Tuvalu i Sirija), a

Južnu Osetiju tek pet, pored Rusije to su Nikaragva, Venecuela, Nauru i Tuvalu. Na osnovu toga, Rusija je, u odnosu na Abhaziju i Južnu Osetiju, razvila snažan mehanizam zavisnosti i prinude, koji se ogleda u sedam tipova povezanosti: ekonomska, međuvladina, tehnokratska, socijalna, informaciona i civilna povezanost, i na kraju institucionalna povezanost i paralelnost (Gerrits & Badder 2016: 298).

Rusija podržava ekonomije Abhazije i Južne Osetije bivajući njihov glavni ekonomski partner, tako što je najveći partner Abhazije, a gotovo jedini Južne Osetije, a pored toga, najvažniji ekonomski i infrastrukturni objekti potpadaju pod vlasništvo Rusije. Međuvladina i tehnokratska povezanost ogledaju se u činjenici da je Rusija dugi niz godina izdavala pasoše građanima Abhazije i Južne Osetije, što dalje daje pravo Rusiji da interveniše u slučaju bilo kakvog napada na svoje građane, a i pod okriljem Rusije organizovani su samiti četiri neprepoznate države postsovjetskog regiona – Abhazije, Južne Osetije, Nagornog-Karabaha i Transnistrije. Isto tako, Rusija je 26. avgusta 2008. zvanično priznala nezavisnost dve države, potpisani su i sporazumi o iskoordiniranim spoljnim politikama i zajedničkom odbrambenom prostoru, dok se tehnokratska ogleda u tome da je većina državnika (kao i građana) dve defakto države svoje obrazovanje stekla u Rusiji, ili su bili pripadnici vladajuće elite u Rusiji. Socijalna, informaciona i civilna povezanost, kao i institucionalna više su nego očigledne kada se uzme u obzir da su zakoni u dve defakto države gotovo identični kao oni u Rusiji, kao i u oblicima institucija i struktura koje postoje i funkcionišu na teritorijama Abhazije i Južne Osetije. Ruski jezik je gotovo univerzalno korišćen na prostorima Abhazije i Južne Osetije, Rusija daje stipendije i pruža mogućnost studija u svojoj zemlji, a ruska televizija i mediji dominantni su i nadaleko dostupni, putem kojih se takođe vrši promocija ruskog jezika (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 298–306).

Diskusija

Spoljnu politiku Ruske Federacije prema Gruziji, samim tim i Kavkazu i celokupnom regionu, moguće je posmatrati s velikom podudarnošću naspram teorije ofanzivnog strukturalnog realizma

Džona Miršajmera. Naime, kroz odnos RF prema Gruziji, počevši od raspada Sovjetskog Saveza sve do rata iz 2008. godine, vrlo se jasno naziru osnovne postavke teorije ofanzivnog strukturalnog realizma. Pre svega, Ruska Federacija je, iako bi se osnovano moglo pretpostaviti da ima unipolarnih ambicija, veoma dobro svesna „zaustavljajuće snage vode” kako je to Miršajmer definisao, prema tome teži uspostavljanju regionalne hegemonije, u čemu je i ostvarila velike uspehe. Iako je opstanak osnovni cilj svake države, što je svakako bilo posebno izraženo u RF po raspadu bivše države, svaka velika sila, kakva Rusija nesumnjivo jeste, teži uvećanju sopstvene moći, budući da je akumulacija moći (nauštrb drugih država) najbolji način za postizanje kako visokog stepena sopstvene bezbednosti, tako i visokog stepena hegemonije u regionu. Pored toga, velike sile jesu racionalni činioci koji u anarhičnom međunarodnom sistemu povlače poteze koji im donose bolju šansu opstanka i poziciju u tom međunarodnom sistemu, a Rusija je svoj neoimperijalni regionalni projekat na Kavkazu ostvarivala korak po korak, čekajući pravu priliku da deluje. Približavanje Gruzije SAD i EU predstavljalo je pretnju po hegemoniju Ruske Federacije u regionu, te je Rusija počela s naturalizovanjem življa Južne Osetije i Abhazije, a pravu priliku za pozicioniranje sebe kao regionalnog hegemonu uvidela je u jednostranom proglašenju nezavisnosti tzv. Republike Kosovo i namerama Gruzije da pripoji nekadašnje teritorije Južne Osetije i Abhazije, započevši (i pobedivši) petodnevni rat iz 2008. godine, čime je u znatnoj meri neutralizovan uticaj SAD i Zapada, i čime se Rusija definitivno vratila na scenu na „velika vrata”, kao hegemon „tradicionalno svog” regiona.

Zaključak

Spoljna politika Ruske Federacije je, po raspadu bivše države, prošla nekoliko faza, nakratko okrenuta ka prozapadnom liberalizmu, ali je ipak, tokom godina, svoju spoljnu politiku usmerila ka ostvarivanju neoimperijalnih ambicija u evroazijskom regionu. Tokom 90-ih godina intenzivirali su se višedecenijski interetnički sukobi koji su rezultirali secesijom Južne Osetije i Abhazije, u okviru kojih je Rusija videla

moćnost za proširivanjem, odnosno ponovnim uspostavljanjem svog uticaja na sada postsovjetskom prostoru, koji je buknuo nestabilnostima i etnoseparatističkim namerama posle raspada Sovjetskog Saveza i na kom su Sjedinjene Američke Države želele da prošire svoj uticaj, privoljavanjem Gruzije (kao i Azerbejdžana, Ukrajine, baltičkih zemalja...) svojoj ideologiji. Usled obojenih revolucija, prevashodno Revolucije ruža i dolaskom Mihaila Sakašvilija na scenu, Gruzija se okrenula ka traženju članstva u NATO alijansi uz ambiciju da reintegriše nekadašnje autonomne socijalističke sovjetske republike i autonomne oblasti, a posle uspeha s Adžarijom, Sakašvili se nadao da će svoju nameru prema Južnoj Osetiji (i Abhaziji) ostvariti na isto tako lak način.

Međutim, Rusija je tokom godina počela da izdaje pasoše građanima s podneblja Abhazije i Južne Osetije, čineći ih naturalizovanim Rusima, što im je davalo za pravo da intervenišu u slučaju gruzijske ofanzive, kako je i bilo 2008. godine. Ishod rusko-gruzijskog rata takav je da je Gruzija poražena, a da su Abhazija i Južna Osetija dobile ono što su želele – svoju (defakto) državu, dok je Rusija pokazala izuzetnu spremnost na upotrebu sile zarad odbrane svojih interesa, pri tome pokazavši SAD (i EU) ko je ipak hegemon u regionu, zauzvrat želeći da pokaže dozu revanšizma za jednostrano proglašenje nezavisnosti tzv. Republike Kosovo, kao i za bombardovanje SR Jugoslavije 1999. godine kom se protivila i koja je bila izuzeta u donošenju (i sprovođenju) te odluke.

Ipak, može se postaviti pitanje koliko su Abhazija i Južna Osetija dobile svojom nezavisnošću i kojim pravcem će se kretati u budućnosti. Svakako, življe s tog podneblja je dobilo svoje države, ali države koje su priznate od tek nekolicine – i to ne moćnih – država, s izuzetkom Rusije, tj. od strane sedam zemalja u slučaju Abhazije, odnosno pet u slučaju Južne Osetije. Obe države su u tolikoj meri zavisne od Rusije da su faktički ruski protektorati, i bez uticaja Rusije bi se moglo postaviti pitanje njihovog opstanka, kako u ekonomskom i socijalnom, tako i u političkom i vojnom smislu. Obe države su pod pritiskom Gruzije i izolovane od sveta na taj način da njihovi državljani nigde ne mogu ni da otputuju (osim u „matičnu” Rusiju), da međunarodne kompanije nisu voljne da otvore svoja predstavništva na njihovim teritorijama, kako zbog pitanja bezbednosti, tako i zbog pitanja pravne regulative, s obzirom na njihovu nepriznatost širom sveta; njihove ekonomije su

u ogromnoj meri zavisne od Rusije i većinski je čine poslovi s Rusijom. Samim tim, verovatnije je da će njihova budućnost više nalikovati na Severni Kipar, pre nego na tzv. Republiku Kosovo.

Na kraju, ruski protektorski stav prema njima ne treba posmatrati kroz naročitu brigu za narod sa tih teritorija, već kroz neoimperijalističke ambicije koje Rusija gaji prema regionu, a koje se ogledaju u suzdržavanju prodiranja antiruskog uticaja u region, koje je Gruzija svakako vrlo otvoreno ispoljavala, što je navelo Putina i Medvedeva, tj. Rusiju, na ulazak u rat 2008. godine koji je bio veoma pažljivo proračunat i za koji se Rusija pripremala godinama. Posmatrano kroz prizmu ofanzivnog realizma Džona Miršajmera, putem kog je Rusija iskoristila povoljnu situaciju i ušla u rat, a iz njega izašla kao regionalni hegemon, što joj omogućava potčinjavanje regiona svojim interesima i bolje šanse za opstanak u međunarodnom sistemu.

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RUSSIA'S NEO-IMPERIALIST AMBITIONS: ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS GEORGIA

ABSTRACT: The Caucasus, dubbed “the Eurasian Balkans” by Zbigniew Brzezinski, or “the near abroad” (*bližnee zarubežbe*) by the Russians, is both a region of strategic interest for Russia, and a space where the Russian foreign policymaking was clearly manifested, Russia’s main goal being to establish regional dominance and discourage the Western influence in the region. Using comparative and content analysis and relying on the theory of offensive structural realism, the paper will discuss the foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards Georgia in the years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Analysing the case studies of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the paper seeks to show how Russia’s neo-imperial foreign policy has been shaped, and how Russia’s foreign policy has shifted in accordance with the part of the Caucasus involved in the conflict and the degree of anti-Russian influence in it. The results show that Russia carefully created the conditions and chose the moment to use the conflict, i.e., the secession on the Georgian soil, to position itself as a regional hegemon.

KEY WORDS: Caucasus, regional security, Russia, Eurasia, Russian foreign policy, Abkhazia and South Ossetia

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1. Introduction

Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been recognized as independent states by only a few countries, such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, and Syria, as well as Vanuatu which recognized Abkhazia but not South Ossetia. Apart from Russia, these countries have little influence globally to significantly improve Abkhazia and South Ossetia's chances of international recognition. Even Russia's recognition of the two states can be interpreted as more of a political move with the aim to position itself as a regional hegemon and prevent Western influence, rather than a sign of faith in the right to self-determination of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's citizens. This paper will give insights into the events in the region since the collapse of Soviet Union, which brought about the creation of fifteen independent states, with several other nations also exhibiting separatist tendencies, until the present day and recent developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted again with six weeks of intense fighting until Russia (and Turkey) intervened and brokered a cease-fire. Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to exist under the Russian patronage and remain existentially dependent on it in economic, military, political and other aspects. Both states can therefore be considered Russian protectorates.

Using the abovementioned conflicts as examples, this paper will analyse the ways in which Russia's foreign policy changes and adapts to a current situation. The paper further looks at the change from the initial decision to let Georgia try to pacify the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the all-out war in 2008. The 2008 war was incited by Georgia's attempt to join the NATO. Russia entered the conflict under the guise of exercising "the right to protect", which involved the protection of Russian citizens on the territory of both republics, which was preceded by the mass passport issuance. Moreover, the paper will follow Russia's shift from the active participation in global affairs and a billion-dollar worth weapon sale to Yemen in the 1990s, to a more prudent policy of balancing Yemen and Azerbaijan by selling weapons to both parties and preventing the intrusion of NATO impact at all costs, even by isolating the region from the unwanted influence.

The paper starts with a review of literature that explains the theoretical framework of realism, or offensive structural realism of John Mearsheimer. The following chapter discusses and explains the development of the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, starting from the collapse of Soviet Union after which Russia shortly turned to pro-Western liberalism. However, after a series of events that resulted in the increasing US influence in the region, Russia decided to pursue a neo-Eurasian policy with strong neo-imperial ambitions. The next chapter explains the historical roots of conflicts in Georgia, or Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Then, we will analyse the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia through the prism of the neo-imperial ambitions of Russian Federation. The case study shows how the conflict developed and how Russia created the right conditions so that, when the opportunity arises, it can use the conflict to position itself as a supreme regional hegemon. Lastly, in the conclusion we will summarize the insights and viewpoints discussed in the paper.-

2. Literature Review

Theoretical approach to realism had an enormous impact on the development of security studies with their focus on the concepts of power, fear and anarchy as crucial factors for providing explanation of the conflict and war. Realist theory went through six stages: classical, neoclassical, the rise and fall realism, neo-realism, as well as offensive and defensive realism (Williams 2012).

According to perceptions of classical realists, the will of power is rooted in the corrupted human nature, and states are continuously engaging in struggles to maximize their power. As noted, this is the reason why war is understood as a consequence of either the aggressive nature of state officials or the nature of the internal political system. Security studies, as a predominantly realistic area of study, claims that states can maintain their security only by relying on their own military power or by entering military-political alliances.

Defensive structural realism starts from the assumption that the states seek security in anarchic international system, that the main threat to their welfare comes from other states. Defensive structural

realism alludes to the fact that predominant technology or geographical conditions often favour defence, seized resources cannot be added easily to those already possessed by the metropole, dominoes do not fall, and power is difficult to project at a distance. Accordingly, defensive structural realists predict that states should support the status quo since conquest in such a world comes with a hard price (Williams, 2012).

Offensive structural realists disagree with the defensive structural realist perception that states only should only seek an 'appropriate' amount of power. The main proponent of this theory is John Mearsheimer, who in his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, argues that states face an uncertain international environment in which any state might use its power to harm another (Williams, 2012).

Mearsheimer's theory is built on five assumptions: there is anarchy in the international system; all great powers possess offensive military capabilities, which they are capable of using against each other; states can never be certain that other states will refrain from using those offensive military capabilities; great powers seek to maintain their survival above all other goals; great powers are rational actors.

Based on these assumptions, Mearsheimer concludes that all great powers fear one another and argues that the best way for great powers to ensure their survival is to maximize power and pursue hegemony, relying only on themselves (Marković, 2014). Mearsheimer claims that security requires accumulation of as much power as possible, in relation to other states, and argues that only the most powerful state in the system can achieve the ultimate security.

However, the "stopping power of water" makes such a global hegemony impossible, so the other more reachable goal is achieving regional hegemony, the dominance of the area where the great power is located. Aside from that, even in the absence of both types of hegemony the states still seek to maximize their wealth and power. Mearsheimer also distinguishes between different kinds of power, such as continental and insular, and the power of regional hegemons. A continental great power seeks regional hegemony but, if unable to achieve this level of dominance, it will seek to maximize its relative power to the extent possible. On the other hand, an insular great power would rather seek the balance against other states than try to become the regional

hegemon, just like Great Britain that acts as an offshore balancer and intervenes only when the continental power threatens to achieve the primacy. Lastly, the third type of power according to Mearsheimer is the power of regional hegemons, the states which seeks to defend the existing favourable distribution of power, such as the USA (Williams, 2012).

From the point of view of the states which cannot be qualified as great powers, Mearsheimer's theory is full of unacceptably hegemonic standpoints, overlooks the role of international institutions, and does not contribute to global security, regardless of states' individual power. Another important factor in interpreting Russia's neo-imperial regional ambitions is the theory of the security dilemma, or the endless "game" of competition, requiring a constant increase of defence capabilities of one state as a response on other state's threats. This leads the states into a "spiral model" of constant increase of military power and/or an arms race (Marković, 2014). Using theories of offensive structural realism and the theory of the security dilemma and examining the case study of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it is possible to better understand and analyse the foreign policy of the Russian Federation through the prism of the five-day war with Georgia in 2008.

It can be concluded that most authors who wrote about foreign policy of the Russian Federation mainly rely on theoretical approach to realism or offensive realism of John Mearsheimer. They emphasized Moscow's desire to become the regional hegemon, which necessitated the implementation of a neo-imperialist project in the Caucasus, a region that Russia has traditionally laid claim on. According to the Russian foreign policy, Russia can act at its own discretion by arranging its troops across the region which is also a clear sign that Russia is not yet ready to accept independence and sovereignty of the states formed after the collapse of the USSR. After the dissolution of USSR, Russia's policy balanced between the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian orientation for some time. It even went through the "western liberalism" while under Yeltsin's leadership, but eventually still opted for the concept of Euro-Asian policy implementation as well as becoming the leader of the region, which was even essentially stated as a part of their mission in the strategic acts from 1992 and 1993.

In addition, Russia also held that all former republics should join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and that the international community, including other forces such as China and USA who already showed interest in the region, should acknowledge Russian supremacy. Also, Russian soldiers should be positioned along the CIS external border with Turkey and Iran (Abushov 2009). O’Lear (2011) explains that this border is not merely a border denoting territorial boundary of a state, but a frame with its political, economic and cultural dimensions along with local mediations within these dimensions, as well as the existing structures that shape individual operations. All this adds to the fact that Russia has been the leader of this region for the past 200 years and consequently implements its policy not only on Caucasus but also Belarus, Ukraine, and Central Asia so as to achieve dominance, either by cooperation or coercion (Blank, 2013; Abushov, 2009).

Some authors argue that Russia will use all political, military, and economic power to control the states of the former USSR in the campaign to succeed in implementing the neo-imperialist project and become a regional hegemon (Sushentstov & Neklyudov 2020). Russia believes that achieving regional hegemony can prevent other states from gaining any influence in the region Russia traditionally considers its own (Karagiannis, 2012). Implementing the neo-imperialist project with its expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia provided the validation of such concepts as the near-abroad (*bližnee zarubežbe*), “Russian interest zone” and the idea of the state as a strong multi-ethnic empire, with Russia as the primary actor (Abushov 2009). The Soviet Union acted as the “glue” that kept everything under control, so, after its fall, maintaining the status of some nations’ autonomous regions was no longer possible which subsequently led to the rise of secessionism. Markedonov’s article (2015) discusses the phenomenon of *de facto* states and statelets in the Eurasian region and their relations to other internationally recognized states. It is argued that the major problem for the region, and the international community as well, is the domestic dynamics in these entities, i.e., the overwhelming majority of the population in favour of the policy of extremism and separatism.

3. Russian Foreign Policy

Since December 1991, Russia's foreign policy went through numerous reforms with various stages. Soon after the collapse of the USSR, two broad trends or "schools of thought" appeared – the Euro-Atlanticist and Neo-Eurasionist (Meshabi 1993: 181). The Euro-Atlanticist school of thought was led by pro-Western liberals whose main goal for Russia to join the international community and thus boost the economic growth. Furthermore, they believed that the traditional concept of Russia having a special role as the "bridge" between Europe and Asia should be rejected and that Russia should turn its focus towards Europe (Light 2003: 44; Krpatcheva 2012: 375). This school of thought had been the cornerstone of thinking in Russian foreign policy during the first year of Boris Yeltsin's government (Борис Ельцин) when Yegor Gaidar (Егор Гайдар) was the Prime Minister. However, joining the West meant abandoning the traditional idea of Russia as a great power, while the transformation into a market democracy weakened the state's sovereignty and role. Hence, the liberal pro-western policy did not last long and was replaced with the idea of a sovereign Russia, the state with a greater role, and the idea of reviving Russia as an independent great power (Kuchins & Zevelev 2012: 149). In late 1992, after the short period of idealizing Western society and attempts to emulate it, it was decided that the Russian foreign policy would be directed towards achieving the regional hegemony over the post-Soviet space (Abushov 2009: 191).

The other school of thought - Neo-Eurasionist – consisted of several subgroups such as neo-imperialists, Russian interest zone ("the near abroad") proponents and ethno-nationalists. They all shared the ambition to establish the regional domination of a strong and sovereign Russian state that would subordinate the former Soviet Union republics by using economic, political, and military power along with establishing more *de-facto* protectorates, i.e., states dependent on Russia (Kuchins and Zevelev 2012: 151). These newly established independent states in the region that was seen as being of special interest to Russia –the near abroad, were supposed to be the focus of the new Russian foreign policy. Russian governments viewed the post-Soviet space as a neo-imperialist state (*державы императорская*), which required the securitization of

the Caucasus as a region in which potential threats to Russia's sovereignty and integrity are manifested (Abushov 2019: 4; Rezvan 2020: 7). Neo-imperialism, as the cornerstone of Russian foreign policy, is nothing but a covert form of imperialism: a state can recognize the independence of another state yet continue to dominate it by controlling its market and resources (Abushov 2009: 188). In the Caucasus, there are three forces at work which shape Russia's foreign policy: firstly, the rivalry between Russia and Turkey, as well as between Russia and the USA; secondly, local conflicts such as those in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and South Ossetia and Abkhazia; lastly, the threats of separatism and terrorism, as was the case in Chechnya, where Russia fought two wars (Sushentsov & Neklyudov 2020: 5).

In the spring of 1993, the then President Yeltsin and the Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (Андрей Козырев) sent a formal request to the UN to recognize the role and importance of Russia as a guarantor of peace in those areas through the deployment of Russian troops (Trenin 2009: 8). After the Cold War ended, the main purpose of Russia's policy was to remove valuable Soviet infrastructure facilities from under the influence of hostile neighbours, while building preferential relations and alliances with friendly states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, therefore trying to restore its own influence lost after the USSR collapse in the post-Soviet space (Sushentsov & Neklyudov 2020: 4). The rhetoric used at the time echoed the desire to view the post-Soviet space as a Russian sphere of influence. Thus, a post-imperialist strategy was designed, which implied the restoration of Russian imperial power over the Baltic, Caucasus and Central Asia, monopolisation of the Caspian Sea, and allowing the new states a limited sovereignty. The CIS and the later Collective Security Treaty (CST; the Tashkent Declaration, later Organization of the Agreement on Collective Security) were to be the new tools of Russian foreign policy to reach this goal (Abushov 2009: 191). Despite the fact that the former state disappeared for good, Russia has remained a major player in the post-Soviet space which makes up the CIS. This area has become an international arena in which Russia attempted to play the role of a mediator in conflicts (Morozova 2009: 671). The CIS, which included all former Soviet republics (except the Baltic states), was in fact a transitional stage whereby Russia managed

to keep its hold over the USSR's nuclear arsenal, but also permanent membership in the UN Security Council and the USSR's assets, embassies, and infrastructure abroad (Trenin 2009: 7). From 1993 until 1999, when Putin came into office, Russia had been keeping up the pretence of being a superpower, although the state's power and influence had been at their lowest. In this period, Russia sought to balance or at least restrain the US influence in the region (Kuchins & Zevelev 2012: 154; Razvani 2020: 9). However, the event that forced Russia to change its strategy in terms of the Caucasus was the NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia (Karagiannis 2013: 84; Hughes 2013: 994; Zellner 2006: 393, Fabry 2012: 667). This event made Russia realize how democratic states can even wage wars for their own benefit under the guise of concern for human rights (Wolff & Peen Rodt 2013: 814). Furthermore, after the bombing and subsequent expansion of NATO to Europe (accession of Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic), for the first time in the past 250 years, Russia stopped being the European superpower. It was nothing more than a former Soviet Union (Trenin 2009: 9; Marten 2015: 189; Kazantsev, Rutland, Medvedeva & Safranchuk 2020: 3). After Putin's taking office, the Russian foreign policy became more coherent and constant. It was embodied in the centralization of the Kremlin's power as well as in the subordination of other states in the region, including those in North Caucasus, to Moscow's will. Moreover, starting in 1994, the West (the USA and the EU), driven by economic interests, began to venture into the Caucasus and strive for influence in it, such as signing of an agreement between Azerbaijan and 10 large corporations that allowed the exploration of Azerbaijani part of the Caspian Sea. When Putin came to power, the Kremlin has had no other choice but to pursue a more consistent policy towards the Caucasus (Abushov 2009: 197).

3.1 Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia)

To understand Russia's foreign policy towards Georgia, and the entire Caucasus in general, through the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it is necessary to first discern the causes of dispute in these two *de facto* statelets. As one of the 15 republics of the Soviet Union,

Georgia consisted of two sub-units - Abkhazia and Adjara - which both had the status of Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republics, as well as the autonomous region of South Ossetia (Sotiriou 2017: 2).

In April 1922, South Ossetia gained the status of an autonomous region (hierarchically lower in status than Abkhazia and Adjara as Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republics) as a minority in Georgia. According to the 1989 census, less than 100,000 people lived in South Ossetia, of which 66% self-identified as Ossetians and 29% as Georgians (Tuathail 2008: 673-674). South Ossetia was an autonomous region of the Georgian SSR from 1936 to 1991, and according to a 1988 report, 86% of Ossetians did not speak the Georgian language (Sotiriou 2017: 2). During the late 1980s, a movement called the South Ossetian Popular Front (*Ademon Nykhaz*) emerged, a network of Ossetian nationalists who sought unification with North Ossetia, as well as an upgrade in status from autonomous region to Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, making it an integral part of Georgia, but with the possibility of potential future secession. The Georgian parliament accepted the request on November 10, 1989; however, the decision was revoked the very next day (Tuathail 2008: 676; Cooley & Mitchell 2010: 61). Georgian national leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia (*Звиад Гамсахурдия*) led a protest towards Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, opposing the regional parliament's law pertaining to the Ossetian language, under the false guise of defending the Georgian people. The road to Tskhinvali was blocked by Ossetian nationalists and protesters where they confronted Gamsakhurdia supporters; many people suffered injuries (Karagiannis 2012: 77). Since then, the territorial integrity of Georgia has been a matter of dispute (Tuathail 2008: 676). In October 1990, Gamsakhurdia was elected leader of Georgia and, with the goal of enforcing the slogan "Georgia for Georgians", he deprived South Ossetia of its autonomy, which culminated in the open conflict of 1991 (German 2016: 157). Fearing an outbreak of local strife, along with the election of Eduard Shevardnadze as President of Georgia in March 1992, prompted a more peaceful approach leading to a peace agreement on June 24, 1992. Subsequently, peacekeepers from Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia were deployed along the conflict zones (Karagiannis 2012: 78; German 2016: 157); furthermore, in July 1992, an OSCE mission

with the aim of establishing facts was sent to South Ossetia (Nishimura 2007: 32). Shevardnadze was persistent in his intentions to restore Georgia's territorial integrity but having refused the use of military force for that purpose, the South Ossetian clashes became a frozen conflict (Karagiannis 2012: 78).

Between 1922-1931, Abkhazia had the status of a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), after which it was united with SSR Georgia and gained the status of an Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic from 1931 to 1991. Following the unification of Abkhazia and Georgia, a repressive and discriminatory policy was used against the Abkhazian people, with the aim of dismantling their cultural identity. The media using the Abkhazian language were shut down and the use of Abkhazian in schools was replaced by Russian or Georgian. The implementation of this approach ceased after Stalin's death, but it still made a substantial impact, given that 75% of Abkhazians (from approximately 220,000, according to estimates) spoke Russian fluently, while the number of Georgians speaking Russian in Abkhazia was 56%. Such a policy gave rise to Abkhazian nationalism, which had been, since the 1930s, more focused on the fight for secession from Georgia than concerned by Russia's domination. The arise of the "People's Parliament" in South Ossetia led to Abkhaz nationalists establishing the Abkhaz Popular Forum ("Aydgylara") through which they appealed to Moscow in order to protect Abkhazian interests (Sotiriou 2017: 2-3; Kereselidze 2015: 311). Secessionist movements in Abkhazia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region sought the right to self-determination, but this was not in accordance with the USSR constitution (Coppieters 2018: 996-997). Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the leaders of Abkhazia demanded secession from Georgia and the restoring of Abkhazia's status to what it was before 1931. Subsequently, in August 1990, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia declared the sovereignty of the republic (Murinson 2010: 8). Georgia declared its independence on March 31, 1991, invoking the 1921 Constitution, according to which both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are inseparable parts of Georgia (Sotiriou 2017: 3). This brought on the re-introduction of the 1925 Constitution in Abkhazia wherein the country was in a special union with Georgia, but which still enabled secession from both the USSR and the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal

Socialist Republic. The crest and the flag were accepted, and the state was renamed from the ASSR of Abkhazia to the Republic of Abkhazia. Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba (*Владислав Ардзинба*) stressed that this should not be seen as an act of secession; however, it still led to the invasion of Georgian troops on August 14, 1992, which started the war in Abkhazia (Murinson 2010: 8). Georgian troops held the capital of Abkhazia, Sukhumi, under occupation for almost 14 months, until a surprise attack in September 1993 that allowed Abkhaz forces to penetrate, resulting in a mass exodus of Georgians from Abkhazia (Fawn & Cummings 2007: 84). Georgia was convinced that the Abkhazians could not wage war without external support and logistics, namely, without Russia's help. Because of this, Eduard Shevardnadze accused the Russian Federation Army of supporting Abkhazia with the intention of suppressing the independence of Georgia and supporting the separatist intentions of Abkhazia (Fawn 2007: 132). In October 1993, Shevardnadze surrendered to pressure from Russia and agreed to open military bases and ports, after which Abkhazia and Georgia signed a truce. Shevardnadze also overturned the position and approach of his predecessor Gamsakhurdia, which enabled Georgia to join the Commonwealth of Independent States on October 8, 1993. In return, fearing a complete disintegration, Georgia expected Russia's help in curbing secessionist disputes on Georgian territory (Fawn & Cummings 2007: 85-87; Fawn 2007: 136). It should also be noted that the international fact-finding mission during the conflict in Georgia confirmed in the "Tagliavini Report", that South Ossetia and Abkhazia had the right to self-determination, not only as ethnic minorities but also based on objective characteristics such as common language, culture, and religion, as well as the stated intention to form their own political community. At the same time, the report states that the right to self-determination does not imply the right to secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Markedonov 2015: 198-199).

Still, Shevardnadze was dissatisfied with Moscow's support in his intention to regain sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and from 1995 onward he began to seek support and partnership with the United States and NATO to balance out Russia's influence over the region, which was seen as the primary source of instability in the

region (Devdariani 2005: 167-173). In 1997, Georgia applied for NATO membership and provided shelter to Chechen refugees and fighters. After the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999, Russia's influence over the region diminished even further and prompted them to remove all military bases from Georgian territory, including those in Abkhazia, as Georgia suspected those bases had provided support for separatist regimes. Moreover, at the OSCE summit, an agreement was reached between Georgia, Azerbaijan and the United States on the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which would bypass the existing Novorossiysk pipeline, to transport energy resources from the Caspian basin to the European markets. The balancing efforts of Georgia and Azerbaijan in the late 1990s led to the emergence of the GUUAM regional alliance (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (which left GUUAM in 2005), Azerbaijan and Moldova). This alliance was perceived by Moscow as an instrument for limiting Russian influence in a zone that traditionally belongs to Moscow, aided by the West (Abushov 2009: 197). Georgia left the Collective Security Treaty in 1999, which was later reorganized through Vladimir Putin's initiative into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Kazantsev, Rutland, Medvedeva & Safranchuk 2020: 9). Russia, dissatisfied with pro-NATO slogans and Shevardnadze's refusal to help Russia in the conflict with Chechnya, implemented more severe measures. Beginning in 1999, Russia changed its isolationist stance toward South Ossetia and Abkhazia, opening borders with Abkhazia, ignoring the embargo, and supporting the employment of Russian reserve personnel and retired veterans in South Ossetia or Abkhazia's security structures. Since 2000, Russia has established a visa regime for Georgia, at the same time assimilating the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by giving them Russian passports. This was painted as a humane gesture that would enable the people to travel. This way, Russia managed to retain the right to intervene in both *de facto* states in the event of a military action by Georgia (Abushov 2009: 199).

The 2003 Rose Revolution brought Mikheil Saakashvili to the helm of Georgia. During the election campaign, Saakashvili advocated for strengthening Georgia's relations with Europe and the United States, promising to reunite the country through the reintegration of South Ossetia (Killingsworth 2012: 229; Tuathail 2008: 681). Initially,

Putin supported the regime change in Tbilisi, hoping that this would improve bilateral relations between Georgia and Russia, but his hopes were short-lived, and Putin soon turned against Saakashvili. From the Russian perspective, the rosy revolution was not a real democratic event, but instead a well-coordinated operation from the West, with its goal of isolating Russia (Nodia 2012: 722; Abushov 2009: 199; Karagiannis 2012: 78). Not only did Saakashvili openly point out that he was pro-Western, but he also, in exchange for American help and support in Georgia's application for NATO membership, sent 2,000 Georgian troops to Iraq, making Georgia the third largest country in terms of troop numbers in the war, right behind the US and Britain (Tuathail 2008: 682). In May 2004, Saakashvili forced Adjara leader Aslan Abashidze to resign, reintegrating Adjara into Georgia, which was not opposed by Russia. Saakashvili hoped for a similar scenario in South Ossetia but had to face a different situation in June 2004 when a minor conflict broke out along the Georgia and South Ossetia border. Georgia encountered a fierce Russian opposition, both military and political. Gennady Savchenko, an emissary to the Foreign Ministry of Russia, said Russia respects the principle of territorial integrity, however, in the case of Georgia, territorial integrity is more of a possibility rather than a political and legal reality (Abushov 2009: 199; Karagiannis 2012: 78). Georgian officials have repeatedly stressed that they plan on continuing to fight for their territorial integrity, but in the meantime, bilateral relations still lie between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as Georgia and Russia.

The unilateral declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo on February 17, 2008, indicated what kind of year it would be, putting new pressures on already existing hotspots throughout the Caucasus (Cheterian 2012: 703). Western officials (who recognized the Republic of Kosovo) said it was a unique case, but in light of the recognition, statements were issued by the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia stating that they would soon ask Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the United Nations as well as other international organizations to recognize their independence (Caspersen 2013: 929). In April 2008, a Russian warplane shot down a Georgian drone in Abkhazian airspace, followed by many accusations from both sides and

creating a war climate between the two countries. This event revealed Russia's sensitivity to any kind of military incursion on Abkhazia, and Russian officials have frequently pointed out that they will defend their citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia at any cost, by force if necessary. On April 18, 2008, Vladimir Putin gave instructions on establishing official relations between Russia and the two *de facto* states, thus letting Georgia know that their reintegration into Georgia is not a possibility (Abushov 2009: 200; Karagiannis 2012: 79). Georgian forces prepared for war weeks before the conflict began, taking strategic positions around Tskhinvali, deploying their troops and weapons throughout the region and redeploying peacekeepers within the conflict zone (Antonenko 2008: 23). Namely, during July 2008, numerous military exercises were held: the US and Georgia cooperated under the name "Current Response 2008", while Russia performed "Caucasus 2008". In late July, a series of bombings in Tskhinvali killed several Georgians, sparking a revolt by Ossetian separatist groups which began attacking Georgian villages and military facilities in South Ossetia. During the night of August 7, Georgian forces attacked Tskhinvali, taking control of much of the city, killing many civilians and several CIS peacekeepers who were being stationed there ever since the last war. The response of the Russian troops followed approximately 12 hours after the start of the Georgian offensive, with air and infantry attacks. On August 9, together with the Abkhaz allies, they opened another front in the Kodori Valley, and shortly afterwards they entered the western part of Georgia and captured the port of Poti. By August 10, they had taken control of Tskhinvali and launched attacks against the Georgian army, which had begun retreating to its home country. The following day, Russian troops bombed and occupied an essential part of Georgia, including the city of Gori. On August 12, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a statement saying that the goal of the Russian military operation to force Georgia into peace had been achieved, and that the decision to suspend operations had been made, thus ending the five-day war (Killingsworth 2012: 229; Karagiannis 2012): 79). Essentially, Georgia's efforts to re-establish control over South Ossetia had provoked Russia into a military invasion. Considering that Russia had been giving passports to the citizens of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for years, they

used that as their reason and motive for launching a military operation on the territory of Georgia. After securing the region, Moscow went a step further and formally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on August 26, 2008. According to *Izvestiya*, the war was seen as the most significant feat undertaken by Medvedev's mandate, which marked Russia's comeback as a global player. The unilateral declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo was also used by Russia as an excuse for the military invasion to punish Georgia for joining the NATO alliance, but also as a demonstration to the West that the Caucasus is a region which "belongs" to Russia (O'Lear 2011: 270; German 2012: 1654).

After the war had ended, Russia updated its legislation, granting to the president the authority to deploy Russian troops outside Russia under the pretext of defending the "honor and dignity" of Russian citizens throughout the post-Soviet countries. Under a law passed on August 11, 2008, Russian military units can be used outside Russian borders in cases when it is necessary to retaliate against attacks on Russian troops, prevent or retaliate against military aggression in another country is necessary, act against piracy and ensure the safe passage of ships, and defend Russian citizens outside Russian borders. This law was designed to be the legal basis for aggressive actions by the Russian military, such as a future attack against Georgia, but it would also provide a basis for the use of military force against any country from the Baltics to Central Asia under the veil of defending the honor and dignity of Russian citizens (2013: 6).

Abkhazia and South Ossetia occupy a unique position in the post-Soviet area. No other political entities in the region have deeper and more extensive linkages with Russia, which makes them *de facto* Russian protectorates. Russia is crucial for their survival, as one of a small number of states that recognizes their independence. Abkhazia was recognized by seven countries (Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu, Tuvalu and Syria), and South Ossetia by only five, which are, besides Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Tuvalu. Russia has developed a strong mechanism of dependence and coercion in relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is reflected through seven types of linkages: economic, intergovernmental,

technocratic, social, informational, civil society, and finally institutional linkage and parallelism (Gerrits & Badder 2016: 298).

Russia supports the economies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by being their main economic partner – Abkhazia's largest and South Ossetia's only partner. In addition, the most important economic and infrastructural facilities are owned by Russia. Intergovernmental and technocratic linkages can be seen in Russia's issuing of passports to citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia over the course of many years, which further gives Russia the right to intervene in any attacks on its citizens. Furthermore, under Russia's patronage, several summits of the four unrecognized countries of the post-Soviet region – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria – were organized. On August 26, 2008, Russia officially recognized the independence of the two states, and signed the agreements on coordinated foreign policies and a common defense space. Technocratic linkage is evident in the fact that most elites and citizens of the two states got their education and training in Russia. Social, informational, civil society, and institutional linkages are more than obvious, considering that the laws in the two *de facto* states are almost identical to those in Russia, as well as in the forms of institutions and structures that exist and function in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia Russian is almost universally used as the official language, Russia offers scholarships and academic exchanges, and Russian television and media are dominant and widely available, which helps promote Russian as the majority language (Gerrits & Bader 2016: 298 -306).

4. Discussion

The foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards Georgia, the Caucasus, and the entire region can be seen as compliant with John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive structural realism. Namely, through the attitude of the Russian Federation towards Georgia, starting from the collapse of the Soviet Union until the war in 2008, the basic principles of Mearsheimer's theory can be clearly observed. Although we can reasonably assume that it has unipolar ambitions, the Russian Federation is very well aware of the "stopping power of water" as defined

by Mearsheimer, and therefore strives to establish regional hegemony, in which it has achieved great success. Although survival is the fundamental goal of every state, which was clearly seen in Russia after the disintegration of the USSR, a great power such as Russia will undoubtedly strive to become even more powerful, since the accumulation of power (to the detriment of other states) is the best path to achieving a high level of self-security and a high level of hegemony in the region. In addition, great powers are rational agents that act in a way which, in the anarchic international community, gives them a better chance of survival and a higher position in that community. Russia implemented its neo-imperial regional project in the Caucasus step by step, waiting for the right opportunity to act. Georgia's rapprochement with the US and the EU posed a threat to the hegemony of the Russian Federation in the region, so Russia began to naturalize the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, the best chance to achieve regional hegemony was through the unilateral declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo and Georgia's intentions to unite the former territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Having started (and won) the five-day war in 2008, which largely neutralized the influence of the US and the West, Russia made a definite comeback as the leader in the region that has traditionally been seen as its own.

5. Conclusion

After the disintegration of the USSR, the foreign policy of the Russian Federation went through several phases, which included a brief turn towards pro-Western liberalism. Over the years, Russia's foreign policy became focused towards achieving neo-imperial ambitions in the European-Asian region. During the 1990s, decades of inter-ethnic conflicts intensified, resulting in the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in which Russia saw the opportunity to expand or re-establish its influence in the now post-Soviet space. The Caucasus region was rife with instability and separatist tendencies after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States wanted to expand its influence in the region, offering Georgia (as well as Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and the Baltic

countries) economic growth and military security. Due to the colored revolutions, primarily the Rose Revolution and the arrival of Mikheil Saakashvili to the scene, Georgia turned to NATO membership with the ambition to reintegrate the former Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republics and autonomous regions. After the initial success with Adjara, Saakashvili hoped to see an equally easy success in South Ossetia (and Abkhazia).

However, over the years, Russia began issuing passports to citizens from the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, making them naturalized Russians, thus giving the Russian military the right to intervene in the case of the Georgian military invasion, as was the case in 2008. In the Russo-Georgian war, Georgia was defeated, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia got what they wanted - their (*de facto*) independent states. Russia got the opportunity to show the world that it would not hesitate to use force to defend its interests. This was particularly directed towards the US (and the EU) to show them who the real leader in the region was and to retaliate for the unilateral declaration of independence of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, as well as for the bombing of FR Yugoslavia in 1999, which Russia opposed and was exempt from making (and implementing) that decision.

The question remains what Abkhazia and South Ossetia gained from their independence and what their future orientation will be. The people of the region gained their independence, but they have been recognized by only a few (not very powerful) states in the international community, apart from Russia. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are dependent on Russia to such a degree that they are *de facto* Russian protectorates. Without Russian economic and social support, it is doubtful whether they would be able to survive, in the political and military sense. Both states are under constant pressure from Georgia and isolated from the world: their citizens are unable to travel anywhere (except to their "mother country" Russia), and international businesses are unwilling to open their offices there, both for security reasons and legislation issues, given they are not unrecognized. Both states' economies and businesses are heavily dependent on Russian trade and support. Therefore, it is more likely that their future status will be resemble Northern Cyprus than the Republic of Kosovo.

Ultimately, Russia's protective attitude towards these states should not be seen as any special concern for the local population, but as Russian neo-imperialist ambitions towards the region. This is mainly reflected in staving off anti-Russian sentiment in the region, the 2008 war with Georgia being a prime example. This war was a very calculated move, which Russia had been preparing for years. According to Mearsheimer's offensive realism theory, Russia took advantage of the favorable situation and entered the war, emerging as a victorious leader in the region. Consequently, it was well-equipped to orchestrate the events in the region in the way most suitable for increasing its influence and power in the international community.

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ZASTARELOST POTRAŽIVANJA NAKNADE ŠTETE U SUDSKOJ PRAKSI

SAŽETAK: Pravni institut zastarelosti potraživanja važan je u postupku ostvarivanja prava na naknadu štete budući da, ako je oštećeni pasivan, može izgubiti pravo da zahteva od štetnika da mu nadoknadi prouzrokovanu štetu.

U cilju zaštite žrtava, tumačenju normi koje regulišu ovu materiju treba pristupiti sveobuhvatno i jedinstveno.

Važno je, a i u cilju je pravne sigurnosti, da se zauzme čvrst i jedinstven stav po pitanju zastarelosti, a posebno rokova koji se primenjuju za zastarelost. Različiti stavovi sudske prakse doprinose neizvesnosti i nesigurnosti građana, te nepoverenju građana u sudove i sudsku vlast.

KLJUČNE REČI: zastara potraživanja, rokovi zastarelosti, prekid i zastoje zastarelosti

1. Uvod

Ovaj rad će obuhvatiti pravni institut zastarelosti potraživanja naknade štete. Da bi oštećeni mogao da nadoknadi štetu koju je pretrpeo, za njega je bitan trenutak kada od odgovornog lica potražuje naknadu pretrpljene štete, to jest kada podnosi zahtev, budući da može doći u situaciju da izgubi pravo da je potražuje ukoliko je zahtev podneo posle vremena propisanog za preduzimanje te radnje. Oštećeni, dakle, može zbog svog pasivnog ponašanja izgubiti pravo na naknadu štete, zapravo izgubiti pravo da potražuje od štetnika naknadu štete.

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Zakonodavci u savremenim pravnim sistemima, a u cilju pravne sigurnosti, propisuju rokove u kojima se mogu preduzeti određene pravne radnje, pa i rokove u kojima se može potraživati naknada štete. I naš Zakon o obligacionim odnosima (ZOO) propisuje rokove u kojima se može potraživati naknada štete. Zato je pravni institut zastarelost potraživanja naknade štete bitan i za pravnu praksu i za pravnu teoriju, a svakako i za oštećeno lice jer nepoznavanjem tih rokova, ono može biti uskraćeno za reparaciju oštećenog dobra.

U prvom delu ovog rada ukazaćemo na osnovne pojmove štete i njene naknade, da bi se kasnije upustili u analizu instituta „zastarelosti potraživanja naknade štete”.

2. Zastarelost potraživanja naknade štete

Članom 154 stav 1 ZOO propisano je: „Ko drugome prouzrokuje štetu dužan je naknaditi je, ukoliko ne dokaže da je šteta nastala bez njegove krivice.”

Shodno ovoj odredbi, naknada štete je vanugovorna obligacija koja nastaje prouzrokoivanjem štete i stvara obavezu licu koje je štetu prouzrokovalo – štetniku, da je nadoknadi licu koje je tu štetu pretrpelo – oštećenom.

U pravnoj teoriji, šteta se definiše kao štetnom radnjom prouzrokovana povreda nečijeg subjektivnog prava ili pravom zaštićenog interesa (Blagojević-Krulj, 1983, str. 513).

Šteta se može podeliti u dva osnovna vida: materijalna (imovinska) šteta i nematerijalna (neimovinska) šteta, budući da Zakon o obligacionim odnosima u članu 155 definiše štetu kao umanjenje nečije imovine (obična šteta) i sprečavanje njenog povećanja (izmakla korist), te kao i nanošenje drugome fizičkog ili psihičkog bola ili straha (nematerijalna šteta).

Materijalna šteta je povreda imovinskog dobra nekog lica i može se javiti kao: umanjenje nečije imovine, obična, stvarna šteta ili u sprečavanju povećanja imovine, izmakla dobit, buduća šteta. Nematerijalna (neimovinska šteta) šteta je povreda prava ličnosti, ličnih dobara, života, zdravlja, časti, slobode. Nematerijalna šteta može biti sadašnja i buduća, a javlja se, prema Zakonu o obligacionim odnosima, u vidu: pretrplje-

nih fizičkih bolova, pretrpljenih duševnih bolova zbog umanjena životne aktivnosti, naruženosti, povrede ugleda, časti, slobode ili prava ličnosti, straha, kao i duševnih bolova zbog smrti bliskog lica i duševnih bolova zbog naročito teškog invaliditeta bliskog lica (Petrović, 1996, str. 87).

Oštećeno lice ,koje je pretrpelo neki vid ili više vidova štete, ima pravo da od štetnika zahteva naknadu pretrpljene štete. Međutim, oštećeni posle određenog vremenskog perioda od nastanka štete gubi to pravo jer su protekli zakonom propisani rokovi u kome je mogao potraživati naknadu štete. Nastupila je zastarelost s kojom ne prestaje pravo na naknadu štete, već mogućnost oštećenog da je potražuje. „Zastarelošću prestaje pravo zahtevati ispunjenje obaveze”, kako je to navedeno u članu 360 stav 1 ZOO.

Nastupanje zastarelosti, međutim, ne sprečava dužnika da oštećenom nadoknadi štetu, tj. štetu koju je prouzrokovao može nadoknaditi i posle isteka roka propisanog za zastarelost, i smatra se da je izvršio prirodnu, naturalnu obavezu. A izvršenje prirodne, naturalne obaveze zavisi od volje štetnika. Zato dužnik koji ispuni naturalnu obavezu ne može tražiti povraćaj isplaćenog, čak ni u situaciji kada nije znao da je obaveza zastarela.

Budući da zastarelošću ne prestaje obaveza na naknadu štete, već pravo da se ona traži, o zastarelosti sudovi ne vode računa po službenoj dužnosti, već je na dužniku – štetniku, obaveza da se na nju pozove, jer je stavom 3 člana 155 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima propisano: „Sud se ne može obazirati na zastarelost, ako se dužnik nije na nju pozvao.” Prigovor zastarelosti je materijalnopravne prirode i na njega se mora pozvati dužnik.

Do stupanja na snagu Zakona o parničnom postupku („Sl. glasnik RS” br. 125/04), dužnik je do pravnosnažnosti presude mogao istaći prigovor zastarelosti, odnosno ovaj prigovor je mogao istaći i u žalbi. Međutim, po stupanju na snagu Zakona o parničnom postupku iz 2004. godine, prigovor zastarelosti se može istaći do zaključenja glavne rasprave. Isticanje prigovora u smislu člana 298 ZPP-a propisano je za procesnopravne prigovore, a prigovor zastarelosti potraživanja jeste materijalnopravni prigovor koji se prema odredbi člana 372 ZPP-a ne može isticati u žalbi (Vrhovni kasacioni sud, Rev 759/2017).

3. Rokovi koji se imaju računati za zastarelosti potraživanja naknade štete

Stavom 2 člana 360 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima propisano je da zastarelost nastupa kada protekne zakonom određeno vreme u kome je poverilac mogao zahtevati ispunjenje obaveze. Prema istom zakonu, potraživanja zastarevaju u roku od 10 godina, ako zakonom nije određen neki drugi rok zastarelosti. Rok od 10 godina, u pravnoj praksi i teoriji, naziva se opšti rok zastarelosti.

Opšti rok zastarelosti ne primenjuje se kod potraživanja naknade štete, a članom 376 i članom 377 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima propisani su drugi rokovi zastarelosti.

Član 376 propisuje rok u kome oštećeni može potraživati naknadu štete u slučaju deliktne odgovornosti za štetu, koja nije prouzrokovana krivičnim delom, a član 377 u slučaju kada je šteta nastala izvršenjem krivičnog dela.

Član 376 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima propisuje da za štetu koja nije nastala kao posledica izvršenja krivičnog dela, oštećeni može potraživati naknadu štete u roku od tri godine od saznanja za štetu i za lice odgovorno za štetu (subjektivni rok), ali naknadu štete nikako ne može potraživati po isteku roka od pet godina od nastanka štete (objektivni rok).

Međutim, u slučajevima kada je šteta prouzrokovana izvršenjem krivičnog dela, rok u kome oštećeni može potraživati naknadu štete izjednačava se s rokom u kome se može krivično goniti učinilac dela iz koga je šteta nastala, jer član 377. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima propisuje: „Kad je šteta prouzrokovana krivičnim delom, a za krivično gonjenje je predviđen duži rok zastarelosti, zahtev za naknadu štete prema odgovornom licu zastareva kad istekne vreme određeno za zastarelost krivičnog gonjenja.” Krivičnim zakonikom, u našem prvom sistemu, propisani su rokovi zastarelosti krivičnog gonjenja.

U sudskoj praksi, poslednjih godina, sporno je pitanje računjanja rokova zastarelosti u situaciji kada je šteta nastala prouzrokoivanjem krivičnog dela, ali se kao dužnik – lice koje je u obavezi da nadoknadi štetu, pojavljuje pravno lice, odnosno drugo lice koje nije izvršilac kri-

vičnog dela. Prema članu 170 stav 1 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, za štetu koju zaposleni u radu ili u vezi s radom prouzrokuje trećem licu odgovara preduzeće u kome je zaposleni radio u trenutku prouzrokovanja štete, osim ako dokaže da je zaposleni u datim okolnostima postupao onako kako je trebalo. Prema članu 172 istog zakona, pravno lice odgovara za štetu koju njegov organ prouzrokuje trećem licu u vršenju ili u vezi sa vršenjem svojih funkcija, dok prema članu 174. za štetu nastalu u vezi sa opasnom stvari odgovara njen imalac, a za štetu nastalu u vezi sa opasnom delatnošću odgovara lice koje se njome bavi.

Sporan je deo odredbe stava 1 člana 377 koji se odnosi na „odgovorno lice”. Zapravo, sporno je ko može biti odgovorno lice iz člana 377 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, a prema kome se primenjuju rokovi zastarelosti iz tog člana. Da li je „odgovorno lice” samo fizičko lice koje je izvršilo krivično delo, ili „odgovorno lice” iz tog člana može biti i pravno lice koje odgovara po pravilima građanskog prava – tzv. posredno lice.

Na sednici Građanskog odeljenja Vrhovnog suda Srbije 10. februara 2004. godine zauzet je stav da rokovi zastarelosti potraživanja naknade štete iz člana 377 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima teku samo prema učiniocu krivičnog dela koji je štetu prouzrokovao, a ne i prema državi, odnosno pravnom licu koje za štetu odgovara umesto njega, po odredbama člana 172 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima. Prema tom stavu, potraživanje naknade štete po osnovu odgovornosti države za štetu koju prouzrokuje njen organ, zastareva u rokovima propisanim članom 376 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima. Zauzet je stav: „Potraživanje naknade štete po osnovu odgovornosti države za štetu koju prouzrokuje njen organ nezakonitim lišenjem slobode zastareva u rokovima propisanim odredbama člana 376. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima” (Pravno shvatanje Građanskog odeljenja Vrhovnog suda Srbije, 2004.

U jednoj presudi Vrhovnog suda Srbije, u postupku čiji je predmet spora bio potraživanje naknade nematerijalne štete za pretrpljene duševne bolove zbog smrti bliskog lica nastradalog u saobraćajnom udesu, navedeno je: „[...] Protiv prvotuženog u tom postupku, a koji je bio radnik drugotuženog, vođen je krivični postupak u kome je oglašen krivim za učinjeno krivično delo i izrečena mu je kazna zatvora. Niže-

stepeni sudovi su odgovornost drugotuženog, pravnog lica, zasnivali na odredbama čl. 170 i 174 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima iz razloga što je prvotuženi štetu prouzrokovao trećem licu kao radnik drugotuženog i u vezi sa radom, a postoji i odgovornost drugotuženog po principu objektivne odgovornosti, budući da je imalac opasnih stvari, te prema stavu tih sudova prema drugotuženom primenjuju se rokovi zastarelosti iz člana 377 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, odnosno u tom slučaju rok od 20 godina a taj rok nije protekao, jer se nezgoda dogodila 1990. godine, a zahtev za naknadu štete je podnet 2001. godine. Vrhovni sud Srbije, rešavajući u tom predmetu po reviziji tužene drugog reda, izrazio je stav, da su pobijane, nižestepene presude, donete uz pogrešnu primenu materijalnog prava, jer se u tom predmetu na drugotuženog kao pravnog lica imaju primeniti rokovi zastarelosti iz člana 376 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima” (Vrhovni sud Srbije, Rev. 127/06, 2006).

Pre stava Vrhovnog suda Srbije iz februara 2004. godine, bio je opšteprihvaćen stav u sudskoj praksi da se za štete nastale izvršenjem krivičnog dela, nezavisno od toga da li je odgovorno lice izvršilac tog dela ili su to druga lica koja odgovaraju kao on ili umesto njega, primenjuju rokovi zastarelosti iz člana 377 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima i to samo u slučajevima kada je pravnosnažnom osuđujućom presudom krivičnog suda utvrđeno postojanje krivičnog dela i odgovornost lica za učinjeno krivično delo. Izuzetno, ako su postojale procesne smetnje zbog kojih je bilo apsolutno nemoguće da se protiv učinioca krivičnog dela postupak pokrene ili okonča, bilo zato što je učinilac štete umro ili je nedostupan organima gonjenja, parnični sud je ovlašćen da, kao prethodno pitanje, utvrdi da li je šteta prouzrokovana takvom radnjom koja u sebi sadrži elemente krivičnog dela, jer krivično delo može da postoji i kada je krivični postupak izostao. Pri tome, delovanje parničnog suda nije usmereno na utvrđivanje krivične odgovornosti, jer se to može utvrditi samo u krivičnom postupku, već da bi se saglasno načelu pružanja jače zaštite pravu oštećenog na naknadu štete prouzrokovane krivičnim delom, primenila posebna pravila o zastarelosti iz člana 377 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima. Ako se, objektivno gledano, krivični postupak protiv učinioca ili nekog od saizvršilaca mogao ili može inicirati, pokrenuti ili voditi, navedena pravila radi raspravljanja ovog prethodnog pitanja, kao izuzetka u parničnom postupku, ne bi se mogla primeniti.

Takav stav izražen je u poznatom pravnom shvatanju Građanskog odeljenja Vrhovnog suda Srbije utvrđenom na sednici 27. decembra 1999. godine, u kome se navodi da je šteta prouzrokovana pripadnicima bivše JNA (pogibija, ranjavanje) u oružanim sukobima s paravojnim formacijama bivših republika SFRJ do dana njihovog međunarodnog priznanja od strane Generalne skupštine OUN 22. maja 1992. godine prouzrokovana krivičnim delom oružane pobune iz člana 124 KZ Jugoslavije, pa njeno potraživanje zastareva u roku od 15 godina propisanom za zastarelost krivičnog gonjenja za to delo – član 377 stav 1 ZOO (Pravno shvatanje Građanskog odeljenja Vrhovnog suda Srbije, 1999, str. 31).

Stav da odgovorno lice iz člana 377 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima mogu biti i pravna lica, vraćen je 2011. godine, tačnije 14. jula 2011. godine, kada je Ustavni sud Srbije utvrdio stav koji se odnosi na rok zastarelosti naknade štete prouzrokovane krivičnim delom, a koji glasi:

„U slučaju kada je šteta prouzrokovana krivičnim delom (član 377 ZOO), ako je za krivično gonjenje predviđen druži rok zastarelosti od rokova predviđenih članom 376 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, zahtev za naknadu štete prema svakom odgovornom licu, a ne samo prema štetniku, zastareva kada istekne vreme određeno za zastarelost krivičnog gonjenja samo ako je pravnosnažnom presudom utvrđeno postojanje krivičnog dela i okrivljeni oglašen krivim za krivično delo. Prekid zastarevanja krivičnog gonjenja povlači za sobom i prekid zastarevanja zahteva za naknadu štete.

Isti rok zastarelosti krivičnog gonjenja primenjuje se ako je krivični postupak obustavljen, odnosno ako se nije mogao pokrenuti zato što je okrivljeni umro ili je duševno oboleo, odnosno ako postoje druge okolnosti koje isključuju krivično gonjenje i odgovornost okrivljenog, kao što su amnestija i pomilovanje.

U svim ostalim slučajevima primenjuje se opšti rok zastarelosti potraživanja iz člana 376 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima” (Ustavni sud Srbije, Su 400/1/3, 2011. godine).

Međutim, i pored ovako zauzetog stava, u sudskoj praksi srećemo odluke koje su bliže stavu Vrhovnog suda Srbije iz februara 2004.

godine. Tako se u Biltenu Apelacionog suda u Kragujevcu iz 2017. godine, sreće sledeći stav: „Pitanje: Radnik tuženog preduzeća osuđen je za krivično delo u radu ili u vezi sa radom tuženog preduzeća, koje je za posledicu imalo smrt drugog radnika tuženog preduzeća, a bliski srodnici radnika podneli su tužbu protiv tuženog preduzeća radi naknade nematerijalne štete zbog smrti bliskog lica. Da li zahtev za naknadu štete zastareva kad istekne vreme određeno za zastarelost krivičnog gonjenja, jer je za krivično gonjenje za krivično delo za koje je osuđen radnik tuženog preduzeća predviđen duži rok zastarelosti od rokova propisanih članom 376 ZOO i prema tuženom preduzeću koje odgovara u smislu čl. 170 ZOO ili samo prema štetniku radniku tuženog preduzeća za koga je pravnosnažnom presudom utvrđeno postojanje krivičnog dela i isti oglašen krivim, odnosno da li se privilegovani na rok zastarelosti čl. 377 ZOO primenjuje i na tuženo preduzeće? Odgovor: Kada je šteta prouzrokovana krivičnim delom, ako je za krivično gonjenje predviđen duži rok zastarelosti od rokova propisanih čl. 376 ZOO, zahtev za naknadu štete prema svakom odgovornom licu, a ne samo štetniku, zastareva kada istekne vreme određeno za zastarelost krivičnog gonjenja (Ristić, 2017, str. 56).

U postupcima u kojima se kao odgovorno lice pojavljuje izvršilac krivičnog dela nije sporno da se primenjuju rokovi zastarelosti iz **člana** 377 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima. Tako: „U situaciji kada je protiv učinioca krivičnog dela vođen krivični postupak koji je pravnosnažno okončan osuđujućom presudom, osnov za odlučivanje o prigovoru zastarelosti istaknutom u parničnom postupku je odredba **člana** 377. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima.” Iz obrazloženja: „U smislu člana 377. stav 1. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, odgovornim licem smatra se kako učinilac krivičnog dela, tako i svako drugo lice koje po bilo kom osnovu odgovara za štetu nastalu kao posledica krivičnog dela. Dakle, i osiguravajuće društvo kod koga je vozilo štetnika bilo osigurano od autoodgovornosti” (Viši sud u Subotici, Gž 219/12, 2012).

Ovo nije jedino sprono pitanje koje se pojavljuje u sudskoj praksi, a u vezi je s pravnim institutom zastarelosti. Pored spornog pitanja povodom „odgovornog lica” iz stava 1 člana 377 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, u pravnom institutu zastarelosti potraživanja naknade štete sporan je i trenutak od kada teku rokovi zastarelosti iz člana 376.

Zapravo, sporan je trenutak nastanka štete i saznanja za štetu, jer je potrebno kumulativno postojanje saznanja za štetu i lica odgovornog za štetu. Ako se za obe ove činjenice ne stekne saznanje u isto vreme, zastarelost počinje da teče od saznanja za poslednju od njih.

Zbog prirode nematerijalne štete, posebno može biti sporno kada je ona nastala i kada je oštećni saznao za nju, budući da ona postoji u slučaju povrede subjektivnih neimovinskih prava i interesa ličnosti. Te povrede subjekt oseća kao štetu iako ne pogađaju direktno njegovu imovinu (Vedriš-Klarić, 1983, str. 86) Nematerijalna šteta nije materijalno vidljiva šteta, to je šteta kojom se povređuju osnovna ljudska prava i vrednosti. Zbog toga je potrebno s posebnom pažnjom utvrditi od kada počinje da teče rok koji se računa za zastarelost potraživanja naknade nematerijalne štete.

U praksi sudova Republike Srbije zauzet je stav da se činjenica saznanja za štetu kod oštećenog koji je pretrpeo telesnu povredu vezuje za završetak njegovog lečenja, tj. smatra se da je tada povreda dobila konačan oblik. Ali oštećeni ne mora za sve vidove nematerijalne štete imati saznanje u isto vreme, tako da rokovi zastarelosti po vidovima nematerijalne štete teku od dana kada je taj vid dobio konačno stanje. Za pretrpljene fizičke bolove rok od tri godine počinje da teče od momenta kada su bolovi jakog i srednjeg intenziteta izgubili trajnost i postali povremeni bolovi slabog intenziteta; za pretrpljeni strah, kada je prestao strah od smrti; za naruženost od završene poslednje hirurške intervencije, kada je postala izvesna promena spoljašnjeg izgleda; a za duševne bolove zbog umanjene životne aktivnosti od završetka lečenja. „Rok zastarelosti neimovinske štete počinje teći od onog dana kada su pojedini vidovi neimovinske štete dobili oblik konačnog stanja” (Vrhovni sud Srbije, Rev. 251/98). Takođe: „Za bolove zastarelost počinje teći od prestanka bolova, za strah od prestanka straha, a za duševne bolove zbog smanjene opšte životne sposobnosti zastarelost počinje teći od završetka lečenja i saznanja za postojanje smanjene opšteživotne aktivnosti” (Vrhovni sud Srbije, Rev. 497/97).

Tako je i Apelacioni sud u Novom Sadu zauzeo stav: „Saznanje za štetu se ne vezuje za dan njenog prouzrokovanja (nastanka štete) već za okolnosti koje se odnose na trajanje i prestanak fizičkih bolova ili

straha, odnosno za završetak lečenja i saznanje da je došlo do trajnog oštećenja zdravlja i životne aktivnosti. Potraživanje za svaki vid nematerijalne štete zastareva posebno, kao i za naknadu materijalne štete” (Apelacioni sud u Novom Sadu, GŽ 4485/16).

Završetak lečenja nije osnovni kriterijum koji se ima ceniti prilikom utvrđivanja početka računjanja roka zastarelosti potraživanja naknade nematerijalne štete. Tako u odluci Apelacionog suda u Beogradu nalazimo: „Za zastarelost potraživanja po osnovima naknade nematerijalne štete od značaja je kada je po svakom od naznačenih osnova konsolidovano stanje a nije od značaja da li je lečenje završeno ili ne, jer određena dijagnostikovana oboljenja mogu imati konačno stanje, a da njihovo lečenje traje do kraja života.” Iz obrazloženja: „Naime, prema odredbi člana 376. stav 1. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima potraživanje naknade prouzrokovane štete zastareva za 3 godine od kada je oštećeni doznao za štetu i za lice koje je štetu učinilo. Poštujući ovu pravnu normu kada se radi o naknadi nematerijalne štete po naznačenim osnovima, bilo je nužno razjasniti kada je po svakom od naznačenih osnova konsolidovano stanje. Pri tome nije od značaja da li je lečenje završeno ili ne jer određena dijagnostikovana oboljenja mogu imati konačno stanje, a da njihovo lečenje traje do kraja života. Za vreme koje je merodavno za početak zastarelosti u smislu odredbe člana 361. stav 1. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima bilo je nužno razjasniti kada je umanjeње životne aktivnosti dobilo svoj konačni oblik, kada su ožiljne promene koje predstavljaju osnov za naznačeni zaključak o navedenom stepenu naruženja postale definitivne i opažanju vidljive kao takve te kada je fizički bol posebno bol jakog i srednjeg intenziteta prestao odnosno primarni i sekundarni strah prestao, a započele promene u sferi ličnosti koje se ispoljavaju kroz umanjeње životne aktivnosti. Pri tome razlog koji koristi ožalbena presuda za početak roka zastarelosti – vreme podnošenja odštetnog zahteva bi bilo merodavno samo pod uslovom da je u to vreme bilo konsolidovano stanje po svakom od naznačenih osnova nematerijalne štete, a u suprotnom bi bilo pravno nevažna činjenica. Radi toga, u odnosu na ovaj razlog ni činjenično stanje nije potpuno utvrđeno, a na okolnosti kada je konsolidovano stanje po svakom od naznačenih osnova nematerijalne štete.”

Dan prouzrokovanja štete ne može se ceniti kao vreme koje se ima računati za zastarelosti i kod nekih vidova materijalne štete, kao što je naknada materijalne štete na ime izgubljene zarade i naknada materijalne štete na ime tuđe nege i pomoći.

Prema članu 195 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, lice koje drugom nanese telesnu povredu ili mu naruši zdravlje, dužno je nadoknaditi mu troškove oko lečenja i druge potrebne troškove u vezi s tim, kao i izgubljenu zaradu zbog nesposobnosti za rad. A ako oštećeni zbog pretrpljene povrede ostane potpuno ili delimično nesposoban za rad, te zbog toga gubi zaradu, ili su mu potrebe trajno povećane, ili su mogućnosti njegovog daljeg razvijanja i napredovanja uništene ili smanjene, ima pravo da od štetnika potražuje i novčanu rentu kao naknadu za tu štetu.

Prema stavu sudske prakse, rok koji se računa za zastarelost takve materijalne štete ne poklapa se s datumom nastanka štete, već teče od dana donošenja akta državnog organa, kojim je utvrđena ta nesposobnost. Tako: „Dan kada je oštećenom utvrđen potpuni gubitak radne sposobnosti i priznato prvo na invalidsku penziju, ima se smatrati kao dan početka roka zastarelosti za ostvarivanje prava na naknadu štete zbog izgubljene zarade” (Vrhovni sud Srbije, Rev. 236/08).

Pod saznanjem za lice odgovorno za štetu, nije bitno da je oštećeni saznao za lice koje je štetu pričinilo, već da ima saznanje o licu koje je za tu štetu odgovorno.

4. Zastoj zastarelosti

Član 381 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima propisuje da zastarevanje ne teče: između bračnih drugova; između roditelja i dece dok traje roditeljsko pravo; između štićenika i njegovog staraoca, kao i organa starateljstva, za vreme trajanja starateljstva i dok ne budu položeni računi; između dva lica koja žive u vanbračnoj zajednici, dok ta zajednica postoji.

Za razliku od prethodnog stava, prema kome zastarevanje ne teče jer su štetnik i oštećeni u određenom odnosu, koji je regulisan Porodičnim zakonikom, isti zakon u članu 382 propisuje da zastarevanje

ne teče kada nastupe određena faktička stanja ili radni angažman štenika ili oštećenog, te zastarevanje ne teče: za vreme mobilizacije, u slučaju neposredne ratne opasnosti ili rata u pogledu potraživanja lica na vojnoj dužnosti; i u pogledu potraživanja koja imaju lica zaposlena u tuđem domaćinstvu prema poslodavcu ili članovima njegove porodice koji zajedno s njima žive, sve dok taj radni odnos traje.

Zbog nemogućnosti da zakonom predvidi sve životne situacije koje mogu sprečiti oštećenog da potražuje štetu, Zakon o obligacionim odnosima u članu 383 određuje da zastarevanje ne teče za sve vreme za koje poveriocu nije bilo moguće zbog nesavladivih prepreka da sudskim putem zahteva ispunjenje obaveze.

Prema navedenim odredbama, može se utvrditi da se vremenski period u kome oštećeni može zahtevati potraživanje naknade štete može staviti u stanje mirovanja, može i da zastane onda kada nastupe određene okolnosti izričito propisane zakonom. Tada nastupa zastoj zastarelosti, koji se ne računa u rok zastarelosti. Tada, kako smo videli iz citiranih članova, u rok zastarelosti ne računa se vreme za koje je oštećeni bio u pravnoj ili fizičkoj nemogućnosti da ostvari svoje potraživanje naknade štete od odgovornog lica.

Vreme pre zastoja računa se u propisani rok za zastarelost, a nastavlja da teče kada prestane uzrok zbog koga je nastao zastoj. U slučaju da zastarevanje nije moglo početi da teče zbog nekog zakonskog uzroka, ono počinje da teče kad taj uzrok prestane.

Izuzetno, prema članu 385 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, ako je zastoj zastarelosti nastupio iz razloga što maloletni oštećeni nije imao zastupnika ili drugo poslovno nesposobno lice nije imalo zastupnika, zastarelost ne može početi ponovo da teče dok ne proteknu dve godine od kad su ta lica postala potpuno poslovno sposobna, ili od kad su dobila zastupnika.

Takođe, zastarelost ne nastupa odmah ni prema licu koje se nalazi na odsluženju vojnog roka ili na vojnoj vežbi. Prema članu 386, zastarelost ne nastupa dok ne proteknu tri meseca od odsluženja vojnog roka ili prestanka vojne vežbe.

5. Prekid zastarelosti

Vreme koje se računa u zastarelost može se prekinuti, a prema Zakonu o obligacionim odnosima to se može desiti u situacijama kada dužnik prizna dug (član 387) ili kada poverilac podnese tužbu ili preduzme neku drugu radnju protiv dužnika pred sudom ili drugim nadležnim organom (član 388).

Prema navedenim odredbama, vidimo da određene radnje oštećenog kao poverioca, ili štetnika kao dužnika, mogu dovesti do prekida zastarelosti. Odnosno, prekid zastarelosti nastaje kada još, pre kraja zastarelosti, dođe do pravnog učinka propisanog zakonom, što prouzrokuje da se vreme zastarelosti koje je proteklo do prekida više ne računa u zastarelost nekog zahteva (Raspor, 1982, str. 36).

Zakonom preduzete radnje od strane dužnika ili poverioca, a označene u članu 387 i 388 Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, imaju za posledicu to da se vremenski period koji je protekao pre preduzimanja tih radnji ne računa u rok za zastarelosti, i zastarelost po izvršenju tih radnji počinje ponovo da teče.

Radnjom dužnika zastarelost se prekida kada on prizna dug. Priznanje duga može se učiniti ne samo pismenom ili usmenom izjavom datom poveriocu već i na posredan način, kao što su davanje otplate, plaćanje kamate, davanje obezbeđenja. Priznanje dužnika mora sadržati i priznanje osnova i priznanje visine duga, a samo priznanje pravnog osnova ne dovodi do prekida zastarelosti.

Radnjom oštećenog zastarelosti se prekida podnošenjem tužbe i svakom drugom radnjom preduzetom protiv dužnika pred sudom ili drugim državnim organom radi utvrđivanja, obezbeđenja ili ostvarenja potraživanja. Ako oštećeni povuče tužbu, smatra se da prekid zastarelosti nije nastupio. Takođe, smatraće se da nije nastupio prekid zastarelosti ako tužba koju je podneo tužilac, ili pak njegov zahtev, bude odbačena ili odbijena. Međutim, ako je tužba protiv dužnika odbačena zbog nenadležnosti suda ili nekog drugog uzroka koji se ne tiče suštine stvari, pa poverilac podigne ponovo tužbu u roku od tri meseca od dana pravosnažnosti odluke o odbacivanju tužbe, smatra se da je zastarevanje prekinuto prvom tužbom.

Poverilac može u već postojećoj parnici preinačiti tužbeni zahtev tako što će pored već postojećeg, podneti i zahtev za naknadu štete. Postavlja se pitanje kada nastupa prekid zastarelosti u takvim situacijama, da li podnošenjem tužbe ili preinačenjem tužbe. Sudska praksa je zauzela stav da prekid nastupa preinačenjem tužbe, te: „Zastarelost potraživanja koje je predmet drugog zahteva istaknutog uz postojeći preinačenjem tužbe, prekida se preinačenjem tužbe, a ne danom inicijalnog utuženja” (Privredni apelacioni suda Pž 1624/19). Iz obrazloženja: „Privredni apelacioni sud navodi da je inicijalnim aktom, odnosno tužbom od 15. 07. 2011. godine, tužilac tražio da se isplati, kao vanugovorna šteta, nastalo umanj enje njegove imovine plaćanjem naknade za odvođnjavanje za spornih 359 ha u KO [...] Tek podneskom od 07. 05. 2014. godine tužilac je pored već prvobitno postavljenog tužbenog zahteva postavio zahtev za naknadu štete i to, kako je u tom podnesku naveo, ‘štete na prinosima’ odakle proističe da je za ovu štetu tužilac utužio tek 07. 05. 2014. godine, a ne kako prvostepeni sud pogrešno navodi 15. 07. 2011. godine. Otuda je zastarelost prekinuta tek 07. 05. 2014. godine što dalje ukazuje da je prvostepeni sud pogrešno cenio istaknuti prigovor zastarelosti, a što ističe i žalilac u žalbi. Prvobitno postavljeni tužbeni zahtev i naknadno postavljeni zahtev za naknadu štete na prinosima nisu istovetni već se radi o tome da je tuženi preinačio tužbu tako što je postojećem zahtevu dodao novi. U pogledu tog novog zahteva, kako je obrazloženo, rok zastarelosti prekinut je 07. 05. 2014. godine, a parnica je u pogledu istog počela teći dostavljanjem tog podneska tuženom. Stoga se ne može prihvatiti navod obrazloženja prvostepenog suda da je zastarelost prekinuta podnošenjem tužbe 15 .07. 2011. godine.”

Samo pozivanje poverioca upućeno dužniku da plati dug nije razlog za prekid zastarelosti, potrebno je da je taj zahtev upućen nadležnom državnom organu. „Zahtev za naknadu štete podnet u mirnom postupku, ne prekida zastarelost potraživanja naknade štete” (Viši sud u Novom Sadu, Gž 1533/17). Iz obrazloženja: „Podnošenjem zahteva za mirno rešenje spora nije došlo do prekida zastarelosti. Za prekid zastarelosti nije dovoljno da poverilac pozove dužnika usmeno ili pismeno da ispuni obavezu u smislu odredbe člana 391. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima. Zastarevanje se prekida kada dužnik prizna dug, podizanjem tužbe i svakom drugom poveriočevom radnjom preduzetom protiv

dužnika pred sudom ili nekim drugim nadležnim organom u cilju utvrđivanja, obezbeđenja ili ostvarivanja potraživanja u smislu odredbe člana 387. i 388. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima. Zahtev za naknadu štete oštećenog prema odgovornom licu – dužniku pre podnošenja tužbe ne prekida zastarelost u smislu člana 388. Zakona o obligacionim odnosima.”

Prekid zastarelosti prava na naknadu štete nastupa i onda kada poverilac u krivičnom postupku podnese imovinskopravni zahtev. Taj prekid zastarelosti nije vezan za ishod krivičnog postupka ako je oštećeni radi ostvarivanja svog zahteva upućen na parnicu i ako je u roku od tri meseca od pravnosnažnosti presude krivičnog suda pokrenuo parnicu za naknadu štete (Vrhovni sud Srbije, Rev. br. 1651/90). Smatraće se da prekid zastarelosti nije nastupio ako poverilac odustane od tužbe.

Imovinskopravni zahtev podnet u krivičnom postupku ne mora biti opredeljen u pogledu visine potraživane štete. Takav stav zauzeo je Vrhovni sud Srbije navodeći: „Isticanjem imovinskopravnog zahteva u krivičnom postupku i bez opredeljenja visine naknade štete prekida se zastarelost.” Iz obrazloženja:

„Naime, isticanje imovinskopravnog zahteva u krivičnom postupku (bez opredeljivanja visine naknade štete po osnovama) je dovoljno i ima učinak prekida zastarelosti iz člana 388. ZOO. Po članu 203. stav 2. ZKP („Službeni glasnik RS” 58/04, koji se primenjuje na rešenje konkretnog odnosa, imajući u vidu da su radnje za koje je postojala osnovana sumnja o izvršenom krivičnom delu učinjene 2008. godine) imovinski zahtev se može podneti najdocnije do završetka glavnog pretresa pred prvostepenim sudom. Lice ovlašćeno na podnošenje predloga dužno je da određeno označi svoj zahtev i da podnese dokaze.

Smisao sintagme „određeno označi svoj zahtev” ne može se shvatiti kao obaveza ovlašćenog lica (oštećenog) da mora u momentu podnošenja opredeliti visinu nematerijalne štete po vidovima iz člana 200 ZOO. Citirano pravilo treba tumačiti u povezanosti s članom 201 stav 2 ZKP-a, po kome se imovinskopravni zahtev može odnositi na naknadu štete, povraćaj stvari ili poništaj određenog pravnog posla, pa je „za određenost” po shvatanju Vrhovnog kasacionog suda dovoljno da se u momentu podnošenja imovinskog zahteva oštećeni opredelio u pogledu vidova iz člana 201 stav 2 ZKP-a. Konačno opredeljivanje, u ovom

slučaju visine štete, može da izvrši sve do zaključenja glavnog pretresa (član 203 stav 4 ZKP-a), jer oštećeni u početnoj fazi po pravilu nema sve elemente za određivanje vidova i visine štete (veštačenje je uglavnom nužno). Opredeljivanje visine naknade materijalne ili nematerijalne štete u krivičnom postupku zavisi od izvođenja dokaza – utvrđivanja činjeničnog stanja. Ni u parničnom postupku sud nije ovlašćen da tužbu odbaci zbog neopredeljivanja visine ili vidova štete (osim ako tužbu ne podnosi punomoćnik – advokat).”

6. Zaključak

Iz iznetog, može se zaključiti da je pravni institut zastarelosti potraživanja važan u postupku ostvarivanja prava na naknadu štete. Jer, ako je oštećeni pasivan, može izgubiti pravo, da zahteva od štetnika da mu nadoknadi prouzrokovanu štetu.

U cilju zaštite žrtava, tumačenju normi koje regulišu ovu materiju treba pristupiti sveobuhvatno i jedinstveno.

U cilju pravne sigurnosti, važno je da se zauzme čvrst i jedinstven stav po pitanju zastarelosti, a posebno rokova koji se primenjuju za zastarelost. Poslednjih godina bilo je dosta kolebanja u stavovima sudova po tom pitanju, a kao što je izneto i u ovom radu, sve to doprinosi neizvesnosti i nesigurnosti građana, kao i nepoverenju građana u sudove i sudsku vlast.

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UNENFORCEABILITY OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES IN COURT PRACTICE

ABSTRACT: The statute of limitations is an essential element in claims for damages proceedings. If the claimant fails to seek damages in time, they may lose the right to claim restitution from the debtor. To protect injured parties, the laws regulate this matter should be interpreted carefully and uniformly. It is of crucial importance to establish legal security regarding unenforceability, especially the statute of limitations, by taking a decisive and uniform position. Different court opinions and decisions can contribute to feelings of uncertainty and vulnerability, and ultimately generate citizens' distrust in the judiciary.

KEY WORDS: unenforceability, statute of limitations, delay and interruption of limitation period

1. Introduction

This paper will discuss the legal institute of unenforceability of claims for damages due to the statute of limitations. The timing when the injured party files a damages claim is crucial, as this timing often decides when and/or whether the injured party will be awarded damage compensation. The timing is of special import since the injured party may lose the right to seek compensation because the claim was filed after the prescribed time limit. As a result of his/her failure to act, the injured party may lose the right to seek compensation from the tortfeasor.

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Modern legislation prescribes the statute of limitations for certain legal actions in order to provide legal security. Many legal systems prescribe the statute of limitations for damage claims. This applies also to the Law on Contracts and Torts of the Republic of Serbia. The statute of limitations is an essential element in claims for damages proceedings. If the claimant fails to seek damages in time, they may lose the right to claim restitution from the debtor. If the claimant is ignorant of time limits, he or she may be denied the right to be awarded damage compensation.

The first part of this paper discusses the basic concepts of damages and damage compensation, and the second part will analyse the statute of limitations in Serbian law.

2. The Statute of Limitations for Claiming Damages

The Law of Contracts and Torts (Art. 154, paragraph 1) states: “Whoever causes injury or loss to another shall be liable to redress it, unless he proves that the damage was caused without his fault”. Pursuant to this provision, damage compensation is a non-contractual obligation which occurs by causing damage and obliges the tort-feasor to compensate it to the injured party. In legal theory, damage is defined as a violation of one’s subjective right or interest protected by a right caused by a harmful act (Blagojević-Krulj, 1983: 513).

Injury or damage can be divided into two types: material (property) damage and non-material (non-property) damage. The Law of Contracts and Torts defines injury as a diminution of someone’s property (simple loss) and preventing its increase (profit lost), as well as inflicting on another physical or psychological pain or causing fear (non-material damage).

Material damage is a violation of one’s property which occurs as a diminution of property (simple loss) or preventing its increase (profit lost or future loss). Non-material (non-property) damage is a violation of personal rights, goods, life, health, honour or freedom. Non-mate-

rial damage may be present or future; the Law of Contracts and Torts defines it as suffering physical or psychological pain due to diminished physical functioning or disfigurement, defamation, injury of reputation, violation of rights and freedoms, as well as suffering psychological pain due to the death or severe disability of a family member (Petrović, 1996: 87).

The injured party who suffered one or more than one type of injury has the right to seek compensation from the tort-feasor. However, after a certain time limit (the statute of limitations) has expired the injured party may lose the right to seek compensation at court. The statute of limitations does not nullify the right to compensation, but it does prevent the injured party to file a claim for damages. The Law of Contract and Torts (Art. 360 (1)) states: "A right to request fulfilment of an obligation shall come to an end if time barred by statute of limitations."

However, the statute of limitations does not prevent the debtor from compensating the injured party, which means that the damage it caused can be compensated even after the prescribed statute of limitations. The debtor is thus considered to have fulfilled a natural obligation. This fulfilment depends on the will of the injuring party; therefore, the debtor who fulfils a natural obligation may not ask for a refund of the payment, even if he did not know that the obligation has expired.

Since the statute of limitations does not prevent the debtor from compensating the injured party, courts are not obligated to observe the statute of limitations. It is, in fact, the debtor's obligation to invoke the statute of limitations clause. The Law on Contracts and Torts (Art. 155 (3)) states: "The court shall not adhere to the statute of limitations, if the debtor did not refer to it". The statute of limitations complaint is in the province of material law and must be referred to by the debtor.

Before the Civil Procedure Law entered into force ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 125/04), a debtor was allowed to file the statute of limitations complaint until the judgement is legally effective. However, according to the 2004 Civil Procedure Law, this complaint may be filed until the conclusion of the main hearing. According to the Civil Procedure Law (Art. 298) complaints may be filed on the grounds of procedural law; however, the statute of limitations

complaint falls within the province of material law, and therefore may not be grounds for complaint, as stated in Art. 372 (Supreme Court of Cassation, Rev 759/2017).

3. Time Limits for Claiming Damages

Article 360 (2) of the Law on Contracts and Torts stipulates that unenforceability due to the statute of limitations shall follow the expiration of the period specified by statute during which the creditor was entitled to request fulfilment of the obligation. According to the same law, the right to request fulfilment of an obligation shall expire after ten years if the law does not prescribe a different time limit. In legal practice and theory, the ten-year statute of limitations is called the general statute of limitations. The general statute of limitations is not applied to claiming damages for loss. Articles 376 and 377 of the Law on Contracts and Torts prescribe different statutes of limitations. Article 376 prescribes the statute of limitations during which the injured party can seek damage compensation in case of tort liability not caused by a criminal offense, whereas Article 377 in case when the damage or loss was caused by the criminal offense.

Article 376 of Law on Contracts and Torts states that a claim for damages for loss not caused by a criminal offense shall expire three years after the party sustaining injury or loss became aware of the injury and loss and of the tort-feasor (subjective statute of limitations). In any event, such claim shall expire five years after the occurrence of injury or loss (objective statute of limitations).

When damage or loss was caused by a criminal offense, the statute of limitations for claiming damages is the same as the one prescribed for criminal prosecution of the tort-feasor. Article 377 states: "Should loss be caused by a criminal offence, and a longer unenforceability time limit be prescribed for the criminal prosecution, the claim for compensation against the person liable shall expire upon the expiration of the limitation period set forth in the statute of limitations of the criminal prosecution".

In recent years, determining the statute of limitations when damage or loss was caused by a criminal offense, but the debtor is a legal person and not the tort-feasor has become a debatable issue in court practice. According to the Article 170 (1) of the Law on Contracts and Torts the enterprise at which the employee was employed at the moment of causing the loss or injury shall be liable for damage caused by an employee to a third person unless it is proved that the employee, in given circumstances, had proceeded as he should have. Article 172 states that a legal person (corporate body) shall be liable for damage caused by its members or branches to a third person in performing or in connection to performing its functions. On the other hand, according to the Article 174, the owner of a dangerous object of property shall be liable for injury or loss caused by it while for injury or loss caused by a dangerous activity the person performing it shall be liable.

It is Article 377 (1) referring to the “person liable” which has been the matter of dispute. The issue is whether the “person liable” is a natural person who has committed a criminal offense, or if the “person liable” can also be a legal person who is liable under the civil law, i.e., indirect person. The Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Serbia at the session on 10 February 2004, passed the opinion that the statute of limitations for claiming damages from the Article 377 of Law on Contracts and Torts is applied only to the tort-feasor, not the state, i.e., the legal person liable for damage instead of him, according to the provisions of Article 172 of Law on Contracts and Torts. The right for claiming damages based on the state’s liability for the damage caused by its body shall expire within the limitation period specified in the Article 376 of Law on Contracts and Torts. The opinion reads: “Claiming damages based on the state’s liability for damage caused by its body by unlawful deprivation of liberty shall expire within the time limit specified in the provisions of Article 376 of Law on Contracts and Torts” (Legal understanding of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Serbia, 2004).

One verdict of the Supreme Court of Serbia, in the case of claiming non-material damage for mental pain suffered due to the death of a close person injured in a car accident, reads: “...A criminal procedure was conducted against the first defendant, an employee of the second defendant, in which he was found guilty of criminal offense and was

sentenced to imprisonment. Lower courts have based the responsibility of the second defendant, a legal person, on the provisions of Articles 170 and 174 of the Law on Contracts and Torts due to the fact that the first defendant caused damage to a third party as the second defendant's employee and in connection with work. Moreover, what is important is the second defendant's responsibility according to the principle of strict liability, given that he is an owner of dangerous objects. Therefore, according to the position of those courts towards the second defendant, the statute of limitations from Article 377 of the Law on Contracts and Torts is applied, i.e., the limitation period of 20 years in this specific case. This limitation period has not expired, considering that the accident happened in 1990 and the claim for damages was submitted in 2001. Deciding the case after the revision of the second-order defendant, the Supreme Court of Serbia stated that the refuted lower-instance verdicts were rendered with wrong application of substantive law, since in that case the statute of limitations from Article 376 of LCT should be applied to the second defendant as a legal entity" (The Supreme Court of Serbia, Rev. 127/06 2006).

Prior to the opinion of the Supreme Court of Serbia from February 2004, it was a common court practice to hold that the statute of limitations from Article 377 of Law on Contracts and Torts applies to damage or loss caused by a criminal offense, regardless of whether the tort-feasor is the liable person. This was related only to the cases when the criminal offense and the liability of the person for the committed criminal offense were established within the final, enforceable judgement of the criminal court. Exceptionally, if there were some procedural obstacles due to which it was completely impossible to initiate or end the proceedings against the perpetrator, either because he died or is unavailable to the prosecuting authorities, the civil court is authorized to determine, as a preliminary question, whether the damage was caused by an action which contains elements of a criminal offense. This is because a criminal offense may exist even if the criminal procedure has not happened. At the same time, the action of the civil court is not aimed at determining criminal responsibility, since this can be determined only during criminal proceedings. In fact, it is aimed at applying special rules for expiration from Article 377 of Law on Contracts and

Torts in accordance with the principle of providing stronger protection of the injured party's right to compensate the damage caused by criminal offense. If, objectively speaking, criminal proceedings against the perpetrator or one of the co-perpetrators could or can be initiated or conducted, the stated rules for discussing the previous issue as an exception in civil proceedings could not be applied.

This opinion was expressed in the well-known legal understanding of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Serbia at the session on December 27, 1999. The Supreme Court of Serbia stated that the damage caused to members of the former JNA (deaths, wounds) in armed conflicts with paramilitary formations of the former republics of SFRY until the day of their international recognition by the UN General Assembly on May 22, 1992, was caused by armed rebellion under Article 124 of the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia. Therefore, its claim expires within the limitation period of 15 years for criminal prosecution for that act (Article 377 (1), the Law on Contracts and Torts). (Legal understanding of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Serbia, 1999, page 31)

The position that the liable person from the Article 377 of Law on Contracts and Torts can be a legal person as well was revised in 2011. The Constitutional Court of Serbia passed the opinion regarding the statute of limitations for compensating the damage caused by criminal offense, which reads: "In the case when the damage was caused by a criminal offense (Article 377 of the Law on Contracts and Torts), if a different statute of limitations is intended for criminal prosecution than the ones from Article 376 of the Law on Contracts and Torts, a request for compensation for any person liable, not only the tort-feasor, expires when the limitation period set for the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution is over, only if a final verdict establishes the existence of a criminal offense and the defendant is found guilty of a criminal offense. Termination of the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution entails the termination of the statute of limitations for claims for damages. The same statute of limitations applies if the criminal proceedings are suspended, if they could not be initiated because the defendant has died or has become mentally ill, or if there are other circumstances which exclude prosecution and liability of the defendant, such as amnesty and

pardon. The general statute of limitations for claims from Article 376 of Law on Contracts and Torts applies in all other cases” (The Constitutional Court of Serbia 400/1/3, 2011).

Despite this, in court practice there have been different decisions and verdicts, closer to the 2004 position of the Supreme Court of Serbia. Thus, in the 2017 issue of the Kragujevac Court of Appeals Bulletin, the following position is expressed: “Q: A worker of the defendant company was convicted of a criminal offense in the workplace or in connection with functioning of the defendant company, which resulted in the death of another employee from the same company. The worker’s family filed a lawsuit against the company for non-material damage. Does the claim for damages expire when the time set for the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution expires, because a longer statute of limitations is required than the ones prescribed by Article 376 of the Law on Contracts and Torts for the respondent company which is liable in terms of Article 170 of the Law on Contracts and Torts or only against the harmful employee of the defendant company for whom the final verdict established the existence of a criminal offense and found him guilty, i.e. whether the privileged to the statute of limitations stated in the Article 377 LCC also applies to the defendant company? A: When the damage was caused by a criminal offense, if a longer statute of limitations is required than the ones prescribed in Article 376 of the Law on Contracts and Torts, the claim damages against each person liable, not only the debtor, expires when the time set for the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution is over” (Ristić, 2017: 56).

In proceedings in which the perpetrator of a criminal offense appears as the liable person, the statute of limitations from Article 377 of Law on Contracts and Torts shall apply. Therefore: “When a criminal procedure has been conducted against the perpetrator of criminal offense which was concluded with a conviction, the basis for deciding on the objection of statute of limitations emphasized in civil proceedings is the provision of Article 377 of the Law on Contracts and Torts.” From the explanation: “In terms of Article 377, paragraph 1 of the Law on Contracts and Torts, the person liable is considered to be the perpetrator of the criminal offense, as well as any other person who is liable on any grounds for the damage caused by criminal offense. Therefore, the

insurance company which insured the injuring party's vehicle is included as well." (Subotica Higher Court, 219/12, 2012)

This is not the only debatable issue regarding the statute of limitations in court practice. Aside from the issue regarding "the person liable" from the Article 377, it is crucial to know from the Article 376 when a statute of limitations runs. In fact, the moment of the occurrence of damage and awareness of damage is also crucial because both the awareness of the damage and the awareness of the person liable for the damage need to exist at the same time. If this is not the case, the statute of limitations shall run from the time either of these occurred last.

Due to the nature of damage or loss, it is especially crucial to know when non-material damage had occurred and when the injured party found out about the damage. Non-material damage exists in the case of violating subjective non-property rights and personal interests. Even though these damages do not directly affect property, the subject experiences injury or loss (Vedriš-Klarić, 1983: 86). Non-material damage injures fundamental human rights and values. Therefore, it is essential to carefully determine when a statute of limitations starts to run.

In Serbian court practice, it is customary to relate the moment the injured party, who suffered physical injury became aware of it, and the end of his treatment, i.e., when the injury took its final form. However, the injured party need not be simultaneously aware of every feature of non-material damage. The statute of limitations for features of non-material damage runs from the day when a certain feature enters its final stage. The period of three years for the suffered injury starts to run from the moment when severe and moderate pain lost its durability and became occasional low-intensity pain; for the suffered fear, it runs when the fear of death ceased; for the disability since the last surgical intervention, it runs when there is a certain change in appearance; and for the mental distress due to diminished functioning, it runs from the end of a treatment. "The statute of limitations for the non-material damage starts to run from the day when certain aspects of non-material damage are in the final stage." (The Supreme Court of Cassation in Serbia, Rev.251/98). Additionally, "for physical pain, the statute of limitations starts to run from the cessation of pain; for fear, it runs from the cessa-

tion of fear, and for mental distress due to diminished functioning, the statute of limitations starts to run from the end of treatment and knowledge about the existence of reduced functioning” (The Supreme Court of Cassation in Serbia, Rev.497/97).

The Novi Sad Court of Appeals stated the following opinion: “Finding out about the damage is not bound to the day of its occurrence, but to the circumstances regarding duration and cessation of physical pain or fear, i.e., to the end of treatment and knowledge that there has been a permanent damage to health and general functioning. Claims for every feature of non-material damage have different statutes of limitations, and the same applies for material damage compensation.” (The Novi Sad Court of Appeals, Gž 4485/16)

The end of treatment is not the only basis for determining when the statute of limitations for non-material damage claims starts to run. The Belgrade Court of Appeals decision reads: “For determining the unenforceability of claims for non-material damage, it is of vital importance to determine when each indicated feature became stable. It is irrelevant whether the treatment is completed or not, as certain medical conditions may exist in their final stage, and their treatment last for the rest of a person’s life.” The rationale goes on to state: “According to Article 376 (1) of the Law on Contracts and Torts, a claim for damages for loss caused shall expire three years after the party sustaining injury or loss became aware of the injury and loss and of the tort-feasor. Consequently, it is necessary to clarify when each of the indicated features was consolidated. It is irrelevant whether the treatment is completed or not, as certain medical conditions may exist in their final stage, and their treatment last for the rest of a person’s life. For the starting point of the statute of limitations, according to the Article 361 (1) of the Law on Contracts and Torts, it is necessary to clarify when diminished functioning became a permanent state, when scarring as grounds for disfigurement claims became observable, when physical pain of severe and medium intensity ceased, when primary and secondary fear faded, and when personality changes began to manifest through reduced life activities. Therefore, the time of filing the claim is only relevant if each of the indicated features was consolidated at that time – the reason used by the appellate judgement in determining the start of a statute of lim-

itations. On the contrary, the time of filing a claim would be a legally irrelevant fact, as neither the actual nor consolidated state is fully determined on each of the indicated features for non-material damage.”

The day of causing the damage cannot be regarded as the starting point for the statute of limitations and for some aspects of material damage, such as material damage compensation on behalf of lost earnings or on behalf of other people’s care and assistance. According to the Article 195 of the Law on Contracts and Torts, one who inflicts to another bodily injury or impairs his health, shall be liable to reimburse his medical expenses, as well as other related necessary expenses, including recovery of the salary lost due to inability to work during medical treatment. Should the injured person due to total or partial disability lose his salary, or should his needs become permanently increased, or should possibilities of his further development and advancement be destroyed or reduced, the person liable shall pay to the injured one specific annuities as damages for such loss.

According to the case law, the statute of limitations for claims for such material damage does not coincide with the date of damage occurrence but runs from the day when the state body enacted the act which determined disability. “The day when the injured person was granted the right to disability pension due to total inability to work shall be considered the starting point of the statute of limitations for claims of loss of earnings.” (The Supreme Court of Serbia, Rev.236/08). For the injured party, the awareness of who the tort-feasor is irrelevant; what is important is the awareness of who the person liable is.

4. Delay of the Statute of Limitations

The Article 381 of the Law on Contracts and Torts stipulates that the period of unenforceability due to statute of limitations shall not run: (i) between spouses; (ii) between parents and children during the validity of parental right; (iii) between a ward and his guardian, and/or a guardianship organisation in the course of the guardianship relationship, and until relevant accounts are settled; (iv) between two cohabitantes during the course of such cohabitation.

Article 382 stipulates that the limitation period due to statute of limitations shall not run when a certain state or employment applies to the injured party or the tort-feasor: (i) during mobilization, in case of imminent danger of war, or war – relating to claims of persons engaged in the military; (ii) concerning claims of persons employed in another person's household, against the employer or members of his family living with him in the same household – in the course of such employment.

As it is impossible for any law to foresee all situations which may prevent the injured party from claiming damages, the Law on Contracts and Torts in Article 383 stipulates that the limitation period shall not run for the entire time of creditor's inability to institute legal proceedings demanding the fulfilment of obligation due to insurmountable obstacles.

According to the aforementioned provisions, we can conclude that the limitation period, in which the injured party may claim compensation for damage, may be put on hold or may be stopped when certain circumstances are explicitly prescribed by law. Then, a delay of statute of limitations occurs and such a delay is not counted in the limitation period. The statute of limitations does not include the time during which the injured party was legally or physically unable to claim damages from the person liable. The time before a delay of statute of limitations is counted within the prescribed limitation period, and it continues to run when the cause due to which a delay occurred ceases. If the statute of limitations could not start running due to some legal cause, it starts to run when that cause ceases.

Exceptionally, according to the Article 385 of the Law on Contracts and Torts, if a delay of statute of limitations involves minors having no representative and other unrepresented persons without business capacity, the statute of limitations shall not take place until the expiration of a two-year period from their regaining business capacity or obtaining a representative. According to the Article 386, unenforceability due to statute of limitations of a claim against a person serving his military term, or being on manoeuvres, shall not take place until the expiration of a three-month period after completing the military term or after the end of manoeuvres.

5. Interruption of the Statute of Limitations

A statute of limitations may be interrupted, and according to the Law on Contracts and Torts, this may occur by the debtor acknowledging the debt (Article 387) or by instituting legal proceedings and by other motion of a creditor against a debtor at court or another competent agency (Article 388). We can conclude that certain actions of the injured party as a creditor, or the tort-feasor as a debtor, can lead to the interruption of statute of limitations. In other words, the interruption of statute of limitations can even occur before the end of the statute of limitations when the legal effect prescribed by law occurs. Then such the effect causes the limitation period, which expired before the interruption, to no longer be counted in the statute of limitations (Raspor, 1982: 36).

Legal actions taken by a debtor or a creditor, and which are specified in Articles 387 and 388 of the Law on Contracts and Torts, have the consequence that the time which passed before taking these actions is not counted in the statute of limitations. After initiating these actions, the statute of limitations starts running again.

The action of the debtor interrupts the statute of limitations when he acknowledges the debt. The debt recognition can be made not only in a written or oral statement given to the creditor, but also in an indirect way, such as giving repayment, paying interest, or giving securities. The recognition of the debtor must include both the recognition of the claim and the recognition of the amount of the debt, whereas the recognition of the legal basis alone does not lead to the interruption of the statute of limitations.

The statute of limitations may be interrupted by the creditor instituting legal proceedings or by other motion of a creditor against a debtor at court or another competent agency with the aim of determining, securing, or realizing the claim. If the creditor withdraws the claim, it is considered that the interruption of the statute of limitations did not occur. Moreover, if the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff or his claim is dismissed or rejected, it would be also considered that the statute of limitations is not interrupted. However, if the lawsuit against the debtor is dismissed due to the lack of jurisdiction or another reason which does

not concern the essence of the matter, and if the creditor reinstates the action within three months from the date of the decision that the lawsuit is dismissed, it is considered that the statute of limitations had not been interrupted by the first lawsuit.

In the already existing litigation, the creditor can modify the lawsuit by also filing a claim for damages. In such cases there is a question of when the interruption of the statute of limitations occurs – when filing a lawsuit or when modifying the lawsuit. Generally, in court practice it is accepted that the interruption occurs by modifying the lawsuit, e.g.: “Unenforceability of claims, which is the subject of the second claim attached to the existing lawsuit, is interrupted by modifying the lawsuit and not by the date of the initial lawsuit” (The Commercial Appellate Court, Pž 1624/19). The rationale reads: “The Commercial Appellate Court states that in the initial act i.e., the lawsuit from July 15, 2011, the plaintiff sought the monetary compensation, as a non-contractual damage compensation, for the drainage on disputed 359 ha that caused the reduction of his property... In addition to the initial filed lawsuit, the plaintiff filed a claim for damage compensation on May 7, 2014, where he stated “damages on yields” which means that the plaintiff sued for this damage only on May 7, 2014, and not as the lower court misstated on July 15, 2011. Hence, the statute of limitations was interrupted only on May 7, 2014, which further indicates that the lower court mistakenly assessed the outstanding objection of the expiration, and which the appellant points out in the appeal. The initially filed lawsuit and the subsequent claim for compensation for damage on yields are not identical, but it is the fact that the defendant modified the lawsuit by adding a new claim to the existing lawsuit. Regarding this claim, as justified, the statute of limitations was interrupted on May 7, 2014, and the litigation in respect of the same began to proceed by submitting that claim to the defendant. Therefore, the stated reasoning of the first instance court that the statute of limitations was interrupted by filing a lawsuit on July 15, 2011, cannot be accepted.”

The mere claim of the creditor addressed to the debtor to pay the debt is not a reason to interrupt the statute of limitations, it is rather necessary to address the claim to the competent state body. “A claim for damage compensation filed in a peaceful procedure does not inter-

rupt expiring of claims for damage compensation” (Novi Sad Higher Court, Gž 1533/17). The rationale reads: “Filing a claim for a peaceful settlement of the dispute has not resulted in the interruption of a statute of limitations. For the interruption of a statute of limitations, it is not sufficient for the creditor to claim the debtor orally or in writing to fulfil an obligation in terms of the provision of the Article 391 of Law on Contracts and Torts. The statute of limitations is interrupted when the debtor acknowledges the debt, by filing a lawsuit and any other action taken by the creditor against the debtor before a court or other competent state body for the purpose of determining, securing, or realizing a claim in terms of Articles 387 and 388 of Law on Contracts and Torts. A claim for damage compensation to the responsible person, i.e., to the debtor, does not interrupt a statute of limitations before filing a lawsuit according to the Article 388 of Law on Contracts and Torts.”

Interruption of the statute of limitations for the right to damage compensation also occurs when the creditor in the criminal procedure files a property claim. This interruption of the statute of limitations is not related to the outcome of the criminal procedure if the injured party was referred to litigation in order to realize his claim and if he initiated a lawsuit for damages within three months from the finality of the criminal court judgment. (The Supreme Court of Serbia Rev. No. 1651/90). The interruption of the statute of limitations shall be deemed not to have occurred if the creditor withdraws the lawsuit.

A property claim filed in criminal proceedings does not have to be determined in terms of the amount of the claimed damage. Such a position was taken by the Supreme Court of Serbia, stating: “The statute of limitations is interrupted by filing the property claim in criminal proceedings and without determining the amount of compensation for damage.” The rationale reads: “Namely, filing the property claim in criminal proceedings (without determining the amount of compensation for damage on the criteria) is sufficient and has the effect of interrupting the statute of limitations from Article 388 of the Law on Contracts and Torts. According to Article 203, paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia“ 58/04 which applies to the solution of a specific relation, bearing in mind that the actions for which there were reasonable criteria of a committed crime

in 2008), property claim may be filed no later than the end of the main trial before the lower court. The person authorized to file a proposal is obliged to specifically state his claim and to provide evidence.

The meaning of the phrase “specifically state one’s claim” cannot be understood as the obligation of an authorized person (the injured party) to determine the amount of non-material damage according to the aspects referred in Article 200 of the Law on Contracts and Torts at the time of filing. The aforementioned rule should be interpreted in connection with the Article 201, paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which the property claim may relate to damage compensation, restitution or annulment of a particular legal transaction. Thus “for determination”, according to the Supreme Court of Cassation, is sufficient that the injured party is determined in terms of the aspects referred in the Article 201, paragraph 2 of Code of Criminal Procedure at the moment of filing the property claim. The final determination, in this case the amount of damage, can be made until the conclusion of the main trial (Article 203, paragraph 4 of the CPC), because in the initial stage the injured party usually does not have all the elements to determine the type and amount of damage (forensic evaluation is usually necessary). Determining the amount of compensation for material or non-material damage in criminal proceedings depends on the presentation of evidence – establishing the facts. Even in civil proceedings, the court is not authorized to dismiss the lawsuit due to failure to determine the amount or type of damage (unless the lawsuit is filed by a lawyer).”

6. Conclusion

From the above, it can be concluded that the legal institute of the statute of limitations is important in the procedure of claiming damages. If the injured party fails to act, he can lose the right to demand from the tort-feasor to compensate him for the damage. In order to protect injured parties, the interpretation of the norms that regulate this matter should be approached comprehensively and uniformly. To protect injured parties, the laws regulate this matter should be interpreted carefully and uniformly. It is of crucial importance to establish legal secu-

rity regarding unenforceability, especially the statute of limitations, by taking a decisive and uniform position. Different court opinions and decisions can contribute to feelings of uncertainty and vulnerability, and ultimately generate citizens' distrust in the judiciary.

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The title of the paper in capital (upper-case) letters, in bold, should be written in the middle (Times New Roman 14 pts.)

Before the main body of the text a short **abstract** (summary) in length up to 8 lines should be given with **five key words** single spaced in font 10 pts.

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	In-text	In the list of references
Book		
Book with one author	<p>As mentioned by Brown (2010, p. 64), ...</p> <p>When considering the possibility for foreign language learners to acquire native-like pronunciation, Brown (2010), says: “This conclusion lends support for a neurologically based critical period, but principally for the acquisition of an authentic (nativelike) accent, and not very strongly for the acquisition of communicative fluency and other “higher-order” processes” (p. 64).</p>	<p>Brown, D. (2006). <i>Principles of language learning and teaching</i> (5th edition). Pearson Education.</p>

Book with two authors	According to Boyle and Fisher (2007), ...	Boyle, J., & Fisher, S. (2007). <i>Educational testing. A competence-based approach</i> . Blackwell Publishing.
Book with three and more authors	UPON THE FIRST MENTION: As suggested by Tsagari, Vogt, Froehlich, Csépes, Fekete, Green, Hamp-Kyons, Sifakis, and Kordia (2018), ... UPON SUBSEQUENT MENTIONS: As suggested by Tsagari et al. (2018), ...	Tsagari, D., Vogt, K., Froehlich, V., Csépes, I., Fekete, A., Green, A., Hamp-Lyons, L., Sifakis, N., & Kordia, S. (2018). <i>Handbook of assessment for language teachers</i> . European Commission.
Edited book	According to Birkle (2020), ...	Birkle, C. (2020). "Obama sushi" and the ch(i)ang way of life: Transculturalting America and the world. In A. Izgarjan, D., Đurić, & S. Halupka-Rešetar (Eds.), <i>Aspects of Translationality in American Literature and American English</i> (pp. 28-59). Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad. http://digitalna.ff.uns.ac.rs/sadrzaj/2020/978-86-6065-632-4
Book with corporate authorship	As claimed by UNICEF (2007), ...	UNICEF. (2007). <i>Promoting the rights of children with disabilities</i> . UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre.

Book with a foreign author	As indicated by Vasić (2021), ...	Vasić, A. (2021). <i>Razvojna psihologija</i> [Developmental psychology]. Fakultet za pravne i poslovne studije dr Lazar Vrkić, Univerzitet Union.
Periodicals		
Scientific journal with DOI	As claimed by Brantmeier and Vanderplank (2008, p. 460), ...	Brantmeier, C., & Vanderplank, R. (2008). Descriptive and criterion-referenced self-assessment with L2 readers. <i>System</i> , 36, 456-477. doi:10.1016/j.system.2008.03.001
Magazine	As Browne (2021) warns, ... AY.3 is a new version of the Delta variant of the SARS-Cov-2 virus (Browne, 2021).	Browne, E. (2021, March 9). AY.3 COVID subtype explained as Delta variant spawns offshoots. <i>Newsweek</i> . https://www.newsweek.com/ay-3-covid-subtype-explained-delta-variant-offshoot-1625785
Newspaper	As claimed by Gerstein (2021), ... As claimed by many authors (e.g., Gerstein, 2021), ...	Gerstein, T. (2021, September 6). Why everyone should care about workers' rights. <i>The New York Times</i> . https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/06/opinion/labor-workers-rights.html
Legal documents		
Law/ Rulebook/ Constitution	In accordance with the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act (2021), ...	COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act, 34 U.S.C. & 937 (2021). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-117publ13/pdf/PLAW-117publ13.pdf

Online source		
Website whose author is known	As claimed by Gerstein (2021), ... As claimed by many authors (e.g., Gerstein, 2021), ...	Gerstein, T. (2021, September 6). Why everyone should care about workers' rights. <i>The New York Times</i> . https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/06/opinion/labor-workers-rights.html
Website of an institution	As suggested by World Health Organization (2021), ...	World Health Organization (2021, September 2). <i>World failing to address dementia challenge</i> . https://www.who.int/news/item/02-09-2021-world-failing-to-address-dementia-challenge
Dissertation/Thesis		
Unpublished master's or doctoral thesis	As suggested by Alnofaie (2013), ...	Alnofaie, H. A. (2013). <i>The implementation of critical thinking as EFL pedagogy: Challenges and opportunities</i> . [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Newcastle University.
Presentation		
Conference presentation	According to Rutkowski and Meinck (2019), ...	Rutkowski, D., & Meinck, S. (2019, June 24-25). <i>Using large-scale assessment data to inform policy and practice</i> [Workshop]. 8th IEA International Research Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark. https://www.iea.nl/news-events/irc/8th-international-research-conference/program

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